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Abstract
Commerce and Justice: Ottoman and Venetian Courts in Istanbul during the Seventeenth
Century
Tommaso Stefini
2021
"Justice and Commerce: Ottoman and Venetian Courts in Istanbul during the
Seventeenth Century” analyzes legal disputes and economic transactions between
Ottoman and Venetian merchants in Istanbul on a daily basis between 1600 and1620. At
that time, the Venetians constituted the largest European community in the Ottoman
capital, and they engaged intensively in trade ventures with Ottoman businessmen
belonging to different religious and ethnic communities, including Muslim Turks,
Sephardic Jews, and Orthodox Greeks. This dissertation asks how Ottomans and
Venetians cooperated in commercial undertakings and solved controversies despite the
absence of a system of inter-polity law and secular legal regimes in the early modern
Mediterranean. Drawing from both Ottoman and Venetian primary sources, I address this
question through a comparative study of three types of courts used by Ottoman and
Venetian merchants in Istanbul for certifying their property rights and regulating their
disputes: Islamic forums of justice headed by a Qadi (a Muslim judge), the Imperial
Council (divan-ı hümayun) under the jurisdiction of the Grand Vizier, and the Venetian
consular court.
I argue that, despite differences in the normative systems, these institutions jointly
promoted trade exchange by providing distinct but complementary legal and economic

services to Ottoman and Venetian merchants that allowed commercial cooperation. Their
first and foremost contribution was the certification of property rights across religious
and political boundaries. I also maintain that the administration of justice for Venetian
and Ottoman merchants was tightly entangled in the political and economic context of the
seventeenth-century eastern Mediterranean and in the ebb and flow of Ottoman/Venetian
relations. The political economy of the Republic of Venice and the Ottoman Empire
affected the resolution of commercial and criminal controversies and the access of forums
of justices for merchants belonging to different political and religious communities.
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Introduction
In the early modern Mediterranean, long-distance trade between Christian and
Muslim states carried the prospect of great profits, and, at the same time, daunting risks.
In contrast to today, no system of international law regulated inter-state political and
trade relations and no inter-governmental commercial institutions, such as the World
Trade Organization, supported governments and businessmen in settling trade-related
controversies. Instead, Christian, Jewish, and Muslim merchants in Mediterranean trading
hubs had to navigate a multitude of foreign legislations, courts, commercial customs, and
linguistic groups. In both Christian Europe and the Muslim world, religion and social
status played a central role in the day-to-day business activities determining the legal and
economic rights of different religious communities and social groups in marketplaces and
courts of justice. Technological constraints complicated business operations, slowing the
flow of information, payments, and exchanges between commercial partners separated by
vast distances. How could merchants understand the terms of the exchanges—such as
contractual obligations and notions of value—in the politically fragmented and
linguistically, culturally, and religiously diverse early modern Mediterranean? Which
legal, economic, and political mechanisms allowed Christians, Muslims, and Jews to
engage in protracted commercial undertakings with one another?
This dissertation addresses these questions by examining the day-to-day
administration of justice performed by Venetian and Ottoman courts that served
merchants and other groups in seventeenth-century Istanbul. As the capital of a world
empire, the most populous city in the Mediterranean, and a major trade hub connecting
European and Asiatic markets, Istanbul hosted large communities of merchants hailing
1

from European, Asian, and African territories and belonging to numerous religious,
ethnic, and linguistic backgrounds. In the first half of the seventeenth century, the
subjects of the Venetian Republic still constituted the largest community of Western
European merchants residing in the Ottoman capital. Building on a long tradition, they
engaged in multiple trade ventures with Ottoman businessmen belonging to different
religious and ethnic communities, including Muslim Turks, Sephardic Jews, and
Orthodox Greeks. In these commercial undertakings, they were helped by international
treaties, active diplomacy, Ottoman and Venetian legal institutions, extensive trade
networks, local middlemen, and widely shared customary norms. At the same time, from
the end of the sixteenth century onwards, new mercantile communities from emerging
northern European powers began to operate in the eastern Mediterranean, slowly eroding
the Venetian hegemony in the trade between the Levant and western Europe. The
establishment of numerous and competing commercial networks, together with increased
European diplomatic activity in the Ottoman Empire and Mediterranean-wide migrations,
promoted the creation of what historian Molly Greene calls a “shared world.” 1
Despite the production of an extensive scholarship on the relationship between
law and trade in the pre-modern world, we still know very little about how justice for
merchants was administered on a routine basis and the contribution of both European and
Islamic legal institutions to the regulation of trade. I provide the first comprehensive
study of the legal institutions that Venetian and Ottoman merchants could avail
themselves when trading in Istanbul. Because of the vastness of the records available, I

Greene, Molly. A Shared World, Christians and Muslims in the early modern Mediterranean (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, c2000).
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gathered data for the period 1604-1628, and below I will explain the reason for my
choice. These institutions include the Venetian chancellery (cancelleria), a consular
tribunal and notarial office, and two different types of Ottoman Islamic courts: Ottoman
lower courts of justice headed by a kadı (a Muslim judge, a public notary, and local
administrator) and the Imperial Council (divan-ı hümayun), a court of justice and council
of state headed by the sultan’s deputy, the Grand Vizier. I show that, despite differences
in the normative frameworks, each of these courts provided distinct but complementary
legal and economic services to Venetian and Ottoman merchants. Their main contribution
to trade regulation was the certification of property rights across religious and political
boundaries. Furthermore, I demonstrate that the administration of justice for Venetian
and Ottoman merchants was tightly entangled in the international political and
commercial context of the eastern Mediterranean in the seventeenth century. The political
economy of the Republic of Venice and the Ottoman Empire affected the resolution of
commercial and criminal controversies as well as access to forums of justices and notarial
offices for merchants belonging to different political and religious communities.
By focusing on courts and long-distance trade, I engage with debates in the
historiography of the early modern Mediterranean and the Ottoman Empire on the
relationships between European and Islamic legal systems, trade and institutions, and
legal pluralism. In the scholarship of the pre-modern Mediterranean, legal institutions
play an important role in grand narratives of commercialization and the different
economic performances of Christian and Muslim societies over the centuries. Economic
historians working in the theoretical framework of the new institutional economics focus
on legal systems to explain why Western Europe witnessed substantial economic growth
3

from the late medieval period onwards while other states stagnated. In their view,
efficient institutions protecting property rights and impersonal contract negotiations
promoted commercial development by solving what Avner Greif calls “the fundamental
problem of exchange,” namely, merchants’ needs for protection of their persons and
goods in foreign lands and for the enforcement of their contractual arrangements, either
through a system of communal responsibility or some higher legal authority. Institutions
could be formal, such as state legislation and state courts, or informal, such as customary
and religious norms. 2
Among the numerous scholars studying trade and institutions, Greif and Timur
Kuran stand out for their grand narratives of divergent economic patterns of development
between western Europe and the Islamic world. By comparing two medieval merchant
groups, the Genoese and North African Maghribi Jews, Greif argues that only the
Genoese created an efficient system of public law based on written contracts and state
courts that enforced agency contracts between strangers. In contrast, Maghribi merchants

Greif, Avner. “The Fundamental Problem of Exchange: A Research Agenda in Historical, Institutional
Analysis.” Review of European Economic History 4/3, 251–84. For other important works on trade and
institutions in the pre-modern Europe and the Middle East, see North, Douglass C. “Institutions,
Transactions Costs, and the Rise of Merchant Empires,” in James D. Tracy (ed.) The Political Economy of
Merchant Empires: State Power and World Trade 1350-1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1991), 22-40, and Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990); Milgrom, Paul, Douglass C. North, and Barry R. Weingast. “The Role of
Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Medieval Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the Champagne
Fairs.” Economics and Politics 1 (1990), 1–23; González De Lara, Yadira. “The Secret of Venetian
Success: A Public-order, Reputation-based Institution,” European Review of Economic History 12/3
(2008), 247–86; Lydon, Ghislaine. On Trans-Saharan trails: Islamic law, trade networks, and crosscultural exchange in nineteenth-century Western Africa (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2009); Kuran, Timur. The Long Divergence: How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), Ogilvie, Sheilagh. Institutions and European Trade:
Merchant Guilds 1000–1800 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), Goldberg, Jessica. Trade and
institutions in the medieval Mediterranean: the geniza merchants and their business world (Cambridge;
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). Gelderblom, Oscar. Cities of commerce: the institutional
foundations of international trade in the Low Countries, 1250-1650 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2013); Bishara, Fahad Ahmad. A Sea of Debt: Law and Economic Life in the Western Indian Ocean, 17801950 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
2
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could not rely on Islamic and Jewish courts, due to their slowness and the inefficiencies
of the underlying law. Instead, they established a reputation mechanism within a closed
coalition of merchants which substituted for a state-sponsored legal system to police
agency relations. 3 The reason for such institutional divergence, in Grief’s approach, lay
in Maghribi Jews’ “collectivistic cultural beliefs”, that is, their cultural preference for
community and informality, which contrasted with the Genoese “individualistic cultural
beliefs’ that privileged state policing of norms.
While Greif attributes the Islamic world’s stagnation to “culture” and “beliefs,”
Kuran focuses on Islamic law (Sharia) to explain the “long divergence” between the
economies of Muslim states and Europe from the early modern period onwards. He
claims that, due to some inherent rigidities of Islamic law, Islamic economic institutions
did not develop during the early modern era as extensively as the European ones leading
to economic stagnation and to the current underdevelopment in the Middle East. 4 In
particular, he blames impermanent Islamic business partnerships, the partible inheritance
system, and weak judicial institutions. Moreover, according to Kuran, Ottoman courts
were institutionally biased against non-Muslims and did not accept written evidence as
legal proof. Owing to these deficiencies, they did not promote impersonal exchange and
litigation and they indirectly pushed Jews and Christian to apply to European consular
courts, which offered faster, cheaper, and impersonal litigation.

Greif. Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade (Cambridge
University Press. 2006), 63-66.

3

4

Kuran, The Long Divergence.
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Both Greif and Kuran have been criticized by other economic historians for
deriving their arguments more from theoretical postulates than from empirical studies of
legal systems and the practice of trade as well as for simplifying available historical
evidence. 5 At minimum, it is important to note that neither of them provides a systematic
analysis of the administration of justice in European courts, which they consider to be
efficient institutions protecting property rights that were absent in the “East,” and the
political and economic contexts in which these institutions operated. Furthermore,
scholars working on trade diasporas have demonstrated that systems of public law alone
did not guarantee the enforcement of contracts and that merchants were usually reluctant
to use state courts in the first place. By focusing on the trade networks and the forms of
business associations of a group of Sephardic Jewish merchants in eighteenth-century
Livorno (Italy), Francesca Trivellato illustrates they used a combination of intra-group
discipline, contractual obligations, customary norms, political protection, and state courts
to enter into sustained business relations with non-Jews. 6
This dissertation draws insights from the rich scholarship on trade and institutions
in matters of institutional analysis. However, it departs from previous studies because,
rather than focusing on international treaties, legislation, or religious norms, it
concentrates on the ordinary administration of justice for merchants. My starting point is
For instances of critical reappraisals of the theses of Greif and Kuran, see Trivellato, Francesca, The
Familiarity of Strangers: The Sephardic Diaspora, Livorno, and Cross-Cultural Trade in the Early Modern
Period (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 13-15 and 156-158, Goldberg, Trade and institutions,
148-178; Gelderblom, Cities of Commerce, 2-10; Çızakça, Murat. “Was Shari'ah indeed the culprit?”
MPRA Paper 22865 (Munich: University Library of Munich, 2010); Yaycıoğlu, Ali. “Timur Kuran, Social
and Economic Life in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul: Glimpses from Court Records, 10 vols.,”
International Journal of Middle East Studies 47 (2015), 625-627; Bishara, A Sea of Debt, 249-257.
5

Trivellato, The Familiarity of Strangers. For a different perspective, more centered on intra-group trade,
see Aslanian, Sebouh D. From the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean: The Global Trade Networks of
Armenian Merchants from New Julfa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010).
6
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the perspective of individuals who turned to Venetian and Ottoman courts for specific
legal and notarial services, from the litigation of a commercial lawsuit to the registration
of business agreements and legal acts. By analyzing the merchants’ “consumption of
justice” 7 in a routine basis, I challenge widely shared but empirically unproven depictions
of European legal institutions in the early modern period as “efficient” and “modern” and
the castigation of their Islamic counterparts as “traditional” and “unfriendly” to trade
expansion.
In order to reveal the overall contribution of various tribunals to VenetianOttoman trade, I study the entire range of functions performed by of them. Pre-modern
courts were multifaceted institutions. In addition to the adjudication of disputes, which is
usually the focus of most research on trade and law, courts played an important role in
certifying property rights, that is, they had a notarial function, and in identifying and
classifying individuals who came to their offices. I argue throughout my dissertation, that
these three functions were influenced by the legal culture of each institution and by the
political economy of the Republic of Venice and the Ottoman Empire.
Pluralistic legal regimes
Studying the administration of law in the early modern world entails confronting a
plurality of legal sources and institutions. Muslim and Christian polities in the
Mediterranean were highly hierarchical but they were also segmented, meaning that that
they deemed it inconsequential to accommodate multiple normative systems,
jurisdictions, and conceptions of justice within the same society. All regimes, whether

I borrow this felicitous expression from Smail, Daniel L. The consumption of justice: emotions, publicity,
and legal culture in Marseille, 1264-1423 (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 2003), 19.

7
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world empires or city-states, contained several recognized communities, including
associations of artisans and merchants, religious and ethnic groups, villages, and urban
and imperial authorities. In the same locality and at the same time, there existed different
forums of justice and jurisdictions often applying much different legal principles, such as
customary and religious norms and state legislation. This situation resulted in a more or
less centralized pluralistic legal regimes containing multiple legal orders whose
jurisdictional boundaries were a source of constant conflict and negotiation among
different administrative and legal authorities.
Legal and jurisdictional pluralism was, in short, a norm rather than an exception.
As a conceptual paradigm, legal pluralism now constitutes a major theme in the sociology
and anthropology of law as well as in legal theory. It emerged in 1970s in the analysis of
colonial and postcolonial situations as a response to the dominant perspective of "legal
centralism," namely the idea that the state alone promulgated and administrated law
which was uniform for all persons. The advocates of legal pluralism maintain that law is
not a single system necessarily linked to the state as a unified entity, but rather a complex
of overlapping systems or normative orders. John Griffith defines it as "a social state of
affairs” and "the omnipresent, normal situation in human society.” 8 The behavioral
counterpart of legal pluralism is “forum-shopping,” that is, the idea that a litigant, as legal

Griffiths, John. "What is Legal Pluralism?" Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 24 (1986), 155, 39. Hooker, Michael B. Legal Pluralism: An Introduction to Colonial and Neo-Colonial Laws (Oxford:
Clarendon Press. 1975); Merry, Sally E. "Legal Pluralism," Law and Society Review 22 (1988), 869-96;
Shahar, Ido. “Legal Pluralism and the Study of Sharia Courts,” Islamic Law and Society 15 (2008), 112–41.
8
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consumer, chooses the forum which offers the best resolution to his/her dispute in a
specific normative environment. 9
Apart from legal theorists and anthropologists, beginning in the 2000s, historians
working on empires in the premodern and modern world utilized the notion of legal
pluralism to examine inter-imperial dynamics and intra-group relations in imperial and
colonial societies. Historian Lauren Benton puts legal pluralism at the forefront of the
study of state formation in colonial societies. She analyzes how jurisdictional conflicts
among different actors, such as colonial authorities and indigenous populations, over
imperial subjecthood, legal authority, and economic rights, shaped imperial sovereignty
in different colonial contexts. In her view, legal pluralism amounted to jurisdictional
complexity and provided an arena for different historical actors, either imperial
authorities or subjects, to advance their goals, from the centralization of imperial power
to inclusion in a political community. 10
With a few notable exceptions, in the historiography of the Ottoman Empire and
the Mediterranean, scholars working on legal pluralism have not followed Benton’s
framework of jurisdictional conflicts and imperial sovereignty. Rather, they have focused
on the relations between different courts in practice of justice administration or between

Shahar “Legal Pluralism,”123/124; “Forum Shopping Reconsidered,” Harvard Law Review 103 (1990),
1677-96.
9

10
Benton, Lauren. Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400–1900 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2002); Benton, Lauren and Richard J. Ross (eds). Legal pluralism and
empires, 1500-1850 (New York: New York University Press, 2013). For other works focusing on the law
and imperial sovereignty, see Duindam, Jeroen, Jill Harries, Caroline Humfress, and Nimrod Hurvitz (eds.),
Law and Empire: Ideas, Practices, Actors (Leiden: Brill, 2013); and Pitts, Jennifer. Boundaries of the
International: Law and Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018).
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different normative systems and the practice of forum-shopping among them. 11 Three
strands of research prevail. First, scholars working on Ottoman courts of justice illustrate
the considerable use of Muslim tribunals by Christians and Jews, even for intra-group
affairs such as divorce and inheritance. This evidence contradicts long-standing
assumptions about the legal autonomy of non-Muslim communities in Muslim polities.12
Second, as scholars of Islamic legal systems examine the interplay between different
sources of Islamic law, legal schools, and courts, in the daily administration of justice and
in juristic debates, they demonstrate the ill-defined jurisdictional boundaries between
different types of courts and conflictual relationships among legal schools. 13
A third group of legal and economic historians deals with the relationship
between Islamic and European legal regimes and institutions, but they diverge in their
opinions. On the one hand, Kuran and his followers examine practices of legal pluralism
in the Ottoman Empire to explain the decline of Ottoman legal and economic institutions.
For instances of scholars working on jurisdictional conflicts and state building, see Barkey, Karen.
“Aspects of Legal Pluralism in the Ottoman Empire,” in Richard J. Ross and Lauren Benton (eds), Legal
Pluralism and Empires, 1500-1850 (New York: New York University Press, 2013), 83-107; Baldwin,
James. Islamic Law and Empire in Ottoman Cairo (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017); Calafat,
Guillaume. “Jurisdictional Pluralism in a Litigious Sea (1590–1630): Hard Cases, Multi-Sited Trials and
Legal Enforcement between North Africa and Italy,” Past and Present 242 (2019), 142-178.
11

For a few important studies, see Ergene, Boğaç. Local Court, Provincial Society and Justice in the
Ottoman Empire: Legal Practice and Dispute Resolution in Çankırı and Kastamonu (1652-1744) (Leiden,
Brill, 2003); Kuran, Timur. “The Economic Ascent of the Middle East’s Religious Minorities: The Role of
Islamic Legal Pluralism.” The Journal of Legal Studies 33/2 (2004), 475-515; Simonsohn, Uriel I. A
common justice: the legal allegiances of Christians and Jews under early Islam (Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 2011); Kermeli, Eugenia, “The Right to Choice: Ottoman, Ecclesiastical and
Communal Justice in Ottoman Greece,” in Christine Woodhead (ed.), The Ottoman World (Abingdon:
Routledge, 2012), 347–361; Marglin, Jessica. Across legal lines: Jews and Muslims in modern Morocco
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016).
12

13
Tamdoğan, Işık. “Qadi, governor and Grand Vizier: Sharing of Legal Authority in 18th Century Ottoman
Society.” Annals of Japan Association for Middle East Studies 27/1 (2011), 237-257; Rubin, Avi. Ottoman
Nizamiye Courts: Law and Modernity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Burak, Guy. The Second
Formation of Islamic Law: The Ḥanafī School in the Early Modern Ottoman Empire (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2015). Aykan, Yavuz. Rendre la justice à Amid: Procédures, acteurs et
doctrines dans le contexte ottoman du XVIIIème siècle (Leiden: Brill, 2016).
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According to them, by allowing non-Muslims to apply to European consular courts,
Ottoman authorities allowed them to shift to a more “efficient” legal system characterized
by impersonal litigation and the use of written evidence. 14 On the other hand, a few legal
scholars study the interplay between the Ottoman and the European legal systems.
Through analyses of legal disputes, they illustrate how European merchants navigated
different Ottoman and European courts and legislations showing the fallacy of old-time
assumptions of the incommensurability between “modern” European and “traditional”
Ottoman legal systems. 15
In my dissertation I draw insights from both Benton’s approach to jurisdictional
complexity and the recent scholarship on the interrelations between Ottoman Islamic and
European legal regimes to analyze the practice of legal pluralism for Venetian and
Ottoman merchants in seventeenth-century Istanbul. Following Gordon Woodman, I
define legal pluralism as “the condition” in which different social segments observe
different bodies of norms. 16 Venetian and Ottoman merchants in Istanbul were
simultaneously members of different “norms-generating communities,” 17 whether
political, religious, or professional, which produced specific legal cultures and

Kuran, Timur. The Long Divergence; Artunç, Cihan. “The Price of Legal Institutions: The Beratlı
Merchants in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire,” Journal of Economic History 75/3 (2015), 720748.
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Van den Boogert, Maurits. The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System: Qadis, Consuls and
Beratlıs in the 18th Century (Leiden: Brill, 2005); Calafat, “Jurisdictional Pluralism;” Apellániz, Francisco
J. Breaching the Bronze Wall: Franks at Mamluk and Ottoman Courts and Markets (Leiden: Brill, 2020),
143-205.
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Woodman, Gordon R. “The Idea of Legal Pluralism,” in Baudouin Dupret (ed.), Legal Pluralism in the
Arab World (The Hague, London, Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999), 3-20, 16.

16

I borrow this expression from the legal theorist Paul Berman in Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence
of Law beyond Borders (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 13.
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institutions. The boundaries between different jurisdictions were ill-defined and
overlapped, and some of them possessed more enforcement power than others.
Seventeenth-century Istanbul presents elements of both “multicentric” and “statecentered” types of legal orders, to use two analytical typologies coined by Benton. In
multicentric legal orders the state is among many legal authorities while in state-centered
legal orders the state sustains claims to dominance over other legal authorities. 18 In
Istanbul, Ottoman law was one among many normative systems applied in the Ottoman
Empire. It included both Hanafi Islamic law (Sharia)—a trans-imperial, divinely inspired,
and universal source of law, whose doctrines and legal practices in the Ottoman Empire
were shaped by state legal authorities and whose practitioners were state employees—and
sultanic legislation (kanun)— a collection of legal, administrative, and economic norms
promulgated by different sultans. At the same time, Ottoman officials allowed different
social, religious, and professional groups (called taife), such as Christian and Jewish
communities, groups of foreign merchants like the Venetians, and artisanal associations,
to conduct their internal legal affairs according to their customs or internal regulations
without the intervention of state legal authorities. However, the Ottoman state sustained
claims to dominance over all legal authorities. Communal normative systems and
officials operated without hindrance as long as they did not encroach on the jurisdictions
of Muslim judicial authorities. Nevertheless, jurisdictional conflicts did take place, even
among different Muslim legal officials. 19 Furthermore, being state authorities, the
enjoyed greater prerogative of enforcing their rulings in Ottoman territories.
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In my dissertation, I employ a legal pluralist perspective to the study of different
Venetian and Ottoman legal institutions in seventeenth-century Istanbul. Such an
approach enables me to study the interrelations between different types of courts and
legal systems and to pinpoint the role of each of them in regulating Ottoman/Venetian
trade. This pluralist perspective also provides an excellent viewpoint from which to study
the phenomenon of forum-shopping among Ottoman and Venetian courts. I illustrate both
the limits and the frequency of this phenomenon by analyzing the normative frameworks
(customary practices, religious norms, and state legislation) and actual instances of such
practice. Furthermore, legal pluralism offers an alternative to essentialist depictions of
legal systems as either “modern/efficient” or “traditional” because it considers a larger
legal field which provided historical actors with different legal avenues to resolve
conflicts. Many studies of Islamic legal institutions and long-distance trade deal with
single institutions and legal systems (above all kadı courts and Islamic law) in isolation.
Therefore, they do not pay attention to other forums of adjudication or notarial offices
that were available in the same historical contest. 20 My study of both Venetian and
Ottoman courts in seventeenth-century Istanbul offers a more nuanced view of the role
played by each institution in regulating long-distance trade because it takes into accounts
the different institutions available to Venetian and Ottoman merchants in a single
historical context.

20
For instance, see Kuran, Timur and Scott Lustig. “Judicial Biases in Ottoman Istanbul: Islamic Justice
and Its Compatibility with Modern Economic Life,” Journal of Law and Economics 55/3 (2012), 631–66.
Kuran’s work deals mostly with kadı courts and Islamic law while he does not include other forums of
justice and normative orders, such as the Imperial Council and sultanic legislation as well as customary
norms of different Ottoman communities.
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In order to better understand the use of Ottoman and Venetian courts by
merchants, I focus on the entire range of legal and economic services they provided to
private merchants, which, apart from adjudication, included notarial services. Medieval
and early modern merchants sought the public certification of property rights in order to
preserve the memory of business dealings and to obtain documents to use in courts in
case a dispute arose. In the early modern Mediterranean, there existed a plurality of
institutions for certifying property rights, such as European public and ecclesiastical
notaries, consular chancelleries, kadı courts, and ship scribes. A plurality of forums to
adjudicate a lawsuit corresponded to a plurality of institutions certifying property rights.
This plurality notwithstanding, notarial institutions are not usually included in studies of
legal pluralism in the pre-modern period. 21 This stems, I suspect, from the fact the
academic study of legal pluralism developed in American and English universities, that
is, in two societies that historically lacked the institution of the public notary, which had
first developed in southern Europe and played an importance role in the development of
long-distance trade in the Mediterranean from the eleventh century onwards. 22
Notarial and judicial institutions were complementary within the same legal
culture since they shared a common normative source, namely the the ius commune in
most of Western Europe and Hanafi Islamic law in the Ottoman Empire. 23 Furthermore,
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Christian and Muslim judges and notaries were both concerned with avoiding and settling
controversies arising from credit and commercial transactions. Studying judicial and
notarial institutions together allows us to understand the legal culture in which they were
embedded and the often-blurred relationship between the adjudication and certification of
rights in early modern legal institutions.24 In seventeenth-century Istanbul, the Venetian
chancellery and Ottoman kadı courts operated as both tribunals and notarial offices.
Through the combined analysis of their judicial documents and notarial deeds, I
demonstrate that the certification of property rights was the principal reason why
merchants trading between Istanbul and Venice applied to these two institutions.
Methodology
Another major contribution of my dissertation to the study of legal pluralism and
commerce is a methodological one: the combination of quantitative and qualitative
analyses. So far, scholars working on legal pluralism in the pre-modern world have
privileged qualitative analysis and have eschewed quantification. This absence reflects a
long-lasting suspicion against quantitative analysis in history writing. After enjoying a
period of popularity in economic history during the 1960s-1980s, especially in the
Annales tradition in France and in cliometrics in the United States, social and cultural
historians from different intellectual backgrounds abandoned and distrusted this type of

24
As argued by scholars of early modern Europe and the Ottoman Empire, individuals starting legal
proceedings against debtors often aimed to certify a credit or a business agreement rather than obtaining a
court sentence. Ago, Renata. Economia barocca: mercato e istituzioni nella Roma del Seicento (Roma:
Donzelli, 1998), 156-171; Ghazzal, Zouhair. The Grammars of Adjudication: The Economics of Judicial
Decision Making in Fin-de-siecle Ottoman Beirut and Damascus (Beirut: Institut Français du ProcheOrient, 2007), 16, 277-313.
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analysis. 25 They faulted quantitative studies for their anachronistic categories of analysis,
the positivist underpinnings of their results, the uncontextualized use of historical
sources, and the general disregard for individuals’ actions in favor of social structures.
This mistrust of quantification still prevails in the legal history of the earlymodern word, especially in scholarship on legal pluralism, trade, and legal institutions. 26
Scholars working on plural jurisdictional regimes privilege a qualitative analysis of case
studies, usually a single legal suit or a group of them. Such a perspective enables them to
examine the reasons why individuals chose a particular court or a specific legal procedure
to resolve a lawsuit in a specific historical context. However, relying on case studies
alone risks overplaying the occurrence of phenomena like forum-shopping. Although
some courts of justice and notarial offices were open to any individual regardless of
social status, religion, and citizenship, and although historical records contain instances
of disputes in which historical actors chose among different institutions, we cannot
conclude that forum-shopping was a universal practice. As we will see, in seventeenthcentury Istanbul, forum-shopping between Ottoman and Venetian courts was a limited
occurrence that occurred among specific religious and political communities.

For an excellent review of the rise, decline, and recent return of quantitative history, see Lemercier,
Claire and Claire Zalc. Quantitative methods in the humanities: an introduction (translated by Arthur
Goldhammer, Charlottesville; London: University of Virginia Press, 2019), 8-27.
25
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A quantitative analysis offers several opportunities for the study of legal
pluralism. It allows us to discern both exceptional cases and broad patterns in the use of
specific courts by individuals belonging to different social, religious, and political
communities, both in adjudication and in notarial services. Such patterns could relate to
the socioeconomic context, state and communal regulations, legal and religious norms,
commercial customs, and political circumstances. Each of these factors either facilitated
or constrained the use of courts for different merchants. By uncovering trends,
quantification provides the historian with an important tool to test long-term explanations
of historical developments and to produce comparative studies across political boundaries
and historical periods. 27
In my dissertation, quantification allows me to test widely held assumptions about
early modern trade and legal institutions, such as the ubiquity of forum-shopping for
merchants and seamen, the existence of a shared notarial culture in the early modern
Mediterranean, the popularity of notarial certification for long-distance merchants, and
the “unfriendliness” of Islamic institutions towards trade expansion. Furthermore, my
quantitative analysis demonstrates empirically different routines in the administration of
justice and notarial practice in seventeenth-century Istanbul. These routines include the
specialization of Ottoman and Venetian courts in different legal and notarial services:
Venetian and Ottoman merchants preferred the Venetian consular court for commercial
arbitration and for the notarization of business dealings, while they turned to Ottoman

Lemercier, Zalc, Quantitative methods, 25-27; Coşgel, Ergene. The Economics of Ottoman Justice, 2633.
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courts for criminal justice, the registration of specific types of commercial agreements,
the enforcement of contracts, and for regulating long-distance trade in general.
In order to reach these results and avoid some well-known pitfalls of quantitative
history, such as the distortion of the historical context and anonymous generalizations, I
combine my quantitative study of the workings of Venetian and Ottoman tribunals with a
micro-qualitative analysis of selected lawsuits, notarial transactions, and a few diplomatic
episodes. A micro-scale analysis allows me to uncover the reasons why individuals chose
specific courts and for what services in a particular historical context. 28 My qualitative
study focuses particularly on court procedure since its analysis allows me to discern the
relationship between, on the one hand, social status, religious affiliation, and membership
into a political community, and, on the other, the legal and economic services that
individuals sought in different courts. 29 Furthermore, studying court procedure shed
lights on the legal culture in which each court was embedded, such as the summary or
mercantile procedure applied in the Venetian chancellery, and Hanafi Islamic law and
sultanic legislation enforced in Ottoman courts.
Lastly, I conceptualized my quantitative and qualitative analysis around the
distinction made by anthropologists and linguists between emic and etic categories. The
emic approach recovers the actor’s own categories and language while the etic develops

The combination of micro-scale and quantitative analysis corresponds to the social-scientific brand of the
Italian microhistory championed by Giovanni Levi. Inheriting Power: The Story of an Exorcist, trans.
Lydia G. Cochrane (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988 [1985]). See also Trivellato, Francesca.
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(2011), 13/14.
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the scholar’s categories. 30 This distinction is extremely important because the vocabulary
used by scholars to refer to the protagonists of my study differs considerably from the
nomenclature used by the historical actors themselves. 31 On the one hand, a culturespecific emic approach helps me to better reconstruct the historical context in which the
actions of the historical actors took place and to correct historical distortions arising from
the historians’ use of modern analytical categories to study the past. On the other hand,
an etic approach provides me with the tools to compare different social and religious
groups.
The emic and etic approaches are central to my reading of historical sources. They
are mostly collections of legal and economic documents produced in Venetian and
Ottoman courts during lawsuits and commercial transactions. My quantitative and
qualitative analysis of them relies on a relational database that organizes the historical
information about lawsuits and notarial deeds administered by Venetian and Ottoman
authorities. 32 This tool helps me to analyze the historical data both quantitatively and on
an individual and nominative way. In this database, I classify individuals and their legal
and economic transactions according to etic and emic categories. For every individual, I
30
Pike, Kenneth L. Language in Relation to a Unified Theory of the Structure of Human Behavior (The
Hague: Mouton, 1967), 8-12; Harris, Marvin. Cultural Materialism: The Struggle for a Science of Culture
(New York: Random House, 1979), 32-45; Cerutti, Simona. “Microhistory: Social Relations versus
Cultural Models?” in Anna-Maija Castrén, Markku Lonkila, and Matti Peltonen (eds), Between Sociology
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Literature Society, 2004) 17-40, 26-34; Ginzburg, Carlo. “Our words, and theirs: A reflection on the
historian’s craft, today,” in Susanna Fellman and Marjatta Rahikainen (eds.), Historical knowledge: In
quest of theory, method and evidence (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012), 97-119. The
emic and etic categories correspond to what the sociologist Rogers Brubaker and the historian Frederick
Cooper call “categories of practice” and “categories of analysis,” respectively. “Beyond ‘identity.’” Theory
and Society 29/1 (2000), 1-47, 4-6.
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show religious affiliation and political identity as they appear in the documents as well as
how I, the historian, identify them. In this way, I am able to determine in which specific
legal action and economic deeds did religious and political affiliation matter and fallacies
of widely employed analytical categories such as “Venetian merchant” and “Ottoman
merchant.” Similarly, I illustrate how court officials defined each legal act and notarial
deed and how scholars would identify it. In doing so, I discern distortions arising from
the use of modern analytical categories, such as the stark distinction between
“adjudication” and “certification of rights” in the workings of legal institutions.
Political Economy of Empires
Apart from institutional analysis and legal pluralism, the last major analytical
framework of my dissertation is the political economy of early modern Venice and the
Ottoman Empire. Venetian and Ottoman courts in Istanbul did not operate independently
from the larger complex political and economic context of seventeenth-century Istanbul
and the eastern Mediterranean. The ebb and flow of Ottoman/Venetian relations,
Mediterranean-wide commercial and political developments, and transformations in the
Venetian and Ottoman economies jointly affected the workings of Venetian and Ottoman
courts in Istanbul. By considering the political economy of the Republic of Venice and
the Ottoman Empire, we can evaluate if and how far various political and economic
factors influenced that openness of legal institutions to foreign merchants, the legal and
notarial services that Ottoman and Venetian merchants sought there, and the procedures
chosen by the courts to solve controversies. 33

So far, few studies of trade and courts include the political economy of states to understand the
functioning of legal institutions. For instances, see Fusaro, Maria. “Politics of Justice, Politics of Trade:
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My dissertation focuses on the first two decades of the seventeenth century for
two main reasons. First, the early decades of that century were a pivotal period in the
commercial history of Venice and the Mediterranean in general. This period represented
the last time in its long history when Venice constituted a major commercial power in
trade between the Ottoman Empire and Western Europe. Large communities of Venetian
merchants conducted business in the empire’s major commercial hubs under the
protection of their ambassadors in Istanbul (bailo, plural baili) and a centuries-old
consular system. Furthermore, Venice was still the most important commercial partner of
the Ottoman Empire in terms of its volume of trade well into the 1620s-1630s. 34 Lastly,
trade expansion benefitted from the long period of peace between the two states between
1573 and 1645.
However, starting from last decades of the sixteenth century, Venice’s
preeminence in European-Ottoman trade had been gradually eroding due new
commercial competition from northern European states, the crisis of the Venetian
shipping sector, and an upsurge of piracy and privateering across the Mediterranean. 35
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During the so-called “Northern Invasion,” groups of merchants and ship captains from
England, France, and the Dutch Republic began to operate in Ottoman commercial hubs
and successfully competed with Venetians, thanks to their better shipping services,
cheaper merchandises, and the increasing diplomatic protection of their home
governments. Although the long-term consequences of the arrival of these new merchants
into the eastern Mediterranean for local commercial practices and networks are still a
matter of debate, undoubtedly these European merchants made the trade between
Western Europe and the Ottoman Empire much more competitive. 36 Furthermore, Venice
faced a new challenge from Muslim and Christian pirates and privateers from the 1580s
onwards, when large-scale naval warfare between the Ottomans and Spain had ceased.
Given its policies of guarded neutrality in Mediterranean conflicts and of appeasement
towards the Ottoman Empire, and, due to its declining naval power, Venetian shipping
suffered considerably.
In order to preserve its lucrative trade with the Ottoman Levant, Venice reversed
some of his age-old commercial policies, such as the exclusion of non-Venetian citizens
from the trade with the eastern Mediterranean, it strengthened its diplomatic ties with
Ottoman Empire, and it promoted new commercial routes, such as the overland trade line
between Istanbul and Venetian-held Dalmatia. 37 I argue that this concern over the
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protection of Venetian trade and the maintenance of peaceful relations with the
Ottomans, extended to the administration of justice in Istanbul. It affected the “openness”
of the Venetian chancellery to non-Venetians, the procedures followed by this institution
in case of disputes including influential Ottoman merchants, and the stances of Venetian
ambassadors and consuls towards Ottoman legal institutions.
The second reason for focusing on the first two decades of the seventeenth
century is that they corresponded to the military and political growth of the Ottoman
Empire and to the development of Ottoman trade with Western Europe. Despite serious
financial crises from the late sixteenth century onwards, military rebellions, and
unconclusive conflicts along its European and Asiatic boundaries, the Ottoman Empire
remained the major military and political power in the eastern Mediterranean and its
economy continued to be largely unaffected by European commercial development.
Studies of commerce and legal institutions in the Ottoman empire focus on the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, a period of declining military and diplomatic standing in the
Ottoman Empire vis-à-vis European powers. 38 Focusing on the first half of the
seventeenth century allows us to study the Ottoman Empire and its legal and economic
systems as largely uninfluenced by European political and economic expansion. For
instance, in contrast with the later periods, no groups of non-Muslim Ottoman protégés
(beratlı) of European powers, with their legal and economic privileges, existed since
Ottoman authorities bestowed such privileges only on very few Ottoman individuals.
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Furthermore, the period of peace between 1573 and 1645 of the seventeenth
century witnessed the apogee of Ottoman trade with Venice, which is still a much
overlooked period in the commercial history of the early modern Mediterranean. 39 While
previously Venetian merchants had monopolized trade between the Republic and the
Byzantine and later Ottoman territories, military and diplomatic reversals against the
Ottomans forced Venetian authorities to allow Ottoman subjects to partake in that
lucrative flow of trade from the mid-sixteenth century onwards. Ottoman merchants
included large groups of Jews, Christians, and Muslim belonging to different linguistic
and ethnic communities. Therefore, focusing on the early seventeenth century allows us
to see large numbers of Ottoman subjects turning to Venetian and Ottoman courts for
their legal and business affairs.
Structure of the Dissertation
Eight chapters makes up my dissertation. Chapters 1 and 2 introduce the
protagonists of our study, Venetian and Ottoman merchants, and the historical contexts of
their commercial activities. Chapter 1 focuses on the complex identification of the
“Venetian” in seventeenth-century Istanbul. Rather than being determined exclusively by
state enactments, I argue that membership in the Venetian community was the outcome
of an interplay between state legislation, diplomacy, the workings of different legal
institutions, and the actions of individuals who sought to be recognized as “Venetian” to
enjoy specific legal and fiscal privileges in the Ottoman Empire. In such processes of
identification, Venetian and Ottoman courts played a central role. As put by Daniel Lord
Kafadar, Cemal. “A Death in Venice (1575): Anatolian Muslim Merchants Trading in the Serenissima."
Journal of Turkish Studies 10 (1986), 191-218; Arbel Trading Nations; Dursteler, Eric R. “Commerce and
Coexistence: Veneto-Ottoman Trade in the Early Modern Era,” Turcica 34 (2002), 105-33.
39
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Smail, courts were “record-keeping bureaucracies:” 40 they shaped, classified, and
recorded conventions or configurations of identity in a world when identification
documents like passports did not exist. Chapter 2 extends this study of identification
practices to the “Ottoman merchants,” an analytical category often employed by
economic historians of the Ottoman Empire despite the fact that it did not exist in
historical records. By describing the political and economic contexts of Ottoman trade
with Venice and practices of identification employed by Ottoman and Venetian courts
and by the merchants themselves, I demonstrate that state authorities in both the states
considered and treated merchants from Ottoman lands not as a unitary group of “Ottoman
subjects” but as different social, ethnic, and religious groups. Individual merchants
strategically employed identification categories created by state authorities when seeking
new economic and legal privileges in Venice and in Ottoman territories.
Chapters 3,4, and 5 analyze the Venetian chancellery, the central institution of the
Venetian community in Istanbul, which operated as both a consular court and a notarial
office for an international community of merchants, shipmasters, and seamen. Chapter 3
introduces this institution by focusing on its normative system (Venetian legislation,
customary mercantile norms, and international treaties), the different services it provided
to merchants, and its religiously mixed clientele. I illustrate that, contrarily to our current
understanding of consular justice in the early modern period, it functioned mostly as a
notarial office and that nothing prevented Ottoman subjects belonging to different
religious communities, including Muslims, to turn to this institution for legal and,

Smail, Daniel L. Imaginary cartographies: possession and identity in late medieval Marseille
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), XII/XIII.
40
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especially, notarial services. Such “openness” of the court, I argue, was influenced by the
Venetian efforts to promote Venetian-Ottoman trade in a period of increasing
competition by newly established merchants from northern Europe.
Chapter 5 focuses on the notarial services of the Venetian chancellery, the
institution’s most important contribution to the regulation of Ottoman/Venetian trade.
European consular chancelleries in the Ottoman Empire are usually regarded as the
promoters of an international shared mercantile culture, based on written contracts, in the
early modern period Mediterranean. However, my research shows that the documents
produced by the Venetian chancellery, even when sought by non-Venetian individuals,
circulated mostly within the Venetian commercial system and across Venetian territories
casting doubts on the existence of this alleged shared mercantile culture in the
seventeenth-century Mediterranean. Furthermore, my quantitative study shows that
Venetian merchants did not routinely register business dealings in this institution. On the
contrary, it was Ottoman subjects or less-preeminent Venetians who mostly sought the
notarization of credit and business contracts and transactions in this institution. This last
finding reduces the overall importance of consular institutions to the promotion of
European trade in the Levant.
Chapter 5 deals with the judicial function of this institution. It describes the
different types of disputes that it handled, its legal procedures, and its jurisdictional reach
in Istanbul. I argue that the Venetian chancellery offered commercial arbitration
according to a fast and equity-based procedure which focused on commercial agreements
and individual actions rather than on the religion and the social status of litigants. In this
way, it allowed non-Venetian individuals belonging to different religious and political
26

communities, mostly Ottoman Jews, to litigate commercial disputes against Venetian
merchants under the same procedural rules. However, despite the equity-based procedure,
the political context of seventeenth-century Venice and the Ottoman Empire too
influenced the workings of this institution. Venetian concerns with maintaining good
relations with Ottoman officials determined the procedures adopted by the Venetian
consular in cases involving preeminent businessmen, especially those with ties to
Ottoman officials.
Chapters 6 and 7 shift our institutional analysis to the most important Ottoman
Islamic institutions available to Venetian merchants and their Ottoman peers in Istanbul:
the kadı court of Galata, the tribunal of the kazasker of Rumeli, and the Imperial Council.
Chapter 6 examines the role played by the courts of Galata and of the kazasker of Rumeli
in regulating trade between Venice and Istanbul by studying their judicial and notarial
functions. In scholarship on trade in the pre-modern Mediterranean, kadı courts usually
appear as “traditional” and “unfriendly” to cross-cultural trade due to their institutional
biases against non-Muslims. I demonstrate that that, while procedural hindrances (such as
the preference on oral testimony) limited the use of these courts by Venetian and
Ottoman merchants for solving commercial disputes, they still played a role in criminal
matters and provided specific notarial services, such as the drawing of contracts for
commercial ventures within Ottoman territories, that Venetians could not obtain
elsewhere. Furthermore, diplomatic and commercial concerns affected the workings of
these Islamic institutions, as demonstrated by the intervention of the Venetian
ambassadors in lawsuits potentially detrimental to Venetian commercial interests.
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Chapter 7 studies the Imperial Council, a court of justice and a council of highranking Ottoman officials under the authority of the sultan’s deputy, the Grand Vizier.
This institution played many roles in Ottoman-Venetian trade: it punished the
mistreatment of Venetian merchants at the hands of Ottoman officials, piracy attacks,
banditry, and resolved commercial disputes between Ottoman and Venetian subjects.
More than other institutions in Istanbul, its workings embodied the political economies of
the Ottoman empire and Venice in the early seventeenth- century. Its procedure involved
Venetian ambassadors and high-ranking Ottomans and not individual merchants. The
officials of this institution primarily sought to protect the smooth conduct of Venetian
trade in the empire by upholding the rulings of international treaties. Such concerns are
well shown by commercial disputes where the Imperial Council intervened on the behalf
of Venetian merchants by prioritizing the enforcement of international treaties over the
strict application of Hanafi Islamic law and by facilitating the resolution of lawsuits in
favor of the Venetian sides.
Chapter 8, the final chapter, brings us to issue of forum-shopping between
Venetian and Ottoman courts for both adjudication and notarial services. Relying on the
findings of the previous chapters and new historical evidence, I show that the practice of
forum-shopping was limited by several factors such as legal and religious norms,
communal regulations, monetary and reputational concerns, the legal culture of each
institution and the specific legal and economic services that they offered. All these factors
affected each religious, social, and political group of merchants differently: among all
merchants engaged in trade between Istanbul and Venetian territories, Ottoman Jews and
Christians were the most likely to shop among different courts and notarial offices, as
28

demonstrated by frequent of the Venetian chancellery instead of Ottoman tribunals and
communal institutions. On the contrary, Venetian subjects and Ottoman Muslims were
the least capable to turn to multiple legal institutions. Overall, I argue that the little
occurrence of forum-shopping between Venetian and Ottoman courts in matters of
litigation and notarial deeds demonstrates that long-term commercial exchanges and
practices of dispute resolution and certification of rights in Istanbul had created routines
in the use of legal institutions by Venetian and Ottoman merchants. These routines
allowed Venetian and Ottoman merchants to collaborate in business ventures and solve
disputes without hindrances despite the absence of a system of international law and the
continuous importance of religion in the social and economic life of the early modern
Mediterranean.
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Chapter 1: A Contested Identification: “Venetians” in Seventeenth-Century
Istanbul
1—Introduction
In September 1616, Mevlana Ali Efendi, the kadı (a Muslim judge and public
notary) of Istanbul’s district of Galata, conducted a census of all Western Europeans
(called “Franks” in Ottoman parlance) residing in Galata and its surroundings in order to
impose on them the harac, the Islamic poll tax on non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman
sultans. This act was part of the “Carazo affair,” a diplomatic crisis (1613-1617) pitting
European diplomats against Ottoman authorities in Istanbul. It stemmed from the latter’s
intention to impose the harac on the subjects of European powers, which was prohibited
according to international treaties. 1 The Ottoman census identified 108 individuals as
members of the Venetian community (Venedik taifesi). Following the drawing of this
census, the bailo, Venice’s ambassador and consul in Istanbul, wrote that the entire
Venetian community was actually much larger than 108 persons. In other early
seventeenth-century accounts, the baili put the number of Venetian subjects at several
thousands. 2
Why did the baili and the Ottoman authorities disagree over the number of the
Venetians residing in Istanbul? Who were the individuals identified by both the Ottomans

On this episode see Krstić, Tijana. “Contesting Subjecthood and Sovereignty in Ottoman Galata in the
Age of Confessionalization: The Carazo Affair, 1613-1617.” Oriente Moderno, 93 (2), 422–53. For the
census, see VGMA, 1722, Galata Evkaf Tahriri, fols. 3-7. I would like to thank Professor Krstić for sharing
this important document with me.

1

ASV, SDC, busta 82, No 25 fols 249- 252, (12 February 1617), and ‘‘Relazione di Simone Contarini,’’in
Barozzi, Niccolò, and Guglielmo Berchet (eds), Le relazioni degli stati europei lette al senato dagli
ambasciatori veneziani nel secolo decimosettimo. Turchia—Parte I–II (Venice: P. Naratovich, 1871–1872),
1, 229.
2
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and the baili as members of the Venetian community? What procedures of identification
did different parties adopt? This chapter addresses these questions using documents
produced by Venetian and Ottoman legal institutions in Istanbul as well as international
diplomatic agreements. Focusing on systems of identification enacted by different
institutions and actors allows us to understand how various categories of belonging, such
as religion, legal citizenship, and profession, shaped the regulation of legal conflicts and
business exchanges between members of different religious and political communities.
Since identification documents, like travel documents, were little used in the period under
study, courts played a crucial role in the identification of individuals.
In this chapter, I put forth three interrelated arguments. First, membership in the
Venetian community did not depend exclusively on state regulations but individuals too
played an important role in being recognized as part of it. Second, institutions such as
tribunals and notarial offices created membership in the Venetian community using
classification practices. Finally, such membership was not fixed but it was dependent on
constant reconfirmation and negotiations between multiple actors: individuals and
Venetian and Ottoman authorities in Istanbul.
The chapter deals with processes of identification rather than their results, that is,
individual identity. Procedures of identification (or classification) of individuals entailed
either conferring or denying an individual membership in a particular human group such
as an urban, territorial, or religious community or a lineage. They were means of
inclusion into or exclusion from material and immaterial resources of a community, such
as a web of social relations, occupation, trade rights, assistance and welfare, inheritance

31

rights, and diplomatic support. 3 In addition to granting access to communal resources,
formal membership in a community involved several duties, including tax payment,
residence, taking part in local ceremonies, and other social practices, whose performance
was necessary in order to preserve one’s status.
Scholarship on identification in the early modern and modern world has expanded
in the last three decades. Currently, there are two main approaches in this field of
research. The first, influenced by Weberian notions of the bureaucratic state and
Foucault’s concept of governmentality, focuses on the role of the state and its growing
monopoly over means of identification from the late Middle Ages onwards. 4 From this
perspective, the gradual importance of identification papers, such as travel documents
like passports, was the result of the birth of the modern state and modern bureaucracies.
Registration procedures were uniquely a work of the state and their development was
corollary to the state’s growing power to control and coerce individuals. A second strand
of scholarly literature downplays the efficiency and coercive tools of pre-modern
government institutions and insists instead on the forms of social control enacted by
social groups. Rejecting the view that processes of registration are exclusively state-

Herzog, Tamar. Defining Nations. Immigrants and Citizens in Early Modern Spain and Spanish America
(New Haven-London: Yale University Press, 2003), Cerutti, Simona, Étrangers. Étude d’une condition
d’incertitude dans une société d’Ancien Régime (Montrouge: Bayard, 2012). Many of my ideas about
identification practices and membership in the Venetian community were developed in the Venetian
archives over the course of several discussions with my friend and fellow historian of the early modern
Mediterranean Umberto Signori. I would like to thank him.
3

Caplan, Jane and John C. Torpey (eds), Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of State
Practices in the Modern World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Sahlins, Peter. Unnaturally
French: Foreign Citizens in the Old Regime and After (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004); Groebner,
Valentin. Who Are You? Identification, Deception and Surveillance in Early Modern Europe (translated by
Mark Kyburz e John Peck. New York: Zone, 2007), Noiriel, Gérard, and Ilsen About. L’identification.
Genèse d’un travail d’Etat. Paris: Belin, 2007), Smail, Daniel L. Imaginary cartographies: possession and
identity in late medieval Marseille (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000).
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driven and aimed primarily at social control, this growing literature focuses on the role
that individuals and communities themselves play in such processes. Individuals
negotiated their membership in a community by behaving like its members, claiming its
rights, and accepting its duties and not only by obtaining identification documents, such
as letters of naturalization, from state authorities. From this perspective, identification
assumes a “strategical nature” and individuals are critical actors in processes of
identification. 5
This chapter bridges the gap between these two approaches by focusing on the
identification practices carried out by multiple actors in early seventeenth-century
Istanbul: individuals claiming membership in the Venetian community, and Venetian and
Ottoman political authorities and legal institutions. By this means, this chapter shows
both limits of state power over the identification of individuals residing within its borders
and the actual leeway that individuals enjoyed in such process. Moreover, this chapter
aims to draw the often-overlooked Ottoman Empire into debates about identification
practices in the early modern Mediterranean. 6 The Capitulations (ahdname in Ottoman

Herzog, Defining Nations. Cerutti Étrangers, Breckenridge, Keith, and Simon Szreter (eds). Registration
and Recognition: Documenting the Person in World History (Oxford: Oxford University Press for the
British Academy, 2012); About, Ilsen, James Brown, and Gayle Lonergan (eds). Identification and
Registration Practices in Transnational Perspective: People, Papers and Practices (New York: Pelgrave
Macillan, 2013); Signori, Umberto. Proteggere i privilegi dello straniero. I consoli veneziani nell’Impero
ottomano tra Sei e Settecento (PhD dissertation, Università di Milano, 2018); Buono, Alessandro. “Tener
persona: Sur l’identité et l’identification dans les sociétés d’Ancien Régime.” Annales. Histoire, Sciences
Sociales 75/1 (2020), 73-111.
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Hanna, Nelly. “Les réseaux dans le monde ottoman aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles: le migrant et l’étranger,”
in Claudia Moatti and Wolfgang Kaiser (eds) Gens de passage en Méditerranée de l’Antiquité à l’époque
moderne: procédures de contrôle et d’identification (L’atelier méditerranéen. Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose
2007), 117–134. Tamdoğan. Işık. “La mobilité comme compétence dans la société ottomane. Nomades de
la Çukurova et travailleurs migrants à Üsküdar au xviiie siècle,” in Claudia Moatti,Wolfgang Kaiser,
Christophe Pébarthe (eds), Le monde del’itinérance en Méditerranée: procédures de contrôle et
d’identiﬁcation (Pessac: Ausonius Éditions Études 22, 2009), 81-202. Recent studies of Ottoman practices
of identification and control of mobility focus on the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. For
instance, see Zarinebaf, Fariba. Crime and Punishment in Istanbul: 1700/1800 (Berkeley: University of
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Turkish), diplomatic and commercial agreements signed between the Ottoman and the
Venetian governments, provided the legal framework for the conduct of long-distance
trade and the safe residence of Venetian subjects in Ottoman cities and vice-versa. In
particular, they stipulated the privileges and duties of the Venetians as “protected
foreigners” (called in Islamic jurisprudence müstemin). However, these agreements did
not contain specific instructions about how to identify Venetian subjects travelling to the
empire. At the same time, Venetian citizenship laws restricted trade between the Levant
and Venice to a small number of Venetian subjects, even though many non-citizens took
part in this branch of trade and were publicly recognized as “Venetian merchants.” This
chapter will therefore demonstrate that the identification of different individuals as
Venetian subjects in Istanbul was contingent on constant negotiations between different
actors and on the workings of institutions.
2—Venetian Identification Practices
In the early seventeenth century, the “Venetian nation” (natione venetiana) in
Istanbul was the largest European resident community in the Ottoman capital. It was a
heterogenous group of diplomats, merchants, ship captains, artisans, sailors, bandits,
women, slaves, and many more individuals of different ethnic, social, economic, and
religious backgrounds. 7 These individuals hailed from the city of Venice, its mainland,

California Press, 2010); Başaran, Betül. Selim III, Social Control, and Policing in Istanbul at the End of the
Eighteenth Century: between Crisis and Order (Leiden: Brill, 2012), Hanley, Will. Identifying with
Nationality: Europeans, Ottomans, and Egyptians in Alexandria (New York: Columbia University Press,
2017).
7
In contrast to common wisdom, this heterogeneity was not exclusively an early modern phenomenon.
Chrysostomides, Julian. “Venetian Commercial Privileges under the Palaeologi,” Studi Veneziani 12
(1970), 267-356; Jacoby, David. “Venice and the Venetian Jews in the Eastern Mediterranean,” in Gaetano
Cozzi (ed.), Gli ebrei e Venezia: secoli XIV-XIII. Atti del Convegno internazionale organizzato dall’Istituto
di storia della società e dello Stato veneziano della Fondazione Giorgio Cini Venezia, Isola di San Giorgio
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and its overseas territories. The center of the community was the Venetian embassy in
Beyoğlu, the hilly area north of the walled city of Galata. The embassy housed the
Venetian chancellery, the principal institution of the Venetian community. For Catholic
Venetian merchants, other two important centers of life in Galata were the commercial
district of Lonca (from the Italian “loggia”) and the nearby Church of San Francesco,
where most of them resided, conducted business, and worshipped. 8
In an important study of the Venetian community in Istanbul during the early
modern period, Eric Dursteler challenges previous accounts of homogenous mercantile
communities in the Levant as composed of individuals sharing a common social and
ethnic background. 9 He distinguishes between an “official nation,” composed of Venetian
citizens, and a much larger “unofficial nation” that included subjects from the Venetian
mainland (Terraferma), overseas territories (Stato da Mar), and even Ottoman subjects.
Members of the latter two groups enjoyed the right to trade and consular protection on
par with Venetian citizens, even- though there were not legally entitled to such privileges.

Maggiore, 5-10 giugno 1983 (Milan: Edizioni Communità, 1987), 29–59; Apellániz, Francisco. “Venetian
Trading Networks in the Medieval Mediterranean,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 44, 2 (2013), 157–
79.
For an overview of the social, religious, and economic life of early modern Galata see Mantran, Robert.
Istanbul dans la seconde moitié du XVIIe siècle; essai d'histoire institutionelle, économique et sociale
(Paris: Adrien Maison-neuve, 1962), 514-544; Dursteler, Eric. Venetians in Constantinople: Nation,
Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
2006), 130-150; Bulunur, Kerim İ. Osmanlı Galatası (1453-1600) (İstanbul: Bilge Kültür Sanat, 2014);
Zarinebaf, Fariba. Mediterranean Encounters: Trade and Pluralism in Early Modern Galata (Oakland:
University of California Press, 2018).
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2016).
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Ethnic, religious, and occupational heterogeneity supports Dursteler’s argument about the
hybridity, flexibility, and social nature of identity in the early modern Mediterranean:
several elements (not only religion and political status) engendered an individual identity
and, depending on specific contexts, individuals shifted their identity in order to gain
specific legal and economic privileges.
Dursteler’s study provides a compelling case for the flexible and dynamic nature
of early modern identity. However, his stark distinction between an official and an
unofficial nation implies that membership in the Venetian community was determined
exclusively by a normative and top-down system imposed by state officials and that any
deviation from such system was a proof of a disconnection between the law and its
application. Such a distinction is inaccurate because membership in the Venetian
community in Istanbul, similarly to other human groups in the early modern
Mediterranean and Western Europe, was not determined exclusively by legal enactments;
publicly-performed acts, too, played an important role. 10 I contend that practices such as
long-term social and business relations with Venetian citizens (both diplomats and
merchants) residing in Istanbul or in Venice, participation in activities traditionally
conducted by the latter, such as long-distance trade and the payment of consular duties
(the cottimo and consolato 11), compliance with communal rules, and a recognized loyalty
For early modern Spain and its territories in South America, see Herzog, Defining Nations. For the
Venetian case, see Bellavitis, Anna. “‘Per cittadini metterete…’ La stratificazione della società veneziana
cinquecentesca tra norma giuridica e riconoscimento sociale,” Quaderni storici 30/2 (1995), 359-383;
Rothman, Natalie E. “Becoming Venetian: Conversion and Transformation in the Seventeenth-Century
Mediterranean,” Mediterranean Historical Review 21/1 (2006), 39–75; and Brokering Empire: TransImperial Subjects between Venice and Istanbul. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2012).
10

The baili levied these taxes on goods coming to Istanbul from Venice and vice versa, either by sea or by
land, on the behalf of both Venetian and non-Venetian merchants. They were meant to support the bailo’s
diplomatic efforts in Istanbul and to pay the embassy’s personnel. In the early seventeenth century, the baili
collected them as a single duty called only cottimo (3% on incoming goods and 1% on outgoing ones).
11
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to Venetian officials could become markers, or “proofs,” of belonging into this
community. These activities created public reputation and mutual trust and, together with
written records, and identification documents produced by state institutions, in processes
of identification of membership into the community. This identification did not
perpetually fix membership to a community, conversely, the latter had to be publicly
repeated through the performance of a variety of social acts and rituals. Furthermore, the
Venetian chancellery played an important role in identification by registering individuals
in its records during lawsuits and notarial transactions. Lastly, the frequent use of this
institution created the mechanisms of social reputation fostering social and commercial
relations in Istanbul’s business circles. 12
In what follows, I illustrate how different groups of individuals claimed or
negotiated membership to Venetian community on the basis of the records of the
Venetian chancellery for the years 1609-1620. 13 Located in the Venetian embassy, the
chancellery functioned as both a civil tribunal and as a notarial office. In the years under
study, 1,777 individuals belonging to different religious and political communities

Those who did not pay it faced fines and confiscation of their goods in Venice by the magistracy of the
Provveditori al Cottimo di Londra. CSM, 1 Serie, reg. 137, fol. 102 (28 January1584), and Seconda Serie,
busta 49 (Cottimo di Londra), unnumbered page (30 March 1589).
On the role of institutions in creating membership in a community in early modern Europe see Cerutti
“La cittadinanza in età moderna: istituzioni e costruzione della fiducia,” in Paolo Prodi (ed.), La fiducia
secondo i linguaggi del potere (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2008), 255–273; and Buono, Alessandro. “Le
procedure di identificazione come procedure di contestualizzazione. Persone e cose nella cause per l’eredità
vacanti (Stato di Milano, secc. XVI-XVIII),” in Livio Antonielli (ed.), Procedure, metodi, strumenti per
l’identificazione delle persone e per il controllo del territorio, (atti del seminario internazionale, Università
di Messina, 10-11 dicembre 2010) (Messina: Soveria Mannelli, Rubbettino, 2014), 35-65.
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appeared (or were summoned there) to litigate a commercial lawsuit, register a notarial
deed, testify with regard to a dispute, or to provide expert opinion on a contested case.
Who is a “Venetian merchant” in seventeenth-century Istanbul?
In the early modern Venetian trading system, two key factors affected the conduct
of commerce. First, since the fourteenth century Venetian laws of citizenship had been
barring non-citizens (the vast majority of individuals living in Venice and in its territories
in the Levant) from engaging in trade between the city of Venice and the Levant.
Theoretically, only three categories of people, the patricians, native citizens (cittadini
originari), and those who acquired trade privileges (citizens de intus et extra) could
participate in these commercial exchanges. 14 Second, in Venice and its dominions there
existed no merchant guilds or charted companies and therefore merchants did not
constitute a legal category but rather a social and professional one whose boundaries
were not always clear. The Venetian government, not corporative bodies, remained the
exclusive representative of Venetian trade interests issuing legislation and negotiating
with Ottoman authorities on the behalf of private merchants. 15
Most historiography of Venetian commerce often treats as “Venetian merchants”
anyone trading between Venetian and foreign territories regardless of their

On Venetian citizenship laws see Zannini, Andrea. Burocrazia e burocrati a Venezia in età moderna:
icittadini originari (sec. XVI-XVIII) (Venice: Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, 1993); Mueller,
Reinhold C. Immigrazione e cittadinanza nella Venezia medievale (Rome: Viella, 2010). Different rules of
citizenship existed in the Venetian territories in the Levant. See Arbel, Benjamin. “Venice’s Maritime
Empire in the Early Modern Period,” in Eric Dursteler (ed.), A companion to Venetian history (Leiden;
Boston: Brill, 2013.), 125-254, 182-198.
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socioeconomic backgrounds and areas of activity. 16 However, a systematic study of the
chancellery records shows that Venetian officials used the taxonomy “Venetian
merchants” exclusively for a specific group of individuals while they excluded from such
category numerous others who traded between Venetian and Ottoman lands. In the 8
years under study, the chancellery records registered as “Venetian merchants” (mercante
venetiano) only 65 out of 1777 individuals. Such taxonomy appears exclusively in two
types of records: bailo’s commandments (mandato) to all merchants about major traderelated issues, and documents concerning the decisions of the Council of the Twelve
(Consilio dei XII), the government body of the Venetian community, to which merchants,
shipmasters (patrono), 17 and ship scribes (scrivano) took part. 18 This assembly dealt with
pressing issues involving the Venetian community, such as new taxes imposed by the
Ottomans, shipwrecks of Venetian ships, and the election of officials of the community.
Each member had the right to vote on these issues. Between 1609 and 1620, it convened
32 times. Apart from the merchants, 70 shipmasters and 35 ship scribes also often
attended the council. Despite their small number, these merchants, shipmasters, and
scribes, (170 individuals in total) conducted most of the trade and shipping between
Istanbul and Venetian territories and took part in the community’s most important
decisions. From now onwards, I focus on this group of individuals, which constituted the
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“core” of the Venetian mercantile community, in discerning patterns of the use of
Ottoman and Venetian legal institutions.
The 65 merchants were involved in many of the legal and economic transactions
taking place at the bailo’s consular court: the 66% of all lawsuits (286 out of 434 cases)
involved at least an individual identified as “Venetian merchant” in the Council of the
Twelve. If we sum all the lawsuits involving merchants, ship masters and scribes who
also took part in the Council of the Twelve, we notice that they constitute the 78% of all
the lawsuits heard by the bailo. 19 Furthermore, these individuals appear in all the bailo’s
orders (52) about trade and shipping regulations. These results show the preeminence of
those individual identified as “Venetian merchants” in the economic and social life of the
Venetian community: in spite of their little number, they figure preeminently among the
legal and economic workings of the Venetian chancellery, and they were the main
addressees of the baili’s commercial policies.
An analysis of the place of provenience and the social and economic profile of
those registered as merchants shows striking results. We know the place of origin for 56
out 65 Venetian merchants. Most of them hailed from either Venice or its possessions in
mainland Italy (mostly from the Lombard town of Bergamo) while a few others had been
born in Istanbul. None of them were noble and only 5 of them were Venetian citizens (1
cittadino originario and 4 de intus et extra) while the rest did not hold any title of
citizenship. They were mostly commercial agents (fattori), especially commission agents
who resided in Istanbul for long periods and conducted business in the name of resident

As we will see in Chapter 4, the situation was different in the case of notarial deeds in which Venetian
merchants, shipmasters, and scribes, were a minority among all the individuals seeking such documents.
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merchant in Venice (either nobles or other Venetian citizens) receiving a percentage of
the profits (commissione). 20 They constituted a closely-knit group living in Galata in the
surroundings of Lonca district and worshipping in the church of San Francesco. 21 None
of these individuals registered as “Venetian merchants” hailed from the Venetian
possessions in Dalmatia and in the Levant and their ranks included only individuals
trading between Istanbul and Venice.
Those originating from Istanbul deserve particularly attention. Edoardo di
Gagliano, several members of the Pironi family, and others, were all born and raised in
Galata and were members of the local Latin Catholic community of Genoese descent
(Magnifica Communità). Called “Perots” (perotti) by the Venetians, they were Ottoman
subjects because they paid the Islamic poll tax on non-Muslims and other Ottoman state
taxes. 22 At the same time, they participated to commercial and shipping activities of the
Venetian community by providing dragomans, wool appraisers (cernidori), and other
officials, and by engaging themselves in international trade with Venice. Dursteler shows
the manifold commercial activities of the Gagliano and Pironi families between 1590s
In the first two decades of the seventeenth century, chancellery records contain only one registered
contract of commercial partnership (compagnia). BAC 277, reg. 396, fols. 76r-78r (2 September 1611). For
the new social and economic profile of the Venetian merchants in the early moder period, see Tucci, “La
psicologia del mercante veneziano nel Cinquecento,” in Id., Mercanti, navi, monete nel Cinquecento
veneziano (Bologna 1981), 43-94.
20

The Ottoman census listed 37 of them as living either inside or in the surroundings of Lonca District.
VGMA 1722, fols. 3-7. For some glances on their religious life see Dursteler, Venetians, 180-185.
21

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Latin community of Galata enjoyed an administrative and
legal status distinct from that of other Ottoman Christians thanks to the Capitulations granted to it by sultan
Mehmed II in 1453. Its members paid the harac and other Ottoman taxes, but they were exempted from the
child-levy (devşirme system) and they were allowed to preserve their churches. İnalcık, Halil. ‘‘Ottoman
Galata, 1453–1553,’’ in Edhem Eldem (ed.), Première Rencontre Internationale sur l’Empire Ottoman et
la Turquie Moderne (Istanbul: Éditions-Isis, 1991), 17-116; Mitler, Louis. “The Genoese in Galata: 14531682.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 10 (1979), 71-91; Pistarino, Geo. “The Genoese in
Pera-Turkish Galata,” Mediterranean Historical Review 1 (1986), 63-85.
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and 1610s. 23 Their members held a preeminent position within their Perot community but
also traded with Venetian and other Ottoman merchants, partook in the patronage
networks of Ottoman officials, owned ships, used legal and economic services of the
Venetian chancellery, and paid consular duties to the Venetian embassy. Clearly, they
moved across multiple communal and legal regimes: the Perot community, the Ottoman
imperial system, and the Venetian community. Thanks to their extensive social and
economic relations with Venetian merchants and the embassy and to their trade activities
they considered themselves as members of the Venetian community and were considered
as such by the latter’s representatives, at least as their commercial activities are
concerned. However, Ottoman authorities did not agree with such identification.
A rare petition (supplica) of a member of the Pironi family, Stefano di Antonio, in
1615 sheds lights on the negotiated and performative ritual of claiming membership in
the Venetian community. 24 Stefano petitioned the bailo to ask for protection against
(unspecified) mistreatments and abuses by Ottoman authorities (avanie turchesche)
which Ottoman subjects are “usually” subjected to. He claimed that himself, his father,
and his ancestors had been “loyal” (devoti) towards and “humble servants” (humilissimi
servitori) of Venice. According to him, his long-term commercial ventures with Venice,
his regular payments of the cottimo, and by the fact that he never brought a Venetian
subject to an Ottoman court represent proofs of his loyalty. He pleaded to obtain the
“grace” (gratia) 25 to enjoy Venetian “protection” like Venetian subjects and other
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Dursteler, Venetians, 130-150.
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BAC 317, reg. 3, fols. 81v/82r (4 September 1615).

On the concept of “grace” in the early modern world see Peristiany, John George, and Julian Pitt-Rivers.
“Introduction” Peristiany and Pitt-Rivers. Honor and Grace in Anthropology (Cambridge: Cambridge
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“servants” of Venice through the issuance, at the bailo’s request, of an Ottoman imperial
commandment (called hüküm) stating his status as Venetian subject. Finally, he adds that,
should he enjoy such privilege, he would continue to trade benefitting the Venetian
treasury and the embassy through the payment of consular duties.
This document shows how an Ottoman subject self-refashioned himself as a
member of the Venetian community through the rhetorical device of a long-established
loyalty to Venice by himself and his ancestors and by showing that he had already
enjoyed the trade rights enjoyed by Venetian citizens and fulfilled his obligations as
member of this community: the payment of the cottimo and the respect of community’s
rules, such as the prohibition against suing a Venetian subject in an Ottoman court. 26
These social actions produced public reputation and through them Stefano “proved” to
behave like a Venetian subject and the baili effectively recognized him as a member of
the community by supporting his trade ventures with Venice and allowing him, as well as
his other relatives, to participate to the community’s most important decisions in the
Council of the Twelve.
A last aspect of those registered as Venetian merchants deserves our attention,
that is, how the identification of these individuals actually took place. In the registers of
the chancellery, we find no instances of registration of “Venetian merchants” when they
arrived in Istanbul for the first time. Individual registration in the Venetian chancellery
University Press, 1992), 1–18. Such award of privilege was an important tool used by Venetian authorities
in creating an informal political patronage with local officials in Venetian dominions in the Levant. See
O’Connell, Monique. Men of Empire: Power and Negotiation in Venice's Maritime State (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2009), 97-117.
We encounter a similar rhetoric of devotion and service to the Venetian community the petitions
forwarded to Venetian authorities by Ottoman subjects in provincial towns who applied to become
Venetian consuls. Signori, Proteggere i Privilegi, 103-135.
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was not mandatory and it took place only when individuals sought to be recognized as
members of the community. This was not the case with the aforementioned Venetian
merchants. Unfortunately, our sources tell us nothing about how they identified
themselves once arrived in Istanbul. However, based on existing literature on the
medieval and early modern Mediterranean, we can put forth some hypotheses.
Firstly, in the seventeenth century, letters of recommendation were a wide-spread
instrument of identification used by merchants and single travelers. 27 These documents
were usually written by influential individuals: in our case, the latter might have been
Venetian citizens residing in Venice, likely the principal partners of our merchants. The
bailo too issued these documents to both Venetian and Ottoman subjects of any religious
faith, sex, and occupation. 28 Another device of identification was the fede, a legal
certificate, which, in the early modern period, registered different legal and economic
deeds as well as individual identity. Individuals obtained it by appealing to notary courts
where written document or, more likely, the testimony of their acquaintances
(fidefacente) confirmed their identity. These two types of documents could have provided
the bailo and his secretary with a proof of the reputation of the merchants which, coupled
with trade activities and other social actions, made their registration in the chancellery
records unnecessary.
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Venetian records show several examples of letters of recommendation produced by the bailo to Ottoman
subjects. For instance, see SDC, b. 75, No 23, f. 271r (20 May 1613). Documents of identification did not
include safe-conducts since they constituted travel documents and Venetian subjects moving to Ottoman
territories did not usually employ such documents given that the Capitulations stipulated the safety of
Venetian subjects and protection of their goods. Signori, Proteggere i Privilegi, 136-138.

44

Despite Venetian merchants did not seek to be individually registered in the
chancellery records, they occasionally recorded their goods in notarized documents (51
instances) such as bills of lading or powers of attorney. This registration took place
through marks (marchi) which were stamped on the goods and which the merchants
recorded at the chancellery. Such marks belonged to either the merchant applying to the
chancellery or his business partner(s) in Venice or in Ottoman lands. 29 Another procedure
(in 138 cases) allowed for the registration of the ownership of merchandise, letters of
credit, and commercial agreements, through the recognition by merchants in Istanbul of
the handwriting (mano) of their absentee partner(s) in signature on documents (such as
bills of exchange, commercial letters) which the former had notarized in the chancellery.
At least two individuals, had to recognize the handwriting under oath. 30 As these
procedures show, Venetian merchants were more concerned to render their goods
identifiable rather than have themselves identified in the chancellery.
Colonial subjects 31
The largest section of the Venetian community in Istanbul was constituted by
colonial subjects coming mostly from Crete, Venice’s last major possession in the
Levant, and the Aegean island of Tinos. In his final report (relazione) of his
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For instance, see BAC 277, reg. 397, fol. 212 r (14 March 1613).

Ibidem, fols. 10r/11v (6 April 1612). For these procedures to register merchants’ goods, credits, and
commercial letters see Mueller, Reinhold C. “Merchants and their Merchandise: Identity and Identification
in Medieval Italy,” in Moatti and Kaiser (eds), Gens de passage en Méditerranée, 313-344; Piasentini,
Stefano. “L’identificazione delle persone negli atti di un notaio veneziano del Cinquecento,” in Antonielli,
Livo (ed.) Procedure, metodi, strumenti per l’identificazione, g15-34.
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Following Benjamin Arbel, I call Venetian subjects from the Levant as “colonial subjects.” Arbel,
“Colonie d’oltremare,” in Tenenti Alberto, and Ugo Tucci (eds), Storia di Venezia, vol. v: Il Rinascimento:
società ed economia (Rome: Istituto della Enciclopedia italiana 1996), 947–985.
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ambassadorship before the Venetian Senate in 1612, the bailo Simone Contarini
recounted that more than 3.000 of individuals hailing from these two islands resided in
Istanbul. However, the Ottoman census of the Europeans in Galata in 1616 registered
only 71 individuals from these islands. 32
In scholarly literature, Venetian subjects from the Levant are usually described as
“Greeks” even though the meaning of the term “Greek” in the early modern period did
not refer to a specific ethnic, political, and geographical community. “Greek” could refer
to a religious group (Orthodox Christians), a linguistic group, and also a profession (such
as sailors in the Mediterranean ports and merchants in the Balkans). 33 In the records of
the Venetian chancellery the term “Greek” is extremely rare (only 11 cases) and we trace
colonial subjects only when court officials registered their place of origin (268
individuals between 1609 and 1620). The baili in their reports to Venice described these
colonial subjects exclusively according to their places of origin, for instance, they call
Cretans as “Candiotti” (from “Candia, the Venetian name for both Crete and its capital,
the modern Heraklion) while those from Tinos are “Tiniotti.” The lack of any reference
to a religious identity or to the political status of these colonial subjects makes impossible
to distinguish between Orthodox and Catholics and between Venetian and Ottoman

32

“Relazione di Simone Contarini” in Barozzi and Berchet, Le relazioni, 1, 229; VGMA, 1722, fol. 13-15.

Grenet, Mathieu. La Fabrique communautaire. Les Grecs à Venise, Livourne et Marseille, 1770-1840
(Rome Athènes, École française de Rome et École française d’Athènes), 17-62; Seirinidou, Vassiliki.
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Mediterraneans: Transnational and Imperial Histories (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2016), 131167, 136-148; Burke, Ersie C. The Greeks of Venice, 1498-1600: immigration, settlement and integration
(Turnhout: Brepols Publishers, 2016), 183-209.
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Christian subjects. 34 Furthermore, we lack also any information about the civil status of
these individuals in their hometowns which suggests a lack of a normative framework, at
least in the Venetian chancellery in Istanbul, to deal with colonial subjects in the
Venetian chancellery. 35
Colonial subjects came to Istanbul mostly to find occupation in the city’s
numerous industries or in low-profile professions. The Ottoman census of 1616 registered
them as 15 worked as weavers (yapağıcı), 16 as grocers (bostancı), 15 as coopers
(varilci), 11 as sailors (mellah), 7 as daily laborers (ırgat), 2 as bakers (hayyat), one as an
assistant of a merchant (hizmetkar), and only one as merchant (tacir). 36 A document from
the chancellery, dated 1627, described forty one of them as working in the woolen
industry which, together with shipbuilding in the Ottoman arsenal, constituted the most
important occupation for Venetian colonial subjects in Istanbul. 37 The Venetian
government was much concerned about the emigration to Istanbul of this workforce since
it feared that it would weaken the Venetian shipbuilding industry in the Levantine
colonies in a period of persistent Ottoman military threat against these territories.
Consequently, in the first decades of the seventeenth century, it instructed the baili to
encourage subjects to return to their native places with promises of new occupations,

34
Venetian islands in the Levant hosted large groups of Catholics. Arbel, “Venice’s Maritime Empire,”
164-170.

The same was true for the Venetian notaries in fifteenth-century Alexandria. Apellániz, “Venetian
trading networks,” 165.
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financial aid, and by granting safe-conducts to those who had been banned from the
colonies. 38
Another important group of colonial subjects in Istanbul was involved in the trade
between Istanbul and the islands of Tinos and Crete. The officials of the Venetian
chancellery never record them as “merchants” even though the records of this institution
contain several examples of their commercial activities. Cretan merchants brought to
Istanbul a vast array of agricultural products from olive oil, raisins, lemon juice, but,
more important, the famed Cretan wines. Some of them ventured into the Black Sea,
which the Ottomans had closed to European shipping since the fifteenth century, to trade
with the Ottoman tributary Principality of Moldovia and the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth. 39 These Cretan merchants played a minor role in the life of the Venetian
community since they never took part to the Council of the Twelve and they show a
lower social and economic profile in comparison with those registered as “Venetian
merchants.” 40 However, there are a few notable exceptions.
An example is the family partnership of Giovanni Battista Veveli and his sons
Costantino and Luca from Rethymnon. Between 1580s and 1630s, they engaged in the

For instance, see SDelC, reg. 10, fols. 128r/129v (6 February1607). See also, Dursteler, Venetians in
Constantinople, 84/85.
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lucrative wine trade between Crete and the Moldavian town of Kiliya (today in Ukraine),
from where they dispatched their goods to Polish towns, and they imported to Istanbul
and Venetian territories local products such as sturgeon, caviar, and codfish. They owned
ships, sailed in the Black Sea, and entered agency and credit relations with numerous
Venetian and Ottoman subjects and officials in Istanbul and Moldova. Costantino married
the daughters of Moldovan princes (hospodar), played a role in the principality’s political
life, and held administrative offices in that principality, such as that of chief customs
official in the principality. In their trade activities, they used both Venetian and Ottoman
legal institutions and appealed to the bailo when they faced problems with Ottoman
authorities in Black Sea ports or when they suffered losses due to pirate attacks. 41 These
merchants clearly were major economic actors connecting the Venetian, Ottoman, and
eastern European markets and entertained relations with Ottoman officials as well. Yet
can we call them “Venetian merchants”? They did not trade with Venice, did not take
part to any session of the Council of the Twelve, and used the legal and notarial services
of the Venetian chancellery only seldom (16 cases out of 2136 court entries) and there
they are never recorded as “Venetian merchants.” Overall, they did not take part to the
main Venetian mercantile networks connecting Venice and the Levant, but they crated
new extensive ones with Ottoman subjects and authorities. In case of need, they appealed

For a sketch of the business careers of Battista, Costantino, and Luca Veveli see Luca, Christian. “La
gestione familiare degli affari mercantili nel commercio internazionale riguardante l’area del Basso
Danubio durante il XVII secolo: la fortuna dei Vevelli, dei Locadello e dei Pepanos,” in Cavaciocchi,
Simonetta (ed.), La famiglia nell’economia europea. Secc. XIII–XVIII/The Economic Role of the Family in
the European Economy from the 13th to the 18th Centuries. Atti della «Quarantesima Settimana di Studi»,
6–10 aprile 2008 (Florence: Florence University Press, 2009), 527–541. For instances of the baili’s support
to them vis-à-vis Ottoman authorities, see BOA, DED 13/1, sayfa 116, No 589 and 590 (8 Ramazan
1023/12 October 1614).
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to Venetian institutions and the baili supported them in controversies with Ottoman
authorities.
There was not a prevalent migration pattern of Venice’s colonial subjects in
Istanbul. Some of them went back to their native towns after a certain period of
employment, others moved together with their families or they joined their kin who had
already migrated there, while others married local Ottoman Christian women and started
families and never returned to their native lands. 42 Some merged with the large Christian
community of the Ottoman capital (mostly Orthodox Greeks) accepting Ottoman
sovereignty while others claimed membership in the Venetian community. In order to be
recognized as Venetians they appealed to the Venetian chancellery for a certificate, called
either a fede (see above) or a bollettino del carazo (a certificate of exemption from the
harac), registering that they were Venetian subjects. They obtained these documents
either through the testimony of other people or by presenting some written
documentation, such as fedi issued by Venetian officials or preeminent individuals, such
as clergymen, in their home countries. 43 In the early seventeenth century, fedi/bollettini
were relatively cheap as they costed 4 aspers, and this might explain why several
individuals applied to them. 44
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Dursteler, Venetians in Constantinople, 77-88.

Unfortunately, we have little evidence of how such identification took place in the chancellery. In a rare
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In the period before the War of Crete (1645-1669), these documents survived in
specific registers of the chancellery only for a few years between 1597 and 1606.
Between 1601 and 1606, 333 individuals obtained to these documents: they come mostly
from Crete (183) and Tinos (127). 45 Theoretically, Ottoman authorities recognized these
documents even though research so far does not show, with a degree of certainty, if this
was the case and how such recognition took place. Furthermore, theoretically they lasted
one year after which they had to be renewed by the holders. Yet, public reputation and
social practices might have made such renewal unnecessary. 46
Consular registration was not obligatory, and it was not a central concern for
Venetian officials, rather, it was voluntary act by individuals seeking to enjoy the status
of protected foreigners in the Ottoman Empire. Apart from a very few individuals from
Venice and the Terraferma (3), those seeking these documents were colonial subjects
from the Levant. None of the Venetian merchants sought such certification. The typically
low social and economic profile of colonial subjects and their blurred relationship with
the Venetian community may explain their recourse to consular registration. Apart from
paying the fees charged by the chancellery for legal and notarial services, they did not
seem to have contribute much to the life of community. On the contrary of those
registered as “Venetian merchants,” artisans, daily labors, and other subjects not involved
in trade did not pay consular duties and they did not take part in the community’s main
decisions.

BAC 297, reg. 1-3 (unnumbered pages) Other individuals came from the Ionian Islands of Zakynthos and
Cephalonia.
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Venetian colonial subjects also included groups of Cretan Jews. Since the
medieval period, Venetian Crete hosted small but thriving communities of Romaniote
Jews and, from the sixteenth century onwards Sephardic Jews as well, who were engaged
in trade between the island and Byzantine and later Ottoman territories. 47 The Venetian
chancellery contain information about the legal and economic activities of a small
number of Cretan Jews (21 individuals) who are registered according to their town of
birth (for instance, hebreo di Candia). The relations between these Jews and the Venetian
community were much blurred. Cretan Jews never applied for a fede/bollettino del carazo
to be recognized as Venetian subject and the reports of the baili in the first two decades
of the seventeenth century do not contain instances of baili’s defending the stance of
Cretan Jews vis-à-vis Ottoman authorities. No evidence from the years of our study
shows the willingness of these Jews to claim membership in the Venetian community and
the Ottoman census of 1616 do not record any of them as part of the community.
Other members of the community
After free colonial subjects, the second largest group of members of the Venetian
community were the convicted individuals (banditi). From the late sixteenth century
onwards, hundreds of individuals, mostly men but also a few women, who had been
banned by Venetian authorities in the Levant moved to Istanbul to seek occupations in
city’s industries. Some of them resided in the Ottoman capitals for several years, finding
occupation, marrying Ottoman subjects, and accepting Ottoman suzerainty. Others after a
certain period re-claimed membership into the Venetian community by applying to the
Jacoby, “Venice and the Venetian Jews;” Papadia-Lala, Anastasia. “The Jews in early modern Venetian
Crete: community and identities,” Mediterranean Historical Review 27/ 2 (2012), 141–150; Lauer, Rena N.
Colonial Justice and the Jews of Venetian Crete (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019).
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bailo for safe-conducts or to have their sentence repelled. In 1581, the Council of Ten
(Concilio dei Dieci) authorized the baili to annul/modify sentences issued by Venetian
tribunals in the Levant and to issue safe-conducts (salvocondotto) for convicted
individuals enabling them to return to their home places in order to settle their
controversies without being arrested or to temporarily settle in specific areas. In other
cases, the latter’s freedom depended on a certain period of service, especially in the
Venetian fleet. 48
Only between 1609 and 1620, 873 bandits appeared before the bailo. Almost all
hailed from the Venetian islands of Crete, Tinos, Cephalonia, and Zakynthos. A few of
them (16) were Cretan Jews while other 6 were Christian women. Bandits, together with
manumitted slaves, are the only groups of individuals being registered in the chancellery
through a physical description. Such registration procedure produced many more
information than any other one about an individual because it aimed to provide more
detailed identification of their carrier once in Venetian territory to avoid detention.
However, it was also more prone to falsification. 49 One of the reasons why the baili
easily granted safe-conduct or reverse sentences was to control Venetian subjects residing
in the Ottoman capital in order to avoid potential controversies with Ottoman authorities
due to their actions and also their conversion to Islam. Safe-conducts and the annulment
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of sentences were means through which the bailo tried to encourage these individuals to
return to their native countries.
Another important group in the Venetian community were the dragomans
(dragomanni), diplomatic interpreters and translators. They played an important role in
the social and economic life of the Venetian community because they conducted most of
the diplomacy between the baili and Ottoman authorities, the negotiations between
Venetian merchants and Ottoman officials over trade-related issues, and they represented
Venetian individuals in Ottoman courts. 50 During the 1610s, they were 16 and they all
originated from a few preeminent Catholic families of Galata. The Venetian Senate
elected them through an appointment deed (patente), and they received a regular stipend
from the Venetian government. Given the important services they provided to the
Venetian embassy and the Venetian community in Istanbul, from the early seventeenth
century onwards, they began to enjoy legal and fiscal privileges akin to those of Venetian
subjects. Such development, as we see below, was at times contested by Ottoman
authorities. 51
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(Leiden: Brill, 2005), 63-67. Another groups of dragomans, usually employed for less important functions,
were Venetian subjects trained in the language school of the embassy, giovani di lingua (translator
apprentices), which was founded in 1551 in order to free the baili from their dependence of non-Venetian
dragomans. Dursteler, Venetians in Constantinople, 37.
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Why to be a member of the Venetian community?
Why did individuals of different social economic background seek to be
recognized as Venetian? Which advantages did membership in the Venetian community
entail? Merchants, colonial subjects, and others sought foremost the legal and economic
privileges enshrined in the Capitulations issued by the Sultan to the Republic and
Venetian diplomatic protection more generally. Among these privileges, fiscal
exemption, inheritance, and juridical advantages played a central role. Fiscal exemption
included the poll tax on non-Muslims and other taxes introduced by the Ottoman
authorities from the last sixteenth century onwards. 52 Venetian merchants, a minority
within the Venetian community, paid only customs duties, whose amount was a constant
source of negotiations between Ottoman and Venetian officials.
Inheritance privileges included immunity from the authority of the beytülmalcı, an
official of the Ottoman Treasury, charged with managing the estates of deceased
individuals. 53 As a standard procedure, when an individual died without apparent heirs in
Ottoman territories, this official prepared the inventories of his estates, and waited for
certain amount of time for heirs and creditors to lay claims to such properties. In the
cases of Venetian subjects, the baili collected the properties of the deceased, drew
inventories, and arranged for their dispatch to Venetian territories. A few (8 out of 333
documents) of the above-described certificates of Venetian subjecthood (fedi or bollettini
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del carazo) sought by colonial subjects are registered in the name of dead individuals
hinting that the protection of a line of succession, especially in case of the existence of
family-based commercial partnerships (called fraterna in Venice), was another reason for
colonial subjects to claim membership in the Venetian community. 54
Lastly, but likely the most important reason, individuals sought the baili’s
diplomatic protections in case of controversies with Ottoman authorities and subjects.
Venetian ambassadorial reports are replete with cases of Venetian subjects of any social
and economic background seeking the baili’s support when enduring physical violence,
the imposition of illegal taxes, and economic losses at the hands of Ottoman authorities
and subjects belonging to any religious group in the marketplace. 55 As a matter of fact,
the baili strove to defend any Venetian subjects from Ottoman threats regardless of their
socioeconomic and religious background.
3—Ottoman Identification Practices
In addition to the Venetian chancellery and individual actors, Ottoman legal
authorities were the third entity involved in processes of identification of Venetian
subjects residing in Istanbul. Such processes were contingent on both Ottoman
identification practices and the diplomatic agreements with Venetian officials.
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In the early modern Ottoman Empire, the classification of individuals reflected
the fiscal needs of the state rather than concerns with controlling the mobility of
individuals. Apart from legal disputes heard in Ottoman courts and major demographic
movements developing under particular military and socioeconomic circumstances,
Ottoman authorities registered individuals only for fiscal reasons. 56 As matter of fact,
taxation constituted the main taxonomical principle in Ottoman society: regardless of
religious and ethnic affiliation, the subjects of the Ottoman sultans were divided between
tributary tax-payers (reaya), mostly peasants, merchants, and artisans, and non-tax payers
(askeri), who included army and administrative officials, and jurists/scholars (ulema). 57
Fiscal obligations affected also the other key marker of social division in the
empire, that is, religion. Following the precepts of Islamic law (Sharia/şeriat), Ottoman
officials conferred on Christians and Jews, called zimmi (literally a “tributary
individuals”), a discriminatory fiscal and legal standing: they had to pay a poll-tax (called
either cizye or harac in the Ottoman context), faced several restrictions on worship, attire,
and at court, and they had to pay higher rates of customs duties. Specific Ottoman tax
collectors (called haraccı) registered those non-Muslims liable to the payment of the

Under distressful political, economic, and social circumstances, such as during conflicts and rebellions
generating large-scale immigration from the countryside into cities, the Ottoman authorities enforced
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harac, usually the head of a household, in particular registers (cizye defterleri). 58 The
close association between non-Muslims and the payment of the harac is evident in the
term haracgüzar (“harac-payer”) which in Ottoman administrative and diplomatic
documents referred to non-Muslim Ottoman subjects. Venetian officials too adopted this
term (carazaro in the Venetian sources) to refer to Ottoman Christians and Jews.
The fiscal status was the most important marker of the legal and economic
standing of Venetian subjects residing and conducting business in the Ottoman Empire.
The Capitulations defined the condition of Venetians residing in the empire foremost
according to exemption from the harac, which was the key marker of Ottoman
subjecthood. For instance, the Capitulations of 1604 stated the following:
“Those coming from Venice and its territories to my Well-Protected Domains to
conduct business, be married or bachelor, on a temporary basis should not pay the
harac” 59
This clause, more than any other articles, defined the status of the Venetian “protected
foreigner,” called in Islamic legal terminology müstemin. It was repeated in numerous
imperial rescripts (firman or hüküm) issued whenever controversies arose about the status
of Venetian subjects. As we have seen above, the status of protected foreigners entailed
several privileges which distinguished the Venetians from Ottoman subjects.
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The article of the Capitulations links the enjoyment of the status of the protected
foreigner to a limited duration of the permanence in the empire and to the conduction of
business. According to the Hanafi legal doctrine (the official school of Islamic law of the
Ottoman Empire) a müstemin was the recipient of an aman, a safe-conduct. Theoretically,
the validity of such safe-conduct was limited to one lunar year after which the beneficiary
would either have to leave the country or he would automatically become a non-Muslim
Ottoman subject (zimmi). 60 However, in the Ottoman case, such limitation was usually
not observed and Venetians, as well as the subjects of other European states who
benefitted from the Capitulations, resided in the empire for extended periods. For
instance, Nicolò Soruro, one of the most active Venetian merchants of the early
seventeenth century, married an Ottoman Christian woman and resided in Istanbul
consecutively at least twenty-three years, from 1601 up to his death in 1624. 61 Records of
the Venetian and other European communities are replete of instances of merchants and
other individuals sojourning in Ottoman cities for several years. 62
Nevertheless, the duration of residence at times became a matter of controversy
between the Venetian and the Ottoman authorities. Especially from the early seventeenth
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century onwards, the growing number and size of European communities in the empire
led to periodical attempts by Ottoman officials to regulate the duration of the residence of
Europeans and to restrict the number of individuals enjoying the status of protected
foreigners. Such initiatives often brought about diplomatic controversies and negotiations
between Ottoman and European officials over the status of the protected foreigners. At
stakes was access to economic resources, such as local markets and occupation in
Ottoman industries, and state sovereignty over an increasingly large number group of
individuals. Ottoman and Venetian authorities differed over the requirements, such as the
length of residence, marital status, and occupation, to be identified as member of the
Venetian community in the empire. Controversies and negotiations to solve them
represent an excellent context for understanding the points of contentions in determining
membership in the Venetian community and either convergent or divergent practices of
identification employed by Ottoman and Venetian authorities. Furthermore, they are
another proof of the fundamentally negotiated nature of membership into European
communities. We analyze here one of these episodes, the already mentioned “the Carazo
Affair,” and after discuss identification practices of Venetians appearing in Islamic
courts.
The Carazo Affair 1613-1617
Between fall of 1613 and the spring of 1617, the international European
community in Galata was engaged in repealing repeated attempts by the kadı of Galata,
Ali Efendi (office 1613-1616), to impose the harac and other Ottoman taxes on the
subjects of Republic of Venice, France, England, and the Dutch Republic, including
dragomans attached to the embassies of these countries. This episode, known as the
60

“Carazo Affair” involved joint diplomatic efforts from European ambassadors and the
participation of high-ranking political and legal Ottoman authorities, two Grand Viziers
(the sultan’s deputy) and two chief jurisprudents of the Ottoman Empire (şeyhülislam). 63
It was not an isolated episode as Ottoman attempts to levy the harac from foreign
Europeans took place occasionally in Istanbul and in the empire’s commercial hubs till
the early nineteenth century. Furthermore, it represented one of the many instances of
conflict between a Hanafi law-focused interpretation of the contents of the Capitulations
championed by Ottoman jurists, kadı, and their supporters, and another one based on
sultanic legislation (kanun) and customary law (örf), which was usually promoted by
those high-ranking state officials, such many numerous grand viziers, who prioritized
commercial development and the establishment of peaceful relations with European
powers. 64 While other studies describe the religious and socio-economic context of such
episode, I focus on the negotiation between Ottoman and Venetian officials over the
definition of the protected foreigners.
The Ottoman justification for imposing the harac are all clear in a fetva (fatwa, a
non-binding legal opinion) issued by the şeyhülislam Hocazade Esad Efendi (office 161522; 1623-25), on request of the kadı Ali Efendi sometimes in 1616.
Question: “Some infidels from the Abode of War (harbi taifesinden) come to the
Abode of Islam (darülislam) with a safe-conduct either individually or by groups
63
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of two, they reside for five, ten, twenty, and thirty years and even more, they
purchase fields and vineyards producing revenues (akâr), and they marry with
non-Muslim Ottoman women (zimmiye) and have children….Are they liable,
according to the Sharia, to pay the harac?
Answer: “…By residing one year they become non-Muslim Ottoman subjects
(ehl-i zimmet). They must pay the harac and they must be prevented from
returning to the Abode of War.” 65
As this fetva shows, for the Ottoman authorities the key points of contention were the
Europeans’ long duration of residence in the empire, the private ownership (mülk) of
agricultural lands, and marriage with Ottoman women. According to the aforementioned
şeyhülislam, the kadı Ali Efendi, and other Ottoman authorities who advocated for a
stricter implementation of Hanafi Islamic law in the Capitulations, Europeans who
sojourned one year and beyond, owned revenue-generating agricultural lands, and
married local Christian women lost the status of protected foreigners and became
“naturalized” Ottoman non-Muslims. 66 In other words, these three actions demonstrated,
for the Ottoman authorities, their “willingness” to definitely settle in the empire accepting
Ottoman sovereignty. By becoming Ottoman subjects, they were liable to Ottoman taxes,
but they also acquired the undisputed rights to own real estate, marry local women, and
start a family. The enjoyment of these rights by Europeans was source of contention

SK, Kasidecizâde, Fetâvâ-yı Esad Efendi No 277, p. 76. Venetian reports too mention the issuance of this
fetva as legitimizing the imposition of the harac. For instance, see SDC, b. 81, No 40, fols. 423-427 (18
September 1616).
65

The fetva specified the ownership of “revenue-producing (akâr)” agricultural lands as a marker of
Ottoman subjecthood. Since they generated an income for the owner, such properties were liable to state
taxation. To my knowledge, fetvas’ collections and manuals of Hanafi jurisprudence circulating in the
Ottoman Empire do not contain information on whether ownership of urban dwellings or warehouses by
foreigners was controversial for Hanafi jurists. For instance, see Ibrahim Halebi, İzahlı Mülteka el-ebhur
tercümesi (translated by Mustafa Uysal, 3 Volumes, İstanbul: Elif Ofset Tesisleri, 1975), Vol. 3, 320/321;
and Neticetü'l-Fetava - Şeyhülislam Fetvaları (derleyenler es-Seyyid Ahmed Efendi, es-Seyyid Hafiz
Mehmed b. Ahmed el-Gedûsî ; hazırlayan, Süleyman Kaya [and 4 others]; editör Mustafa Demiray.
İstanbul: Klasik 2014), 109.
66

62

between Ottoman and European authorities during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. 67
After the issuance of this fetva, in September 1616, the kadı conducted the census
(tahrir) of all the Europeans residing in the l district of Galata and in its surroundings in
order verify their marital status and ownership of real estate. It also included all the
dragomans serving the embassies. This census was not a common Ottoman practice of
identification but, rather, the product of the Carazo affair, a diplomatic controversy. 68
Ottoman authorities did not usually register European protected foreigners in Ottoman
Empire since they were exempted from state taxes. Those among them practicing trade
paid customs duties on the goods they both brought to and exported from Istanbul and
they received from customs officials (emin) a receipt (tezkere or temessük) of this
payment. However, to my knowledge, customs officials did not record such receipts in
specific registers. 69
Table 1.1: The Protected Foreigners (müstemin taifesi) in Galata in 1616 Census
Community of origin (taife)

67

Number of Individuals

Venetian

108

French

25

English

19

Dutch

12

Total

164

Boogert, The Capitulations, 168-172, Faroqhi, “The Venetian Presence,” 366/367.

Ottoman authorities conducted a similar census of European communities (in this case throughout the
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Table 1.2: Non-Muslim Ottoman Subjects (zimmi) in Galata in 1616 Census
Groups

Number of Individuals

Franks of Galata (efrenciyan)

48

Immigrants from Tinos (istendilli)

40

Immigrants from Crete (giritli)

31

Dragomans (tercüman)

34

Others

1,008 70

Total

1,161

The census registered 108 individuals as belonging to the Venetian community in
addition to 11 dragomans out of the 34 dragomans of European countries. Furthermore, it
listed the colonial subjects (71) coming from the islands of Tinos and Crete as Ottoman
subjects (zimmi). It shows physical description, marital status, occupation, and place of
residence for each of them. 71 Those recorded as merchants (tacir) were a minority (37)
while the rest of individuals were coopers, weavers, jewelers, sailors, ship scribes, tailors,
grocers, and helpers and accountants of merchants, and a few other professions. Only two
Venetians owned real estate (mülk) were they rest are recorded as living in rented houses
belonging to local Christians and Muslims or to Muslim charitable foundations (evkaf).
Among all, there were 32 married men, included two merchants.
Unlike Venetian subjects, the eleven Venetian dragomans are registered as “longtime inhabitants of Galata” (kadimden Galatalı olup) and as having avoided, with the

I included with the group “others” both recent immigrants and long-time residents of Galata who are
listed in the census. VGMA 1722, fols. 10-60.
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“excuse” (bahane) of working as interpreters, paying the harac and other state taxes.
They resided either in their own houses (4) or in the Venetian embassy (7). Lastly, the
census excluded from the Venetian community all those Catholics of Galata (Perots), 48
individuals, who, in the records of the Venetian chancellery, we have seen as registered
as “Venetian merchants.” Despite their intense trade activities with Venice, their payment
of consular duties, the participation to the community’s main decisions in the Council of
the Twelve, Ottoman legal and tax officials regarded them as Ottoman subjects and listed
them in a separate section for the tax-paying “Franks of Galata” (nefs-i Galata taife-i
efrenciyan). 72
The baili and the other European ambassadors opposed this classification and
considered the ensuing imposition of the harac as a violation of the Capitulations. Their
reports to Venice about the crisis shed light on the main concerns of Venetian officials:
the ruin of trade and the loss of both jurisdiction over numerous individuals and of
inheritance rights. Firstly, they opposed the one-year limit on the residence of the
merchants as they consider it greatly destructive for the conduct of trade. Secondly,
according to the the bailo Almorò Nani, despite the payment of the harac was not itself
burdensome (in 1616 it equaled only to two sequins yearly), it symbolized the acceptance
of Ottoman suzerainty: its imposition on the Venetians meant turning them into nonMuslim Ottoman subjects and, as a consequence, the baili would lose jurisdiction over
them. 73 Furthermore, as the latter repeated during any round of negotiations with
Ottoman officials, by paying the harac Venetian subjects would lose their estates, and
72
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The census registers the harac levied on each European subject to 545 aspers, that is, about 4 Venetian
ducats. VGMA, 1722, f. 11; SDC, b. 80, No 10, fols. 83-89 (17 November 1616).
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consequently those of their business principals in Venice, if they die in the empire since
officials of the Ottoman treasury (the aforementioned beytülmalcı) would confiscate
them. The protection of a line of succession, especially when that it jeopardized the
investments of Venetian citizens back in Venice, was an utmost concern for the baili. 74
The baili rejected the exclusion of married and property-owning individuals,
colonial subjects, and the dragomans from the privileges of the Capitulations. They
stressed the aforementioned article of the Capitulations (on page 26) which stated that the
merchants included either married or unmarried were exempted from the harac, although
it did not specify whether marriage with Ottoman Christian women was allowed. The
Venetian Senate repeatedly instructed them to defend all Venetian subjects from the
harac, even those who had married local women, owned properties in the Ottoman
capital, and lived in the empire for several years. 75 Furthermore, both in its letters to the
baili and those directed to Ottoman authorities, it defended dragomans’ membership in
the Venetian community on the grounds that, despite they were born in the empire, they
served the Venetian embassy receiving a stipend and they “depended on Venice for
everything.” 76
After protracted negotiations between the European ambassadors and different
Ottoman authorities, a settlement was finally reached in spring 1617. The Imperial
Council, the chief executive body of the Ottoman Empire and a high court, issued an
imperial rescript (nişan-ı hümayun) which clarified the status of the protected foreigner.
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The order defines the latter as those merchants who comes to Istanbul “to conduct trade
and do business” (ticaret ve kar u kesb içün) “without settling indefinitely” (mütemekkin
olmayup) and “who are unmarried” (mücerred). 77 It continues stating that “those
[registered in the census] who, once in Istanbul, married local women, and purchase real
estate and refuse to pay the harac with the excuse that they trade and they are not
permanent residents should pay that tax…and, if they die without an heir, their movable
and immovable estates should be confiscated.” Furthermore, the imperial order exempted
from the harac only three dragomans of Venice and of the other European states.
This imperial order provided a more specific definition of the protected Venetian
than those of the Capitulations. It restricted membership into this privileged group only to
those unmarried merchants who had come to the empire and went back to their home
countries after conducting business. However, it did not clarify the crucial issue of the
duration limit of residence apart from the generic expression “without settling
permanently” and it did not establish any procedures in this regard. If this ruling had been
enforced, it would have excluded from such category all but 35 of the 108 individuals
recorded as Venetians in the Ottoman census and the much larger number of individuals
whom the bailo considered and treated as members of the Venetian community. In
particular, all those colonial subjects who sought to be recognized as Venetian and

The lengthy definition of the protected foreigner in the nişan is the following “..meşarüileyh
vilayetlerinden ticaret ve kar u kesb içün gelüp mütemekkin olmayup ticaret ile vilayetlerine giden tüccar
taifesinden Galata ve nevahiyesindende ve makar-ı hilafetim olan İstanbul ve navahisinde gelüp tavattun
etmeyup mücerred tüccar taifesinden varid olan ferman-ı şerifim mücibince harac talep olunmayup min
baad rencide itmeyeler.” VGMA, 1722, f. 1/2 (ahar-i Cemaziyü’l-ahir 1026/ 25June-10 July 1617). The
same document can also be found in DED 13/1, s. 102, No 719.
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obtained from the baili a fede or bollettino del carazo testifying their status would have
lost such privileged condition.
However, from Venetian reports following the Carazo affair we do not know if or
how far Ottoman authorities enforced this ruling since we do not find any complaints
about the forced payment of the harac. It surely did not establish a lasting practice
because during the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries periodical imperial orders
reinstated the prohibitions against foreign merchants marrying local women and owning
real estate. 78 Furthermore, Venetian and Ottoman records contain instances of Venetian
subjects marrying Ottoman women who resided without major problems in the years
following the issuance of 1616 prohibition. 79
Registering Venetians in Ottoman courts: 1604-1625
Apart from fiscal needs under exceptional circumstances, the only other reason
for Ottoman authorities to register individual Venetian subjects was in case of civil and
criminal lawsuits litigated in Ottoman courts or when the former turned voluntarily to
these institutions to notarize legal and economic deeds. As we will see in the next
chapters, the Capitulations stipulated that Ottoman courts held jurisdiction over lawsuits
between Venetian and Ottoman subjects. 80 In the early seventeenth century, the main

For instance, in 1677 an imperial decree of the Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pasha prohibited European
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Ottoman court used by Venetians in Istanbul was the kadı court of Galata. It operated as a
civil and criminal tribunal and a notary office open to all Ottoman subjects as well as to
protected foreigners regardless of social status, gender, and religious identity. 81
Between 1604 and 1625, records (sicil) of the court of Galata contain 85 court cases
involving Venetian subjects out of 10.385 documents. Most of these cases were notarial
transactions (59) while the rest (26 cases) were lawsuits between Venetian and Ottoman
subjects belonging to different religious communities. 82 Court scribes (kâtib) registered
Venetians according to their profession (merchants, Venedik taciri, 39 individuals),
according only to their legal status as protected foreigner (müstemin, 9), and, according to
their place of origin and Catholic faith, as “Frank” (Efrenc/Frenk, 33). Furthermore, they
recorded 4 Venetian dragomans as either Frank or Ottoman non-Muslims (zimmi) but
never as Venetian protected foreigner (müstemin) showing, once again, the contested
identification of these individuals as members of the Venetian community in the early
seventeenth century. 83
The word “Frank” needs unpacking. The medieval term “Frank,” (Ar. ifranj,
efrenc and frenk in Ottoman Turkish) which was often employed in Ottoman literary and
legal texts, denoted Christian individuals originating from Western Europe and, in the

The other court available to Venetians was the Imperial Council headed by the Grand Vizier, the sultan’s
deputy. In this chapter I deal only with the kadı court of Galata.
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208/74 (2011-2), 129-138.
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early modern period, it could refer to both Catholics and Protestants (but not to Orthodox
Christians) residing in the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, Ottoman legal and fiscal
officials used the term to refer to Ottoman Catholic subjects, especially in Istanbul and in
the Aegean islands. 84 For instance, the Ottomans called “Franks” the members of
Galata’s Catholic community (Galata Frenkleri), the aforementioned Perots, who were
Ottoman subjects but, thanks to Capitulations granted them in 1453 (and renewed lastly
in 1625), they enjoyed some privileges inaccessible to other non-Muslim Ottoman
subjects. 85 The presence of this community complicated and blurred the differentiation,
in the court records, between those “Franks” who were Catholic Ottoman subjects and the
other “Franks” who hailed from Western Europe and were beneficiaries of the
Capitulations granted to their home state. In the years under study, 53 individuals
appeared registered as “Frank.” By focusing on the individual names of these Franks I
managed to identify at least 33 Venetians among them. It is possible that this number was
actually higher given the misspellings of Italian names by court scribes. It is also likely
that Ottoman legal authorities may have conflated between Galata’s native Catholics and
Venetian subjects. Both groups shared the Catholic faith, worshipped in the same
churches, and spoke two versions of vernacular Italian.

Şakiroğlu, Mahmut H. “Frenk,” Diyanet İslam Ansiklopedisi 5/13 (İstanbul: İslam Araştırmaları Merkezi,
1996), 197-199; Sobers-Khan, Slaves Without Shackles, 92/93; Bayraktar-Tellan, Elif. “The Clash of
‘Rum’ and ‘Frenk’: Orthodox-Catholic Interactions on the Aegean Islands in the Mid-Seventeenth to MidEighteenth Centuries and Their Impact in the Ottoman Capital,” in Özlem Çaykent and Luca Zavagno
(eds), Islands of the Eastern Mediterranean: a history of cross-cultural encounters (London: I.B. Tauris &
Co Ltd, 2014), 64-78.
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İnalcık, “Ottoman Galata;” Dursteler, Eric. “Education and identity in Constantinople’s Latin Rite
community, c. 1600,” Renaissance Studies, 18/2 (2004), 287-303; Bulunur, Kerim I. “II Mehmed
tarafindan galatalilara verilen 1453 ahidnâmesi ve buna yapilan eklemeler hakkinda yeni bilgiler,” Tarih
Dergisi 50 (2009), 59-85.
85

70

The use by Ottoman court officials of different and overlapping categories of
belonging to refer to members of the Venetian community point to the absence, at least in
the early seventeenth century, of a systematic taxonomy to identify the growing number
of Europeans residing in the empire. Furthermore, it shows a tension in registration
practices in kadı courts between a Hanafi law-based classification of all the Western
Europeans as members of a single Western European community (the “Frankish
community,” frenk taifesi) enjoying the same privileges and duties, and a growing
differentiation in the practice of long-distance trade and diplomatic relations between
different subgroups within such community (Istanbul’s Perots, the Venetians, the French,
the English, and the Dutch). 86
From the names of the Venetians appearing in the court of Galata we infer that 77
of out of 85 individuals belonged to the small group of businessmen whom the Venetian
chancellery recorded as “Venetian merchants” and who, as we have seen, played an
important role in long-distance trade and in the administration of the Venetian
community in the Council of the Twelve. Most of them were also registered as
“merchants” in the Ottoman census of 1616. Furthermore, three of these Venetians were
ship masters who participated in the Council of Twelve. Lastly, the already mentioned
Cretan merchant Costantino Veveli is registered simply as “protected foreigner”
(müstemin) in 4 different court entries showing that, as census too illustrates, Ottoman
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Court records from the second half of the seventeenth century show the disappearance of the term
“Frank” to refer to Western Europeans. Kuran, Timur (ed.) Mahkeme Kayıtları Işığında 17. Yüzyıl
İstanbul'unda Sosyo-Ekonomik Yaşam (Social and Economic life in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul:
Glimpses from court records) (Istanbul: Turkiye Bankası, 2010), V. 1, 831-920. In 1682, Ottoman
authorities refused to reconfirm the Capitulations to the Franks of Galata who thereafter became
assimilated to the status of Ottoman non-Muslims (zimmi). Mitler, “The Genoese in Galata,” 79/80.
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court authorities distinguished between Venetian subjects from Venice and its Italian
territories and those “protected foreigners” coming from Crete and Tinos. 87
The almost-exclusive presence of preeminent merchants among those registered
as “Venetians” in Ottoman court records suggests two possible explanations. We can
hypothesize that mostly high-profile merchants could apply to the kadı court of Galata
given the costs of applying to this institution and their knowledge of court procedures. 88
We can also speculate that Ottoman court officials, mirroring the practice of the 1616
census, registered as “protected foreigners” only those Venetians conducting longdistance trade and enjoying a high social standing in Galata’s business community. After
all, given the centrality of Hanafi legal doctrine in the workings of kadı courts, we can
except that court officials strictly followed its precepts in classifying non-Muslims as
either Ottoman subjects (zimmi) or protected foreigners (müstemin) in accordance with
the Islamic notion of a temporary safe-conduct for merchants. The conduct of trade, their
business reputation, and the payment of custom duties to the Ottoman treasury were
“proofs” for court officials that they were Venetian protected foreigners. Unfortunately,
given the highly formulaic character of the records, we cannot know how individuals
described themselves at court, especially what role did written records, the testimony of
acquaintances, or public reputation play in such identification procedures. 89 If the abovementioned hypothesis is plausible, we can also consider that low-profile non-merchant
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For instance, see GŞS 38, 4/A (24 Ramazan 1023/October 28, 1614). For other instances of Cretan
merchants whom Ottoman court officials did not register as members of the Venetian community, see
Bulunur, Osmanlı Galatası, 171/172 and 274.
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We will explore the procedures of this court in Chapter 6.

The testimony of Muslim men was necessary to certify the identity of the individuals appearing in the
court (ta‘rîf procedure). See Chapter 6, page 281.
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Venetian subjects, such as the artisans and daily labors coming from colonial possessions,
might have been registered as Ottoman Christians (zimmi) instead. 90
Apart from Christian Venetians, the years under study the records of the kadı
court of Galata contain two notarial transactions involving two Cretan Jews, Samarya
veled-i Isak and Luna (?) veled-i Elyaz. Court officials registered both as “Jews” (yahudi)
and they recorded the former as “member of the Cretan community” (Girid cemaatinden)
and the second as “inhabitant of Crete” (Girid ahalisinden), respectively. 91 We find here
no reference to Venetian subjecthood: court scribes registered Jewish subjects of Venice
as Ottoman Jews. Their cases suggest that, at least in the early seventeenth century,
Ottoman officials might have regarded European communities as religiously homogenous
groups. As shown in the texts of the Capitulations, they considered the Venetian
community foremost as one among the different groups (taife) that constituted a single
and universal “Christian community” (millet-i nasraniyye). However, research in the
records of Galata’s kadı court for the second half of the seventeenth century shows the
emergence of the taxonomy “Venetian Jew” (ex. Venedik taifesi yahudilerinden) as well
as that of “French Jews” (ex. França yahudilerinden). 92 These new categories point to a
change in the classification procedures adopted by Ottoman kadı courts to identify
members of European communities throughout the seventeenth century and it suggests a
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Testing this hypothesis would require a careful analysis of the names of all the thousands of nonMuslims appearing at the court of Galata, a goal well beyond that of the current study.
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Köse, Metin Ziya. “Avrupa’dan osmanlı devleti’ne: yeniçağ’da Galata’da müste’men Yahudilere dair
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new awareness by court officials of different categories of belonging to such political
groups beyond sharing a common Christian faith.
The classification as either Venetian or Ottoman subject entailed a different legal
status in Ottoman Muslim courts. As we will analyze in detail in Chapter 6, The
Capitulations stipulated several privileges for Venetian subjects in Ottoman tribunals in
matters of legal evidence accepted by the courts, prescribed the presence of Venetian
dragomans in court proceedings, and protected the estates of Venetian subjects from the
confiscation of state officials. An inheritance-related controversy case shows how the
differences in classification affected the legal status of the litigants during court sessions.
In 1624, the already mentioned Venetian merchant Nicolo Soruro died in Galata.
His death brought about a dispute over his inheritance between his two sons Pietro, the
eldest one, and Francesco, the youngest one who had been born from a different
mother. 93 Francesco’s mother was an Ottoman Christian (zimmiye) called Kokina. Pietro
brought to court Francesco and Kokina claiming Nicolo’s inheritance exclusively for
himself. As we have seen, according to the Capitulations the bailo had the authority to
collect the estates of Venetian subjects who died in the empire. However, the fact that the
late Nicolo had married a local Ottoman woman complicated the recovery of his estates
since his Ottoman wife and son advanced claims on his estates on the ground that,
“according to Islamic law” (şerʿle), they were entitled to receive a share of his
inheritance. All court records of this controversy described Nicolo as an Ottoman subject
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(zimmi) while in commercial disputes he had been involved previously he had been
recorded as a Venetian merchant (Venedik taciri). 94
This difference in individual classification entailed different legal procedures. On
the one hand, in the inheritance-related controversy the kadı of Galata applied standard
Hanafi legal norms on inheritance, which the Capitulations prohibited in legal suits with
Venetian subjects, treating Nicolo and his sons as Ottoman subjects. On the other hand,
in commercial lawsuits, Nicolo was identified as a “Venetian subject” and, consequently,
the kadı implemented the articles of the Capitulations in matters of legal procedure.
4—Conclusion
This chapter has illustrated how identification of Venetian subjects took place in
early seventeenth-century Istanbul. By focusing on the workings of Ottoman and
Venetian institutions, international treaties, individual actions, and diplomatic
negotiations, it has showed both the multiple actors who played a role in registration
processes of Venetians and the fundamentally negotiated and contested nature of such
processes. Neither Ottoman nor Venetian authorities required the formal registration of
individuals coming to Istanbul from Venice and its territories. As shown by the cases of
the Venetian colonial subjects, Galata’s Catholic merchants, and dragomans, some
individuals sought to be formally recognized as “Venetians” to enjoy specific legal and
economic privileges and to obtain the diplomatic support of Venetian officials. However,

For an example of a commercial controversy involving Soruro handled by the kadı court of Galata, see
GŞS 25, 143/B (14 Şaban 1013/5 January 1605).
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their actual leeway in claiming Venetian subjecthood was constrained by Ottoman legal
and administrative authorities.
On the Venetian side, identification as “Venetians” took place in different ways in
the Venetian chancellery according to the socioeconomic background of the individuals
applying to it. Merchants trading between Istanbul and Venice did not seek formal
registration in the chancellery. As I argued, through their social and business ties with
Venetian citizens and officials, their commercial activities, the payment of consular
duties, and their role in the community’s main decisions, they were “publicly” recognized
as Venetians. Such social actions played a role akin to letters of citizenship as it
demonstrated by the fact that even Ottoman subjects could become recorded as “Venetian
merchants” in the chancellery’s records. Conversely, non-merchants and low-profile
Venetian subjects, above those coming from Venice’s Levantine territories, were more
likely to apply for formal recognition as Venetian subjects since their association to
Venetian community was less evident in their social actions. Overall, the Venetian
chancellery played a crucial role in all these procedures of identification in different
ways: by supporting a web of social relations which created social reputation, by issuing
documents proving membership into the community, such as fedi/bollettini del Carazo,
and safe-conducts to bandits, and by offering legal and notarial services to a growing
number of individuals.
Ottoman authorities and courts were the last crucial actor in these registration
practices. They opposed the extension of the status of protected foreigners to both
Ottoman subjects, such as Galata’s Catholic dragomans and merchants, and to an
increasingly larger group of non-merchant immigrants from Venetian territories. The
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Carazo affair illustrates the points of contention in delimiting membership in the
Venetian community: long duration of residence in the empire, marriage with Ottoman
Christian women, and ownership of real estate in the empire. For Ottoman legal
authorities, these factors constituted “proofs” of accepting Ottoman sovereignty.
Furthermore, the Carazo affair and the identification practices of the kadı court of Galata
show the socioeconomic groups whose membership to the Venetian community was
more controversial: non-merchants individuals, especially those low-profile artisans and
low-skilled laborers, who migrated to Istanbul from Venetian territories and resided there
for long periods. They did not conduct trade, did not pay custom duties to the Ottoman
treasury, and were less associated with mobility, the three key social practices
characterizing the “protected foreigners” according to Ottoman legal authorities. In the
next chapter, as we move to another contested identification of a group of individuals, the
Ottoman merchants, we encounter comparable differences in the identification of
individuals by Venetian and Ottoman authorities and similar individual strategies of
individuals claiming membership into political communities.
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Chapter 2: “Ottoman Merchants” in Venetian/Ottoman Trade
1—Introduction
On 10 June 1610, the Venetian government received a petition (supplica) from 13
Jewish merchants residing in Istanbul. In the document, written in vernacular Italian, they
defined themselves as the representatives of the “Jewish Levantine nation that was
subject of the Ottoman sultan” (natione hebrea levantina suddita del Gran Signore).
They complained against the imposition of the cottimo, a consular duty owed to the bailo,
on both the goods they had sent from Istanbul to Venice (and vice versa) by caravans
through Balkan Peninsula and on those merchandise that they had received from the port
city of Ancona, in the Papal States. They asked to be exonerated from such duty like the
“Turkish merchants” (mercanti turchi). 1 In its reply to the petition and in its letters to the
bailo, the Venetian government denied the requested exemption and affirmed that even
Turkish merchants paid the cottimo. 2 After negotiations between Ottoman and Venetian
authorities in Istanbul, the Ottoman government issued an imperial decree (hüküm)
commanding “[Ottoman]Jewish and Christian merchants” (yahudi ve zimmi bazirganları)
sending goods to Venice from Istanbul (and vice versa) to pay the cottimo to the bailo in
Istanbul. 3

The original petition is kept in ASV, SDelC, filza 12 (unnumbered, on the last page of the folder). As the
journey from Ancona to Istanbul passed through the Adriatic Sea, the bailo stressed that the goods were
under Venetian sovereignty and therefore subject to the cottimo. For the Venetian claim of sovereignty over
the Adriatic Sea, see Calafat, Guillaume. Une mer jalousée: contribution à l'histoire de la souveraineté
(Méditerranée, XVIIe siècle) (Paris, XIXe: Éditions du Seuil, 2019), 63-149.
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SDelC, registro 11, fols. 5r (18 July 1610) and 26v (12 November 1610).

3

BOA, ED 013/1, sayfa 73, No 347 (15 Safer 1019/9 May 1610).
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All of these documents-a petition written by a group of merchants to a foreign
government, rulings of the Venetian government, and an Ottoman imperial
commandment- produced during the dispute over the payment of the cottimo share a
striking element: they lack an overarching identification category to refer to all Ottoman
merchants regardless of religious affiliation. Economic historians of the early modern
Mediterranean and of the Ottoman Empire, usually employ the term “Ottoman
merchants” to denote any individual engaged in long-distance trade who hailed from
Ottoman territories. 4 However, documents issued by Venetian and Ottoman governments
and courts during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as well as surviving petitions
from private individuals, show that such identification category did not exist in the early
modern period. This situation thus calls for an examination of how merchants originating
from Ottoman lands identified themselves and were registered by state authorities in the
Ottoman Empire and European trade hubs during commercial ventures and legal suits. 5
Who were the “Ottoman merchants”? This chapter examines the identification of
merchants hailing from the sultan’s territories by Ottoman and Venetian authorities in
Istanbul and Venice, the position of long-distance merchants in Ottoman society and its
economic system, and their business activities with Venice in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries. In doing so, this chapter introduces the business partners and
opponents of Venetian merchants in Ottoman and Venetian courts chapters in legal
disputes and notarial transactions in subsequent chapters, and provides an historical
For instance, see the different essays in Faroqhi, Suraya and Gilles Veinstein (eds), Merchants in the
Ottoman Empire (Paris; Dudley, MA: Peeters, 2008).
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Despite the absence of the taxonomy “Ottoman merchants” in historical sources, I employ this term for
the sake of simplicity since it is identification category most employed in the historiography of the premodern Mediterranean and the Ottoman Empire.
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background of the Ottoman trade with Venice. Furthermore, by illustrating the
taxonomies employed by businessmen and state officials, this chapter shows how
categories of belonging affected the conduct of international trade in Venice and in the
Ottoman Empire, as was the case with the identification of the “Venetians” in Istanbul.
Following the category of identification most employed by Venetian and Ottoman
authorities, namely religious affiliation, I discuss three religious groups of merchantsJews, Muslims, and Christians that were active in the trade between Istanbul and
Venetian territories. As in the previous chapter, I employ records from the Venetian
chancellery and Ottoman courts in the first two decades of the seventeenth century, as
they provide a provide an institutional perspective on the identification of individuals, as
well as surviving petitions from individual merchants. My emic and etic analyses uncover
the complexity of categories of belonging used by different historical actors, their
employment in specific contexts —in petitioning processes, lawsuits, and notarial
transactions—and demonstrate the fallacies of analytical categories employed by scholars
today to identify the merchants in my study.
As I demonstrate, the legal identification category of “Ottoman merchants” did
not exist in the early modern Mediterranean and state authorities and institutions in
Venice and Ottoman cities classified merchants from Ottoman domains foremost
according to their religious affiliation. I argue that this situation stems from the absence
of both a corporate association of long-distance merchants in Ottoman cities and a
juridical notion of Ottoman subjecthood which included any individual regardless of
religious affiliation. Only in 1869, with the Ottoman Nationality Law, did Ottoman
officials delineate a uniform category of “Ottoman subject” (devlet-i aliyye teba‘ası) that
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was independent from religion. 6 Consequently, in Venice, each religious group of
Ottoman merchants established different relations with Venetian authorities as shown by
different institutional arrangements devised by the latter to regulate their residence and
legal and economic rights. Furthermore, Venetian officials created ex-novo legal
taxonomies to distinguish between different groups of merchants from the Ottoman
Empire. Similarly, Ottoman administrative and legal authorities in Istanbul and in the
provinces classified different groups of Ottoman merchants as members of religious
groups and thus not as a uniform professional community with a shared legal status.
Apart from religion, social status, too, played an important role in processes of
identification of Ottoman merchants. Members of the Ottoman ruling group (askeri),
which was composed by mostly Muslim military, administrative, and judicial authorities,
and palace corps, were much engaged in Ottoman-Venetian trade in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries. As I illustrate, both Venetian and Ottoman political and legal
authorities focused on rank to describe these individuals and the latter themselves
emphasized rank when petitioning to Venetian institutions. Such emphasis on social
status reflects the hierarchical structure of the Ottoman Empire and reveals the
association between an “Ottoman identity” and closeness to the Ottoman dynasty. As
shown by intellectual historians of Ottoman Empire, the word “Ottoman” in the early
modern period was employed mostly by the Ottoman intellectual elite to refer to the

Hanley, Will. Identifying with Nationality: Europeans, Ottomans, and Egyptians in Alexandria (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2017), 1-21.
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Ottoman dynasty and its closer associates, the military-administrative officials called kul
in Ottoman parlance (literally “slaves” or “servants”) who belonged to the askeri group. 7
2—Long-distance Merchants in Ottoman Economy and Society
In the Ottoman Empire, anyone could engage in international and inter-regional
trade regardless of religion and social status. Long-distance merchants, called bazirgân or
tâcir (plural tüccȃr) in Ottoman legal and administrative documents, did not constitute a
separate corporate group according to Ottoman authorities and they rarely operated in
unified manner with common goals. While craftsmen were organized in guild-like
organizations, called taife, 8 which controlled membership, collectively levied state taxes
on their members, and imposed set prices and quality regulations on the products,
merchants individually paid customs duties according to rates set by regional law codes
(kanunname), and did not face price or quality controls on the goods they imported and
exported. Where merchants’ associations (tüccar taifesi) did exist, as in Cairo, they
regulated the commerce only of specific goods and imposed but few constraints over
their members in matters of the destination of goods, their quality, and prices. 9 The only

Hagen, Gottfried. “Afterword: Ottoman Understandings of the World in the Seventeenth Century,” in
Dankoff, Robert. An Ottoman Mentality: The World of Evliya Çelebi (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 215–56.
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The term taife referred to any kind of social, economic, and religious association (from occupational
groups to religious communities and nomadic groups) which possessed collective identity in so far that they
dealt with the Ottoman state, especially in matters of taxation. See Masters, Bruce. The Origins of Western
Economic Dominance in the Middle East Mercantilism and the Islamic Economy in Aleppo, 1600-1750
(New York: New York University Press, 1988), 43-45.
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İnalcık, Halil. “Capital Formation in the Ottoman Empire,” The Journal of Economic History 29/1 (March
1969), 97–140; Masters, The Origins, 47-60; Andrè Raymond, Artisans et commerçants au Caire au XVIIIe
siècle (Le Caire: Institut français d'archéologie orientale, 1999), 521/522. Hanna, Nelly; Making big money
in 1600: the life and times of Isma'il Abu Taqiyya, Egyptian merchant (Syracuse: Syracuse University
Press, c1998), 18/19. In Cairo and Aleppo wealthy merchants held the title of şahbandar (“master of the
port”) which was granted by the authority with an imperial diploma (berat). Research shows that in the
early modern period this official did not have the same authority over merchants as the heads of artisanal
groups (kethüda). Raymond, Artisans et commerçants, 578-582; Masters, The Origins, 57/58. In Istanbul,
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exceptions were merchants charged by the state with supplying Istanbul and other large
cities with foodstuffs. Called kapan tüccarları in Istanbul, these merchants obtained an
importation monopoly on types of foodstuffs from a specific territory and were organized
like a guild with a head (kethüda) and state-controlled prices. 10
Because of the absence of a formal corporate structure, long-distance merchants
did not constitute a legal category but only a professional and social one in Ottoman
society. Anyone with capital could invest in trade ventures and there existed multiple
social profiles for “Ottoman merchants.” Ottoman and European sources show socially
and religiously heterogenous groups of individuals engaging in trade ventures with
foreign countries or inter-regional trade: Jews, Christians, and Muslims belonging to the
tax-paying Ottoman group (reaya) and members of the Ottoman administrative-military
elite (askeri), such as viziers, Janissaries, ulema, and even sultans, who traded through
royal agents. 11 In commercial centers like Istanbul, Aleppo, and Cairo, long-distance
trade constituted a valuable investment for large sectors of the population.
Despite the general lack of corporative constraints, which theoretically might
have given them an advantage over most of their European peers, Ottoman merchants
engaging in international trade did not achieve the same prosperity and social prestige as

there existed the office of the bazırganbaşı (literally, the “the head of the merchants”) whose actual
authority on trade and shipping is still much unclear. Mantran, Robert. Istanbul dans la seconde moitié du
XVIIe siècle; essai d'histoire institutionelle, économique et sociale (Paris: Adrien Maison-neuve, 1962),
356, Note 2; Eldem, Edhem. French trade in Istanbul in the eighteenth century (Leiden; Boston: Brill,
1999), 52/53.
10
Mantran, Istanbul, 427-452; Çızakça, Murat. A Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships (Leiden:
Brill, 1996), 117-126.

For an overview see the essays in Faroqhi and Veinstein (ed.), fMerchants in the Ottoman Empire;
Dursteler, Eric. “Commerce and Coexistence: Veneto-Ottoman Trade in the Early Modern Era.” Turcica,
34 (2002), 105-33.
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European merchants. Since the 1960s, their social standing in Ottoman society, the
extension and the size of their business activities, and the attitude of Ottoman authorities
towards them have been the subject of a long-standing debate among economic historians
of the Ottoman Empire over the “Ottoman economic mind.” 12 Until recently, the
prevailing view was that, irrespective of religion, Ottoman merchants did not accumulate
as large a capital as their European peers, their forms of business organization did not
evolve from medieval precedents, Europeans dominated trade between Europe and the
Ottoman Empire, and that Ottoman authorities neither encouraged nor protected through
diplomacy and military might their trade ventures with foreign countries. Scholars put the
blame for this situation on either the guiding principles of the Ottoman economy or on
features of Islamic law. 13
According to Mehmet Genç the foundations of Ottoman economic policies were
“provisionism,” “fiscalism,” and “traditionalism.” 14 By “provisionism,” Genç means an
overwhelming concern by Ottoman officials with the needs of the army, the court, and
the population of Istanbul, and thus with securing goods below market-level prices and
discouraging exports. Fiscalism stands for the state’s concern to acquire additional

12
Halil İnalcık firstly introduced this expression in “The Ottoman Economic Mind and Aspects of the
Ottoman Economy,” in Michael A. Cook (ed.), Studies in the economic history of the Middle East: from the
rise of Islam to the present day (London, New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 207-218.

For some important studies on the early modern Ottoman economy focusing on and trade see İnalcık,
Halil. “Capital Formation in the Ottoman Empire,” The Journal of Economic History 29, 1 (March 1969),
97–140; Masters, The origins of Western Economic Dominance, Stoianovich, Traian. “Cities, Capital
Accumulation and the Ottoman Balkan Command Economy, 1500–1800,” in Charles Tilly and Wim P.
Blockmans (eds), Cities and the Rise of States in Europe (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 60–99; Çızakça,
A Comparative Evolution, Genç, Mehmet. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'unda Devlet ve Ekonomi (İstanbul:
Ötüken Neşriyat, 2000); Pamuk, Şevket. The Ottoman economy and its institutions (Farnham UK,
Burlington, VT: Ashgate, c2009); Kuran, Timur. The Long Divergence: how Islamic Law Held Back the
Middle East (Princeton; Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2011).
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sources of revenues, largely through taxation, and its vision of the economy as
subservient to the fiscal needs of the treasury. Lastly, by “traditionalism,” Genç refers to
the state’s emphasis on the preservation of a status quo in all matters relating to politics,
society, and economy, with a consequent animosity towards potentially disrupting
novelties, such as the rise of merchant groups, which could alter the relation between
different components of the Ottoman society.
According to Genç and other economics historians like Halil İnalcık and Murat
Çızakça, by following these economic policies state officials encouraged imports over
exports, secured goods at prices below market level, set fixed prices in the market places
(the narh system), and prevented the rise of wealthy merchants among both the subject
population (reaya) and the ruling group (askeri) by employing different practices such as
the confiscation of private properties. 15 As a consequence of these “anti-mercantilist”
policies, which show the government’s “insensitivity” towards the needs of merchants
and artisans, Çızakça maintains that merchants involved in long-distance trade could not
accumulate as large a capital as their European peers. 16
Apart from Ottoman political economy, some scholars have focused on Islamic
law and economic institutions to explain the allegedly limited Ottoman commercial
expansion. Timur Kuran claims that, due to some inherent rigidities of the Islamic law,

Due to these economic policies, Halil İnalcık, Donald Quataert, and Traian Stoianovich, define the
Ottoman economic system as a “command economy,” in İnalcık and Quataert (eds), An Economic and
Social History of the Ottoman Empire (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994, Vol. 1,
1, while Çızakça calls it a “pseudo-socialist” system. Ibid, “The Ottoman Government and Economic Life,”
in Suraiya Faroqhi and Kate Fleet (eds.), The Cambridge History of Turkey, Volume II, The Ottoman
Empire as a World Power, 1453-1603 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 241-275, 263-267.
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Ibidem, 267-269. On the modest capital accumulation of Ottoman merchants in Bursa, a major Ottoman
commercial center, see also İnalcık, “Capital Formation,” 109.
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Islamic economic institutions did not develop during the early modern era as extensively
as the European ones, thus resulting in Ottoman economic stagnation. He focuses on
commercial partnerships and the Islamic inheritance system as the two clearest examples
of absences in institutional evolution. Islamic commercial partnerships, he maintains, did
not undergo any evolution from medieval forms until the nineteenth century, and
remained small in capital, short in duration, and lacking in legal personhood. In contrast,
since the Late Middle Ages, Europeans experimented with increasingly complex business
forms, that culminated in the joint-stock companies. Another important reason for
underdevelopment was the Islamic inheritance system, in which an individual’s
inheritance was divided equally among his male heirs. According to Kuran, such a
system fragmented family property and forced the dissolution of partnerships upon a
partner’s death. 17
These explanations run the risk of essentialism. Economic historians supporting
the idea of an “Ottoman command economy” assume a constant and uniform application
of its principles throughout the empire during the entire early modern period. 18 The same
applies for Kuran, who assumes that Islamic business institutions operated in the same
way in every Ottoman city and that Ottoman legal authorities applied legal norms equally
without any influence from other normative systems such as state legislation (kanun) and
local customs. The vastness of the empire and the high degree of heterogeneity of its

Kuran, The Long Divergence; and “The Islamic Commercial Crisis: Institutional Roots of Economic
Underdevelopment in the Middle East.” Journal of Economic History, Vol. 63, No. 2, (2003), 414-446. For
critique of Kuran’s arguments see Çızakça, Murat, "Was Shari'ah indeed the culprit?” MRPA Paper 22865
(University Library of Munich, Germany, 2010).
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Çızakça too admits that, at least in the sixteenth century, the Ottoman government permitted a times
substatinal capital accumulation in some sectors of the Ottoman society, included long-distance merchants.
Çızakça, “The Ottoman Government,” 270/271.
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populations, economic and social realities, customary practices and legal traditions (even
within Islamic jurisprudence) 19 require us to study other provincial contexts farther from
the heartlands of the empire as well as foreign towns frequented by Ottoman merchants.
A growing number of studies have begun to reassess the alleged uniformity and
Ottoman economic policies, the unchanging and inflexible Islamic business institutions,
and the European domination of the Levantine trade. Nelly Hanna deals with the business
undertakings of Ismaʻil Abu Taqiyya, a wealthy merchant based in Cairo in the late
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, showing substantial capital accumulation and
diversified economic activities. Bashara Doumani’s study of merchant families in
Palestine during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries demonstrates how households
bypassed Islamic inheritance rules to reach collective decisions for their new family head,
who formally or informally controlled the household’s wealth as joint patrimony through
entail arrangements. Lastly, in my own study of Bosnian cash-waqfs (Islamic pious
foundations) and Bosnian/Venetian commerce in late sixteenth century, I illustrate that
this Islamic institution provided entrepreneurial capital for large trade ventures. 20
Lastly, new research also challenges the long-term assumption that Ottoman
authorities were unconcerned with the trade activities of Ottoman merchants outside the
empire’s boundaries. That assumption derives from a still-common belief that the
Ottoman Capitulations were unilateral grants of fiscal and legal privileges bestowed by
For instance, see Guy, Burak. The Second Formation of Islamic Law: The Ḥanafī School in the Early
Modern Ottoman Empire (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
19
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JabalNablus, 1700–1900 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 61-68; Stefini, “Cash-vakıfs as a
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Modern Era: some Evidence from Venetian Archival Sources” (Paper presented at The History Project
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the Ottoman on European subjects and that they did not entail reciprocal rights for
Ottoman subjects trading in European territories. 21 Research on Ottoman merchants in
Venice shows that, at least in the sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth centuries,
Ottoman officials in Istanbul often intervened on behalf of their subjects, irrespective of
religious affiliation, who had incurred economic losses or endured violence at the hands
of Venetian officials and authorities. Such intervention involved diplomatic missions in
Venice, military and economic threats, and a great deal of diplomatic pressure on the
baili in Istanbul. 22
Despite this growing reassessment of Ottoman trade, it is clear that Ottoman
authorities and merchants did not attain the same interest in the Ottoman-European trade
as European officials and businessmen. European states conducted most of the trade
between western Europe and the Ottoman Empire during the early modern era by setting
up chartered companies, monopolies, and by deploying diplomacy, consuls, and a naval
protection to an extent not matched by the Ottoman Empire. This did not reflect the anti-

On this debate, see İnalcık, Halil. “Imtiyazat”, EI (Leiden: Brill, 1971); de Groot, Alexander. “The
Historical Development of the Capitulatory Regime in the Ottoman Middle East from the Fifteenth to the
Nineteenth Centuries,” in Maurits van den Boogert and Kate Fleet (eds), The Ottoman Capitulations: Text
and Context (Rome: Istituto per L’Oriente, 2003), 575-604; Eldem, Edhem. “Capitulations and Western
Trade” in Suraiya Faroqhi (ed.) The Cambridge History of Turkey, 1603-1839 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2006), 284-335.
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alla guerra di Candia (Venezia: Deputazione editrice, 1994), 153-190; Arbel, Benjamin. Trading Nations:
Jews and Venetians in the Early Modern Eastern Mediterranean (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 95-144, and
“Maritime Trade and International Relations in the Sixteenth-Century Mediterranean: The Case of the Ship
Ghirarda (1575-1581)”, in Vera Costantini and Marcus Koller (eds), Living in the Ottoman Ecumenical
Community. Essays in Honour of Suraiya Faroqhi (Brill: Leiden, 2008), 391-408; Stefini, Tommaso.
“Ottoman Merchants in Dispute with the Republic of Venice at the End of the 16th Century: Some Glances
on the Contested Regime of the Capitulations,” Turcica, 46 (2015), 153-176. For a case involving Dutch
Republic see, van den Boogert, Maurits. “Redress for Ottoman victims of European privateering: A case
against the Dutch in the Divan-ı Hümayun (1708-1715),” Turcica 33 (2001), 91-117. Already in the 1960s,
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merchants. “The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant,” Journal of Economic History 20 (1960), 234313, 240.
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mercantile attitude of Ottoman authorities but, rather, a preference for other source of
profits by Ottoman entrepreneurs, such as internal trade and tax-farming. Revisionist
accounts of Ottoman commerce illustrate that intra-Ottoman trade was superior in value
to foreign trade in the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries. 23
3—Jewish merchants of Istanbul
During the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth centuries, Sephardic
Jewish merchants constituted a prominent mercantile group engaged in trade between
Istanbul and Venice. Their ascendence in international trade was the outcome of
migration patterns across the Mediterranean, shifting Ottoman-Venetian relations, and
commercial developments during the sixteenth century.
The rise of a mercantile community
Most of the Ottoman Jews engaged in the trade with Venice belonged to different
communities of Iberian Jews (Sephardim). After their expulsions from Spain in 1492,
Portugal (1497), and from other parts of western Europe afterwards, numerous Jews and
New Christians moved to the Ottoman Empire in multiple waves in the late fifteenth and
first half of the sixteenth centuries. They settled in large numbers in Ottoman cities,
above all Istanbul and Thessaloniki. The Ottoman sultans welcomed their immigration
hoping to benefit from their financial expertise and their connections with coreligionists

23

Raymond, Artisans et Commercants, 1, 188; Eldem, “Capitulations and Western Trade,” 305.
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in European cities. Once in the Ottoman Empire, they became non-Muslim Ottoman
subjects (zimmi) through the payment of the Islamic poll-tax (cizye or harac). 24
In Istanbul, Sephardic Jews found other ethnic communities of Jews, above all
Romaniote Jews, Greek-speaking Jews from Byzantine lands, and Ashkenazi Jews that
had migrated to Istanbul from Central and Eastern Europe following Ottoman conquests
and expulsions from Christian states. 25 Differences in language, customs, ritual, and legal
practices, separated these Jewish groups from one another. An Ottoman fiscal survey
(tahrir) conducted in 1623 counted 2,180 Jewish households in Istanbul, including 908
Iberian ones. They amounted to about 10, 980 Jews (among which 4,504 were
Sephardim), that constituted a small minority of the whole population of seventeenthcentury Istanbul which amounted to about 300.000 inhabitants. 26 They settled mostly in
intra-muros Istanbul in along the Golden Horn in the areas of Eminönü, Sirkeci,
Tahtakale, and Balat where other Jewish groups resided. After the 1550s, Portuguese
New Christians began to settle in Galata as well, which, until those years, had hosted few
Jews. They shared a common Christian-European background with the Latin Catholic
population of Genoese descent and with the Venetian, they spoke a romance language

On the settlements of Sephardic Jews in the Ottoman Empire see Levy, Avigdor. The Sephardim in the
Ottoman Empire (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1992), 1-11, Rozen, Minna. A History of The Jewish
Community of Istanbul: The Formative Years (1453–1566) (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 47-49.
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(Freiburg: Klaus Schwartz Verlag, 1980), 178-189; Yerasimos, Stéphane. “La communaute juive d'lstanbul
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sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Istanbul see İnalcık, Halil, “Istanbul,” Encyclopedia of Islam, Second
Edition (Leiden: Brill, 1997).
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(Ladino or Judeo-Spanish), and they engaged in long-distance trade with Western
Europe. 27
From the early sixteenth century onwards, Iberian Jews in Istanbul emerged as
major protagonists in the trade between Italian port cities and the Ottoman Empire.
Several factors favored their activities: their command of European languages, the
disposition of their rabbis to recognize the legality of commercial practices that did not
strictly respect Jewish law, the use of Hebrew and Ladino as languages of commercial
correspondence across the Mediterranean, their ability to use bill of exchange to transfer
capital between the Ottoman Empire and Europe, the presence of preeminent Jewish
power brokers and businessmen in Istanbul, and, lastly, the protection bestowed on them
as Ottoman subjects by the Ottoman authorities. 28
Protected by the Ottoman sultans, they created extensive commercial networks
between Istanbul, Balkan cities—above all Dubrovnik and Sarajevo— and Italian cities,
such as Ancona, Ferrara, and later Livorno. Some Italian states that were rivals of Venice,
like the Papal States, the Duchy of Ferrara, and the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, strove to
attract their business activities by granting them charters of fiscal and legal privileges that
allowed them to reside in their territories to conduct business without fearing
persecutions by church authorities. 29

Heyd, “The Jewish Communities,” 309-314; Rozen, A History, 60/61; Bulunur, Kerim İlker, Osmanlı
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In 1541, in order to revitalize Venice’s much weakened trade with the Levant
after a disastrous war with the Ottomans (1537-1540), the Venetian government allowed
for the first time Ottoman Jews to reside in Venice for the purpose of trade. Called
“Levantine Jews” (hebrei levantini) in Venetian bureaucratic language, they could live in
a secluded area called the Old Ghetto (Ghetto Vecchio) adjacent to one created in 1516
for the first settlement of Jews. What is more, they enjoyed custom exemptions for some
goods they imported from the Ottoman Empire. 30 Venetian officials recognized them as
“transient merchants” (mercanti viandanti) and restricted their residence in Venice to a
few years. Ottoman Jews acquired the privilege to trade between Venice and the Levant
which, until then, had been restricted to Venetian citizens. This development represented
a momentous shift in Venetian commercial policies.
In 1589, the Venetian government finally regulated their social and economic
status in Venice with a charter (called condotta) of privileges and duties. Similar to the
Ottoman Capitulations, it had to be renewed periodically. The charters reconfirmed the
privileges of the 1541’s enactment and extended them also to the New Christians coming
from Spain and Portugal, called “Ponentine Jews” (hebrei ponentini) by Venetian
officials. 31 The taxonomies “Levantine Jews” and “Ponentine Jews” did not exist before

Ottoman Empire in the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Centuries” in Aron Rodrigue (ed.), Ottoman and
Turkish Jewry: Community and Leadership (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 123-166.
This area was adjacent to, but separate from, the “Ghetto Nuovo”, the city quarter allotted in 1516 to the
Tedeschi Jews (hebrei tedeschi), Jews who hailed from Germanic lands and north Italy and who engaged in
pawnbroking and the trade of second-hand cloth.
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the sixteenth century: they were the creation of Venetian bureaucracy which imposed
them on selected groups of Jews sharing a specific geographical provenience. 32
Both the Levantine and Ponentine Jews enjoyed fiscal, economic, and legal
privileges unavailable to Venice’s other Jewish groups and most of the inhabitants of
Venice itself. Apart from trade rights, they included exemptions from state taxes and a
preferred legal standing in Venetian courts. Civil disputes involving them fell under the
jurisdiction of the Venetian Board of Trade (Cinque Savi alla Mercanzia). The tribunal of
this magistracy applied summary procedure, which entailed speedy and cheap trials, the
admission of written documents, and the prohibition of bot appeal to sentences and the
employment of legal representatives. It aimed to improve the weak legal standing of
foreigner merchants in state courts vis-à-vis local inhabitants in terms of the types of
admissible evidence, as well as to accelerate the resolution of commercial conflicts in
order to restore business ties. 33
After 1541 and up to the first decades of the seventeenth century, Jewish trade
with Venice expanded considerably. In Istanbul, Jewish merchants became competitors
of Venetian merchants in they city’s marketplaces and animosity between the two groups
frequently arose. Jewish merchants dominated the wholesale trade of certain products
much sought by the Venetians such as wools, cloth, camlets, and alum, and forced the
latter to comply with their conditions. Venetian merchants also had to rely on Jewish

On the genealogy of the category “Levantine,” see Rothman, Natalie. Brokering Empire: Trans-Imperial
Subjects between Venice and Istanbul. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2012), 212-247.
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merchants for the retail trade of goods they imported from Venice since the latter, with
the backing of Ottoman authorities, strove to oppose their opening of shops by the
former. 34 Furthermore, in Istanbul and in other Ottoman commercial centers, Jewish
businessmen occupied tax-farming positions on custom duties which put them in control
of the key positions in the customs administration arousing, at times, disputes with
Venetian merchants. 35 Lastly, Jewish merchants also engaged in the trade, mostly fabrics,
between Florence and Istanbul through the Adriatic ports of Ancona and Dubrovnik. The
imposition of the cottimo on them, which was raised at the beginning of the chapter, was
part of Venetian efforts to undermine this rival commercial route between western
Europe and the Ottoman Empire. 36
One of the main reasons for the commercial success of Jewish merchants was the
important role played by influential Iberian Jewish powerbrokers and entrepreneurs
throughout the sixteenth century in Ottoman diplomatic and economic life. Jewish
physicians of the sultans and viziers and wealthy Jewish merchants, like the famed
Salomon Ashkenazi and David Passi, operated as advisors and diplomatic agents for the
Ottomans and as collectors of information about European politics. Striking examples of
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influential Jewish businessmen are Doña Gracia Mendes (d. 1569) and her nephew
Joseph Nasi (d. 1579), who were members of the Mendes family, a prominent Portuguese
family of New Christian merchants and financiers with far-flung business connections in
western Europe. Settled in Istanbul in 1550s, Doña Gracia and Joseph Nasi engaged in
financial and commercial activities in the Ottoman Empire and in Western Europe and
acquired lucrative tax-farms in the empire and trade monopolies in goods, such as wine.
The sultan Selim II (r. 1566-1575) even invested Nasi with the Duchy of Naxos and the
Cyclades with the rank of sancak beyi. He became a de facto member of the Ottoman
ruling elite (askeri). 37
These influential Jews operated on behalf of Jewish merchants by establishing
networks of protégés and appealing to Ottoman authorities in cases where merchants
suffered mistreatment in foreign cities at the hands of state officials and businessmen.
Such interventions took place mostly during the sixteenth century. Scholars agree that the
disappearance of such preeminent Jews from Ottoman political and economic life was
one of the reasons for, together with changes in patterns of Mediterranean trade and its
protagonists, the social and economic decline of Ottoman Jewry from the early
seventeenth century onwards. 38

Epstein, The Ottoman Jewish Communities, 77-96; Arbel, Trading Nations, 77-94, Gürkan, Emrah Safa.
“Touting for Patrons, Brokering Power, and Trading Information: Trans-Imperial Jews in SixteenthCentury Istanbul” in Emilio Sola Castaño and Gennaro Varriale (eds), Detrás de las apariencias.
Información y espionaje (siglos XVI-XVII) (Alcalá de Henares: Universidad de Alcalá, 2015), 127-152.
37

Levy, Avigdor. The Sephardim in the Ottoman Empire (Princeton: the Darwin Press, 1992), 71-98;
Goffman, Daniel. “Jews in Early Modern Ottoman Commerce,” in Avigdor Levy (ed.), Jews, Turks,
Ottomans: A Shared History, Fifteenth through the Twentieth Century (Syracuse: Syracuse University
Press, 2002), 15-34.
38

95

“Ottoman Jewish merchants” in Istanbul
Istanbul’s Jews that engaged in trade with Venice belonged to the city’s various
Jewish communities (cemaat). Each group constituted a fiscal, administrative, and legal
unity. As opposed to Ottoman Christians (Orthodox Greeks and Armenians), in early
modern Istanbul Ottoman Jews were not subject to the authority of a supreme religious
authority, but to the heads of each community, which possessed fiscal and legal
authority. 39
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Ottoman fiscal officials and the scribes
of kadı courts in Istanbul recorded Jews according to either their religion alone or their
community and religion combined. Tax registers distinguished between two main groups
of Jews: sürgün, those who have forcefully settled in Istanbul by sultan Mehmed II (reign
1451-1480) after 1453 and who were Romaniote Jews, and kendü gelen, (literally, “those
who came of their own will”), that is, those who voluntarily migrated to Istanbul (mostly
Sephardic Jews). Within these two groups were various sub-groups named either for the
geographic points of origin or for prominent households: for instance, the “Portuguese
community” (portakal cemaati), and the “community of señora” (sinura cemaati) which
was a term that referred to the extended household of the afore-mentioned Doña Gracia
Mendes. 40
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Although Ottoman Jews were legally zimmi, that is, non-Muslim Ottoman
subjects, documents of kadı courts and the Imperial Council applied such a term
exclusively to Ottoman Greeks, the largest Christian group in Istanbul. 41 As we have seen
in the previous chapter, at least until the beginning of the seventeenth century, court
officials recorded Jewish subjects of Venice from Crete only as “Jewish,” in effect
assimilating them into the status of non-Muslim Ottoman subjects. 42 It appears that in the
period under study Ottoman authorities perceived all Jews residing in the empire, either
temporally or permanently, as their own subjects. This point is proven by the fact that a
political category of “Ottoman Jew” was also absent in the Ottoman official
correspondence between Ottoman and Venetian authorities over legal and economic
issues involving Jewish merchants. For instance, in 1585, an imperial letter (name-i
hümayun) written by sultan Murad III (reign 1575-1595) on behalf of Yakub Kastal
(Iacobbe Castiel), who travelled to Venice for some “important issues,” defined him as
simply as “Jew” (yahudi). 43
Venetian officials in Istanbul and Venice employed different templates to classify
Ottoman Jewish merchants. Between 1609 and 1620, 425 Jews (409 men and 16 women)
appeared before the bailo and its secretary to litigate commercial disputes, to register
notarial transactions, or as witnesses to other individuals’ legal and economic deeds. 44 In
See Epstein, The Ottoman Jewish Communities, 27; and Wittmann, Richard. Before Qadi and Grand
Vizier: Intra-Communal Dispute Resolution among Christians and Jews in the Plural Society of
17thCentury Istanbul (PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 2008), 163-165.
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contrast to state courts and magistracies in Venice, the scribes of the bailo’s chancellery
did not employ the term “Levantine,” which held political and religious connotations and
entailed specific legal and commercial privileges, to denote Ottoman Jews. None of the
Jews appearing in the chancellery are identified according to their political affiliation and
fewer than half of them (175 individuals, 41%) by their religious affiliation (hebreo). The
place of origin appears only for 147 Jews: 101 of them hailed from Istanbul and they are
registered as “Jew of Constantinople” (hebreo di Costantinopoli) and 7 as “Jew of
Venice” (hebreo di Venezia). Such expressions referred exclusively to a geographical
location and did not hold any political or legal connotation. 45 As we will see in the next
three chapters, all Jews appearing in the Venetian chancellery enjoyed the same legal
standing regardless of geographical provenience and social status.
The most commonly used title used to refer to Jews was “rabbi” (rabi), which
appeared for 342 out of 409 male Jews (83%). It could indicate a religious official of a
synagogue and a scholar of Jewish law (halakha). 46 It is unlikely that all those Jewish
merchants identified as “rabbi” were scholars and religious authorities apart from being
long-distance merchants. It is more plausible that such a title held an honorary function in
many instances. Nevertheless, the presence of many individuals holding this prestigious
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title indicates that mostly preeminent members of Istanbul’s Jewish communities became
involved in Ottoman/Venetian trade, at least as far as the records of the Venetian
chancellery tell us. 47
Despite the absence of the category “Levantine Jews,” in Venetian legal
documents produced in Istanbul, Istanbul’s Jews strategically employed it when they
appealed to Venetian authorities to ask for new economic privileges or to complain about
state officials and Venetian subjects. The petition at the beginning of this chapter
exemplifies this process. In 1610, in petitioning the Venetian government, a group of
prominent Jewish merchants in Istanbul defined themselves as the heads of the
“Levantine community,” which was subject of the Ottoman sultan. In this way, they
claimed membership in a foreign mercantile community which was subject to the
Ottoman Empire that Venice had established bilateral political and commercial relations
with. 48
4— “Turkish” merchants
In the historiography of Mediterranean trade and the Ottoman economy as whole,
Muslim trade with Western Europe has long figured negligibly. Generations of
orientalists and economic historians have depicted Muslim merchants as unwilling to
trade outside Muslim lands on religious and cultural grounds. As “warriors of the
steppes,” Muslim Turks, it was alleged, did not engage in commerce and crafts preferring

For another instance of a Jewish merchant group in Muslim states which was composed of socially and
economic preeminent individuals of a local Jewish community, see Goldberg, Jessica. Trade and
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New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 33-55.
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warfare and state administration and, as Muslims, they feared “contamination” from
contacts with Christians and Jews outside the empire. 49 From the 1980s onwards, the
studies of Giorgio Vercellin, Cemal Kafadar, Gilles Veinstein, Maria Pia Pedani, and Eric
Dursteler, have rejected these culturalist accounts. 50 These scholars present innumerable
instances of Muslim businessmen moving to Venice and residing there for long periods
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in order to conduct trade with Christians
and Jews. Kafadar also demonstrates that no religious/legal authority (ulema) prohibited
Muslims from conducting business in non-Muslim territories. 51
The development of Muslim trade with Venice was concomitant with the growth
of Ottoman Jewish trade. The same international developments, such as the Ottoman
expansion, the bilateral nature of the Ottoman/Venetian Capitulations, and the grants of
privileges by Italian cities to merchants from the Ottoman Empire, promoted the
international trade of Ottoman Muslims, Jews, and Orthodox Christians alike. In 1514,
Ancona was the first Italian city-state to allow Muslims to reside and trade in its
territories by granting them and other Ottoman merchants a charter of fiscal and
economic privileges. Papal authorities, who from 1534 onwards were the new rulers of

For a review of these culturalist explanations, see Kafadar, Cemal. “A Death in Venice (1575): Anatolian
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Ancona, renewed it. Muslim merchants were accommodated in a secluded building (a
fondaco). 52 Ancona and Venice were the only places in Western Europe where Muslims
traded as a matter of routine.
In Venice, Ottoman Muslim merchants began to appear in the early sixteenth
century and by 1550s their presence became more regular, as evidenced by numerous
complaints they sent to the Ottoman sultan about damages they suffered while trading
with Venice. 53 They hailed mostly from Ottoman Bosnia, Istanbul, and Anatolia. They
brought a vast array of goods to Venice, including camlet, woolen fabrics, silks, leather,
etc. At the outbreak of the War of Cyprus in 1570, Venetian authorities arrested all
Ottoman Muslim merchants whose number amounted to about 70 individuals. 54
Venetian officials called all Muslim merchants from Ottoman domains “Turkish
merchants” (mercanti turchi). They categorized them along linguistic and ethnic lines
into two subgroups: “Bosnian and Albanian Turks” (turchi bossinesi et albanesi) and
“Asiatic Turks” (turchi asiatici). Again, as in the case of the “Levantine Jews,” the
identificatory categories “Turk,” “Bosnian Turks,” and “Asiatic Turk” did not exist
among the Ottoman Muslims who resided in Venice, yet, this notwithstanding, the latter
employed them when petitioning to Venetian magistracies. 55 In the Venetian bureaucratic
language of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the term “Turk” held a political
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and religious connotation: a “Turk” was a Muslim subject of the Ottoman Empire. Other
Muslims, like those coming from Safavid Iran or the Moriscos from Andalusia, were
identified according to their place of provenience: a “Persian” (persiano) or “a Muslim
from Granada” (granatino). 56
As it was the case with the taxonomy “Levantine Jew,” being identified as “Turk”
entailed trade and legal privileges in Venice. Ottoman Jews and Muslims shared the same
trade rights, fiscal exemptions, and preferred legal standing in Venetian courts. However,
Venetian authorities did not bestow on Ottoman Muslim merchants any charter of
privileges that regulated their residential arrangements and their legal and economic
status. The bilateral nature of the Capitulations and regulations issued ad hoc provided
these merchants with the legal framework to reside in Venice without hindrances.
Ottoman Muslims did not constitute a distinct corporate entity possessing internal
administrative and legal institutions, and communal leaders recognized by the Venetian
officials. When they applied to Venetian magistracies, they petitioned either as
individuals or as group of Muslims from a specific region or town. 57 The only exception
to this rule are petitions regarding the payment of the cottimo, the due owned to the
Venetian baili and consuls by any individuals irrespective of religion and social status

Natalie Rothman illustrates that emergence of the taxonomy of “Persian Turks” (turchi persiani) to refer
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in Venice or in Istanbul before 1630s. For instance, see the petition of the “Persian” Mehmed Bey
(Maomedi Bei) in CSM, I Serie, Busta 146, 33r/34v (06/23/1623) and a document concerning the trade of
merchants from Granada (mercanti granatini) based in Tunisi, Ibid, Busta 145, 18v (04/12/1619). To my
knowledge, the only instance of the use of the category of Persian Turks before the mid-seventeenth
century are the records of commercial brokers. Vercellin, “Mercanti turchi a Venezia,” 260, 264.
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that traded between Ottoman lands and Venice. For instance, in 1582, the “Turk” Seidi,
petitioned the Venetian government to have the amount of these duties lowered for the
whole “Turkish nation” (natione turchesca). 58
For most of the sixteenth century, Venetian authorities did not confine Ottoman
Muslims in secluded buildings or spaces but allowed them to reside in hostels and inns
close to the city’s main market, Rialto. After the War of Cyprus (1570-1573), following
the growing number of Muslim merchants and complaints by Church authorities, the
Venetian government began to regulate their residence more carefully. After decades of
negotiations, in 1622 it allocated them a palace on the Grand Canal which became the
famous Fondaco dei Turchi, a hostel and warehouse for Muslim merchants from the
Ottoman Empire. It was divided into two sections, one for the Balkan Muslims and one
for Asiatic ones. Like Venice’s Jewish Ghetto, the building was closed during the night.
However, during the days the Muslim merchants were free to go to the city’s
marketplaces. 59
The long period of peace between 1573 and 1645 witnessed the apogee of
Ottoman Muslim trade with Venice. Apart from the creation of the Fondaco dei Turchi,
two other factors reflect intense commercial development. Firstly, the number of
commercial brokers working with Ottoman Muslims (sensali dei turchi) significantly
increased from the late sixteenth to the first half of the seventeenth centuries: from about
14-20 in the 1580s to 33 in 1621 out of a total of 190 brokers operating in the whole
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city. 60 According to Venetian legislation, state-sanctioned brokers had to mediate in
every commercial exchange involving Muslim merchants and to make note of them in
specific books. Secondly, in the 1590s, with the support of the neighboring Bosnian
Ottoman authorities, Venetian officials in Venetian-held Dalmatia opened and promoted
the development of the port of Split (scala di Spalato). In the first half of the seventeenth
century this port became the major Adriatic transit port for merchants trading between
Venice and the Ottoman Balkans. It was the destination of merchant caravans leaving
Istanbul with the goods of both Ottoman and Venetian merchants. Among the main
beneficiaries of the creation of the Split were Bosnian Muslim merchants who diverted
their goods there from Dubrovnik, which was Venice’s chief commercial competitor in
the Adriatic Sea. 61
The multiple profiles of the “Turkish merchants” in Istanbul
Many social and economic profiles of the “Turkish merchant” existed. Contrary to
Ottoman Jews and Christians, Ottoman Muslim merchants that engaged in
Venetian/Ottoman trade belonged to both the tax-paying population (reaya) and the
military/administrative/judicial elite (askeri) of the Ottoman Empire. Membership in
either of these groups affected both the state-imposed identification of Muslim
businessmen and their self-identification.
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Between 1609 and 1620, 133 Muslim businessmen appeared in the Venetian
chancellery seeking its legal and notarial services. 62 The term “Turk” appeared only for 7
of these individuals, while 8 hailed from non-Ottoman territories. Four are registered as
“Persian” (persiano) while the other four were Moriscos from Andalusia as “Muslims of
Granada” (musulmano granatino). 63 In opposition to the labels “Turk” and “Persian” that
were employed in courts and state magistracies in Venice, in the Venetian chancellery in
Istanbul such labels did not entail specific legal rights and all Muslims enjoyed the same
legal status of other individuals, Christian and Jewish alike. Officials also registered the
place of origin of 40 other individuals: Anatolian cities (mostly Ankara, Beypazarı,
Sivrihisar, and Tosya) that were mohair-producing centers, the international trading
emporium of Aleppo, and the capital Istanbul. 64 Apart from Edirne, no Balkan cities
appear as places of origins for the merchants, showing the little role played by the
Venetian consular court in the commercial ventures of Balkan Muslims.
The most important indicator of the socioeconomic status of the Muslim
merchants are their honorific titles, which were the main markers of individual identity
used by the officials of the Venetian chancellery. Such titles appear for 91 out of 113
individuals and they all refer to positions of preeminence in the socioeconomic life of
Istanbul. These titles could indicate individuals’ membership into the militaryThere were also four Muslim women applying to the court to retrieve the estates of husbands or other
relatives who had died while trading in Venetian territories. As in the case of Jewish women, I do not
include them into my analysis in this chapter because they did not engage in trade activities.
62
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administrative-legal establishment (askeri), their occupational status, or simply their
economic preeminence in long-distance trade. The most common ones are “ağa,”
“çelebi,” “çavuş,” “efendi,” “hacı,” “hoca,” “beşe,” etc. Such titles shifted in meaning
over the centuries and across the empire, and, therefore, we cannot know with a degree of
certainty whether they actually corresponded to a specific profession and if they could be
attributed to individuals belonging to different social groups. 65 However, as we will see
in the next three chapters, while they all indicate a substantial social and economic
position of their holders within the Muslim business community in Istanbul, they did not
confer any privileged legal standing in the Venetian consular court.
Among them, the terms “ağa” “çelebi” referred to any person of social and
economic standing in the Ottoman Empire, including preeminent export-import
merchants. A more specific term to refer to prominent long-distance merchants was
“hoca,” (from the Persian khawaja) which appears for Muslim and non-Muslim
merchants (for Armenians) alike. 66 Other terms, such as “efendi” shows individuals of
some scholarly attainment, usually members of the religious-judicial administration
(ilmiyye). 67Among this group, we find also “professors” (müderris) in high-learning

On Ottoman honorific titles and their changes overtime, see Tülüveli, Güçlü. “Honorific Titles in
Ottoman Parlance: A Reevaluation,” International Journal of Turkish Studies 11/1-2 (2005), 17–28;
Canbakal, Hülya. Society and politics in an Ottoman town: 'Ayntāb in the 17th century (Leiden; Boston:
Brill, 2007), 61-112; Coşgel, Metin and Boğaç Ergene. The Economics of Ottoman Justice: Settlement and
Trial in the Sharia Courts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 49-60.
65

Raymond, Artisans et commerçants, Vol 2, 411-415; Marcus, Abraham. The Middle East on the eve of
modernity: Aleppo in the eighteenth century (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 51. For an
Armenian merchant with the title of “hoca” (cogia in the Venetian documents) see BAC 277, reg. 395, 88r
(8 June 1611).

66

67

The religious-judicial establishment belonged to the askeri group.

106

colleges (medrese) and kadıs. 68 Furthermore, titles of “Janissaries” (yeniçeri) and “beşe”
(bassa in Venetian documents)” indicate the affiliation to the military group (seyfiyye).
The involvement of these members of the ruling group of the Ottoman Empire in longdistance trade, especially those belonging to military corps and to the ulema, confirms the
findings of recent studies about the engagement of members of these prestigious military
corps and learned elites in business pursuits. 69
While most of the Muslim merchants operated either individual businessmen or as
members of merchant partnerships, a few of them (2 individuals) were royal merchants
who traded for members of the Ottoman royal palace and commercial agents of highranking state officials. Venetian and Ottoman sources illustrate the presence of these
categories of merchants, which is a little studied topic in Ottoman commercial history,
from the second half of the sixteenth century onwards. 70 Royal merchants, called hassa
tüccarları or hünkar bazirganı in Ottoman sources and “mercante del re” in Venetian
documents, belonged to different military and administrative corps of the sultanic palace,
such as the çavuş, kapıcı, müteferrika. 71 Furthermore, as we will see in Chapter 5, such
identification as “royal merchants” entailed a privileged legal treatment in the Venetian

For instances of müderris and kadıs, see BAC 279, reg. 401, 33r/34v (19 November 1615) and Ibid, 101v
(27 April 1617).
68

Dursteler, “Commerce and Coexistence,”114-124; Tezcan, Baki. The second Ottoman Empire: political
and social transformation in the early modern world (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 3045, 191-226.
69

For a few references to these individuals, see Dursteler, “Commerce and Coexistence,” 114-124; Pedani,
In nome del Gran Signore, 172-176.
70

For these different palace corps, see Uzunçarşılı, İsmail H. Osmanlı develtinin saray teşkilâtı (Ankara:
Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1945).
71

107

chancellery since the baili aimed to solve their disputes quickly in order to avoid
jeopardizing relations with Ottoman officials.
In the years under study, an example of such a merchant was Mehmed Ağa bin
Abdülmennan. A Spanish renegade, in the 1610s he held the office of the customs official
(gümrük emini) in Galata, the titles of kapıcıbaşı and hazinedar (treasurer) in the royal
palace and that of bazirganbaşı (literally, the “head of the merchants”). 72 Through
Muslim and Jewish commercial agents, he traded silk textiles and camlets with Venice in
the name of sultan and of other high-ranking Ottoman officials, such the Grand Vizier
Nasuh Pasha (office 1611-1614), the heads of the Ottoman financial department
(başdefterdar) Ekmekçizade Ahmed Pasha (o. 1606-1613) and Abdülbaki Efendi Pasha
(o. 1614/1615), and the chief mufti of Istanbul (şeyhülislam) Hocazade Esad Efendi (o.
1615-22; 1623-25). In 1618, the bailo Almorò Nani even borrowed 2,000 sequins from
him for his embassy’s expenditures. 73
Despite sharing the same religious affiliation of the Ottoman dynasty, Ottoman
Muslim merchants did not define themselves as “Ottoman” and they were not recorded as
such by state officials. Survived petitions sent to Venetian authorities by single
individuals or groups of merchants illustrate the two main categories of selfidentifications employed by Muslim merchants: the place of origin and social status, but
not religion. The latter was likely self-evident in the name of the petitioner. In a group
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petition written in July 1617 in Split after an attack on two merchant galleys by a Spanish
flotilla in the Adriatic Sea, a group of 51 Muslim merchants (mostly from Bosnia)
defined themselves only according to their place of origin: for instance, Ahmed from
Sarajevo (sarayî) and Hacı Ali from Istanbul (islambollu). 74 The writer of the petition, a
royal merchant named Mümin Çavuş, defined himself exclusively according to his
membership in a royal palace corps, the çavuş. 75 Such affiliation entailed membership
into the Ottoman askeri elites, which was the social group more closely affiliated to the
Ottoman dynasty and, therefore, more closely associated with an “Ottoman identity” in
the early modern period.
In the case of imperial rescripts (firman and nişan-ı hümayun) produced by the
Imperial Council and addressed to the Venetian government, religion was the main
marker of identification used to define non-elite Muslim merchants while rank played a
central role in defining those royal merchants who were members of the Ottoman ruling
elite. On the one hand, in a letter sent by the sultan Mustafa I (reign 1617/1618 and
1622/1623) to Venice after the above-mentioned episode of the Spanish attack in the
Adriatic, the aggrieved merchants are defined as “Muslim” (müslüman) hailing from
Bosnia. 76 On the other hand, in an imperial document, dated 1588, sent to Venice on
behalf of a royal merchant, Seyyid Abdi Çavuş bin Ahmed, Ottoman officials stressed his
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ranking status (dergâh-ı mu‘allâm çavuşlarından) and omitted his religion affiliation
altogether. 77
5—The Conundrum of the “Ottoman Christian Merchants”
The last group of merchants engaged in Venetian-Ottoman trade were different
communities of Christians hailing from Ottoman territories. They belonged to various
ethnic and confessional groups and maintained different relationships with the Venetian
community in Istanbul, with Ottoman authorities, and Venetian officials in Venice. We
can distinguish three major linguistic and confessionals groups of Ottoman Christians
trading with Venice: Galata’s Catholics, Orthodox Greeks, and Armenians. Here
onwards, I focus on the Greeks while I refer to other groups as well.
Among the different communities of merchants from Ottoman territories,
“Ottoman Christians” constitute the most complex group to define. In contrast to
Ottoman Jews and Muslims, ethnicity, confession, and place of origin all played key roles
in the classification of each group of Christian merchants by Venetian and Ottoman
authorities, as well as in the self-identification of the merchants themselves. Furthermore,
they maintained a more tenuous relations with Ottoman authorities while trading with
Western European states in matter of protection and representation vis-à-vis Christian
authorities.
Among the various religious communities of the Ottoman Empire, Christians
were those who managed to most strategically employ different categories of
belonging—religious affiliation and subjecthood— to navigate different legal regimes in
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the Ottoman Empires and European states as well. As by Molly Greene’s work indicates,
in disputes arising from Catholic piracy, Orthodox Greeks from Ottoman lands assigned
great importance to their religious identity to claim certain legal prerogatives. However,
in other circumstances, for instance during trade ventures with Venetian territories, they
employed political identity over religion for legal and economic advantages. 78 Similarly,
as we have seen in the previous chapter, merchants from Galata’s Catholic community
(the Perots, the Franks of Galata) routinely took part to meetings of the Venetian
community’s Council of Twelve in matters of long-distance trade and they applied to
Venetian authorities in order to seek protection from Ottoman authorities and to be
recognized as Venetian subjects.
“Ottoman Greek Merchants”
The largest group of Christians engaged in Ottoman-Venetian trade were
Orthodox Greeks based in Istanbul and in mainland Greece. As we discussed in the
previous chapter, in the early modern period the term “Greek” did not have a welldefined religious and ethnic connotation. Rather, it could be used to refer to a linguistic
(Greek-speaking), religious community (Orthodox Christians), and or to a professional
group (sailors in Venice and merchants in the Balkans). 79
In seventeenth-century Istanbul, Orthodox Greeks constituted the largest nonMuslim community in the city. In contrast to the Jews, all Orthodox Greeks were under
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the authority of the Orthodox Greek Patriarch who was based in the district of Phanar
(Fener), in intra-muros Istanbul. Apart from his administrative, religious, and judicial
duties within the Orthodox community, he was also responsible for the collection of state
taxes, such as the Islamic poll-tax on Muslims, from the Greek population in the capital.
Apart from Phanar, the other main center of Greek life in Istanbul was Galata, where
most of the international community trading between Istanbul and Western Europe
resided and conducted business. After the Ottoman conquest in 1453, the Latin Catholic
population of Galata declined over the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, while
Greeks established there in large numbers and operated in shipping and trade activities
with the Black and the Mediterranean Sea, and with Western Europe. 80
The development of Ottoman Greek shipping and trade with Venice began in the
early sixteenth century and, like in the case of Ottoman Jewish and Muslim merchants, it
was concomitant to the expansion of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans and in the
Eastern Mediterranean and the decline of Venetian commercial power in the latter.
Already, in 1514, Ottoman Greeks from Epirus obtained charters of legal and commercial
rights to trade in Ancona and to worship according to the Orthodox rite unmolested by
the Catholic clergy. In the same century, other groups of Greeks moved to Venice, and,
later, to the Tuscan port of Livorno, which was established in 1590s. 81 As in the case of
Muslims, in Venice Greeks coming from Ottoman territories were not granted charters
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regulating their legal and economic status. Rather, they joined other communities of
Greeks who had been migrating to Venice from former Byzantine and Venetian
territories following Ottoman conquests from the fifteenth century onwards.
Regardless of place of origin, most of these Greeks (at least those professing the
Orthodox faith) resided around the Greek Fraternity of Venice (Scuola dei Greci),
established in 1498 in the area of Castello, which included an Orthodox Church. It was a
religious fraternity run by lay people whose communal activities focused on religious
rites, education, and charity. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it constituted the
most importance center of Greek cultural and economic life outside the Ottoman
territories. The members of the fraternity were mostly merchants and ship captains. In
mid-sixteenth-century, individuals from Ottoman territories (mostly from Epirus)
constituted a small minority among the members of the fraternity. 82 The whole
community of Greeks in Venice formed the largest community of non-Venetians,
approximately 4,000 to 5,000 during the last decades of the sixteenth century when the
population of Venice amounted to roughly 140,000 individuals. 83
It is difficult to distinguish between Greeks hailing from Ottoman territories and
Greeks coming from Venetian lands in the Levant. This is because, in contrast to
Sephardic Jews and Muslim Turk, which the Venetian officials categorized in their
records as Ottoman subjects, Greeks cannot be easily categorized, based on archival
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materials. Apart from the lack of charters, Venetian officials did not put Greeks under the
jurisdiction of a specific magistracy, as it was the case with the Board of Trade with
Ottoman Jews and Muslims. Furthermore, Venetian officials in Venice did not create a
separate legal category, like as was the case with “Levantine Jew” and “Turk,” to denote
Ottoman Greeks. As current research indicates, Venetian magistracies used the term
“Greek” (greco) to refer to any ethnic Greek regardless of place of origin and
confession. 84 Nevertheless, towards the end of the sixteenth century, the Board of Trade
began to include “Greeks” within it the capacious category of Levantine individuals
alongside Ottoman Jews, Muslims, and Armenians. 85 Such inclusion entailed trade rights
between Venice and the Ottoman Empire and a privileged legal status in Venetian courts,
as was the case of Muslims and Ottoman Jews. However, based on current research, it is
not clear whether the “Greek” term included all the Greeks residing in Venice, those who
came from the Ottoman Empire, or only those who traded between the latter and Venice.
Another major challenge in defining Ottoman Greeks in Venice in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries is discerning how they registered themselves. We have no
information about a political and juridical notion of “Ottoman subjecthood” in petitions
forwarded by Greeks hailing from Ottoman territories to Venetian authorities asking for
economic and legal rights or in legal and economic documents drawn in Venetian notarial
offices. As studies of Greeks in Venice show, these individuals first and foremost
employed faith and place of origins to identify themselves when appealing to Venetian
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institutions.86 This contrasts with Ottoman Jews who, as we have seen above, employed
the political category “Levantine” (that is, Ottoman subject) when appealing to Venetian
magistracies.
Another instance of the absence of a legal category to denote Ottoman Greeks is
the representatives of communities of Christian merchants from Ottoman territories who
resided in Venetian possessions in the Levant. In the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, merchant groups from Greek-speaking cities and territories like Patras,
Aitoliko, or the island of Lefkada (Aya Mavra, Santa Maura) appealed to Venetian
officials to ask for the formal appointment of representatives of their native communities
in the Venetian islands of Zakynthos, Cephalonia, and Corfu. Venetian officials recorded
these individuals as “Greek consuls” (console dei greci) of the community they
represented. For instance, in 1605, the Venetian Board of Trade defined the
representatives of the merchants from the city of Patras in Zakynthos as the “consul of
the Greek nation of Patras” (console della natione greca di Patrasso). 87
Greeks and other “Ottoman Christian merchants” in Istanbul
Locating an “Ottoman Greek” commercial community in seventeenth-century
Istanbul is another major hurdle. In the records of Ottoman courts, both kadı courts and
the Imperial Council, the term “Greek” (rum) referred exclusively to either the Greek
Orthodox Patriarch (rum patrikiği) or to the whole Christian Orthodox community
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(millet-i rum) in the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, court scribes employ the term “nonMuslim Ottoman subject” (zimmi) to mostly Orthodox Greeks, who constituted the
majority of the Christians in Istanbul. 88 However, they also distinguished other linguistic
and ethnic groups of Ottoman Christians with more precise terms, such the ethnic and
confessional taxonomies of “Armenian” (ermeni) and “Galata’s Franks” (Galata
frenkleri). 89 However, there is substantial confusion and overlapping among all these
categories and the same individuals could appear with different Christian templates in
different court entries. 90 Nevertheless, all these ethnic, linguistic, and confessional
designations identified Ottoman subjects with the same legal and economic status in
Ottoman courts and in the empire’s commercial activities.
The same confusion applies to the records of the Venetian chancellery. In the
period 1609-1620 the term “Greek” is exceedingly rare appearing only in 11 cases out of
1,219 Christian individuals. 91 Furthermore, Venetian officials did not record Christian
individuals according to their confessional affiliation making difficult for us to discern
confessional differences among the numerous Christian individuals involved in Venetian-
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December 1604). The Ottoman distinction between Orthodox Greeks defined as zimmi and Armenians
(ermeni) applies to imperial rescripts sent to Venice on behalf of Ottoman Christians. See DT, b. 7, No 909
(evâhir-i Şaban 990/10-18 October 1582); and No (evâhir-i Rebiyülâhir 1010/25 January-2 February 1593).
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Another identification category for Ottoman Christians was “Christian” (nasrânî). It was a purely
religious taxonomy without any ethnic, confessional, or jurisdictional underpinnings. For instance, see GŞS
53, s. 69/A (12 Şevval 1033/ July 29, 1624). For an instance of a Catholic from Galata identified as zimmi
instead of frenk, see GŞS 40, s. 72/A (evâsıt-ı Muharrem 1025/January 29-February 8, 1616).

For instance, see Gianachi Charavachisi. a “Greek cooper” (bottaro greco) in Galata, BAC 276, reg. 394
214v (31 Mart 1610).
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Ottoman trade and shipping activities. The only Christian group which Venetian officials
distinguished from the others are Armenians from Ottoman Anatolia and Safavid Iran.
The term “Armenian” (armeno) held ethnic, linguistic, and religious connotations and it
was applied to 30 individuals trading between Istanbul and Venice in 1609-1620. 92As
was the case with Jews and Muslims, all the identification categories did not point to a
different legal and economic status in the Venetian consular court.
Another way to identify an Ottoman Greek community is to focus on individuals
hailing from Greek-speaking Ottoman territories. Out of the 1,219 Christians, 735 are
designated according to their place of origins. Among them, 145 individuals were natives
from Ottoman territories, mostly from Galata (54), Chios (22), the Ottoman-tributary city
state of Dubrovnik (17), the Cyclades (22), and the Peloponnese (Morea, 17). In cases
referring to Galata and Chios, talking about “Ottoman Greek merchants” is highly
problematic given the presence of a mixed population of Catholic and Orthodox
Christians while Dubrovnik’s population was mostly Catholic. Furthermore, Ottoman
Galata, apart from its local Catholic and Orthodox Christian population, hosted numerous
Venetian subjects, both Catholic and Orthodox, from mainland Italy and Venetian
possessions in the Levant. This group of foreigners complicated the religiously,
ethnically, and linguistically mixed population of Ottoman Galata.
Overall, given the multiple and overlapping designation used by Venetian and
Ottoman officials to refer to confessional diversity among Christians in Istanbul and the
lack of political status on the documents of the Venetian chancellery it is not possible to

For instances of Armenian merchants, see Grigor from Ankara, BAC 278, reg. 400, fol. 138v (13 January
1616) and Avidich from Julfa in Isfahan, BAC 276, reg. 395, fols. 61r/62v (19 January 1611).
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locate a community of “Ottoman Greeks” in Istanbul (and elsewhere) who engaged in
Ottoman/Venetian trade. 93 Different normative communities (like Istanbul’s Christian
Orthodox community, the Venetian community), the place of origin for immigrants, and
the Ottoman overlordship played roles in defining categories of belonging for those
individuals referred to in most of the scholarship as “Ottoman Greeks.” These categories
notwithstanding, all Christians residing in the Ottoman Empire, with the exception of
European protected foreigners, enjoyed the same legal and economic standing in Ottoman
courts.
Dimitri Toderini is a telling example of how complex it is to identify Ottoman
Christians. Originally from the city of Trikala, in Ottoman Thessaly, during the 1610s
and 1620s he partook in many trade ventures between Istanbul, Venice, and North Africa
as a shipmaster (patrono). He owned a ship (called Nave Toderina), co-owned Venetian
ones, had a network of business associates in Venice which included close relatives, and
sailed between Venetian and Ottoman territories carrying the goods of Venetian and
Ottoman merchants, including Jews and Muslims. In the 1610s he appeared in the
Venetian chancellery to litigate lawsuits (13 instances) and to notarize legal and business
deeds (26 cases). In 1613, he sailed as far as Livorno, Tunis, and Algiers where he
purchased ginger and sugar for some Ottoman officials in Istanbul and, while there, he
freed some Christian slaves on the behalf of Tuscan and French individuals in Livorno.
Furthermore, in 1620, he played a key role in brokering a deal between the Venetian
bailo and some preeminent Ottoman merchants that where backed by Grand Vizier Ali
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Greene, Catholic Pirates, 49/50.
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Pasha (office 1619-1621), who had suffered losses at the hands of a Spanish flotilla in the
Adriatic in July 1617. 94
Dimitri was clearly an important economic actor in shipping and trade between
the Ottoman lands and Western Europe. But can we call him an “Ottoman Greek”? In
Venetian diplomatic correspondence, the baili referred to him as simply as a “Greek
captain” (capitano greco) while the records of the Venetian chancellery referred to him
with the title of dominus, a prestige title used usually for Venetian merchants and
officials of the Venetian community. 95 Neither diplomatic documents nor court records
referred to him as an Ottoman subject while scholars of the early modern Mediterranean
call him a “Greek.” 96 Only his place of origin links him to the Ottoman Empire.
6—Conclusion
Long-distance merchants in early modern Venice and the Ottoman Empire shared
two key features of categorization. First, in contrast to their peers in many European
polities, they did not belong to a formal corporate body like merchant guilds or charted
regulated companies. Second, like elsewhere in the early modern world, they were not
members in a uniform political community which included all individuals born and living
in Ottoman or Venetian territories irrespective of religion and social status. Therefore, a
Stefini, Tommaso. Seeking Redress at the Signoria: Ottoman Merchants in Dispute with the Republic of
Venice in the Early Modern Era (Master Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2013), 146/147. For instances of his
legal and business affairs in the Venetian chancellery, see BAC 278, reg. 400, fol. 285v/r (27 September
1616) and BAC 280, fol. 92v (15 September 1619); and, for his commercial expedition in North Africa, see
CSM, Prima Seria, b. 29, fols. 149v/150r (13 March 1613) and b. 30, fol. 149r (13 June 1613).
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Stefini, Seeking Redress, 146. I did not find references to him in Ottoman sources so far.

Calafat, Guillaume. “La jurisdiction des consuls français en Mediterranée” in Bartolomei, Arnaud,
Guillaume Calafat, Mathieu Grenet, and Jörg Ulbert (eds), De l'utilité commerciale des consuls:
l'institution consulaire et les marchands dans le monde méditerranéen (XVIIe-XXe siècle) (Rome, Madrid:
École française de Rome; Casa de Velázquez, 2018), 155-172, 172 note 56.
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legal category to define “Ottoman merchants” and “Venetian merchants” did not exist
and political and legal authorities in both states classified long-distance merchants
foremost according to their social status and religious affiliation, the two most important
markers of belonging in the pre-modern world.
In the Ottoman case, given the vastness of the empire and its ethnically,
religiously, and occupationally highly diverse population, merchants that engaged in
Venetian/Ottoman trade belonged to different religious communities and social groups.
Three main ethnic and religious groups prevailed in this branch of commercial activity:
Sephardic Jews, Muslim Turks, and Orthodox Greeks. Ottoman legal and administrative
authorities classified them according to their religious affiliation, as Jews, Christians, and
Muslims, and dealt with these communities separately, as is shown by imperial rescripts
sent to Venetian officials on their behalf. However, as the case of royal merchants
suggests, Ottoman authorities also distinguished Ottoman merchants according to their
social status as either tax-paying subjects or the administrative-military-judicial elites of
the empire. The last group, the askeri, was the social unit most strongly associated to the
Ottoman dynasty and, therefore, with the early modern notion of “Ottoman identity.” The
emphasis on rank, rather than on religious affiliation, and their affiliation with the sultan
and his household prevailed in the petitions written by askeri merchants to Venetian
officials.
In contrast to Ottoman authorities, Venetian officials in Istanbul and Venice
created ex-novo categories of belonging to classify different groups of merchants coming
from Ottoman territories. In the case of Ottoman Jews, they coined the term “Levantine
Jews,” which combined Ottoman subjecthood and Jewish faith. As for Muslim
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merchants, in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Venetian authorities
employed the term “Turk” exclusively to refer to Muslims hailing from Ottoman lands.
The “Turks” par excellence were the Muslim subjects of the Ottoman sultan. In the case
of Ottoman Christians, Venetian authorities distinguished among different confessional,
ethnic, and linguistic groups, such as “Greek,” “Armenians,” and “Perots.” Many of these
categories of belonging used by Venetian authorities, such as that of “Levantine Jews”
and “Turks,” were not used by the merchants to identify themselves. Nevertheless, the
merchants employed them when applying to Venetian authorities to obtain legal and
economic benefits or to complain about episodes of mistreatment at the hands of
Venetian officials. Furthermore, in Venice classification categories played an important
role in the social and economic life of Ottoman merchant groups. Only those classified as
“Levantine Jews,” “Turks,” and other few groups, enjoyed the rights of trading between
Venice and the Ottoman Empire, they were exempted from state taxes, and they were
subject to a privileged legal status in Venetian courts of justice.
How did all categories of belonging discussed in this and in the previous chapter
affect the use of courts by Venetian and Ottoman merchants in seventeenth-century
Istanbul? Did religion, social status, and subjecthood determine legal status and courts
procedures in Venetian and Ottoman courts? If yes, how so? The following three chapters
will answer these questions by examining legal disputes and notarial transactions among
Venetian and Ottoman merchants in early seventeenth century Istanbul.
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Chapter 3: “A Frankish Court” in Ottoman Istanbul
1—Introduction
On August 14, 1618, the Rabi Iacob Abeniacar and the two Venetian merchants
and business partners (compagni), Nicolò Soruro and Andrea Rizzoli, appeared before
the bailo Almorò Nani in the chancellery (cancelleria) of the Venetian embassy in
Beyoğlu, north of the walled city of Galata. Iacob demanded that Nicolò and Andrea pay
him 264 sequins for a bill of exchange (lettera di cambio) drawn by the latter on June 21,
1617. The bill ordered the two brothers Zuanne Battista and Lorenzo Cigala to pay that
sum to Iacob’s business associates in Venice. The Cigala brothers had accepted the bill
on January 1, 1618 and had presented it to the Consuls of the Merchants (Consoli dei
Mercanti), one of the Venetian merchant courts. Yet six months later they had yet to pay
it. Thus, on March 18, 1618, Iacob presented a document (scrittura) to the Venetian
chancellery in Istanbul indicating that Zuanne Battista and Lorenzo had agreed to pay the
bill. By means of a different piece of written evidence, Nicolò and Andrea rejected
Iacob’s request. After listening to the depositions of all the litigants, and having read the
various documents that they produced, the bailo issued a sentence (sententia) against
Iacob, freeing Nicolò and Andrea from his claims but inviting him to pursue legal action
against the Cigala brothers in Venice instead. Dissatisfied with the sentence, Iacob
appealed to a tribunal in Venice which specialized in legal review, the Auditori delle
Sentenze. 1

ASV, BAC 279, registro 402, fol. 191v/r. All parties appointed legal representatives (procuratori) to
represent them in the appeal process in Venice. Ibid., reg. 401, fols. 144r (23 Aug. 1618) and 145v (27
Aug. 1618).
1
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The short paper trail left by this case in the Istanbul chancellery raises several
questions. Why did Iacob sue two Venetian merchants in the Venetian embassy, a
European consular court in the capital of an Islamic empire? As we have seen in the
previous two chapters, Jewish merchants in Istanbul were considered Ottoman subjects:
they paid the harac (the Islamic poll-tax levied on non-Muslims) and were not included
among the members of the city’s Venetian community. Why did Iacob not use Muslim
courts to retrieve his credit instead? In principle, as an Ottoman subject, he could have
expected better treatment there than the one accorded by an Ottoman judge to a
European. In short, what made the Venetian consular court attractive for an Ottoman
subject, in particular, for an Ottoman Jew? Was it the body of law that was applied or
maybe was it the role that this institution played in regulating the trade between Istanbul
and Venetian territories?
The present and following two chapters answer these questions through an
examination of the surviving registers of the bailo’s chancellery for the period of 1609 to
1620. While scholarly interest in Ottoman justice has considerably expanded in the past
thirty years, historians and legal scholars have generally neglected European consular
courts operating in the empire’s commercial hubs. 2 Such neglect stems from the still
widely-held assumption that European consular justice operated independently from the
For an overview of the recent studies of the Ottoman justice see Ergene, Boğaç and Yavuz Aykan.
“Shari`a Courts in the Ottoman Empire Before the Tanzimat,” The Medieval History Journal 22/2 (2019),
203–228. Studies of the consular institution and consular justice in the early modern period are mostly
concerned with Atlantic Europe, North Africa, and the Western Mediterranean. For instance, see Ulbert,
Jörg and Gérard Le Bouëdec (eds), La fonction consulaire à l’époque moderne: L’affirmation d’une
institution économique et politique (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2006); Aglietti, Marcella,
Manuel Herrero Sánchez, and Francisco Zamora Rodríguez (eds), Los cónsules de extranjeros en la Edad
Moderna y a principios de la Edad Contemporánea (Madrid: Ediciones Doce Calles, 2013); Bartolomei,
Arnaud, Guillaume Calafat, Mathieu Grenet et Jörg Ulbert (eds), De l'utilité commerciale des consuls:
l'institution consulaire et les marchands dans le monde méditerranéen (XVIIe-XXe siècle) (Rome: École
française de Rome; Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2018).

2

123

Ottoman court system and that only Europeans or the protégés of European countries
could apply to consular courts. The only notable exception is Maurits Van den Boogert’s
important work on the relationship between the Ottoman legal system and Dutch consular
justice in the eighteenth-century Ottoman Empire. 3 More recently, a handful of
economists who have focused on European consular courts have identified the so-called
“jurisprudential shift.” According to this thesis, in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, Ottoman Christian and Jewish merchants abandoned the Ottoman Islamic legal
system in favor of European consular jurisdiction, which provided them with more
equitable and cheaper justice. These scholars argue that European consular courts
promoted the development of impersonal exchange and more complex forms of business
associations, and contributed to the economic modernization of the Middle East. 4
Like van den Boogert, I maintain that Europeans did not enjoy extraterritoriality
in the early modern Ottoman Empire and that consular courts operated within, rather than
outside of the Ottoman court system. However, my analysis departs from his study in two
main ways. First, instead of focusing exclusively on notable disputes, I conduct here a

Van den Boogert, Maurits H. The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System: Qadis, Consuls and
Beratlıs in the 18th Century (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2005). For other studies of the relationship between
Muslim courts and the European consulates in pre-Ottoman Anatolia and nineteenth- and twentieth-century
Morocco, respectively, see Fleet, Kate. “Turkish-Latin Diplomatic Relations in the Fourteenth Century:
The Case of the Consul,” Oriente Moderno 22/83/3 (2003), 605–11; Marglin, Jessica M. Across legal lines:
Jews and Muslims in modern Morocco (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 123-170. For Ottoman
merchants appealing to European consulates outside the Ottoman Empire see, Talbot, Michael. “When
Proof is Not Enough: An Ottoman Merchant in the Gibraltar Vice-Admiralty Court in the 1760s,”
Quaderni Storici 51/3 (2016), 753-776.
3

Kuran, Timur. “The Economic Ascent of the Middle East’s Religious Minorities: The Role of Islamic
Legal Pluralism,” The Journal of Legal Studies 33/2 (June 2004), 475-515; Artunç, Cihan. “The Price of
Legal Institutions: The Beratlı Merchants in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire,” Journal of
Economic History 75/3 (2015), 720-748. For a reappraisal of the “Jurisprudential Shift” hypothesis, see
Çizakça, Murat and Macit Kenanoğlu, “Ottoman Merchants and the Jurisprudential Shift Hypothesis,” in
Suraiya Faroqhi and Gilles Veinstein (eds), Merchants in the Ottoman Empire (Leuven: Peeters, 1998),
195-215; and, for a critique, see Van den Boogert, Maurits H. “Legal Reflections on the “Jurisprudential
Shift Hypothesis,” Turcica 41 (2009), 373–82.
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quantitative analysis of the records of the Venetian consular over the period of eleven
years (1609-1620). This approach uncovers patterns in the use of this court by individuals
belonging to various religious and political group that an exclusive reliance on notable
case studies fails to show. Second, I include notarial transactions in my analysis, which
allows me to demonstrate that the notarial function of the Venetian chancellery was the
main reason that individuals applied there.
This chapter introduces the bailo’s chancellery while the next two chapters
analyze the notarial transactions and lawsuits handled by its officials. Here, I deal with
the office of the bailo, Venetian legislation and customary commercial norms, the types
of services provided by this institution, court costs, and the religious affiliation and social
status of its clients. As I show, the jurisdictional reach of the Venetian consular court was
determined by international treaties (the Capitulations), but the body of laws applied by
this court was an unwritten mixture of Venetian state legislation, and mercantile
customary norms. Furthermore, I illustrate that this institution charged substantial fees to
its users, limiting both access to this institution and the frequency of its operations, every
after year. This notwithstanding, the presence of numerous Ottoman clients shows a
substantial “openness” of this institution, which I relate to the Venetian efforts to promote
Venetian-Ottoman trade despite the competition of these individuals against Venetian
subjects.

125

2—The Bailo, the Capitulations, Venetian Law
The bailo’s office
The bailo was the permanent ambassador of the Republic of Venice in the
Ottoman capital and the chief consul of all Venetian subjects residing in Istanbul and in
the Ottoman Empire as a whole. His embassy was the oldest-established permanent
Western European mission in Ottoman Istanbul (from 1454): the origins of the office of
the bailo (called bailaggio, the “bailate”) date from Byzantine times (the eleventh
century), when Venetian merchants and diplomats firstly established themselves in
Byzantine Constantinople. 5
The baili hailed from the Venetian patriciate, the ruling group of the aristocratic
Venetian Republic. 6 As most of the Venetian noblemen, the future baili obtained a
humanist education, often in prestigious universities such as those in Padua. Their
education did not specialize in law but, rather, it centered upon topics such as rhetoric,
letters, philosophy, and others. Furthermore, in contrast to the medieval period, very few
baili in early modern Istanbul had conducted trade before assuming their office, a factor
that might have limited their knowledge of trade affairs. 7 After completing their formal

On the baili in Byzantine Constantinople see Diehl, Charles. “La colonie vénetienne à Constantinople à la
fin du XIVe siècle,” Mélanges de l’École Française de Rome 3 (1883), 90-131, 122–7; Bertelé, Tommaso.
Il palazzo degli Ambasciatori di Venezia a Costantinopoli (Bologna: Casa editrice Bologna, 1932), 19-32;
Nicol, Donald M. Byzantium and Venice: A Study in Diplomatic and Cultural Relations (Cambridge; New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 181–201 and 289–91.
5

On the office of the bailo in Ottoman Istanbul see Bertelé, Il Palazzo; Dursteler, Eric. “The Bailo in
Constantinople: Crisis and Career in Venice’s Early Modern Diplomatic Corps.” Mediterranean Historical
Review 16/2 (2001), 1-30, Ibid, Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early
Modern Mediterranean (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 23-40.

6

This was a consequence of the progressive withdrawal of Venetian patricians from directly participating
to trade ventures from the early sixteenth century onwards. Dursteler, Venetians in Constantinople, 45;
Gullino, Giuseppe. “I patrizi veneziani e la mercatura negli ultimi tre secoli della Repubblica” in Giorgio
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education, Venetian noblemen could acquire political knowledge by travelling to
European courts. At age of 25, they entered the Grand Council (Maggior Consiglio) of
the Venetian Republic. From there onwards, they took up different offices in the
administration of Venetian territories, the navy, and in foreign embassies. The bailate was
one of the most prestigious offices for a Venetian patrician and could provide his holder
with access to more important offices within the Venetian state.
The office of the bailo played different roles in Ottoman-Venetian relations as
well as in the commercial life of Venetian communities in the Ottoman Empire. The
bailo was, first and foremost, an ambassador representing Venice’s political interests visà-vis Ottoman authorities. He spent most of his time in office dealing with political,
military, and commercial issues between Venice and the Ottoman officials. Furthermore,
as an ambassador, he was charged with collecting and relaying information to Venice
about Ottoman politics and military operations. The bailo’s final reports of their
ambassadorship (relazioni) and their regular reports to different Venetian magistracies
(dispacci) are some of the most celebrated historical sources on Ottoman diplomacy and
politics in the early modern period. 8

Borelli (ed.), Mercanti e vita economica nella Repubblica Veneta (secoli XIII-XVIII) (Verona: Banca
popolare di Verona, 1985), 403-45.
A growing number of scholars have employed these sources to study Ottoman politics and EuropeanOttoman diplomacy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. See Valensi, Lucette. The birth of the
despot: Venice and the Sublime Porte (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 1993), Pedani, Maria Pia.
“Safiye’s Household and Venetian Diplomacy,” Turcica 32 (2000), 9-31; Gürkan, Emrah Safa. “Mediating
Boundaries: Mediterranean Go-Betweens and Cross-Confessional Diplomacy in Constantinople, 15601600.” Journal of Early Modern History 19 (2015), 107-128; Işıksel, Güneş. La diplomatie ottomane sour
le règne de Selîm II: paramètres et périmètres de l'Empire ottoman dans le troisième quart du XVIe siècle
(Louvain: Peeters, 2016).
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Scholars have mostly focused on these ambassadorial duties of the bailo, thus neglecting
this office’s second main task: his consular duties. The bailo promoted Venetian trade
and operated on the behalf of Venetian merchants in Istanbul and throughout the empire.
As member of the patriciate, he was particularly concerned with protecting the
commercial interests of the remaining Venetian noblemen who still engaged in the
Levantine trade. Furthermore, as the chief Venetian consul in the Ottoman Empire, the
bailo appointed and had jurisdiction over Venetian consuls in many Ottoman cities,
above all Izmir, with the exception of the consuls of Aleppo and Cairo, which were
selected by Grand Council. 9 Other consular duties included the liberation of slaves, the
adjudication of disputes between Venetian subjects, and the collection of the estates of
dead Venetians.
The Capitulations and consular jurisdiction
Ottoman authorities allowed a degree of autonomy to various social, occupational,
and religious groups (called taife), in handling their internal affairs and solving
controversies among their members according to their “customs” (adet or örf). These
groups included Jewish and Christian communities, marketplace associations of
craftsmes, nomadic groups, villages, and more. Communal authorities, such as Jewish
rabbis, Christian patriarchs and metropolitans, stewards of artisanal groups (kethüda), and

For studies of the Venetian consular system see Steensgaard, Niels. “Consuls and Nations in the Levant
from 1570–1650,” Scandinavian Economic History Review 15 (1967), 13–53; Trampus, Antonio. “La
Formazione del Diritto Consolare Moderno a Venezia e nelle Provincie Unite Tra Seicento e Settecento,”
Rivista di Storia del Diritto Italiano 67 (1994), 288-319; Pedani, Maria Pia. “Venetian Consuls in Egypt
and Syria in the Ottoman Age,” Mediterranean World 18 (2006), 7–21; Maréchaux, Benoît. “Consuls
vénitiens en Méditerranée orientale (1575-1645)” in M. Aglietti, M. Herrero Sánchez y F. Zamora
Rodríguez (eds), Los cónsules de extranjeros en la Edad Moderna y a principios de la Edad
Contemporánea (Madrid: Doce Calles, 2013), 145-158; Signori, Umberto. Proteggere i privilegi dello
straniero. I consoli veneziani nell’Impero ottomano tra Sei e Settecento (PhD, Università di Milano, 2018).
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chieftains of nomadic groups, exercised the authority to arbitrate intra-group
controversies without the intervention of Ottoman legal officials. However, as numerous
studies of Ottoman Christians and Jews and craftsmen demonstrate, members of these
communities often evaded the juridical authority of their group leaders, and instead
applied to Ottoman courts—even for intra-group controversies. 10
The same arrangement also applied to those European communities that
benefitted from the Capitulations. European ambassadors and consuls had jurisdiction
over civil and criminal cases between the subjects of their rulers. In these disputes, they
administered justice according to their home state’s laws and local customs. 11 The
Capitulations formalized consular jurisdiction. For instance, the Venetian Capitulations
of 1604 state:
“If two Venetians are in dispute, their baili should hear their case according to
their customs (adetlerince) and nobody should interfere” 12

Akarlı, Engin, “Law in the Marketplace: Istanbul, 1730–1840,” in Muhammad Khalid Masud, Rudolph
Peters, and David S. Powers (eds), Dispensing Justice in Islam: Qadis and their Judgments (Leiden: Brill,
2006), 245–270, 247; Gerber, Haim. State, Society, and Law in Islam: Ottoman Law in Comparative
Perspective (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), 113-126. For an overview of the use of Ottoman courts by nonMuslims see Barkey, Karen. “Aspects of Legal Pluralism in the Ottoman Empire,” in Richard J. Ross and
Lauren Benton (eds), Legal Pluralism and Empires, 1500-1850 (New York: New York University Press,
2013), 83-107.
10

Van den Boogert, Maurits. “Consular Jurisdiction in the Ottoman Legal System in the Eighteenth
Century,” in Maurits H. Van den Boogert, and Kate Fleet (eds.), The Ottoman Capitulations: Text and
Context (Rome: Istituto per l’Oriente C.A. Nallino, 2004), 613-634; Ferro, Marco, Dizionario del diritto
comune e Veneto (Venice: Santini e Figlio, 1845), Vol. 1, 492-494. The grant of judicial autonomy in intergroup disputes to Western European communities was not an Ottoman creation but it had existed in
Byzantine Constantinople as well. Penna, Daphne. “Legal Autonomy of Latin Christians in the Byzentine
Empire,” in Richard Potz (ed.), Autonomie in den Ostkirchen, Vol. XX (Hennef: Kanon - Jahrbuch der
Gesellschaft für das Recht der Ostkirchenpp, 2010), 70-81.
11

Theunissen, Hans. “Ottoman-Venetian Diplomatics: The 'Ahd-Names. The Historical Background and
the Development of a Category of Political-Commercial Instruments together with an Annotated Edition of
a Corpus of Relevant Documents,” Electronic Journal of Oriental Studies 1/2 (1988), 1-698, 586, line 38.
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Ottoman authorities incorporated European communities into the empire’s legal system
by bestowing on their leaders judicial authority and by treating the laws of their own
states like the “customs” that regulated intra-group affairs of Ottoman Christian
communities. 13 As we will see in the Chapters 6 and 7, local customs were among the
sources of Ottoman law (together with Hanafi Islamic law and dynastic legislation,
kanun) and they played a role in controversies handled by Ottoman courts. In fact,
Ottoman authorities employed the same legal arrangement to European and Ottoman
Jewish and Christian communities. Therefore, consular justice should be considered
among the different normative orders that composed the pluralistic Ottoman legal system.
The “law merchant” and Venetian legislation
What were the Venetian “customs” mentioned in the Capitulations? What body of
laws did the bailo apply in commercial and other types of disputes? To answer these
questions, we should refer to the debate on the law merchant and to the idiosyncratic
Venetian legal system.
European maritime and commercial law in the early modern Mediterranean
developed from customary norms and statutory rules that had emerged in the medieval
period, especially during the expansion of long-distance trade from the tenth century
onwards, the so-called “Commercial Revolution.” 14 In spite of a long tradition of legal
scholars who have argued for the existence of a uniform, private, and transnational law
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Van den Boogert, The Capitulations, 58-61.

Lopez, Robert S. The Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages, 950-1350 (Englewood Cliffs: PrenticeHall, 1971).
14

130

merchant (lex mercatoria), historical evidence does not support this hypothesis. 15 In
Mediterranean and European ports, customs concerning navigation and trade developed
in an independent fashion, even though there were substantial similarities resulting from
operational requirements of shipping and transacting. State authorities incorporated these
customs into their statutes and created new norms. Until the Ordonnance du Commerce
of 1673 issued by the French king Louis XIV, no European state had issued a
comprehensive legislative and administrative regulation of the law merchant which
before belonged to customary norms and to the municipal statutes of different European
cities. Two famous collections of maritime customs, the Rhodanian Sea Law of the
seventh-century Byzantine Empire and the Catalan Consulate of the Sea (Consolat de
Mar, compilated around 1348), codified the law merchant but their actual diffusion
among European merchants is a matter of debate. Furthermore, they contained norms
mostly regarding maritime law. 16

For instances of advocates of a universal law merchant see Berman, Harold J. Law and Revolution: The
Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), 333-356;
Trakman, Leon E. The Law Merchant: The Evolution of Commercial Law (Littleton: Fred B. Rothman,
1983) and Benson, Bruce. “The Spontaneous Evolution of Commercial Law,” Southern Economic Journal
55/3 (1989), 644-661. For some detractors, see Galgano, Francesco. Lex Mercatoria, Storia del diritto
commerciale (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1993), 66-69; Donahue, Charles Jr., “Medieval and Early Modern Lex
mercatoria: An Attempt at the Probatio Diabolica,” Chicago Journal of International Law 21 (2004), 2136; Kadens, Emily. “The Myth of the Customary Law Merchant,” Texas Law Review 90/5 (2012), 11531206.
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within Customs: The Character of Medieval Merchant Law,” Chicago Journal of International Law 39
(2004), 9-65; Allaire, Bernard. “Between Oleron and Colbert: The Evolution of French Maritime Law until
the Seventeenth Century,” in Maria Fusaro, Bernard Allaire, Richard Blakemore, Tijl Vanneste (eds). Law,
Labour, and Empire: Comparative Perspectives on Seafarers, c. 1500-1800 (Houndmills, Basingstoke,
Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 79-99. For maritime and commercial law in medieval Muslim
polities see Udovitch, Abraham L. “The ‘Law Merchant’ of the Medieval Islamic World,” in Gustave E.
von Grunebaum (ed.), Logic in classicial Islamic culture (Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz, 1970), 113-130;
Khalilieh, Hassan S. Admiralty and Maritime Laws in the Mediterranean Sea (ca. 800-1050): the Kitāb
Akriyat al-Sufun vis-à-vis the Nomos Rhodion nautikos (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2006).
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In the Venetian case, medieval statutes and norms issued ad hoc by Venetian
magistracies throughout the late medieval and early modern periods regulated the
maritime and commercial life of Venetian subjects. Scholars of Venetian law so far have
focused on the Middle Ages, specifically on the twelfth and thirteen centuries, because
during this period the Venetian government issued a series of statutes regulating the
administration of civil and criminal justice and navigation, which, until 1797, constituted
“Venetian law.” 17 The 1255’s Statute of the Doge Zeno included a set of maritime norms
but its application and validity in the following centuries is a matter of debate. 18 Only in
1786 did the Venetian government issue the first comprehensive collection of maritime
norms. 19 These statutes and collections of customary norms concerned mostly shipping
while commercial justice was not the subject of codification efforts by the Venetian
authorities. Different Venetian magistracies enacted specific norms on long-distance
trade without much coordination among them. 20
Despite the absence of a uniform law merchant in early modern Europe and
across the Mediterranean, there existed procedural similarities in the resolution of
commercial disputes. During the medieval and early modern periods, merchant courts

The most famous statute was the Statute of Jacopo Tiepolo issued in 1242. Zordan, Giorgio.
L'ordinamento giuridico veneziano (Padova: Imprimitur, 2005), 153-165.
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Some scholars claim that it was forgotten in the Late Middle Ages and that the Venetians had tacitly
adopted the maritime regulations of the Consulate of the Sea like their Genoese rivals, but others disagree
on both points. See Lane, Frederic C. “Venetian Maritime Law and Administration, 1250-1350,” in ibid,
Venice and History: the Collected Papers of Frederic C. Lane (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966),
227-246; Zordan, L'ordinamento giuridico, 164/165; Pansolli, Lamberto, La Gerarchia delle Fonti di
Diritto nella Legislazione Medievale Veneziana (Milano: Dott. A. Giuffrè Editore, 1970), 57-59.
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Nehlesen-Von Stryk, Karin. ““Ius Commune” “Consetudo” e “Arbitrium Iudicis” nella Prassi Giudiziaria
Veneziana del Quattrocento,” in Karin Nehlsen von Stryk and Dieter Norr (eds), Diritto comune, diritto
commerciale, diritto veneziano (Venice: Centro Tedesco di Studi Veneziani, 1985), 107-139, 112.
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(consolato) in Venice and other European cities applied summary procedure, also called
“commercial procedure” (alla mercantile), which distinguished commercial justice from
ordinary justice. It entailed fast and cheap trials, a less formalist approach to legal
evidence, and the absence of witnesses, lawyers, and other legally trained professionals.
Merchant courts first and foremost aimed at establishing compromise between the
litigants and issued sentences based on the so-called “nature of things,” (or “truth of the
fact,” veritas facti) the manifest truth according to shared notions of equity. This
contrasted with the “quality of the person,” that its, an individual’s social status and
personal reputation in a given location, which played a central role in the procedures of
ordinary European courts applying the ius commune. 21 In other words, “facts” such as
contractual obligations or actions performed by the parties after drawing them were the
basis of judgment in merchant courts. Overall, summary procedure allowed for a more
equitable justice for foreign merchants since it annulled the legal privileges enjoyed by
local inhabitants which were related to their public reputation and social status. In

21
On summary/commercial procedure, which was recognized by Roman law jurists, and one the
differences between the “nature of things” and the “quality of the persons” see Lattes, Alessandro. Il diritto
commerciale nella legislazione statutaria delle città (Milan: Hoepli, 1884) 242-306; Cerutti, Simona.
“‘Nature des choses’ et ‘qualité des personnes’. Le Consulat de commerce de Turin au XVIIIe siècle,”
Annales, Histoire, Sciences Sociales 57/6 (2002), 1491-1520, and Giustizia sommaria. Pratiche e ideali di
giustizia in una società di Ancien Régime (Torino XVIII secolo) (Milano: Feltrinelli Editore, 2003); 74-147;
Berman, Law and revolution, 345-348; Kessler, Amalia, K. A Revolution in Commerce: The Parisian
Merchant Court and the Rise of Commercial Society in Eighteenth-century France (New Haven, 2007), 96140; Calafat, Guillaume. “Expertises et tribunaux de commerce: Procédures et réputation à Livourne au
XVIIe siècle,” Hypothèses 14/1 (2011), 141-54; Caracausi. Andrea, “Procedure di giustizia in età moderna:
i tribunali corporativi,” Studi Storici 2 (2008), 323–60. On the concept of equity in commercial justice see
Donahue, Charles, Jr. “Equity in the Courts of Merchants,” Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis [The Legal
History Review] 72 (2004), 1-35.
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Venice, the city’s authorities applied this procedure exclusively to selected groups of
merchants whose commercial activities they aimed to encourage. 22
In addition to Venetian maritime and commercial law and Mediterranean-wide
customary practices, we should also refer to Venice’s idiosyncratic legal system to better
understand the functioning of the Venetian consular court. The two main peculiarities of
this system were Venice’s rejection of external sources of law and a strong connection
between the administration of justice and politics. In contrast with the rest of Europe,
except for England, Venetian administrators did not formally include the ius commune
into the hierarchy of legal sources employed by state tribunals as well as foreign
collections of maritime norms, such as the Consulate of the Sea. The town’s statutes,
analogy, approved usage, and the judge’s discretion (arbritum iudicis), were the most
important legal sources of Venetian law that emanated exclusively from Venetian
legislators. 23 However, despite their absence in city’s statutes, the ius commune
constituted the de facto basis of Venetian law in judicial and notarial practice, like in the
rest of Europe, while Venetian merchant courts followed the regulations of the Consulate
of the Sea. 24

Fusaro, Maria. “Politics of justice/Politics of trade: foreign merchants and the administration of justice
from the records of Venice’s Giudici del Forestier.” Melanges de l'Ecole Francaise de Rome: Moyen Age,
126:1 (2014).
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For the Venetian legal system in general, see Cozzi, Gaetano. “La politica del diritto nella Repubblica di
Venezia,” in Gaetano Cozzi (ed.), Stato, società e giustizia nella Repubblica Veneta (sec. XV–XVIII)
(Rome: Jouvence, 1980), 15-145; Zordan, L’ordinamento giuridico; Pansolli, La Gerarchia; Shaw, James
E. The Justice of Venice. Authorities and Liberties in the Urban Economy, 1550–1700 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2006).
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The formal exclusion of external legal sources reflected the conception of law of
Venetian administrators. Venice lacked a class of jurists and both legislation and judicial
administration were the exclusive prerogative of the patriciate, the ruling elite of the
Republic of Venice. Venetian noble judges in the metropole and in the subject territories
were foremost politicians with little legal training, and they adjudicated disputes
primarily following the political and economic interests of the Republic, which coincided
with that of the patriciate. In the words of a specialist, for Venice law was “the best
possible solution available in a given time in answer to the needs of substantive justice
and political necessity, it is an instrument, not an immutable dogma; it is the result of
political reasoning, not of a technical-jurisprudential elaboration.” 25
Such preoccupations led to a flexible and pragmatic application of law by
Venetian judges, especially outside the metropole, and they explain the importance of the
judge’s discretion as a source of Venetian law. Scholars disagree over the actual degree
of such discretion. Some conceive of it as the judge’s power, in the absence of statuary or
customary norms or in the impossibility of analogue procedure/instance based on a
custom or a norm, to adjudicate according to his own best judgment (bona conscientia).
Dauchy, Dave De Ruysscher, Heikki Pihlajamäki (eds), Migrating Words, Migrating Merchants, Migrating
Law trading routes and the development of commercial law (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2020), 54-83, 70/71.
25
Gasparini, Silvia. “I Giuristi Veneziani e il loro Ruolo tra Istituzioni e Potere nell’Età del Diritto
Comune,” in Karin Nehlsen von Stryk and Dieter Norr (eds), Diritto comune, diritto commerciale, diritto
veneziano (Venice: Centro Tedesco di Studi Veneziani, 1985), 68-104, 72. For commercial justice and the
political use of justice in Venice and its territories in Italy and the Levant, see Cozzi, “La Politica del
Diritto;” Fusaro, “Politics of justice,” and “Public Service and Private Trade: Northern Seamen in
Seventeenth-century Venetian courts of Justice,” International Journal of Maritime History 27/1 (2015), 325; O’Connell, Monique. Men of Empire: Power and Negotiation in Venice's Maritime State (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 75-96; Lauer, Rena N. Colonial Justice and the Jews of Venetian
Crete (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019), 115-117; Cecchini, Isabella. “When Things
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Others consider the judge’s discretion as his faculty to arbitrate a dispute in a way
acceptable to the litigants. 26 As we will see in Chapter 5, political and commercial
concerns played a central role in the procedure followed by the baili in solving
commercial dispute between Venetian and Ottoman subjects.
Finally, it is important to mention that the Venetian chancellery had been
operating in Istanbul since the medieval period, when there existed Byzantine courts
applying Roman law and the consular courts of other Italian maritime republics. Since the
early fourteenth century, the Genoese colony of Galata had its own statutes (Statuti di
Pera) regulating the administrative, legal, and economic life of the colony. Such statutes
prescribed summary procedure in commercial controversies demonstrating that this
procedure had been known in Istanbul since the medieval period. 27 We do not know how
long they remained valid within the Galata’s Genoese community (now called the
“Franks of Galata”/Perotti) after the Ottoman conquest in 1453. Research shows some
continuation of Genoese judicial practices, although without the presence of Genoese
magistrates, at least in the years right after the conquest. 28 The same applies for
Byzantine commercial law and customary practices, a subject that still lacks systematic
26
Cozzi, “La Politica del Diritto,” 24; Pansolli, La Gerarchia delle Fonti, 113-197; Shaw, The Justice of
Venice, 14; Nehlesen-Von Stryk. “Ius Commune,”131-134.
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Constantinople, see Penna, Dafne. “Venetian Judges and their Jurisdiction in Constantinople in the 12th
Century: Some Observations based on Information Drawn from the Chrysobull of Alexios III Angelos to
Venice in 1198,” Subseciva Groningana, Studies in Roman and Byzantine Law 8 (2009), 135–146. On
Byzantine law and commerce in the late medieval period see Laiou, Angeliki. “Byzantine Trade with
Christians and Muslims and the Crusades,” in Angeliki E. Laiou and Roy Parviz Mottahedeh (eds), The
Crusades from the perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim world (Washington: Dumbarton Oaks
Research Library and Collection, 2001), 157-196.
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study. Therefore, the Venetian consular court in seventeenth-century Galata operated in a
historical context where different legal traditions—the Roman/Byzantine, Genoese, and
(the most recent entry) Ottoman Islamic—coexisted.
Examples of a Normative Framework
Did the Venetian consular court apply the norms of the Consulate of the Sea,
Venetian statutes, summary/mercantile procedure, or local customs? Court rulings do not
usually contain reference to either bodies of norms or to customary mercantile practices.
From the records it is not clear whether there existed a body of merchant law. Between
1609 and 1620, only in three legal suits do we find reference to customary norms and to
state legislation. I present two of them here.
On May 7, 1609, Costantino Gialuri, from Rethymnon in Crete, and his partners
brought to court Zuanne Veveli, from the same city, the ship master (patrono) and joint
owner (parcenevole) of the vessel San Nicolò. Costantino demanded that Zuanne
compensate him for 130 kilograms of linseed that had been found spoilt on Zuanne’s ship
which had just arrived in Istanbul from Crete. According to Costantino, the reason for the
damaged goods was the poor condition of the vessel. Zuanne rejected these charges
claiming that, rather than the bad state of the ship, seawater leaks caused by the heavy sea
during navigation had been responsible for the bad state of the goods. He also brought to
court a text of the Consulate of the Sea, the Catalan medieval collection of maritime
customs, to support his defense that, under such circumstances, he was no obliged to
compensate Costantino. The latter responded that the Consulate was not acceptable in
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that situation. After demanding that Zuanne prove through witnesses his innocence for
the bad shape of the goods, the bailo freed him from Costantino’s charges. 29
In another case from November 1619, the Venetian merchant Ieronimo Grattaruol
sued another merchant, Pietro Pencini, over an unpaid bill of exchange valued at 346
ducats. Ieronimo had drawn the bill of exchange to Pietro with the instructions that
Pietro’s brothers in Venice pay the sum to a man named Santo Fonte, Gieronimo’s
business associate. In Venice, Pietro’s brothers publicly accepted the bill at the
magistracy of the Consuls of the Merchants, but he had not paid it yet. Ieronimo therefore
asked to be repaid for that sum. After reading a ruling (capitolare) of that magistracy
(dated 14 December 1593) according to which the payment of bills drawn in the Ottoman
Empire had to be done in Venice, the bailo freed Pietro from Ieronimo’s claims. Ieronimo
subsequently asked his partner Santo to recover the sum of money from Pietro’s
brothers. 30 This case shows how rulings of single Venetian institutions constituted law in
commercial controversies in the Venetian chancellery in Istanbul.
We can explain the general absence of a normative framework in the court’s
rulings by referring to summary procedure. By basing judgment on the “facts”, like
commercial agreements and individual actions, this procedure valued “practice” as a

BAC 276, reg. 394, 56v (7 May 1609) and 63r/64v (14 May 1609). The records do no show which
articles of the Consulate of the Sea Zuanne showed in court on his defense and it is not clear how this
collection of maritime costumes played a role in the bailo’s sentence. Another similar case, which involved
the principle of general average (avaria), see BAC 279, 402, 83r/v (3 July 1617), 103r/104v (2 August
1617), and 111r (14 August 1617).
29

BAC 280, reg. 403, fol. 104v (2 November 1619). The magistracy of the Consuls of the Merchants had
jurisdiction over disputes arising from unpaid bills of exchange and insurance contracts. Nani, Filippo.
Prattica civile delle corti del palazzo veneto (Venice, 1694), 255/256; Ferro, Dizionario, Vol. 2, 553.
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source of law more than specific jurisprudence, local customs, or precedents. 31 In my
view, the lack of reference to norms is an indicator of the application of this procedure in
the resolution of most commercial controversies solved in the Venetian chancellery.
3—The Court: the Personnel, the Fees, and the Types of Documents
The Personnel
The Venetian chancellery was located within the Venetian embassy, which was
known as casa bailaggia (the “bailo’s residence”), in Beyoğlu, a hilly area located north
of the walled city of Galata that hosted all the European embassies. The chancellery was
therefore separate from the commercial district of Lonca (Loggia) which was positioned
within the walls of Galata near the docks and around the Catholic church of San
Francesco. Lonca was the commercial center of the Venetian community in Istanbul.
Merchants had to climb up to Beyoğlu to use the legal and notarial services of the
Venetian consular court. In contrast, the main kadı court of the district of Galata was
located near the area’s main mosque (the Arab Mosque, Arap Camii) in the proximity of
the Lonca district. 32
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Map 2: Ottoman Galata in the First Half of the Seventeenth Century

Taken from Eric Dursteler, Venetians in Constantinople, Nation, Identity, and
Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2006), 25.
Many officials assisted the bailo in his judicial role and carried out other duties. Among
them the most important was the secretary of the bailo. He was both the Chancellor
(cancelliere) of the Venetian embassy, a public notary, and a diplomatic agent. He was a
Venetian citizen belonging to cittadini originari, a citizen sub-elite immediately below
the patriciate. He was a member of the Ducal Chancellery (Cancelleria Ducale) from
which he was elected to accompany the newly appointed bailo to Istanbul. His office
ended with the expiration of a bailo’s ambassadorship which usually lasted between three
years. 33

Zannini, Burocrazia e burocrati a Venezia in età moderna: i cittadini originari (sec. XVI-XVIII) (Venice:
Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti, 1993); 37–45; Bellavitis, Anna. “‘Per cittadini metterete….’ La
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Quaderni storici 89 (1995), 359–83.
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The secretary conducted many tasks in the Venetian embassy. He handled the
transfer of information between the bailo, the Venetian government, and other
magistracies and with Venetian consuls and officials in Venetian territories in the
seaborne Stato da Mar. At times he also substituted the bailo in diplomatic missions at
the Ottoman court and collected information about Ottoman politics. In the chancellery,
he operated as a public notary for the Venetian community and for individuals hailing
from other Christian and Muslim polities. Unlike the bailo, who did not receive
specialized legal training, the secretary was trained in law like other Venetian notaries in
the schools of the Venetian bureaucracy. 34 Given his many duties, the secretary took an
assistant (coadiutore) to help him with the most menial tasks in the chancellery, such as
keeping the notarial records and writing correspondence. 35
After the secretary, the most important official was the court’s bailiff (called
cavaliere), who assisted the bailo in his judicial and consular duties. He travelled
between the court and intra muros Galata to deliver summons and other legal
communications to single individuals, he conducted investigations, and interviewed
witnesses before the bailo in civil and criminal disputes. He also executed the rulings of
the bailo within the limits imposed by the Ottoman legal system. For instance, he seized
confiscated merchandizes, sold goods at audits in the chancellery (incanto), and had the
power to imprison convicted debtors and criminals in the embassy’s prisons. 36 In these

34
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executive duties, the bailiff was helped by the Janissaries (yeniçeri, an elite Ottoman
military corps) employed by the Venetian embassy that carried out the actual arrest of
convicted individuals. Like the secretary, the bailiff was elected in Venice as a member
of the entourage of a newly elected bailo and his office lasted as long as the bailo’s. 37
The other members of the courts were the dragomans, who operated as both
diplomatic interpreters and translators. As we have seen in Chapter 1, most dragomans
belonged to Galata’s preeminent Catholic families. They played a vital role in the
chancellery as they operated as interpreters during court proceedings, and they translated
a variety of documents—Ottoman court documents and commercial letters in
Ladino/Judeo Spanish and Demotic Greek— into vernacular Italian. Unlike to the
secretary and the bailiff, dragomans did not come in and out of power with each new
bailo. Rather, they worked under different baili. Dragomans hailing from local families
had been in the service of Venice for generations. 38 Therefore, they likely possessed
expert knowledge in local legal practices and customary norms. Despite the fact that our
court records are silent about the role of the dragomans in legal processes taking place in
the Venetian consular court, we cannot neglect to acknowledge that the bailo and his
court officials might have consulted with dragomans on local legal customs during
lawsuits.

37
We do not know how such election took place and whether the court bailiffs were Venetian citizens or
not. In the years under study, the bailiffs were Francesco Platina (1609-1612), Francesco di Franceschi
(1612-1615) Tadio Baldavini (1615-1620).
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Costs
Table 3.1: Fees Charged by the Venetian Secretary in 1604. 39
Types of legal and notarial services

Price (in aspers)

Civil Sentence (sententia civile)
 Up to 12 ducats (1.400 aspers)

60

 From 25 to 50 ducats (3.000 to 6.000)

120

 From 50 to 100 ducats (6.000 to 12.000)

240

 From 100 to 500 ducats (12.000 to 60.000)

1,5%

 Above 500 ducats (above 60.000)

1%

Criminal sentence (sententia criminale)

74

bailo’s ruling (terminatione)

18

Power of attorney (procura)

60

Subpoena (citatione)

3

Registration of proxy (scritto in corte)

5

Court injunction (intimatione)

3

Court’s commandment (Commandamento di mandato e con pena)

5

Testimony of witnesses in chancellery (esame di testimoni)

12

Confiscation of goods (sequestro)

5

Embargo against an individual (battellazione)

120

Public Instrument (instrumento publico)
 Up to 100 ducats (12.000 aspers)

120

 From 100 to 500 ducats (12.000 to 60.000)

240

 From 500 to 1000 ducats (60.000 to 120.000)

360

 Above 1000 (120.000)

1%

Registration of private documents (registro di scritture)

8

Will Registration (registro di testamento)

110

Protest of bill of exchange (protesto di lettera di cambio)

120

BAC 274, reg. 391, fols. 11v/12r (22 November 1604). In 1604, 1 Venetian ducat amounted to 120
Ottoman aspers.
39
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Table 3.2: Fees Charged by the Court Bailiff in 1604 40
Types of Deeds

Price (in aspers)

Execution of civil sentence or any bailo’s ruling (sententia civile)
 Less than 50 ducats (6,000 aspers)

8

 More than 50 ducats

15

Execution of criminal sentence (sententia criminale)

36

Report (relatione)

5

subpoena of defendants (mandato)

3

Summon of witness (citatitone)

5

Injunction of sentence (intimatione di sententia)

3

Injunction of bill of exchange (intimatione di lettera di cambio)

3

Public auction (incanto)

36

The chancellery charged fixed fees for its legal and notarial services. Court users
paid different fees to both the secretary and the court’s marshal. These dues constituted
the actual stipend of these two officials. The Venetian Board of Trade (Cinque Savi alla
Mercanzia) decided the amount of fees. The first set of prices (tariffa) dates from 1479,
but two new sets appeared in 1598 and 1604 following inflationary movements. 41 The
two lists shown above, in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, belong to the 1604 tariff. 42
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BAC 274, reg. 391, fols. 12r/13v (22 November 1604).

On the tariff of 1479 and those of medieval Alexandria, see Sopracasa, Alessio. “Les marchands
vénitiens à Constantinople d’après une tariffa inédite de 1482,” Studi veneziani 63 (2011), 49–218, and
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Alexandrines, 2013).
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fols.5-11 and the 1598 also in CSM, Prima Serie, busta 26, fols. 187-190 (11 March 1597). The secretary
charged a fee for 71 different varieties of legal and notarial services while the marshal for 22 acts. I Tables
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Court records do not contain information on the actual fees charged by the court for each
and every judicial and notarial act. Therefore, we cannot know whether the official rates
reflected the actual costs of the consular court. Furthermore, we do not know if, during a
dispute, litigants purchased these services in bundles or separately. However, we do
know that the looser of a legal suit had to pay all the expenses of the court proceedings. 43
How expensive was the Venetian chancellery in early seventeenth-century
Istanbul? In the 1610s, an Istanbul’s skilled worker earned around 23 aspers per day, an
unskilled one 14 aspers, and a Janissary (a member of an elite military corps), 15
aspers. 44 If the officially-set court prices reflect the historical reality, the legal and
economic services of the Venetian chancellery might have been a significant investment
for the majority of merchants based in Istanbul, except for well-to-do Ottoman
merchants. 45 Litigants and individuals seeking the court’s notarial services had to pay
distinct fees to summon the defendant to court, produce witnesses, notarize private
writings, and obtain the bailo’s sentence. Even in the case of a legal victory, a litigant had
to pay other fees to have this sentence enforced by the bailiff. The combined costs of all
these operations might have been a conspicuous investment and must have played a role
in the choice of this institution for litigating a commercial dispute and for notarizing

For instance, see, BAC 279, reg. 402, fols, 58r/59v (18 May 1617). It is not clear whether the payment of
court expenses befell every convicted individual or only in particular circumstances.
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Ibid with Süleyman Özmücür, “Real wages and standards of living in the Ottoman Empire, 1489-1914,”
Journal of Economic History 62 (2002), 292-321, 301.
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Notarial records show several examples of well-to-do Jewish and Muslim merchants. For instance, in
1616 a Muslim merchant named Ömer Çelebi quondam Ahmet Çavuş registered a series of commercial
transactions taking place between 1612 and 1614: they together valued more than 2,000,000 aspers. BAC
278, reg. 400, fols. 236v-247v (29 July 1616).
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business transactions. Furthermore, considerable costs of court operation contradict the
nature of summary procedure in European merchant courts, which was characterized by
cheap court proceedings.
Within the Venetian community, only Venetian merchants must have found court
fees affordable. In the legal suits and notarial records of the court, contested credits and
commercial transactions of Venetian merchants mostly involved sums superior to 10, 000
aspers. 46 A rare survey—dating from 1615—of the monetary value of the goods sent
from Venice to merchants in Istanbul through land caravans provides a rare insight into
the volume of commercial exchanges: 11 business partnerships (compagnie) of Venetian
merchants based in Istanbul, each made up of two merchants, received different goods
whose overall value ranged from 92,000 to 667,600 aspers while the goods of two
individuals merchants (Ieronimo Boneri di Zuanne Antonio and Zuanne Paolo Zois
quondam Zuanne) was 407,000 and 32,000 aspers, respectively. 47
The types of legal acts and notarial deeds
Apart from years of wars, the surviving records of the Venetian chancellery begin
in 1580 and continue until 1797, the year of the fall of the Venetian Republic. 48 They

In this dissertation I do not conduct a statistical analysis of the monetary value of all legal suits and
notarial transactions handled by the Venetian chancellery. I only provide the highest and lowest sum of
money shown in these two varieties of records.
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SDC, Filze, No 78, fols. 202v-222v (22 January 1615). This list does not include the goods that Venetian
merchants received by ships.
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On the archives of the bailo in Istanbul, see Migliardi O’Riordan, Giustiniana. “La documentazione
consolare e il bailo a Costantinopoli,” in Le fonti diplomatiche in età moderna e contemporanea, Atti del
convegno internazionale Lucca, 20-25 gennaio 1989 (Roma: Ministero BB.CC.AA, 1995), 602-605, and
“Présentation des archives du baile à Constantinople,” Turcica 33 (2001), 339-367.
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constitute an exceptionally important source for the history of Venetian and Ottoman
commercial relations, Mediterranean trade, and European consular justice.
Between 1609 and 1620, the registers of the Venetian chancellery recorded 3,574
entries concerning civil and criminal lawsuits, notarial transactions, safe-conducts for
Venetian bandits, bailo’s orders to merchants, correspondence between the bailo and
Venetian magistracies, etc. Indexes (rubrica) in the registers classify different documents
according to 9 categories.
Table 3.3: Types of Legal Acts and Economic Deeds Conducted in the Venetian
Chancellery (1609-1620)—Emic Classification 49
1
2
3
4
5

Intimatione, commandamenti, risposte di
commandamenti, protesti, note, e
depositioni in the cancelleria
Sententie, terminationi, appellationi,
sovventioni
Salvacondotti, realditioni, patenti, fedi,
eletioni
Registro of lettere, scritture, polizze di
cambio, accrescimento ai dragomanni e
altri
Sequestro, intromissioni, bolli, incanto,
remotioni

6 Consiglio dei XII, ordini diversi del bailo,
eletione di periti e relationi loro
7 Deposito di dinaro, scritture, atti volontari
di piezzarie, di notare avvocati in corte,
confessioni, elevationi di depositi
8 Battellazioni, inventari, e testamenti
9 Proclami e Recognitione di persone

49

Subpoena, judicial orders, answers to such
orders, protests, depositions in court
Sentences, bailo’s rulings, appeals,
subsidies
Safe-conducts, patents, sworn-declarations,
elections of officials
Notarization of letters, private documents,
bills of exchange, stipend increase for
dragoman and other Venetian officials
Confiscation, interposition, application of
marks, public audit, removal of
confiscation
Summon of the Council of the Twelve,
bailo’s orders, elections of experts and
their relations
Deposit of money, private documents,
surety and agency contracts, depositions,
and end of deposit
embargo against individuals, notarization
of inventories and wills
Bailo’s orders for the whole Venetian
community, recognition of individuals

From BAC, 274, reg. 391, fols. 1r-32r (1604-1608, no days).
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As Table 3.3 illustrates, court officials used different criteria from those employed
by today’s historians, legal scholars, and by modern courts of justice to distinguish
among different legal, economic, and public acts. The sharp distinction put forth by
scholars between legal and notarial records does not apply to the documents produced by
the Venetian chancellery, as was the case in Ottoman courts and all pre-1800 European
tribunals as well. 50 As we will see in the next two chapters, in contrast to today, the
functions of adjudication and certification of rights were interchangeable in the workings
of the Venetian consular court. The beginning of procedures of debt collection, for
instance by notarizing a commercial contract and intimating its enforcement to a partner,
did not always signal the existence of a social conflict between two merchants. Rather,
such action might have aimed to publicly certify a claim. Regardless of the types of the
document, the chancellery’s secretary organized all court entries in two different registers
covering the entire office of one bailo. 51
For the sake of my analysis, I distinguish three categories (etic classification) of
documents: lawsuits, notarial transactions, and what I term “public acts.” The last are all
those actions performed by the bailo as the representative of the Venetian government
and as the chief Venetian in the Ottoman Empire. They include the issuance of safe-

On the fallacious dichotomy/separation between legal suits and notarial transactions in early modern
tribunals see Ago, Renata, and Simona Cerutti. “Premessa,” Quaderni storici 101 (1999), 307–14; Cerutti,
Giustizia Sommaria, 14/15; Smail, Daniel L. “Notaries, Courts and the legal Culture of Late Medieval
Marseille” in Kathryn Reyerson and John Victor Drendel (eds), Urban and Rural Communities in Medieval
France, Provence and Languedoc, 1000-1500 (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 1998), 23-51; Ago, Renata.
“Enforcing agreements: notaries and courts in early modern Rome,” Continuity and Change 14/2 (1999):
191-206.
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I employ here the records belonging to five registers, BAC 276-280 and 317. The vast archives of the
Venetian consulate contain many more varieties of documents, such translations of Ottoman imperial order
(firman), registers of the embassy’s expenditures, and miscellaneous collections of private and official
documents brought to the court during lawsuits and diplomatic controversies. In this study I analyze only
the registers of legal acts and economic deeds performed before the baili (protocolli atti e sententie).
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conducts to individuals who had been convicted by Venetian judges in the Levantine
colonies, the proceedings of the Council of the Twelve, commandments to Venetian
merchants about trade regulations and payment of consular duties, instructions to captains
on sea voyages from Istanbul to Venice, letters to consuls, etc.
Table 3.4: Types of Legal Acts and Economics Deeds Conducted in the Venetian
Chancellery (1609-1620)—Etic Classification.
Lawsuits

434

13%

Notarial Transactions

1,702

51%

Public Acts

1,190

36%

TOTAL 52

3,326

100%

As Table 3.4 illustrates, the Venetian chancellery carried out different tasks. It primarily
operated as a notarial office and, secondly, as a tribunal. This shows that individuals used
this institutional mainly to certify property rights in order to prevent future disputes and
to produce evidence before suing an individual in court. Among the numerous public acts
performed by the chancellery, the issuing of safe-conducts played a central role, with 878
(73%) out of 1,190 documents of public acts. Henceforth, I do not deal with these public
acts, but I focus exclusively on notarial transactions and legal suits.
Between 1609 and 1620, individuals litigated on average 40 disputes and
performed 154 notarial transactions every year in the Venetian chancellery. This
amounted to a total of 194 legal and notarial services every year. This number is not high
considering that, in the years understudy, at least 65 Venetian merchants were active in

The total number of records shown here 3,326 is less than the sum of all entries (3,574) in the registers of
the chancellery since I count as one case all the entries related to the same lawsuit.
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Ottoman/Venetian trade together with hundreds of other individuals, including Ottoman
subjects and low-status Venetians. How much does it relate to the workload of other
tribunals and notarial offices in Ottoman Istanbul? Regrettably, we lack quantitative
studies on other European consular courts operating in early modern Ottoman capital.
Such comparisons would greatly contribute to our understanding of consular justice in
Ottoman Istanbul, especially with regard of the use of different European chancelleries
made by European and Ottoman subjects and the frequency of the phenomenon of forum
shopping which constitutes an important topic of debate in the legal history of the premodern world.
Here, I propose a comparison only with the main Ottoman court of the district of
Galata, the tribunal and notarial office of the kadı of Galata, and two European merchant
courts. The court of kadı of Galata was used by the inhabitants of the district of any
religious affiliation and, as I show in Chapter 6, by a few European individuals too. The
archives of these court for the dates 1604 to 1625 contain 13,353 records of legal suits
and notarial deeds. On average these number amounted to about 741 court services for
every year against the 186 services provided by the Venetian chancellery. 53 The
difference in the number of legal disputes and notarial deeds handled by these two courts
likely stems from the high population of the district of Galata, which amounted to a few
thousands in the seventeenth century, and to the fact that the kadı of Galata handled many
types of disputes, including criminal cases, while the Venetian chancellery specialized in
commercial arbitration.

In this dissertation I did not differentiate between lawsuits and notarial transactions in counting the total
number of documents produced by the kadı court of Galata.
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However, if we compare our data with that of other merchant courts in other
Mediterranean and European cities, we find no striking differences in the workload of
these institutions and that of the Venetian chancellery. For instance, England’s Admiralty
Court, the country’s high court for maritime and commercial deeds, ruled in 1657 over 96
trade- and navigation-related disputes. 54 Given the centrality of this court in the maritime
life of all English merchants, captains, and sailors, this number is not strikingly higher
than the 40 lawsuits handled by the Venetian consular court every year. In another
context, in seventeenth-century Ottoman Tunis, merchants, ship captains, seamen, and
others registered in the chancellery of the French consulate 249 notarial deeds in the
years 1652/1653 and 175 in 1704-1705. 55 These notarial transactions are, per year,
moderately fewer than those performed in the Venetian chancellery (154) between 1609
and 1620.
We will need more quantitative studies of consular chancelleries to ascertain the
overall workload of these institutions in different political and commercial contexts.
However, these two last examples and that of the Venetian chancellery in Istanbul points
to the absence of an overworking of these institutions in contrast to ordinary courts, like
kadı courts in the Ottoman Empire and civil courts/notarial offices in Western Europe.
As scholars of early modern Europe illustrate, the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
witnessed a steep rise of in the use of state courts by the population at large. Records of

Steckley, George. F. “Instance cases at admiralty in 1657: A court ‘packed up with suitors’,” The Legal
Journal of Legal History 7 (1986), 68-83, 71.
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Arnaud Bartolomei and Anne Brogini. “De la réglementation aux pratiques marchandes: l’enregistrement
des actes dans les chancelleries consulaires françaises (XVIIe–XIXe siècle),” Bartolomei, Calafat, Grenet
Ulbert, De l’utilité commerciale des consuls, 173-199, 190.
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English and Spanish courts illustrate that ordinary courts of handled thousands of civil
disputes every year. 56
Lastly, going back to the Venetian chancellery, a few words must be said on the
language of the records. The documents are written in vernacular Italian. When
translating documents from Ottoman Turkish, Ladino and Hebrew, and Demotic Greek
into Italian, Venetian dragomans call this language “lingua franca,” literally, the
“language of the Franks” —that is, Western Europeans residing in Ottoman cities. 57 The
term “lingua franca” is the subject of a long-term scholarly debate over the alleged
existence of a pidgin Romance language used by people around the Mediterranean for
commerce and diplomacy in the medieval and early modern periods. 58 This is not the
place to engage with such a debate but it is important to remark that, up to the nineteenth
century, vernacular Italian played an important role in the commercial life of both the
Levant and the Western Mediterranean, as well as in Ottoman/European diplomacy. This
resulted from the centuries-old commercial preeminence of Italian maritime republics in
the eastern Mediterranean. The use of such language by the Venetian chancellery, which
was known by many merchants and diplomats in the early modern Mediterranean, might
actually have been a reason compelling non-Venetian individuals to choose this

For litigiousness in early modern Europe, see Kagan, Richard L. Lawsuits and Litigants in Castille,
1500–1700 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981); Muldrew, Craig. The Economy of
Obligation: The Culture of Credit and Social Relations in Early Modern England (New York: St. Martin’s,
1999), 199-271.
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For instance, see BAC 277, reg. 397, fols. 302r/303v (10 July 1614). See Chapter 1 on the complex
identification of the “Franks” in seventeenth-century Istanbul.
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58
For an overview of this debate, see Minervini, Laura. “La lingua franca mediterranea: plurilinguismo,
mistilinguismo, pidginizzazione sulle coste del Mediterraneo tra tardo medioevo e prima età moderna,”
Medioevo romanzo 20 (1996), 231-301; Dakhlia, Jocelyne. Lingua franca: histoire d’une langue métisse en
Méditerranée (Arles: Actes sud 2008); Dursteler, Eric. “Speaking in Tongues: Language and
Communication in the Early Modern Mediterranean,” Past & Present 217/1 (2012), 47–77.
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institution—especially all for Sephardic Jews who spoke another romance language,
Ladino/Judeo-Spanish.
4—Court Clients
Religion, Subjecthood, Social Status
Table 3.5: Religion of the Clients of the Venetian Chancellery (1609-1620)
Religious Group
Christians

Number of Individuals

Percentage

1,219

69%

Jews

425

24%

Muslims

113

7%

TOTAL

1,777

100%

Between 1609 and 1620, 1,777 individuals appeared in the Venetian chancellery
or were summoned there. Court clients belonged to different political and religious
communities, and they included 43 women. As shown in Table 3.5, non-Muslims
constituted a substantial group of individuals (578 persons, 31%) appealing to this
institution. Religious affiliation appeared only for a minority of individuals (231, 13%),
almost all Jews, and we are left to pinpoint their religion according to their names or
honorific titles, such as “Rabbi” in case of Jews or “Ağa” for Muslims.
Religion constitutes the most important element to distinguish the political
affiliation of non-Muslims. As we have seen in the previous two chapters, in the
seventeenth century, Jews residing in Istanbul paid Ottoman taxes and were neither
included in the city’s Venetian community nor they tried to be. Furthermore, in Venice
state authorities recognized them only as “transient merchants”— just like Venetian
merchants for Ottoman authorities. In the case of Muslims, no stable Muslim population
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lived in Venetian territories and elsewhere in early modern Europe. However, in the case
of Christian individuals, discerning membership in a political community is much more
complicated. The officials of the Venetian chancellery rarely described individuals
according to notions of citizenship or subjecthood. Consequently, we cannot classify with
a degree of certainty different Christian individuals (1,219 individuals) according to their
political affiliation.
The scant mention of religious affiliation in the records of the Venetian
chancellery contrasts with the central role played by religion in classifying individuals in
Ottoman courts. Furthermore, the lack of both religion and political affiliation differs
with the documents of state courts in Venice which, as we have seen in Chapter 2,
employed Venetian bureaucratic terms referring to political status, such as “Levantines”
(a political and ethnic taxonomy) to define different groups of Ottoman subjects, mostly
Sephardic Jews. In both state courts in Venice and in Ottoman tribunals, religious
affiliation and political membership, together with social status, played an important role
in the openness of legal institutions to specific groups and in the procedure employed in
their legal cases.
The absence of references to citizenship/subjecthood and the rare use of religion
in identification practices in the legal and notarial documents of the Venetian chancellery
bring us to question the overall importance of these two factors in the workings of this
institution. It is my contention that the legal culture of this institution influenced how the
latter classified individuals. As we have seen above, summary procedure in merchant
courts in medieval and early modern merchant courts allowed businessmen belonging to
different political, religious, and social groups to litigate commercial dispute as a result of
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its fast and equity-based proceedings. Its rulings focused on “facts”—business contracts
and the actions of individuals—rather than on the religious affiliation of individuals, their
membership in political communities, and their social status. Consequently, factors such
as religion and subjecthood/citizenship played a little role in this “supranational” legal
culture, and therefore their recording in the court records was not a priority for its scribes,
who instead focused on the source of the dispute. The lack of identification categories of
religion and subjecthood/citizenship is evidence that elements of summary procedure, as
the legal culture of a mercantile community, was adopted by the Venetian consular court.
Table 3.6: Identification Markers in Venetian Chancellery (1609-1620)
Classification Types

Number of Individuals 59

Percentages of 1,777

Honorific titles

1,421

80%

Place of Origin

801

45%

Occupation

426

24%

Religion

231

13%

Citizenship/subjecthood

5 60

0,3%

While religion and political identity appear rarely, honorific, and professional
titles are the most used identification markers in the Venetian chancellery. They illustrate
the socioeconomic status of individuals turning to this institution by indicating the
profession and social identity of groups. However, we should read these titles with

The number of the individuals in this chart is 2,884, which is more than the total number of individuals
who appeared in the chancellery in the period under study (1,777) This discrepancy is a consequence of the
fact that court official could record the same individual with more than one marker of identification.
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All these five individuals are Venetian citizens from the elite-group cittadini originari: three are the
secretaries of the baili, one is accountant (rasonato) of the bailo Valier (Francesco Girardi), and the last
one is the renegade Giacomo Bianchi /Mehmet Ağa. For the latter see, BAC 279, r. 401, 13v-15r (17 June
1615).
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caution since membership in administrative, military, and religious groups, did not
always correspond to an actual occupational status.
A close analysis of individual titles shows differences across religious groups in
the social and economic standing of individuals appearing in the Venetian chancellery.
Among Christians, we find titles of high social standing, such as “magnifico,”
“Illustrissimo,” or “Clarissimo”, for nobles (12 individuals), 61 high-ranking officials (28)
of the Venetian and other European embassies, and for clergymen (21). 62 Most of the
Christians (1,158 out of 1,219) held titles such as “signore,” “dominus,” or “messer,”
and, in the case of women, of “Madonna” and “chira” (kira, lady). 63 They are all titles of
respect. The term “messer” (303 cases) was applied only to lower-profile individuals,
such as members of ship crews, helpers of merchants, skilled workers like tailors,
coopers, sail makers, and wool appraisers, while the titles “signore” and “dominus” (579
cases) applied to more well-to-do individuals, irrespective of their occupations, such as
merchants, shipmasters and scribes, court officials like bailiffs, and a few other
individuals. 64 However, there is also some overlapping between these groups as 136

Only one (Zuanne Boldù di Antonio) out of 12 nobles belonged to the Venetian patriciate. For instance,
see BAC 277, reg. 397, fol. 16r (28 April 1612). The other nobles hailed from the Venetian-held island of
Zakynthos, Florence, France, Rome, and the Ottoman tributary-state of Dubrovnik.
61

An example of honorific title for clergymen was “Reverendissimo.” BAC 280, reg. 402, fols. 4r-6r (23
October 1618).
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The Greek term kyra/kira (“lady”) was a title of respect for a woman. In the late sixteenth-century
Istanbul, it was applied to a group of influential Jewish women who had access to the Imperial harem and
played an important in Ottoman/European diplomacy. Pedani, “Safiye’s Household,” 11/12.
64
Dennis Romano claims that in late medieval Venice the term dominus was used both to denote patricians
and wealthy commoners. Patricians and Popolani: the Social Foundations of the Venetian Renaissance
State (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 37/38. A few skilled workers too (23) held titles
of “dominus” pointing that not only merchants and shipmasters possessed such title of prestige.
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individuals held both the tile of “signore” and “messer.” Lastly, 276 other Christians did
not hold any honorific/professional title suggesting a low social status.
Overall, the Christian clients of the Venetian chancellery were a socially
heterogenous group of individuals: high-ranking individuals constituted a small minority
(61 out of 1,219 persons, 5 %) while the rest of individuals were equally split between
those individuals who engaged directly in trade and shipping activities (579, 48%) and
lower-status individuals (551) who supported the former in such activities or were
involved in lower profile economic pursuits at the margin of the Venetian mercantile
community in Ottoman Galata.
Unlike Christians, nearly all the Jews and Muslims turning to the Venetian
consular courts were prominent individuals in their religious and professional
communities. As we have seen in the previous chapter, most of the Jewish and Muslim
merchants (83% of 425 Jews and 81% of 113 Muslims) appealing to the Venetian
chancellery held honorific and professional titles demonstrating a somewhat high public
reputation and social and economic status. They include the titles of “rabbi” for Jews, and
that “hoca” which was employed by well-to-do merchants in the Ottoman Empire. A few
Ottoman merchants also belonged to the Ottoman ruling group (askeri), like Janissaries
and members of different administrative and military corps of the royal palace.
The presence of socially and economically affluent businessmen among nonChristian users of the Venetian chancellery raises questions about the access to this
institution by non-Christian businessmen who resided in Istanbul and were Ottoman
subjects. It is possible that, among other factors, the substantial costs of applying to this
institution limited its use to not well-to-do Ottoman individuals. This appears plausible
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considering the above-mentioned low wages of Istanbul’s workers and soldiers in
comparison with the fees charged by the Venetian chancellery. Furthermore, the early
seventeenth-century Ottoman Empire witnessed the rapid debasement of its silver
currency (akçe/aspers) and substantial price increases which must have made longdistance trade with Western Europe and the use of European courts, which charged fees
in foreign currencies, even more expensive. 65
Reasons of “openness”
At least the 31% (578) 66 of all the individuals appearing in the Venetian
chancellery were Ottoman subjects who traded between Istanbul and Venetian territories.
They partook in the lucrative Levantine trade, which had been the main source of the
wealth of Venice during the Middle Ages, and, still in the seventeenth century produced
substantial gains for its citizens and subjects. Until the mid-sixteenth century, lucrative
commerce between Venice and the eastern Mediterranean had been restricted to Venetian
citizens but in the period under study, both non-citizen Venetians and Ottoman subjects
partook in this flow of trade. 67 As we saw in Chapter 2, Ottoman trade with Venice was a
major commercial development in the sixteenth-century Mediterranean.

Pamuk, Şevket. A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999), 112-130.
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I am counting here only Ottoman Jews and Muslims. Given the uncertainty about the subjecthood of
Christians individuals, I do not count them there. It is likely that many of the 1,219 Christians were
Ottoman subjects, especially the 54 individuals from Galata, 17 from Chios, and 17 from the Dubrovnik.
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On this development, see Trading Nations: Jews and Venetians in the Early Modern Eastern
Mediterranean (Leiden: Brill, 1995); Fusaro, Maria. “Coping with transition. Greek merchants and
shipowners between Venice and England in the late sixteenth century,” in I. Baghdiantz McCabe, G.
Harlaftis, and I. Pepelasis Minoglou, eds., Diaspora entrepreneurial networks: four centuries of history
(Oxford; New York: Berg, 2005), 95–123.
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Given this new competition, the “openness” of the Venetian chancellery to
Ottoman merchants raises questions. Why did the baili arbitrate commercial disputes
involving Ottoman subjects and why did his secretary offer them notarial services? Why
did they not exclusively support the commercial undertakings of Venetian subjects? In
studies of trade and institutions, the use of legal institutions by merchants belonging to
different social and religious communities is often taken as a marker of the development
of impersonal trade and modern economic life in general. 68 In my case, I relate the
presence of many non-Venetians to the political economy of Venice in the early
seventeenth century. To preserve its position as the major commercial partner of the
Ottoman Empire in the Mediterranean and avoid further territorial losses to the former,
Venice strove to preserve peaceful relations with Ottoman authorities by avoiding any
potential source of tension between the two states. The permission given to Ottoman
merchants to trade with Venice was among the most important features of this policy of
appeasement. This policy of guarded neutrality and trade encouragement was even more
important giving the growing commercial competition by newly arrived merchants from
France, England, and the Dutch Republic.
The adjudicative and notarial functions of the Venetian chancellery, I argue, were
part of this Venetian strategy to safeguard its position as a commercial power. By
arbitrating commercial disputes of Ottoman subjects and by registering their business
dealings and contracts, the bailo and his court officials aimed to regulate and encourage

68
Greif, Avner. Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval Trade
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 63-66. For a review and critique of this view
of “open-access” or “generalized” legal institutions, see Gelderblom, Oscar. Cities of commerce: the
institutional foundations of international trade in the Low Countries, 1250-1650 (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2013), 2-15.
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the trade activities of Ottoman merchants with Venice. In this way they promoted the
centrality of the trade route between Istanbul and Venice in the trade between Western
Europe and the Ottoman Empire as a whole. Furthermore, by actively supporting
Ottoman subjects in their trade activities, Venetian officials showed Ottoman authorities
a willingness of the Venetian government to maintain peaceful relations and neutrality in
an international context of competing empires and decreased Venetian diplomatic
standing. The fact that such politics of justice and trade added new competitors to
Venetian merchants mattered less to Venetian authorities than preserving both OttomanVenetian trade and peaceful relations with the Ottoman sultan. 69As I show in the next
two chapters, this Venetian policy is embodied both in the procedure chosen by the baili
to solve commercial disputes and by notarial services provided by the chancellery’s
secretary, which almost exclusively included the registration of contracts and commercial
dealings for trade ventures taking place with Venetian territories.
5—Conclusion
The Venetian chancellery was the central institution of the Venetian community
in seventeenth-century Istanbul, operating as both a consular court and a notarial office.
International agreements stipulated its jurisdiction exclusively over intra-Venetian
disputes, to which it could apply “Venetian customs.” These “customs” were an
unwritten mixture of Mediterranean merchant customary norms (such as the Consulate of
the Sea) and Venetian legislation on trade and shipping activities. The essential absence
of references to a normative framework in its judicial records as well as to precedents

For another case of the political use of justice by Venetian authorities to promote the city state’s
commercial interests, see Fusaro, “Politics of justice/Politics of trade.”
69

160

points to the application of summary procedure in the resolution of commercial
controversies. Such procedure, which entailed fast and equity-based legal proceedings,
was the default mode of legal action in medieval and early modern Italian courts of
merchants, and it was implemented already in the Venetian and Genoese mercantile
communities of Byzantine Constantinople.
Despite being the consular court of the Venetian community, the Venetian
chancellery offered its judicial and notarial services to an international and socially and
religiously diverse community of merchants, shipmasters, sailors, and other individuals
who engaged in trade and shipping activities between Istanbul and Venetian territories.
They included Istanbul’s numerous prominent Jewish and Muslim merchants hailing
from Anatolia (the 31% of all court clients). This “openness of the court” to nonVenetian individuals, I argued in this chapter, was not a sign of “modernity” or the
“secular nature” of Venetian institutions. Rather, it stemmed from the baili’s efforts to
promote Ottoman/Venetian trade in a period of increasing international competition and
to protect Venice’s peace with the Ottomans by supporting the commercial undertaking
of their subjects. As a matter of fact, Venetian and Ottoman merchants and other
economic operators benefitted from the same legal and economic services provided by
this institution, despite the fact that the latter, by the seventeenth century, had become a
significant commercial competitor for Venetian merchants.
Apart from the legal framework and the cosmopolitan clientele, this introductory
chapter has uncovered other important features of the workload of the Venetian
chancellery. First, this institution operated mostly as a notarial office for merchants and
other individuals. Therefore, its main contribution to trade regulation was the public
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certification of property rights rather than the adjudication of lawsuits, which is usually
the focus of studies of consular chancelleries. Second, the legal and notarial services of
this court were costly in seventeenth-century Istanbul. This limited access to this
institution to mostly well-to-do individuals, especially on the Ottoman side, as we will
see in more detail in the following two chapters. Third, and partly related to the second
finding, the yearly workload of this institution in Istanbul was not substantial: only 40
disputes and 154 notarial deeds every year. These numbers contrast with the total number
of legal suits and notarial transactions handled by the kadı court of Galata, the main
Ottoman forum of justice in the district inhabited by Venetian subjects. However, the
workload of the Venetian chancellery resembles that of other European merchant courts
in North Africa and England.
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Chapter 4: Certifying Property Rights between Istanbul and Venice
1 – Introduction
On March 9, 1611, Ömer Çelebi, the son and only heir of the late Ahmed Çavuş
from Istanbul, appeared in the Venetian chancellery before Alvise Vellutello, the
secretary of the Venetian embassy. Ömer registered a declaration (confessione) in which
he stated that he had received 50 thalers from the late Iacob quondam Tatar, an Armenian
from Ankara, as repayment for the latter’s debt to Ömer’s father. Iacob had left a silver
cross as a collateral (pegno) in Venice in the hands of Marco Morato, Ömer’s commercial
agent (commesso). Furthermore, Ömer declared that, since he had been paid by Iacob, the
cross should be handed to the heirs of the late Iacob. Four witnesses, a Venetian
merchant, a Venetian dragoman, and two Muslim individuals (the Janissaries at the
service of the Venetian embassy) testified to the registration of Ömer’s declaration. The
following day the wife and brother of the late Iacob, Agipula and Caser, went to the
chancellery to appoint Vassili, an Armenian residing in Venice, as their legal
representative (procuratore) to recover the cross from Marco. 1
These two short documents—a registration of payment and a document of power
of attorney— illustrate the main function of the Venetian chancellery, the notarization of
business dealings and legal documents of individuals engaged in Ottoman/Venetian trade
and shipping. Like the embassies and consulates of other European powers in Istanbul
and other Ottoman towns, the Venetian chancellery registered contracts, witness
statements, bills of lading, wills, and other types of documents that were important for

1

ASV, BAC 276, reg. 394, fols. 74v/75r (9 March 1611).
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long-distance merchants and seamen. This notarial activity reflected the bailo’s consular
duty to promote and regulate Venetian/Ottoman trade. Furthermore, as the episode above
shows, non-Venetian individuals also appealed to the Venetian chancellery for its notarial
services, despite the existence in Istanbul of different scribal institutions for various
social and religious groups.
Since the 1960s, the notarial function of the European chancelleries in the
Ottoman Empire during the early modern period has attracted the attention of numerous
legal and economic historians studying commercial relations between western European
states and the Ottoman Empire, as well as pluralist legal regimes across the
Mediterranean. 2 Generally, scholars agree that by producing business and legal
documents accepted in European courts of law for an international clientele of merchants,
European chancelleries in the Ottoman Empire promoted commercial development, and,
in particular, cross-cultural trade across the Mediterranean. According to John
Wansbrough, the circulation of consular records in the Mediterranean contributed to the
progressive formation of a shared mercantile and legal “lingua franca” created from a

Steensgaard, Niels. "Consuls and Nations in the Levant from 1570 to 1650," Scandinavian Economie
History Review 15 (1967), 13-55; Wansbrough, John E. Lingua franca in the Mediterranean (Richmond:
Curzon Press, 1996); Trivellato, Francesca. The Familiarity of Strangers: The Sephardic Diaspora,
Livorno, and Cross-Cultural Trade in the Early Modern Period (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009),
115-131; Greene, Molly. Catholic Pirates and Greek Merchants. A Maritime History of the Mediterranean
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 149-156; Kuran, Timur. The Long Divergence: How Islamic
Law Held Back the Middle East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); Calafat, Guillaume. “La
juridiction des consuls français en Méditerranée: litiges marchands, arbitrages et circulations des procés
(Livourne et Tunis au XVIIe siécle),” in Arnaud Bartolomei, Guillaume Calafat, Mathieu Grenet, and Jörg
Ulbert (eds.), De l’utilité commerciale des consuls: l’institution consulaire et les marchands dans le monde
méditerranéen (XVIIe–XXe siécle) (Rome, Madrid: École française de Rome; Casa de Velázquez, 2018);
155-172; Arnaud Bartolomei and Anne Brogini. “De la réglementation aux pratiques marchandes:
l’enregistrement des actes dans les chancelleries consulaires françaises (XVIIe–XIXe siecles),” in De
l’utilité commerciale, 173-199. Ulbert, Jörg. “Qu’est-ce qu’un chancelier de consulat? Une approche par les
textes de droit français,” Les Mélanges de l'École française de Rome - Italie et Méditerranée modernes et
contemporaines 128/2 (2016).
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(mostly Italian) notarial culture. 3 Timur Kuran goes as far as to argue that the
chancelleries of European consulates contributed to the diffusion of European legal and
business practices as well as institutions. According to Kuran, Ottoman Christians and
Jews —but no Muslims—adopted the use of written contracts, impersonal adjudication,
and durable forms of commercial partnerships in the Ottoman Empire during the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. By promoting impersonal exchange, consular
chancelleries played a central role in the “modernization” of Ottoman economic life and
in the decline of the “traditional” Islamic commercial system based on oral agreements
and personal exchange between members of the same religious community. 4
Despite the importance attributed to it by legal and economic historians, so far,
the notarial activity of European consulates has not been the focus of systematic analysis.
We still know little about, at least, two critical issues: first, the types of legal and
economic transactions most sought out by merchants and other individuals, and, second,
the circulation of documents produced in European chancelleries across the
Mediterranean and in Western Europe. What varieties of notarial deeds did merchants
accomplish in consular chancelleries? Did European and non-European merchants
routinely register their business dealings, from business contracts to sale/purchase
transactions? Or did they apply there exclusively for specific services? How far did the
documents produced by consular chancelleries circulate in the early modern

3

Wansbrough, Lingua franca, 136/7.

4

Kuran, The Long Divergence, 229-276.
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Mediterranean? Studies of Mediterranean trade share the assumption that these notarial
documents held uncontested legal validity in the courts of law of European polities. 5
Focusing on the notarial function of the Venetian chancellery in the decade 16091620, this chapter addresses these two interrelated issues, which are crucial to our
understanding of the role played by European chancelleries in the social and economic
life of European communities residing in Ottoman cities and as well as EuropeanOttoman trade. I examine the clientele of merchants, shipmasters, seamen, and others
applying to the Venetian chancellery to certify their property rights, the types of notarial
deeds that they sought there, the actual destinations of the notarial documents drawn in
the chancellery, and the relationship between the notarial and judicial duties of the
Venetian chancellery. My goal is then to test the alleged “universality” of notarial acts—
in this case, those produced by a Venetian institution—in the seventeenth-century
Mediterranean, and to assess the overall contribution of such documents to
Ottoman/Venetian trade.
Employing quantitative analysis of the notarial records, I uncover patterns in the
use of the notarial office of the Venetian embassy by individuals belonging to different
political and religious communities. I illustrate that Venetian merchants, who were the
economic elite of the Venetian community in Istanbul, used the notarial function of the
chancellery less frequently than both Ottoman businessmen and less socially preeminent
Venetian subjects. I argue that this situation stems from changing registration practices of

On the thesis of a shared European notarial culture in the medieval and early modern Mediterranean, see
also Apellániz, Francisco. Breaching the Bronze Wall: Franks at Mamluk and Ottoman Courts and
Markets (Leiden: Brill, 2020), 119-125.
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Venetian merchants and their European peers from the late medieval period onwards
which made the use of notaries less important for long-distance trade.
Furthermore, I demonstrate that, irrespective of the religious affiliation and the
political status of clients, the documents produced by the Venetian chancellery circulated
mostly within Venetian territories and the Venetian commercial system. This last finding
casts doubts about the actual existence of a shared notarial culture across the early
modern Mediterranean, even across Western European states. Rather than a shared
notarial culture, I argue in this chapter, there existed a commensurable European notarial
tradition built on the same legal basis, the ius commune. This tradition allowed the
circulation, albeit limited, of notarial documents among those polities, such as Italian
maritime republics, Spain, and France, whose legal systems was based on this legal
culture which developed during the late medieval period.
2 – Venetian Notaries in the Eastern Mediterranean
Venetian notaries appeared in the eastern Mediterranean commercial hubs
following the expansion of the Venetian trade with the Levant in the eleventh century. In
the fourteenth century, they were active in Alessandria, Damascus, and Byzantine
Constantinople. 6
In the medieval and early modern Venetian legal system, there existed different
categories of notaries. There were notaries employed by state magistracies (notai di
ufficio) and public notaries (notai ordinari) who offered their services to private

Ibid, Breaching the Bronze Wall, 119-125, and Parcianello, Federica. Documentazione e notariato a
Venezia nell'età ducale (premessa di Attilio Bartoli Langeli; con un saggio di Silvia Gasparini, Padova:
Imprimitur Editrice, 2012), 125-128.
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individuals in return for a fee. After the fifteenth century, the former group became
known as the “secretary” (secretario) group. 7 Members of both groups were drawn from
the estate of the cittadini originari, the upper echelon of Venetian society from which the
higher ranks of state bureaucracy were filled. Despite differences in occupation, both
groups shared the same type of education, which did not include any formal legal training
in universities, but, rather, it involved the acquisition of skills that focused on the
practical acts of drawing documents and humanistic topics in the schools of the Venetian
bureaucracy. 8 The secretary of the bailo’s embassy belonged to the group of secretaries:
he held the office of the chief chancellor of the Venetian embassy and a public notary for
the Venetian community.
The second major distinction was between “Venetian notaries” and ecclesiastical
and imperial notaries. Until the seventeenth century, in Venice and its territories, there
existed notaries appointed by the authorities of the Holy Roman Empire and the Papacy.
Their education and their socioeconomic background differed from those of Venetian
notaries. Imperial notaries drew documents according to imperial norms (more imperii)
while Venetian notaries followed Venetian legislation (more veneto). The validity of the
documents drawn by imperial notaries was theoretically universal (ubique terrarum), at
least in the lands under the nominal sovereignty of the Roman Empire. 9 The notaries
active in Venetian communities in the Levant during the late medieval period belonged to

7
Trebbi, Giuseppe. “Il segretario veneziano,” Archivio Storico Italiano 144 (1986), 35-73; Pedani, Maria
Pia. “Veneta Auctoritate Notarius:” Storia de notariato veneziano (1514-1797) (Milano: Dott. A. Giuffè
Editore, 1996); Parcianello, Documentazione e notariato, 67-110.
8

Pedani, “Veneta Auctoritate Notarius,” 59-68.

Apellàniz, “Judging the Franks,” 365; Airaldi, Gabriella. Studi e documenti su Genova e l'oltremare,
Collana storica di fonti e studi: 19 (Genova: Università di Genova, 1974), 209.
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this group. 10 In 1612, the Venetian government prohibited imperial notaries from
operating in both the city of Venice and its territories. Already in the previous century,
public notaries had disappeared in the Levant and had been replaced by the secretarieschancellors of the Venetian embassies and consulates. This last development is
noteworthy because, while public notaries worked for the public and not for agencies of
the state, secretaries-notaries of the Venetian chancelleries were bureaucrats whose
activity was tightly controlled by state authorities.
All these different categories of notaries shared the authority of producing
documents endowed with “public faith” (publica fides) which made them acceptable in
courts of justice without the need for recourse to witnesses. Such documents were called
“public instrument” (instrumentum publicum). The validity of notarized documents
uncorroborated by oral testimony distinguished the notarial systems of medieval and
early modern southern European states from those of the Byzantine Empire and Muslim
states, where, as we will see in Chapter 6, notarial documents needed to be corroborated
by witnesses to serve as legal proof in court. Such “triumph of writing” and the office of
the European notary itself alike did not have Roman ancestry. Rather, their emergence
was a medieval phenomenon: the product of the simultaneous development of
Mediterranean trade and the construction of the ius commune in European law faculties
from the eleventh century onwards. 11 Notaries served both the administration of state and
the ascending groups of merchant groups firstly in southern European cities, especially in

Imperial notaries operated also in Venetian territories in the Levant. See McKee, Sally: Uncommon
dominion: Venetian Crete and the Myth of Ethnic Purity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
2000), 29.
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Nussdorfer, Laurie. Brokers of public trust: notaries in early modern Rome (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2009), 9; Apellàniz, Breaching the Bronze Wall, 108-113.
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North Italy, Provence, and Catalonia, and later their offices spread to the advanced
commercial regions of north Europe, such as the Low Countries. 12
Notarial practice and the use of notaries by private individuals were not uniform
in all the European countries where the institution of the notariate spread. Despite
common legal notions drawn from Roman law, cities and guilds statutes, princely
ordinances, and locally applied notarial formularies, regulated the activity of notaries in
specific contexts. Furthermore, specific social and economic circumstances, the legal
system, and the political regime, influenced both the clientele of notaries and the acts that
they sought from them. 13 All these factors affected the actual probative value of notarial
documents which, well into the seventeenth century, was still a matter of debate among
jurists of Roman law irrespective of the public faith endowed in the documents. Oral
testimony still played an important role in courts applying the ius commune during the
early modern period. 14 This notwithstanding, there is a general tendency among scholars
to consider notarial documents as having an uncontested validity in courts of law.

Scholarship on European notaries is extensive. For a few important studies, see Costamagna, Giorgio. Il
notaio a Genova tra prestigio e potere (Rome: Consiglio Nazionale del Notariato, 1970); Murray, James
M. Notarial instruments in Flanders between 1280 and 1452 (Bruxelles: Académie royale de Belgique,
1995); Smail, Daniel L. “Notaries, Courts and the legal Culture of Late Medieval Marseille,” in Kathryn
Reyerson and John Victor Drendel (eds), Urban and Rural Communities in Medieval France, Provence
and Languedoc, 1000-1500 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 1998), 23-51; Hillaire, Jean. La science des notaires:
une longue histoire (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 2000); Kathryn L. Reyerson and Debra A.
Salata (eds.). Medieval Notaries and Their Acts: The 1327–1328 Register of Jean Holanie (Kalamazoo,
Michigan: Medieval Institute Publications, 2004); Nussdorfer, Brokers of public trust; Burns, Kathryn. Into
the archive: writing and power in colonial Peru (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010).
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Nussdorfer, Brokers of Public Trust, 5-7.

Ibid, 9-31; Ago, Renata. “Una giustizia personalizzata. I tribunali civili di Roma nel XVII secolo.”
Quaderni storici, 101 (1999), 389-412, 393-395; Lévy, Jean-Philippe. “L’Évolution de la preuve, des
origines à nos jours,” in La Preuve, RSJB 17 (Brussels: Librairie Encyclopédique, 1965), 9–70. The same
was true in England’s common law courts. See Shapiro, Barbara J. A culture of fact: England, 1550-1720
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 47.
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As far as long-distance trade is concerned, the use of notaries by European
merchants underwent substantial changes throughout the late medieval period and in the
early modern period. Italian scholars working on Genoa, Florence, and Venice illustrate
that merchants, from the early thirteenth century onwards, increasingly neglected notaries
to register their commercial dealings. 15 They did continue to use notaries but only for
specialized services. The reason of this development was the gradual acceptance of
private commercial documents as holding full legal validity in merchant courts. Such
documents included merchant correspondence, bills of exchange, accounting books, and
others which were signed by the merchants and not sealed by a public notary. 16 This
change allowed merchants to avoid the time and the costs of turning to a notary as well as
the rigidity of contracts drawn by notaries, who employed legal language and formulas.
As we will see in the next chapter, private documents constituted most of the
written evidence produced by Venetian and Ottoman merchants during lawsuits in the
Venetian chancellery, a merchant court. The establishment of private commercial
documents as legal proof and a more restricted use of notaries by merchants took place at
different paces and modalities in different Italian states and, from the late medieval

Melis, Federigo. Documenti per la storia economica dei secoli XIII-XVI. Con una nota di paleografia
commerciale a cura di Elena Cecchi (Firenze: L. S. Olschki, 1972), 6/7; Tucci, Ugo. “Il documento del
mercante,” in Civiltà comunale: libro, scrittura, documento; atti del convegno, Genova, 8-11 novembre
1988 (Genova: Società ligure di storia patria, 1989), 541-565; Ago, Renata. “Enforcing agreements:
notaries and courts in early modern Rome,” Continuity and Change 14/2 (1999), 191-206, 200.
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For the doctrinal aspects of such change, see Fortunati, Maura. Scrittura e prova: I libri di commercio nel
diritto medievale e moderno (Rome: Fondazione Sergio Mochi Onory per la storia del diritto italiano,
1996).
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period onwards, it spread to the other Western European countries, such as the Low
Countries. 17
3 – Types of Notarial Documents
Like state-sanctioned notaries in Venice, the secretary of the Venetian embassy in
Istanbul had to follow Venetian legal norms (more veneto) when documents. The latter
included the beginning of the new year on March 1, the use of initials as the notarial seal
(signum tabellionis), and other stylistic features. 18 Being also the chancellor of the
embassy, the secretary had the duty of registering any important document concerning
Venetian trade, Ottoman-Venetian relations, the administration of Venetian territories in
the Levant, etc.
The secretary did not formally distinguish between judicial and notarial deeds
accomplished in the chancellery. This raises the question: what constituted a “notarial
document?” The organization of his registers, which are called ‘protocols’ (protocolli),
provides some clues on this matter. The secretary of each bailo kept two separate
registers bearing the same name (protocolli di atti e sentenze). One of them contained
only a small number of varied documents, which included contracts of power of attorney,
registration of debts, and business agreements and transactions of sale/purchase. The
secretary drew up these documents in the presence of witnesses. 19 The other register,

Gelderblom, Oscar. Cities of commerce: the institutional foundations of international trade in the Low
Countries, 1250-1650 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 87-94. See also Trivellato, The
Familiarity of Strangers, 167-170.
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Pedani, “Veneta Auctoritate Notarius,” 79-87. For collections of Venetian laws on the profession of the
notaries in Venice see Bigalea, Marco Antonio. Capitulare legum notariis publiciis Venetiarum (Venice,
1689) and Pedrinelli, Giovanni. Il notaio istruito nel suo ministero (Venice, 1748-1749), 2 vols.
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Being endowed with public faith, all documents produced by a notary were “public instruments”
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which was much more voluminous, included lawsuits, the documents that I defined as
“public acts” in Chapter 3, and a large variety of documents such as court injunctions
(like the protests of bills of exchange), confiscations acts, legal mandaments, and private
merchant documents like letters of debts, chartering contracts, inventory of estates, etc.
This third group of documents constitute single entries in the registers and were unrelated
to the any of the lawsuits recorded in the same book.
Such organization of notarial protocols suggests that the secretary distinguished
between notarial records drawn by himself which were unrelated to disputes litigated in
the chancellery, and those documents that, instead, constituted the beginning of
procedures of debt recovery, which could potentially lead to a lawsuit. Through obtaining
an injunction of payment or the sequestration of the debtor’s merchandises, or through
the notarization of a private business document such as a commercial agreement, a
creditor registered in the chancellery a claim against another individual turning it into
“public knowledge” in the mercantile community trading between Ottoman and Venetian
territories. In this way, the creditor publicly urged the debtor to respond to his/her claim
by paying a debt or fulfilling a clause of a business agreement to avoid a possible lawsuit
with its related monetary and reputational costs. Therefore, this group of isolated
documents unrelated to lawsuits represent extrajudicial deeds performed before the
secretary/notary at the beginning of processes of debt recovery or execution of business
agreements. Even if they did not lead to a lawsuit, these extrajudicial deeds resulted in

sale, business agreements, and payment of debts, for which he also at times employed different taxonomies
such as “confessione” or “dichiaratione,” “promessa,” or “accordo” The index (rubrica) of all the legal and
notarial acts performed in the chancellery during the office of a single secretary and the tariff of the fees
charged for these deeds do not contain such different taxonomies but only that of “public instrument.” See
Chapter 3, 147.
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the public certification of one individual’s debt or contract anyway and this is why I
consider them “notarial deeds.” 20
In my study, I analyze these two groups of notarial documents together and
classify each act according to the content of the record. However, I also show the
taxonomy employed by the secretaries. My etic classification of the “notarial deeds”
conducted in the Venetian chancellery includes a large group of confiscation mandates
(278) and egal mandaments (59), which did not result into a lawsuit. Like court
injunctions, sequestration orders and legal mandaments represented extrajudicial deeds,
which individuals performed before beginning formal procedures of litigation in order to
prevent it. 21 Similarly, I include sworn statements of individuals (fede) concerning
commercial dealings and events taking place during navigation and commercial ventures.

Many public notaries in Venice kept separate protocols for extrajudicial acts as well as for arbitration
sentences. Pedani, “Veneta Auctoritate Notarius,” 91. On the role of procedures of debt recovery in the
certification of an individual’s property rights, see Ago, Renata, Economia barocca: mercato e istituzioni
nella Roma del Seicento (Roma: Donzelli, c1998), 155-157; and Caracausi, Andrea. “Procedure di giustizia
in età moderna: i tribunali corporativi,” Studi Storici 2 (2008), 323–60, 332-335.
20

On sequestration in Venetian law as both a preemptive action pursued before a lawsuit and as a judicial
decision taken during the litigation or after the final sentence, see Ferro, Marco. Dizionario del Diritto
Veneto (2 Volumes, Venice: Santini e Figlio, 1845), Vol. 2, 684-686.
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Table 4.1: Types of Notarial Acts in the Venetian Chancellery (1609-1620)—Etic
classification
Types of Notarial Act

Number of Cases Percentage

Powers of Attorney

438

26%

Drawing of documents

293

35%

Notarization of documents

318

Commercial Dealings

Extrajudicial Acts
Court injunctions

283

Sequestration acts

278

Legal mandaments

59

Others 22

33

3%

TOTAL

1,702

100%

36%

I distinguish between three main groups of notarial documents: grants of power of
attorney, the registration of commercial dealings, and extrajudicial deeds. The latter two
groups contain other important subdivisions. As Table 4.1 shows, the single most
requested notarial service was the registration of power of attorney. However, a
substantial number of the documents I classify as “notarial documents” were extrajudicial
acts. Individuals started legal proceedings to recover debt without going to litigation.
Furthermore, the secretary registered many private documents (318) related to credit and
commercial transactions. These two types of cases show the interdependence between the
notarial and judicial functions of the Venetian chancellery: this institution registered
private documents concerning business dealings, its notarized complaints of creditors,
I include within the group “others” sworn declarations (fedi) by individuals about single occurrences,
such as weather conditions or the actions of Ottoman officials, that happened during navigation and
commercial transactions.
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issued injunctions of payment and mandates of confiscation of the debtor’s assets, and
lastly oversaw litigation.
4 –Religious Affiliation and Other Categories of Belonging
Between 1609 and 1620, 1,702 persons turned to the Venetian chancellery for
notarial services. They included Venetian subjects of different social and economic
status, individuals belonging to Ottoman Muslim, Christian, and Jewish communities,
and subjects from various European cities, and 54 women of different religious
affiliation. Venetian legislation about notaries does not include specific norms concerning
notarial deeds drawn by or including non-Christians and non-Venetian subjects. Matters
related to religious diversity and political affiliation, such as the use of non-Christian
witnesses, were dwelt with ad hoc during notarial practice. 23 Although Roman law
prohibited Jews from serving as witnesses in lawsuits and contracts involving Christians,
the notarial documents of the Venetian chancellery contain numerous documents with
Jews, and, in a fewer cases also Muslims, testifying to the composition of legal and
economic documents about mixed transactions between Christians and non-Christians.
Furthermore, to my knowledge no legal norm or religious prohibition prevented Muslims

Apellániz, Breaching the Bronze Wall, 119-125; Pedani, Maria Pia. “A Culture of Trust: Ottoman
Merchants and Venetian Notaries in the Early Modern Period” in Anna Valerio (ed.), Venetians and
Ottomans in the Early Modern Age. Essays on Economic and Social Connected History (Venice: Edizioni
Ca' Foscari, 2018), 31-47. For non-Christians in the medieval and early modern notarial records of other
European states, see Airaldi, Gabriella, “Genovesi nel mondo islamico: «carta sarracenica» e «carta in
arabico»,” Critica Storica 11/1 (1972), 106-121; Burns, Robert I, Jews in the notarial culture: Latinate
wills in Mediterranean Spain, 1250– 1350 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 32– 51; Burns,
Kathryn. ‘‘Notaries, Truth, and Consequences,’’ American Historical Review 110/2 (2005), 350–79, 363365.
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from appealing to European notaries, a practice that took place in medieval trade centers
under the sovereignty of the Mamluk dynasty as well. 24
Table 4.2: Religious Affiliation of the Users of the Notarial Services of the Venetian
Chancellery (1609-1611)
Religion

Number of Individuals

Percentage

Christians

1,243

72%

Jews

341

20%

Muslims

118

7%

TOTAL

1,702

100%

As shown in Table 4.2, non-Muslim individuals constituted a considerable
segment of the individuals who applied to Venetian chancellery (27%, 459 cases) for
notarial services. In the case of Muslim merchants, notarial transactions constitute the
main reason why they used this institution in the first place (118 out of 128 legal and
economic deeds).
In the case of Christian individuals, we find significant differences in the social
and economic profile of court users for notarial deeds and for legal suits. First, Venetian
merchants appear in a minority of notarial acts (433 out of 1,702) while they were
involved in more than 66% of all the lawsuits. If we sum the notarial deeds of Venetian
merchants, shipmasters, and scribes (569) we notice that they constitute about the 35% of
all the notarial transactions performed in chancellery (702 out of 1,702 transactions)
while, in the case of lawsuits, these were 78%. These individuals were the core of the
Venetian mercantile community in terms of the volume of trade and shipping activities

24

Apellániz, Breaching the Bronze Wall, 102-134.

177

and given that they routinely participated in the decisions of the Council of Twelve, the
governing body of the Venetian community in Istanbul. These results raise questions
about the overall use of this consular chancellery as a notarial office for long-distance
merchants and economic operators involved in shipping activities.
Second, many more Western Europeans applied to the Venetian chancellery to
register business dealings and contracts than for lawsuits: 123 notarial deeds (7% of all
documents) against 5 lawsuits. Among them, the largest groups were Genoese (48),
French (23), and English (14). This shows Western Europeans were more interested in
the notarial function of the Venetian chancellery than in its judicial authority. As we will
see below, most of these Europeans recorded legal acts and business dealings for
commercial dealing with Venetian territories.
Lastly, the records of the chancellery also contain a small group of European and
Ottoman high-ranking individuals (18 individuals) who sought the notarization of legal
and commercial deeds in their name. They include twelve noblemen from France, Venice
(only one), Zakynthos, Dubrovnik, Florence, Rome, 25 who registered debts—mostly
contracted for their manumission from captivity in Ottoman cities—or grants of power of
attorney, as well as the French and English ambassadors, who used the Venetian
chancellery to record expenditures for some consular duties. The French ambassador
Achille de Harlay (in office 1611-1620) used the notarial services of the Venetian
chancellery in 9 instances despite the fact that his embassy also had a notarial office. 26

The only Roman noble appearing in the Venetian chancellery was the famous traveler and scholar Pietro
della Valle (d. 1652). BAC 279, reg. 401, fols. 18r-20r (8 July 1615).
25
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Ottoman officials include the admiral of the imperial fleet (kapudan paşa) Cafer Pasha
(office 1605-1608), who was engaged in Ottoman-Venetian trade in the 1610s, and the
Orthodox Patriarch of Constantinople Timothy II (office 1612-1620). In the case of the
last three individuals, the Venetian secretary went to their residencies in the districts of
Beyoğlu, Beşiktaş, and Fener, respectively. 27
In seventeenth-century Istanbul there existed a plurality of scribal institutions
performing notarial services. Kadı courts, the most common Islamic legal institution in
Ottoman cities, also operated as public notarial offices for individuals regardless of
religion, subjecthood, social status, and sex, in the district under their jurisdiction. The
documents issued by them (hüccet), if corroborated by witnesses, were valid in Ottoman
Hanafi courts of justice elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire. 28 Non-Muslim communities
also had their own internal scribal or secretariat component, like Church officials,
communal scribes, and the sofer among Jews. 29 Furthermore, the subjects of other
European states with a permanent diplomatic representation in Istanbul had access to the
chancelleries of their own country’s embassy. Overall, apart from kadı courts, we know
little about scribal institutions in Istanbul and other Ottoman cities in the early modern
period.

BAC 276, reg. 395, fols. 22r/23v (13 November 1609) and BAC 279, reg. 400, fols. 106r/107r (11 July
1617).
27

28
Before the Ottoman conquest, in Levantine commercial hubs there existed the institution of the udul—a
Muslim notary and professional witness in a community. Differently from European notaries, his written
records did not possess public faith and they needed to be corroborated by witnesses to constitute legal
evidence in court. Apellàniz, Breaching the Bronze Wall, 361/362.
29

For instance, see Greene, Catholic Pirates, 138-149; Burns, Jews in the notarial culture, 43-49.
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Other individuals charged with drawing documents for European and Ottoman
merchants and seamen were ship scribes. In the Venetian case, medieval statutes
prescribed that two scribes (scrivano) appointed by Venetian magistracies had to
accompany every Venetian ship on which they had authority to certify documents with
his oath and to draw contracts, wills, and bills of lading. They kept two separate registers
logbooks (cartolario) containing these transactions. In the early modern period, this
legislation became obsolete and, instead of Venetian officials, it was the ship owner(s)
who appointed one scribe and his helper (scrivanello). 30 The records produced by them,
such as bills of lading, were used as legal proof in the bailo’s chancellery during lawsuits.
In the Ottoman context, despite the little knowledge about the office of the ship
scribes, existing evidence point to the common practice of keeping cargo books. As with
any other type of written documents, these books alone did not constitute legal evidence
in Ottoman Muslim courts. Rather, witnesses had to testify on their contents. The
documentation produced by the scribes of Ottoman ships increased during the
seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries. 31
Despite this plurality of scribal institutions, individuals engaged in VenetianOttoman trade applied in large numbers to the Venetian chancellery. Below we analyze
the different notarial transactions performed there and the socioeconomic profile of the

Tucci, “Il documento del mercante.”558/559. The Consulate of the Sea, a medieval collection of
maritime customs, contain several articles about the duties of ship scribes. For instance, see Chapters 97
and 98 in Zanetti Daniele e Compagni. Il consolato del mare: nel quale si comprendono tutti gli statuti &
ordini, disposti da gli antichi per ogni caso di mercantia & di navigare: cosi a beneficio di marinari ... :
con l'aggiunta delle ordinationi sopra l'armate di mare, sicurtà, entrate, & vscite (Venice 1576), 42/43.
30

Greene, Catholic Pirates, 181-184; Çızakça, Murat. A comparative evolution of business partnerships:
the Islamic world and Europe, with specific reference to the Ottoman Archives (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 94122.
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court users. I focus primarily on non-Christian groups and Venetian merchants,
shipmasters, and scribes.
5–Powers of Attorney
With 438 documents (about 30% of all notarial deeds), the registration of power
of attorney (procura) was the most requested notarial service most by Venetians,
Ottomans, and other individuals. By appointing a legal representative (procuratore),
individuals in Istanbul aimed to recover credits, settle disputes, collect inheritances, and
resolve other affairs in Venetian territories, other Ottoman towns, and, in a few cases,
also in European cities. Notarizing the nomination of a legal agent was not mandatory
since the grantor could have communicated his/her delegation to the grantee through a
private letter or by the means of a third party. However, formal registration might have
made it imperative for the grantee to accept his/her commission. Furthermore, it produced
written evidence of the agency relationship between the two parties which could then be
used in courts of justice in order to verify and enforce property rights.
As in Roman law, in Venetian legislation there existed two main categories of
power of attorney according to the extant mandate given by the grantor to his or her
representative: “general power of attorney ” (procura generale), in which the mandate
extended to all the legal and business affairs of the grantor, and “special power of
attorney” (procura speciale), in which the latter committed his prosecutor to perform a
specific task. 32 Our records lack this formal categorization but, judging on their contents,
32
For these two categories of power of attorney in Venetian law see, Ferro, Dizionario, Vol. 2, 532-538,
and, for acts of power attorney in early modern European commercial practice, see Malynes, Gerard.
Consuetudo, vel, Lex Mercatoria (London, 1622), 106-110. For studies of powers of attorney in medieval
and early modern Europe, see Lopez, Robert S. “Proxy in Medieval Trade,” in William C. Jordan, Bruce
McNab, Teofilo F. Ruiz (eds). Order and innovation in the Middle Ages: essays in honor of Joseph R.
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they contain only instances of the second type of power of attorney. Generalized agency
was usually established through business correspondence. In Mediterranean commercial
practice, the grant of generalized agency often constituted the formal establishment of
contracts of commission agency between two merchants. 33 In the cases of special power
of attorney, the degree of authority and freedom of action given to the prosecutor in
specific issues could vary from case to case, but it usually included substantial latitude in
the procedures to accomplish the designated task.
An instance of specialized power of attorney with a substantial degree of freedom
for the prosecutor is the commission granted by a Jewish woman named Arcondupula in
on January 1, 1619, to her nephew David. Arcondopula was the widow of the late Rabbi
David Abudente, a Jewish merchant, and the mother and legal guardian (governante et
tutrice) of their six children. According to David Abudente’s testament, which had been
notarized in the chancellery a few days before, he had left credits and merchandises in
Istanbul, Sarajevo, Venice, and other places, in the hands of several commercial agents.
She committed her nephew David to recover such credits and goods “everywhere” and
from “anybody,” and, in order to fulfill such a task, she authorized him to trade goods
and negotiate with third parties in her name “as if she had been conducting such
operations by herself.” 34 She also allowed him, if necessary, to appear before any

Strayer (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 187-194; and Eloire, Fabien, Lemercier, Claire, and
Santarosa Veronica O. “Beyond the personal–anonymous divide: agency relations in powers of attorney in
France in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,” Economic History Review 72/4 (2019), 1229–1250.
33

Trivellato, The Familiarity of Strangers, 154
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“come potria fare la suddetta S.ra Arcondopula di propria persona.”
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magistracy, city council, and in both “Christian and Muslim tribunals” (foro cristiano et
turchesco). 35
Table 4.3: Religious Affiliation of those Registering a Power of Attorney in the Venetian
Chancellery (1609-1620)
Religion of the Applicants

Number of Powers of Attorney Percentage

Christians

274

64%

Jews

82

18%

Muslims

82

18%

Total

438

An analysis of the religious affiliation of the individuals registering power of
attorney in the Venetian chancellery shows substantial numbers of Ottoman Jews and
Muslims (164 records, 36%). The records including Muslims are particularly important
because they contain valuable information about the still little-known organization of
business activities of Muslim merchants in Western Europe. The granting of power of
attorney was the main reason why Muslim merchants applied to the Venetian chancellery
between 1609 and 1620: 82 out of 128 documents (118 notarial transactions and 10
lawsuits).
Muslim merchants usually appointed legal representatives among a small of
number of individuals (5 persons in the years under study) that included both Venetian
merchants and commercial brokers specializing in dealing with Muslim merchants

BAC 279, reg. 401, fol. 156r/v (1 January 1619). The testament of Rabbi David Abudente is in Ibid,
152r-155v (2 February 1619). In the latter, David appointed his wife as legal guardian of their children.
35
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(sensali dei turchi). 36 These individuals operated in Venice as the commercial agents
(commesso) of these merchants, receiving and trading their goods and purchasing and
shipping other ones to Istanbul. They communicated through mercantile correspondence,
which, in case of dispute or accident, was recorded by the Venetian chancellery. 37 By
granting power of attorney, Muslim merchants based in Istanbul instructed their agents in
Venice to carry out specific tasks, such as the performance of business dealings and the
recovery of goods or credits from other business associates.
For example, on October 1, 1615, Hoca Mesud quondam Ramazan from Tosya
registered a commission for two merchants in Venice, Giacomo Morato and Giacomo
Merlo. One year before, a Janissary named Halil Beşe had conducted 26 camlet boards
(tavola) to Venice and had delivered them to Andrea Fontana, a commercial broker
working for Mesud. The latter had instructed Andrea to sell the camlets for 8 ducats for
each bolt (pezza) of fabric together with other 34 boards of camlet, which Andrea had
received a few month later from two Armenians, Deli Kurt and Giusuf, for 30 ducats for
bolt. Andrea sold neither load of goods. Mesud commissioned the two aforementioned
merchants to recover all the boards of camlet from Andrea and trade them for the

Vercellin, Giorgio. “Mercanti turchi a Venezia alla fine del Cinquecento: Il Libretto dei contratti
turcheschi di Zuane Zacra sensale,” Il Veltro 23 (1979), 243–76; Rothman, Natalie. Brokering Empire:
Trans-Imperial Subjects between Venice and Istanbul. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 2012), 29-60. In
the years under study these commercial agents were Andrea Fontana, Cesare Nicsia, Michiel Siro, Giacomo
Morato, and Giacomo Merlo. The first three of them were commercial brokers for Muslim merchants.
36

For instance, see BAC 277, reg. 396, fols. 32v/33r (06/26/1610). These commercial agents might have
operated as commission agents for their principals in Istanbul by trading in their name and receiving a fixed
percentage of the earnings as the commission for their service. Unfortunately, in our sources we have no
information about the nature of their contracts. For the contract of commission agency in the late medieval
and early modern Mediterranean and Western Europe, see Lane, Frederic C. Andrea Barbarigo, merchant
of Venice, 1418-1449 (New York: Octagon Books, 1967), 93-99; Trivellato, The Familiarity of Strangers,
153-155; Gelderblom, Cities of Commerce, 78-83.
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abovementioned prices. They had the authority to appeal to the Venetian Board of Trade
(Cinque Savi alla Mercanzia) and other state tribunals to retrieve those goods. 38
Among 274 Christian individuals, Venetian merchants, ship captains, and scribes,
appear only on 74 of documents of power of attorney, the 17% of these types of notarial
deeds. Overall, they notarized commissions less frequently than Jewish and Muslim
merchants and less-socially preeminent Christians. It is possible that they mostly
appointed legal and commercial representatives for specific tasks and general agency
through commercial letters. As we have seen above, during the early modern period
European merchants increasingly employed business correspondence since it acquired
full legality in European merchant courts. Furthermore, the strength of the Venetian
postal service between Venice and Istanbul in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
which was used by other European communities as well as by Ottoman authorities, must
have made the circulation of these documents quicker and more reliable. 39

38

BAC 279, reg. 402, fols. 31r/32v (1 October 1615).

Dursteler, Eric R. “Power and Influence: Venetian Postal System in the Early Modern Eastern
Mediterranean, 1573–1645” in Diego Curto et aliis (eds.), From Florence to the Mediterranean: Studies in
Honor Athony Molho (Florence: Olschki, 2009), 601–623.
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Table 4.4: Destination of Powers of Attorney drawn in the Venetian Chancellery (16091620)
Destination

Documents

Percentage

Venice

276

63%

Venetian territories

89

20%

Ottoman territories 40

42

10%

Western and Eastern Europe

18

4%

Everywhere

13

3%

438

100%

Moving from religion to the destination of the documents of power of attorney,
we notice that most of these documents entailed the performance of different tasks in
Venice and its territories (83% of all the documents). The second largest group of this
variety of notarial records (46 cases, 10%) included commissions in Istanbul (25 cases)
and other Ottoman territories. They involved Venetian merchants leaving Istanbul for
Venice and appointing agents to recover credits and goods left in the Ottoman capital,
and a few cases of Ottoman and Venetian merchants based in Istanbul registering
commissions for different task to be performed in other Ottoman cities, above all Izmir (8
cases). Both Venetian and Ottoman merchants granted freedom to their legal agents to
appear before the bailo, Venetian consuls, and to use Ottoman tribunals as well.
Regardless of the religious and political affiliation of the grantor, the commissions
for Ottoman cities always involved Ottoman-Venetian commercial affairs. For instance,
in 1611 Murat Reis, a Cypriot renegade previously named Pietro Sansonetto, appointed
the royal merchant Mehmed Ağa to recover goods and credits coming to Istanbul from
Venice. He granted the latter the authority to appear before the bailo and Ottoman

I include the city-state of Dubrovnik (4 cases) and the Principalities of Moldovia and Wallachia (3 cases)
within the Ottoman territories given their tributary status vis-à-vis the Ottoman sultan.
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tribunals to recover his belongings. The rare intra-Muslim commission registered in the
Venetian chancellery is connected to Venetian trade by the origins of the goods/credits in
question. 41
The few documents (18 cases) of power of attorney which did not deal with
Ottoman/Venetian trade altogether involved commercial expeditions and other matters
with other European states. In 6 cases, Venetian merchants appointed agents to carry out
specific services in Lviv (today in Ukraine), an important commercial center in the
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. 42 The other cases (12) concern non-Venetian
individuals and their legal-commercial affairs in Western Europe. I provide two examples
of these rare documents.
In 1609, Norigian di Veligian, an Armenian from New Julfa in Isfahan, appointed
the Reverend Cazadur from Yerevan, who resided in Portugal, to recover 17,000 thalers
from Avanis, another Armenian from Yerevan. In another example, dating from 1619, the
French Ambassador Achille de Harlay de Sancy (office 1611-1620) granted power of
attorney to Giovanni Andrea and Bartolomeo Lumaghi, two banker brothers (banchieri)
residing in Paris, to recover from the French king, Louis XIII, an unspecified sum of
money which the king Louis XIII had assigned to him for the expenses of the embassy. 43
The few instances of these non-Venetian-related documents of power of attorney
demonstrate that the only exceptionally merchants and other individuals used the
Venetian chancellery for notarizing this type of documents for trade ventures and other
41

BAC 276, reg. 395, fol. 99r (20 October 1611).

42

For instance, see BAC 278, reg. 398, fol. 32v (8 February 1613).

43

BAC 276, reg. 395, fol. 22v (22 December 1609) and BAC 279, reg. 401, fol. 159v (2 February 1619).
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matters that were independent from Ottoman/Venetian trade. All the cases mentioned so
far involved Venetian individuals or commercial transactions with Venice and its
territories. The documents of commission to agents drawn in the Venetian chancellery
were valid in Venetian courts, but we cannot ascertain their validity in non-Venetian
tribunals. Furthermore, the few cases of non-Venetian-related records of power of
attorney involved Catholic states, such as the Spanish Empire and France, whose legal
systems were based on the ius commune. 44 Despite Venice’s formal rejection of the ius
commune as a source of Venetian law, its notarial culture developed from this legal
tradition as it was the case with other Italian commercial centers. The shared legal
background might explain why only countries applying the ius commune were the
destinations of all the documents of power of attorney drawn in the Venetian chancellery.
6—Registering Commercial Affairs
Business contracts and commercial transactions constituted the second largest
group of notarial records registered in the Venetian chancellery (611, 35%). Venetian law
did not mandate the registration of commercial dealings and contracts in notarial offices.
Rather, it was the choice of Venetian merchants to see, should they ever want written
evidence of their dealings to use in case of disputes. Furthermore, international
agreements (the Capitulations) required Venetian and Ottoman merchants to notarize
transactions between themselves in Ottoman kadı courts. 45 This notwithstanding, the
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The other 10 instances are for Ancona, Genoa, Rome, Vienna, and Naples.
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See Chapter 6, 286/287.
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records of the Venetian chancellery are replete of notarial transactions between Venetian
and Ottoman subjects.
Notarized credit and commercial dealings contain many types of deeds. I
distinguish between, on the one hand, those dealings/agreements drafted by the secretary
as a public notary in front of witnesses, and, on the other hand, the notarization of private
or public documents treating business dealings. The secretary recorded commercial
documents drawn by himself, including debt recognizance, power of attorney, and sales
in one register, while he registered private business documents in another register
containing lawsuits and public acts. As I noted above, this division likely stems from the
fact that notarized private documents could be used as evidence for future (possible) legal
actions. Furthermore, my distinction also follows the different costs of drawing a notarial
document for business and legal dealings in the court and notarizing private or public
documents.
Documents drawn by the Venetian secretary
Table 4.5: Commercial Documents drawn by the Venetian Secretary (1609-1620)

46

Type of Document

Number

Percentage

Debt Recognizance

131

45%

Quittance

111

38%

Business Contract

11

4%

Sale/Purchase

22

7%

Will

6

2%

Others 46

12

4%

TOTAL

293

100%

I include in the category “others” the registration of delivery of goods and waivers (rinuntia) of credits.
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The secretary drew up almost half of the commercial dealings registered in
Venetian chancellery: 293 cases. They include 105 transactions (36%) registered by nonChristian individuals, including 26 cases by Muslims and 65 cases by Jews. Other nonVenetian individuals included the subjects of some European states (58 cases), mostly the
Republic of Genoa and France, those of the Ottoman tributary city state of Dubrovnik (8),
and Christian individuals hailing from different Ottoman territories (7). Altogether,
transactions recorded by non-Venetian individuals amount to more than half (at least, 178
cases, 47) of all the business dealings drafted by the Venetian secretary in the years under
study.
The Venetian subjects included 41 colonial subjects, and, collectively, ship
masters and scribes 13, while Venetian merchants appear only in 28 business dealings.
The small number of Venetian merchants, like it was the case with documents of power
of attorney, shows that, while conducting business in the Ottoman capital, they might
have avoided formally registering most of their commercial dealings and contracts opting
instead for keeping private records of the latter. As noted above, the recourse to notaries
by Italian and other European merchants for notarizing commercial affairs declined from
the late medieval period onwards due to the growing acceptance of private records as
legal proof in merchant courts. Our records seem to demonstrate this historical
development. Such limited use of notaries by Venetian merchants in the Levant contrasts
with the more common practice of registering business dealings at Venetian notaries by

These are exclusively those individuals that I managed to identify as non-Venetians with a degree of
certainty.
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Venetian merchants, including nobles, in Byzantine Constantinople. 48 Those who turned
to the Venetian chancellery to record business transactions and agreements were
individuals with weaker ties to the Venetian mercantile community in matter of
commercial activities, or who were separated from their creditor/debtor in terms of
religious affiliation, membership in a political community, and social status.
What were individuals recording in the Venetian chancellery? Our record shows
that individuals mostly registered debt recognizances and quittances (242 records, the
82%). These two types of records are called either confessione or dichiaratione. 49
Unfortunately, they do not contain much information about the circumstances of the
business transactions. The monetary value of such transactions varies from 10 sequins
(1,200 aspers) to 6,300 sequins (756,000 aspers). 50
The largest sums involved preeminent non-Venetian individuals. For instance, in
1614, Gasparo Gratiani, a dragoman and diplomatic agent for different European
ambassadors in Istanbul, and later the governor (voyvoda) of the Ottoman-tributary
Principality of Moldovia (office 1619/1620), declared to be indebted for 168,000 aspers

48
See Morozzo della Rocca, Raimondo, and Alessandro Lombardo (eds), Documenti del commercio
veneziano nei secoli XI-XIII (2 Vols, Rome: Sede dell'Istituto, 1940). For an analysis of this important
collection of medieval commercial documents, see González De Lara, Yadira. “The Secret of Venetian
Success: A Public-order, Reputation-based Institution.” European Review of Economic History 12/3
(2008), 247–86, 256.

Quittances are called, in 12 cases, also quietanza. Ferro, Dizionario, Vol 2, 385. On the notarial
documents of debt recognizance in late medieval Europe, see Lopez, Robert S. and Irving W. Raymond.
Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World: Illustrative Documents Translated with Introductions and
Notes (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955, 1961), 157-160 and 229-235; Reyerson, Kathryn L.
Business, Banking and Finance in Medieval Montpellier (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies
1985), 41-43.
49

The highest amount of money (6,300 sequins) recorded in the chancellery was the debt of Atanasio,
described as the “Patriarch of Bulgaria, Serbia, and Macedonia,” towards a nobleman from Koper
(Capodistria), in Venetian-held Istria, Alessandro Mugello. BAC 277, reg. 395, fol. 10r (24 April 1609).
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towards two Venetian merchants, Francesco Girardi and Ieronimo Boneri. He committed
himself to repay his debt within four months and he pledged a ship owned by him, which
was kept by the English ambassador Paul Pindar (office 1611-1620), for the repayment of
his debt. Notarial documents of debt recognition follow this template: an individual
formally declared that he owed his creditor a sum of money as loan or for specific
merchandise, and then he registered the terms of payment. He also usually provided
particular security for the debt, usually his movable and immovable goods in the Ottoman
Empire or elsewhere. 51
In 43 cases, debt recognitions and quittances involved newly manumitted
captives/slaves (schiavo) who either recorded the sum of their ransom and promised to
repay it or they registered the payment for their redemption by a third party. Such
documents shed valuable information on the daily practice of captive/slave ransoming
and trade in early modern Istanbul. 52 There were 27 Genoese individuals and 16 other
individuals from Dubrovnik, France, and Sicily ex-slaves of Ottoman grandees. No
Venetian subjects appear among the manumitted captives and the same applies for Jewish
and Muslim individuals.53 For instance, in 1609, two French knights of Malta registered

51

For instance, BAC 279, reg. 401, fol. 65r (12 December 1614).

For an overview on ransoming and the trade of captives/captives in the early modern Mediterranean, see
Kaiser, Wolfgang and Guillaume Calafat, “The Economy of Ransoming in the Early Modern
Mediterranean: A Cross-Cultural Trade Between Southern Europe and the Maghreb (16th–17th centuries),”
in Francesca Trivellato, Lior Halevi, and Catia Antunes (eds), Religion and Trade: Cross-Cultural
Exchanges in World History, 1000–1900 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 108–130.
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In the Venetian case, it possible that, given that the bailo’s ambassadorial responsibility for freeing
Venetian slaves/captives, the Venetian chancellery kept specific registers with information about the
manumission of Venetian subjects. For the organization of captive ransoming in early modern Venice, see
Davis, Robert C. “Slave Redemption in Venice 1595–1797,” in John J. Martin and Dennis Romano (eds),
Venice Reconsidered: The History and Civilization of an Italian City-State, 1297–1797 (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2002), 454–487.
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their liberation for 250 sequins each from Murad Bey, the governor of Alessandria, by the
French ambassador. They promised to pay their debt once in Malta to the Grand Master
of the Knights of Saint John. In another instance, in 1611 Battista Cassini from Portofino,
in Genoese territory, declared that the Venetian merchant Ludovico Vidali had paid 40
sequins for freeing him. Ludovico had received the order to rescue Battista from two
Genoese merchants who operated in Venice, Paulo and Vicenzo Giustiniani. 54
Another category of commercial deed recorded in the Venetian chancellery were
the sale of merchandise and ships. Their little number (22 cases) shows that such
registration of such transactions was rather exceptional in the commercial practice
between Istanbul and Venice. No Venetian merchants performed such actions whose
actors were Frenchmen, Englishmen, Jews from Istanbul, and Christian individuals from
Crete and Aegean islands. Out of 22 cases, 16 involved the sale of ships or shares of
them, while in three 6 cases individuals notarized the sale of goods.
The documents of ship sale constituted the most expensive business dealing ever
recorded in the Venetian chancellery. For instance, in 1617 Manoli di Dimitri from
Patmos sold his ship, called San Giovanni Evangelista, to Dimitri Toderini, a ship master
from Thessaly that was involved in shipping between Istanbul and Venice, for 7,000
ducats (854,000 aspers in 1617). Dimitri paid 3,000 ducats immediately in court and
pledged to pay the other 4,000 in Venice to an agent of Manoli. 55 This is the highestpriced transaction ever registered in the Venetian chancellery in the years under study.
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BAC 277, reg. 395, fols. 12r (13 June 1609) and 86v (16 May 1611).
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BAC 279, reg. 401, fol. 95r (16 March 1617).
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Lastly, a small number of notarial deeds (11 cases) are credit and commercial
contracts. In the years under study, the Venetian secretary did not draft specific types of
commercial partnerships and credit contracts which merchants in the Mediterranean
employed during the medieval and early modern period. Venetian merchants and their
peers from European states and the Ottoman Empire could employ a vast array of credit
and commercial agreements which were recognized by European and Ottoman legal
institutions, respectively. 56 In the early modern Venetian trade system, the most spread
forms of business associations were family partnerships (fraterna), the single-venture
capital partnership (collegantia), temporary joint-ventures (compagnia), commission
agency, while joint-stock or regulated companies did not exist. 57
Venetian merchants and others engaged in Venetian-Ottoman trade did not draw
up any of these contracts in the chancellery in the years under study. This absence, at
least in part, stems from the fact that, since 1535, Venetian merchants were required to
record their business associations in Venetian magistracies. 58 However, the small number
of contracts drawn in the chancellery by both Venetian and Ottoman merchants also
suggests that, conversely to the Middle Ages, notarial drafting of business partnerships

No legal impediment prevented Venetian merchants form employing Islamic forms of business
partnership, but as will see in the next chapter, they registered such contracts only in Ottoman courts.
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Venice’s merchant courts, the Consuls of the Merchants (consoli dei mercanti), had jurisdiction over
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was not common practice in Ottoman/Venetian trade. 59 Again, this phenomenon likely
originates from the probative value acquired by private business documents in European
courts of law in the late medieval period and by the willingness of merchants to avoid
both the costs of drawing up contracts in a notarial office and the formulaic formats of
contract templates
Most of the few commercial agreements (8 out of 3) drawn in the chancellery
concern the trade of grain between the Ottoman Empire and Venetian territories in
Levant, above all in Crete. These transactions reflect the Mediterranean-wide famine
during the 1590s and 1600s which severely afflicted Venetian possessions and forced
Venetian authorities to purchase grain from the rival Ottoman Empire. 60 The baili were
charged with obtaining a special permission from Ottoman authorities to allow merchants
to purchase wheat, whose export was prohibited in the Ottoman Empire, in Ottoman
ports. 61 Wheat trade therefore constituted a specific branch of trade under the control of
Venetian authorities. The records in Venetian chancellery from the 1590s onwards
contain credit agreements for wheat trade. They involved Venetian merchants and other
individuals affiliated with Venice who lent money to Ottoman ship captains, both

Notarial records from Byzantine Constantinople illustrate Venetian merchant registering business
contracts, like sea loans and colleganza, at Venetian notaries. For instances, see Morozzo della Rocca and
Lombardo, Documenti del commercio veneziano, Vol. 1, 13, 71, 84, 228.
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60
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Muslims and Christians, to purchase wheat in specific Ottoman cities, ship it to Venetian
territories, and sell it according to specific instructions. 62
For instance, in 1610 Manoli Pasquali and Paleologo Sevasto two Christians from
the Ottoman-held Aegean island of Lesbos (Midilli) and co-owners (parcevenoli) of a
ship, registered a credit agreement (called accordo) with Gianuli Piperi, a Cretan
merchant who was also the Venetian consul in Milos, for grain trade with Crete. Gianuli
committed himself to pay in advance 500 sequins to Manoli and Paleologo to go to the
port of Volos, in Thessaly, and to invest the sum in grain to be conducted later to the city
of Chania in Crete. Once there, the latter had the freedom to sell the grain, earn a profit,
and divided it among themselves, as they wished. They pledged in solidum their own
persons and all their belongings, both movable and immovable properties (mobili et
stabili), as surety for the execution of the expedition. 63
Apart from grain trade-related agreements, we have only two instances of a
business contracts drawn by the Venetian secretary. For instance, in 1611, Anastasio
Nichita and Zuanne Lappo from the Venetian island of Zakynthos registered a
partnership (compagnia) for the sale of a load of sturgeon. Anastasio had invested 302
sequins while Zuanne 108 sequins to purchase the merchandise in an unspecified
location. In the agreement, Zuanne granted Anastasio authority to go with the load of
sturgeon to any Levantine port he wished, from Syrian ports to Cretan ones, and to sell it

For instances of credit agreements with Muslim ship captains (reis) from 1590s, see BAC, 317, reg, 1,
fol. 27v/r (5 October 1591).
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there and purchase any other goods “as he wished for their common enterprise.” 64 After
that, Anastasio would go to Zakynthos to sell what he had bought after selling the
sturgeon and the two partners would divide the earnings according to each other’s share
of the initial investment. 65
Lastly, the 293 commercial documents drawn by the Venetian secretary include
25 (8%) commercial documents drawn by the Venetian secretary which involved neither
Venetian subjects nor Venetian-Ottoman trade. Out of 25 documents, 23 are registration
of debts for the liberation of slaves/captives, mostly at hands of the French ambassador
(12 cases) and merchants of Dubrovnik and Genoa, while 2 are instances of a credit
agreement and a ship leasing contract (noleggiato) for the same commercial venture. This
small number, like it was the case with the documents of power of attorney, shows the
limited circulation of documents produced by the Venetian secretary in the seventeenthcentury Mediterranean outside of Venetian territories and the Venetian trading system.
Again, these few cases of non-Venetian-related notarial documents features commercial
expeditions with western European states that applied the ius commune.
For instance, in January 1616, Cipriano Dani, a Genoese residing in Istanbul who
owned a ship called Nave Bonavetura, registered a leasing contract with two English
merchants, Riccardo Haris and Edoardo Chirchen, for a round trip between Istanbul,
Messina, and Naples, in Spanish-held southern Italy. The two Englishmen committed
themselves to load on the ship 2,500 pieces of leather (cuori) and 450 kantars of wool by
15 days and to pay the freight rates (nolo) once in Messina and Naples. According to the
64

“come a lui meglio parerà a vantaggio commune”
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contract, the ship had to stay in Messina 15 days, during which the two Englishmen had
the liberty to buy new goods and load them on the ship paying new freight rates for them.
Once in Naples, the ship had to remain docked for 30 days, during which time the
merchants had to unload all their goods. Both parties pledged themselves and their
movable and immovable goods as surety. 66 Two months later, the two English merchants
recorded a credit agreement with a French merchant, Marco Michael, for the purchase of
and sale of the wool in Naples. The latter was to go to Naples and deliver the goods to an
English merchant living in Naples, who acted as a commercial agent of the two other
Englishmen. 67
Notarization of private and public documents
Apart from drawing commercial documents, the Venetian secretary, at request of
merchants and other individuals, also notarized private documents, or those produced by
Venetian and Ottoman courts concerning business dealings and lawsuits. The archives of
the Venetian embassy of Istanbul include several boxes containing thousands of loose
and uncatalogued legal and commercial documents-from commercial correspondence,
letters of credits, to the records of Ottoman and Venetian tribunals - written by private
individuals or drawn up in Venetian and Ottoman courts. They are mostly in vernacular
Italian, but there are also a substantial number written in Judeo-Spanish, Ottoman
Turkish, and Demotic Greek. 68 They were likely brought to court when starting
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BAC 279, reg. 401, fols. 85r-97v (21 January 1617).

Ibid, fols. 97r/98v (17 March 1617). In 1617, no formal diplomatic agreements existed between the
Spanish and the Ottoman Empires. This may explain why these English merchants registered these two
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procedures of debt recovery or during lawsuits to serve as legal proof. In the years under
study, the Venetian secretary notarized 318 of these types of documents, under request of
private individuals, in the court protocols. I focus my analysis exclusively on these
notarized documents.
Table 4.6: Private Papers Notarized in the Venetian Chancellery (1609-1620) 69
Types of document

Number

Percentage

Debt Recognizance

86

27%

Power of Attorney

35

11%

Arbitration Sentence

28

9%

Merchant correspondence

23

7%

Commercial/Credit agreement 70

25

8%

Bill of exchange

25

8%

Bill of lading

18

6%

Venetian court document

17

6%

Inventory of estates

10

3%

Will

7

2%

Ottoman court documents

6

2%

Other documents 71

38

11%

TOTAL

298

100%

With “private papers” I mean here those documents possessed by the court users about their business
dealings and legal actions. Either the former or state authorities produced them, but their preservation was
the decision of the businessmen themselves.
69
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I include among “commercial/credits agreements” credit contracts, commercial partnerships, as well as
ship leasing contracts.

They include receipts of payments, documents written by Venetian officials in the Levant about legal
cases, petitions (supplica) of individual to the bailo for specific services, and records of Catholic
clergymen, etc.
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Registering one’s own business papers in a public office was not a common
procedure for long-distance merchants in the early modern period. It entailed registration
fees and the disclosure of one’s own business dealings. It took place when individuals
aimed to retrieve a credit or goods from business associates and other individuals. If outof-court oral/written communication between creditor and debtor did not work, the next
step for the former would have been to certify his/her property rights by recording with
the Venetian chancellery credit obligations, business agreements, merchant
correspondences, court records and notarial deeds, and other documents. The notarization
of these documents turned a claim into a public and legally enforceable obligation. It
could have been followed by an out-of-court settlement, a judicial mandament or a
sequestration order issued by the bailo at request of the creditor, or, in case the debtor
refused to pay/deliver goods, by a lawsuit. In the latter event, the notarized document
constituted legal evidence during the ligation process. 72
Only in 14 cases did a lawsuit follow the notarization of these business deeds.
This suggests that notarizing credit and commercial dealings might have functioned as an
important deterrent against launching a lawsuit. The public nature of the notarized
documents made fulfilling an obligation even more compelling because its nonaccomplishment might have jeopardized a merchant’s business reputation in the
mercantile community trading between Istanbul and Venetian territory. 73 Registering
private documents in the Venetian chancellery was also cheaper than having the secretary
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For the procedure of debt recovery in European courts and its interplay with notarial offices during the
late medieval and the early modern periods see Smail, “Notaries, Courts,” 38-41, Ago, Roma Barocca, 131147, and “Enforcing agreements;” Kuehn, Thomas. “Debt and Bankruptcy in Florence. Statutes and
Cases,” Quaderni storici 137/2 (2011), 355-390
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draw up a business or legal document: it costed 8 aspers against 120 for the cheapest
public instrument drafted by the secretary. This may explain the great number of these
notarized commercial and legal documents in the years under study.
As illustrated in Table 4.6, individuals sought to notarize mostly (177 documents,
the 71%) private writings of commercial dealings, above all letters of debt cognizance,
merchant correspondence, and commercial agreements. For such private documents, the
notarization entailed the sworn declaration of, at least, two individuals over the
authenticity of the signature (mano) of the document’s author. 74 These witnesses
belonged to the same religious community of the document’s writer and their
administered oath on their holy texts or epithets and names of God. For instance, in 1611,
the Venetian merchants Francesco Bestici and Francesco Girardi, registered a private
document of debt cognizance written by the Jewish Rabbi Iuda Abensusem, in which the
latter declared he was indebted towards them for 128 sequins for a load of Venetian
textiles that they had sold to him. Three Jews from intra muros Istanbul, Rabbi Mose di
Lazaro, Rabbi Eliau Lion, and Rabbi Mose Sasson were present when the letter of debt
was notarized and swore “on their laws” (secondo la loro legge) that the signature under
the document was that of Iuda Abensusem. 75
The process of recognizing one’s handwriting was not used for documents
produced by Venetian notaries and magistracies in Venetian territories. The signature
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On this practice, see Mueller, Reinhold C. “Merchants and their Merchandise: Identity and Identification
in Medieval Italy,” in Claudia Moatti and Wolfgang Kaiser (eds), Gens de passage en Méditerranée de
l’Antiquité à l’époque moderne: procédures de contrôle et d’identification (Paris: Maisonneuve & Larose,
2007), 313-344, 317.
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(signum tabellionis) of the notary or the seal of Saint Mark validated the documents in
the Venetian chancellery. However, in the case of the notarization of Ottoman court
records (sicil), documents show that witnesses came to court to testify about the
proceedings in those courts and the contents of the translated court records. For instance,
in 1609, Ömer Çelebi from Istanbul registered a court document (hüccet, cozetto in
vernacular Italian) drawn by a deputy judge (naib) in intra muros Istanbul in which Hacı
Mehmed from Tosya declared that he had borrowed 200 sequins from Ömer for a
commercial voyage to Venice. Two other Muslims, Ibrahim Beşe and Mehmed, swore
that they had been present to the composition of the document and that the translated
content was faithful to the original. Our records do not illustrate on what the two Muslim
individuals swore, but, given their religion, it must have been either a Quran or names
and epithets of God. 76
Finally, differently from the credit/commercial dealings drafted by the Venetian
secretary, Venetian merchants appear in a substantial number of notarized private
documents (125, 42%). Together with ship masters and scribes (53 individuals), they
appear in more than half (59%) of all these records (298 documents). While they mostly
refrained from drawing business contracts and transactions, they did register private
commercial documents in substantial numbers because they likely aimed to use them in
processes of debt recovery and contract enforcement. The fact that these individuals
mostly recorded private documents illustrates that they used notarial services of the
Venetian chancellery foremost when beginning processes of debt recovery or the

Ibid, reg. 394, fols. 113v/q114v (7 August 1609). The hüccet is dated 16 Rabiülevvel 1016 (7 August
1607).
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enforcement of business contracts, rather than upon the signing of legal and economic
agreements.
7—Extrajudicial acts
The final category of notarial records are what I refer to as “extrajudicial acts.”
Individuals applied to the Venetian chancellery to register a claim asking, through the
intervention of court officials, that a business associate pay a debt, deliver goods, or
perform other actions according to a previous agreement. If the debtor fulfilled his/her
obligation, the claim did not turn into a legal suit. I therefore include them among notarial
deeds of the Venetian chancellery because of the registration of the claim at court.
Extrajudicial acts are divided into injunctions, sequestrations, and judicial orders. The
bailo issued all these varieties of acts after assessing the soundness of the claims based on
the evidence produced by the creditors, and the Venetian secretary notarized the deeds in
his registers.
Court Injunctions
Our court records contain 283 instances of court injunctions, called either protesto
or intimatione in the registers of the Venetians secretary. 77 Through this procedure, a
businessman entered a complaint against another individual about an unfulfilled credit or
commercial agreement asking for its enforcement. If the bailo, after evaluating the claim
of the creditor, approved the request, the court bailiff (cavaliere) notified the obligation
to the debtor at his/her residence or publicly (per stridore) in the commercial district of

The tariff of the chancellery included only the term intimatione to refer to court injunctions while
collections of Venetian legal and notarial norms and regulations use only the term protesto. The only
exception were the notarized protests of bill of exchange. Ferro, Dizionario, Vol. 2, 551-553.
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Galata (Loggia di Galata, Lonca) and in the nearby Church of San Francesco. A general
injunction, that is, about any type of credit/commercial agreement, was a relatively cheap
transaction costing three Ottoman aspers (0.025 ducats) in 1604, while a specific form of
injunction, the protest of bill of exchange, costed up to 120 aspers. 78
The most common form of injunction was the protest of a bill of exchange
(protesto di lettera di cambio), the subject of 118 documents (42% of 283). This
important credit instrument fulfilled many roles in early modern commercial centers: it
enabled merchants to transfer capital between business partners separated by long
distances, to lend money, to purchase goods on credit, to exchange currencies, and to
conduct speculative undertakings. In the years under study, the mercantile community
trading between Istanbul and Venice used it as means of capital transfer and of credit. 79 A
typical bill of exchange involved 4 individuals: the drafter/drawer in Venice who
received a sum of money from another individual (the deliverer/remitter) and the
beneficiary/payee in Istanbul who received the bill and presented it to the payer/addressee
to obtain the payment in a different currency of the original sum by a specific deadline.
Between 1609 and 1620, Venetian and Ottoman merchants protested 118 bills of
exchange, almost all of which had been drawn in Venice. 80 This was a common notarial

On court injunctions within the procedure of debt recovery in early modern Europe, see Malynes,
Consuetudo, 401-403; Muldrew, The Economy of Obligation, 204/205, and “Credit and the Courts: Debt
Litigation in a Seventeenth-Century Urban Community,” The Economic History Review 46/1 (1993), 2338, 27/28.
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Commercial Society (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019).

Two protested bills had been drawn in Izmir and Heraklion (Crete), respectively. See BAC 277, reg. 396,
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procedure in most early modern European commercial centers taking place when a
merchant (the addressee of the bill) could not pay the bill within the time of payment
stipulated in the letter or refused to pay it altogether. By protesting a bill of exchange, the
beneficiary of the bill notarized a credit obligation and threatened his/her debtor (the
addressee of the bill) to issue a contra-protest (ricambio) directed to the individual (the
drafter/drawer) who had issued the bill in Venice. If the addressee of the bill refused to
pay, a lawsuit could follow, or the creditor issued the contra protest. 81 Only in 28 cases
did unpaid bills of exchange lead to a dispute, even though only 4 of such bills had been
protested before the beginning of the procedures of litigation. 82
The format of the protested bill is the same for all these documents. For instance,
on September 6, 1618, at the insistence of the Venetian merchants Pietro Amadio and
Pietro Arrigoni, the court bailiff protested a bill of exchange to two other Venetian
merchants, Nicolo Soruro and Andrea Rizzoli. In the bill, drawn in Venice on July 19 of
the same year, Michiel Vidali had instructed Nicolo and Andrea to pay 1,700 Hungarian
florins (ungari) to the two Pietros after 90 days from the date of the drawing of the bill
for a sum of money (both the currency and the sum are unspecified) that he had changed
in Venice with Bernardino Bencio. The same day Nicolo and Andrea registered a
declaration (nota) that they refused the payment on the grounds that they did not have

For the procedures of protest and contra-protest of bills of exchange in early modern Europe, see
Malynes, Consuetudo, 398-401. For Venice, see Ferro, Dizionario, Vol. 2, 552/553. In Venice, the court of
the of the Consuls of the Merchants had jurisdiction over disputes arising from unpaid bills of exchange.
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enough currency at that moment. They eventually paid the 1,700 sequins in two different
installments, on October 9 and December 14. 83
Table 4.7: Religious Affiliation of Actors involved in Protesting Bills of Exchange in the
Chancellery (1609-1620)
Creditor’s Religion

Debtor’s Religion

Number of Protests

Percentage

Christian

Christian

21

18%

Christian

Jewish

9

7%

Jewish

Christian

51

43%

Jewish

Jewish

35

30%

Muslim

Christian

2

1%

118

100%

TOTAL

As table 4.7 shows, Ottoman Jews were the religious group that protested the
highest number of bills of exchange in the Venetian chancellery: 86 out of 118
documents. They performed such action against both Christian and other Jews. For
instance, on April 12, 1612, Rabbi Cacam Aron Ishaque protested two bills of exchange
to Rabbi David Alemano. In the bills, both drawn in Venice on 13 October 1611, another
Jew, Salvador Belforte, instructed David to pay 200 sultani (the Ottoman gold pieces) to
Aron for each bill in either aspers or Dutch thalers for money that he had changed in
Venice with David Abeniacar after two months from the issuance of the bills. Salvador
specified the exchange rates of the currencies: 120 aspers for 1 sultani and 80 aspers for 1
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thaler. David rejected the injunction claiming that he did not possess credits/goods
belonging to Salvador. We do not how the two parties eventually settled the payment. 84
The use of bills of exchange by many Jewish merchants demonstrates the
employment of this credit instrument, which firstly developed in medieval Western
Europe, by the Istanbul’s Jewish merchants who traded with Venice. 85 Furthermore, they
illustrate that these Jewish merchants were familiar with the notarial procedure of
protesting bills of exchanges, and they used the Venetian chancellery to accomplish this
task. In the years under study, they performed such action more often than Venetian
merchants: 96 cases against the 16 cases of protest conducted by the latter (out of all the
35 protests performed by Christians).
In contrast to the Jews, Muslims appeared in protests of bill of exchange only in
two instances, both as the creditors of bills drawn in Venice. They involved the same
individuals. For instance, in February 1612, Fatima Obex, the wife of the late Muhamad
Obex (also known with the Christian name of Ieronimo Obex) protested a bill of
exchange valued at 464 Hungarians to the Venetian merchants Antonio Albrici and
Agostino Pina. According to the bill, drafted in Venice almost a year before (on 11

BAC 277, reg. 397, fols. 13v/14r (12 April 1612). For the different currencies employed in the sixteenthand seventeenth-century Ottoman Empire and their changing exchange rates see Pamuk, Şevket. A
Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 59-158.
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March 1611), Zuanne Antonio Daffin had instructed Antonio to pay that sum to Fatima
15 days after they received the bill for a sum of money that the former had changed with
the late Muhamad in Venice. The two Venetian merchants rejected the payment on the
grounds they did not hold credits or goods belonging to Zuanne Antonio. 86
Economic historians of the medieval and early modern Muslim states agree on the
limited use of this credit instrument by Muslim businessmen. 87 They advance different
explanations focusing on Islamic law’s opposition to charging interest from credit
agreements (a procedure which was involved in the drawing of bills of exchange), on
different Muslim commercial practices, and on Islamic alternatives to accomplish goals
similar to those offered by the European bills of exchange, such as the havale/süftece (Ar.
hawala/suftaja, letter of credit). Much less studied is the role played by the commercial
networks established by Muslim merchants trading with Western Europe and the credit
instruments that these businessmen employed in their undertakings.
Apart from protests of bills of exchange, other court injunctions (165 cases)
involved the notarization and the formal notification of claims against unfulfilled clauses
of business agreements, such as the collection or the delivery or the payment of goods,
custom duties and freight rates, and other business-related issues. Like the protests of
bills of exchange, such injunctions were not followed with a lawsuit, suggesting that
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creditors and debtors might have found an agreement out-of-court. Furthermore, they too
contain a threat in case the debtor did not abide by the claims of the creditor.
For instance, in July 1617, on the request of the Venetian merchant Nicolo
Soruro, the bailo issued an injunction (protesto) against the Jewish brothers, Rabbi Iosef
and Rabbi Abraam Soloni, for the payment of an unspecified amount of silver blades
(lame). The court’s marshal, holding a document of this obligation (polizza), notified the
protest to the two brothers at their shop (bottega) in Galata, urging them to collect the
blades from Nicolo and pay for them in three days. Otherwise, the injunction continues,
Nicolo would sell the blades at a public auction (publico incanto) in the Venetian
chancellery to the detriment of Iosef and Abraam. 88 In another instance, in December
1612, Zorzi Ruggiero and Dimitri Zimia, the shipmaster and the scribe of the galleon
Balbi, respectively, filed an injunction (intimatione) to demand that five Venetian and
three Jewish merchants pay the brokerage fees (massetteria) for the goods they had
unloaded on the galleon. In case the latter did not pay, Zorzi and Dimitri threatened to
borrow money through bills of exchange to pay the fees and to commit the goods of the
merchants to the payment of such a loan to the detriments of all the merchants. 89
Contrary to the protests of bills of exchange, this last type of court injunction
involved mostly Christians, 145 out of 165 (87%) individuals, while the rest (20 cases)
were Jews. Among the Christians, Venetian merchants, ship masters, and scribes
obtained court injunctions in 103 cases. As was the case with the notarization of private
documents, the procedure of obtaining a court injunction aimed to have a credit or
88
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business agreement registered in court, notified to the debtor, and then enforced without
filing a lawsuit.
Sequestrations and judicial orders
Two other two types of extrajudicial deeds are orders of confiscation (sequestro,
278 cases) of an individual’s assets and judicial mandaments (commandamento, 59
cases). Since these deeds did not evolve into a dispute, I consider these actions performed
by individuals who sought to retrieve credits or to have business agreements enforced.
Sequestrations and mandaments aimed foremost to put pressure on business associates by
the means of court intervention in order urge the latter to uphold their commitments.
They were costlier than court injunctions, 5 aspers each against the 3 aspers of the latter,
and they entailed more reputational risks and business disruptions for the merchants who
suffered from them.
All the sequestration orders issued by the bailo involved three main parties: the
creditor seeking the freezing a debtor’ assets, the debtor himself, and one or two
individuals whose assets were confiscated because they possessed the goods or credits of
the debtor. The court’s marshal was the official in charge of communicating the order to
its victims in their residence or publicly (per stridore) in the marketplace in Galata. In
case the victims did not possess the goods/credits of the debtor, he/she registered a
declaration (risposta or constituto) with the marshal. 90 According to Venetian legislation,
the confiscation lasted three days, by which time the debtor had to respond to his

In Venice, such declaration entailed an oath. Our records do not show any oath when an individual
rejected a confiscation order. Ferro, Dizionario, Vol 2, 685.
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creditors’ demands in the chancellery. However, as our records show, exceptions were
made when the victims of confiscation ordinances were outside Istanbul. 91
Orders of confiscation are short documents which do not provide much
information about the circumstances of an act of sequestration, such as the specific
reasons of asking for such order. They contain only the names of the actors and vague
information about the contested goods and credits. For instances, in November 1619, on
request of the merchant Ieronimo Grattaruol, the bailo proclaimed the confiscation of the
goods/credits of another Venetian merchant, Zuanne Piero Martinelli, which were held by
Rabbi Isdrael Coen. Four days later, Ieronimo registered in the chancellery that he had
revoked the sequestration suggesting that he had found an agreement with his debtor
Giovanni. 92 In another instance, in 1611, Rabi Iacob Coen obtained the confiscation of
five Venetian fabrics belonging to Cacam Comano, which were held by the Venetian
merchants Nicolo Soruro and Zuanne Maria Parente. Iacob was indebted to Cacam
Comano for an unspecified sum. The two Venetians replied to the court’s bailiff that at
that moment they did not possess anything belonging to Iacob’s debtor. 93
The issuance of a confiscation order and its enforcement must have entailed
substantial reputational costs for businessmen. Its procedure entailed the formal
notification of the confiscation order and the freezing of one’s goods and credits, and it
forced the debtor to respond to the command and, therefore his creditor’s claims, in order

Ibid, 284-286. For an instance of an extended confiscation mandate, see BAC 277, reg. 396, fol. 80v (5
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to retrieve them. Equally important, it involved several other individuals like the business
partners of the debtor who fell victim to confiscation actions through no fault of their
own but due the former’s debts with another party. It took place in 278 circumstances in
11 years, about the same number of court injunctions (283 cases) that by the average of
27 sequestration mandates per year.
Contrary to sequestration acts, judicial mandaments that were not part of a lawsuit
took place in only 59 occasions. 94 Individuals sought such order for the same reasons
they asked for court injunctions and ordinances for sequestration: to retrieve credits and
have business partners fulfill specific clauses of commercial agreements before starting a
lawsuit. It was another common procedure in medieval and early modern European
courts of law. 95 Mandaments differed from the other two categories of extrajudicial acts
since, being the official commandments of the Venetian bailo, the head of the Venetian
community, they possessed more authority, and they included a pecuniary fine imposed
by the bailo in case of noncompliance. The bailo issued up to three mandaments before
imposing and collecting the fine which he later allocated to the liberation of Venetian
slaves or the development of the Venetian arsenal. 96
For instance, in the spring of 1615 the Venetian Iseppo Vidali arrived in Istanbul
to recover, on his father Stefano’s behalf, credits and goods belonging to his brother, the
late Ludovico who had died in October 1613. Between April and October, Iseppo
94
In our documents, judicial mandaments appears as either commandamento or mandato while the
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obtained 4 different mandaments against his brother’s previous business associates. For
example, on September 9, the bailo commanded Zuanne and Zuanne Paulo Zois, fraternal
Venetian merchants, to submit, in three days’ time, to the chancellery 19,800 aspers for a
commercial dealing between the latter and Ludovico which had taken place two years
before. The same day the court bailiff notified the order to Zuanne and Zuanne Paulo at
their residence. The order included a fine of 200 sequins in case of nonconformity and
followed a court injunction (intimatione) issued in the previous days that had urged the
Zois brothers to deliver to the chancellery any sum of money and quantity of goods that
had that belonged to Ludovico. 97 It is likely that the judicial mandament aimed to
strengthen the mandate of the court injunction.
In the years under study, the bailo issued judicial mandaments against nonVenetian individuals as well, such as Ottoman Jews (11 cases) but not against Muslim
merchants. For instance, in February 1610 the Venetian merchants Nicolo Soruro and
Zuanne Maria Parente obtained a commandment demanding that Rabi Iuda Coen pay
them for an unspecified credit within three days. If Iuda did not comply, the order
continues, the bailo would declare a boycott (battellazione) against him according to
which no member of the Venetian community could trade with him. As we will see in the
next chapter, the bailo possessed no judicial authority over non-Venetian subjects to be
able to enforce his rulings. For this reason, in the case of the judicial mandament against
Jewish merchants, he did not threaten them with a pecuniary fine but with the issuing a
boycott against them. In the years understudy such threat never materialized signaling

BAC 278, reg. 400, fol/ 99v (9 September 1615). The court injunction is on Ibid, 98r (25 September
1615). This registers also contain several lawsuits started by Iseppo Vidali to retrieve’s his brother assets.
97
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that judicial orders carried an important reputational weight over those who received
them.
Table 4.8: Litigants’ Religious Affiliation and Sequestration Acts in the Venetian
Chancellery (1609-1620)
Litigants’ Religion

Number of Documents

Percentage

Christian/Christian

197

70

Christian/Jew

37

12

Jew/Christian

16

8

Jew/Jew

25

9

Muslim/Christian

3

1

TOTAL

278

Table 4.9: Litigants’ Religious Affiliation and Judicial Mandaments (1609-1620)
Litigants’s Religion

Number of Documents

Percentage

Christian/Christian

46

78

Christian/Jew

11

18

Jew/Christian

2

4

TOTAL

59

As Tables 4.8 and 4.9 show, mostly Christian individuals sought ordinances of
sequestration and judicial mandaments in, respectively, 254 out 278 cases and 57 out 59.
Among these Christians, Venetian merchants, ship captains, and ship scribes appear in
roughly half of the cases for sequestrations (134 out of 278 cases cases) and judicial
orders (35 cases out of 59). These numbers illustrate that, like in the case of court
injunctions (with exception of protests of bill of exchange), the most important members
of the Venetian mercantile community applied mostly to extrajudicial acts of Venetian
chancellery. In other words, they used the Venetian chancellery to begin processes of
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debt recovery or for the enforcement of a business agreement rather than registering their
commercial dealings and legal acts for future memory.
In contrast to Christian individuals, Ottoman Jews appear in conspicuous numbers
only as the authors of sequestration mandates (41 cases) against Christians and their own
coreligionists. However, they rarely sought judicial ordinances (only 2 cases). Muslims
appeared in only 3 of 298 mandates of confiscation and never as seeker of mandaments.
These results reflect those of court injunctions and illustrate that, among different
political and religious groups, only Istanbul’s Jews seem to have been familiar and
confident with the procedures of debt recovery and business enforcement in the Venetian
chancellery.
8—Conclusion
As a notarial office, the Venetian chancellery office played an important role in
supporting and regulating long-distance trade between Istanbul and Venetian territories.
It recorded and issued a vast variety of legal and economic documents that long-distance
merchants and other individuals employed in their commercial undertakings and legal
affairs. Its international and multi-religious clientele sought many notarial services, above
all the registration of grants of power of attorney, debts, quittances, and private
documents concerning trade. Credit agreement and commercial partnerships were rare.
Furthermore, as shown by court injunctions and sequestration mandates, individuals
notarized business dealings when they started processes of debt recovery. This
demonstrates the interdependence between the notarial and the adjudicative functions of
the Venetian chancellery: it recorded the claims of creditors, notified them to debtors,
and, when the latter rejected them, oversaw the litigation of a lawsuit. Even if
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individuals’ claims did not transform into a legal suit, the chancellery registered the
business dealings and agreements of its users.
The types of notarial services sought by the chancellery’s clientele changed
according to the social and professional status of the individuals. Venetian merchants,
shipmasters, scribes—that is, the most prominent economic actors of the Venetian
community—turned to this institution to certify their property rights less frequently than
Venetian subjects with a lower social/occupational status, Ottoman subjects, both Jews
and Muslims, and several individuals from Western Europe. As I have argued in this
chapter, one explanation for this phenomenon is the gradual acceptance of merchant
documents as proofs in European courts of justice in the early modern period which made
having them publicly certified superfluous. However, as the case of notarized private
documents, court injunctions, and sequestration mandates illustrate, Venetian merchants
did use the notarial services of their embassy mostly when they aimed to enforce credit
and commercial agreements. Therefore, they mostly registered their business dealings not
to preserve the memory of past economic transactions but when they began procedures of
debt collection which could bring about a lawsuit.
This limited use of the chancellery as a notarial office for long-distance merchants
and economic operators raises questions about the overall role of European consular
chancelleries in the Ottoman Empire in regulating European/Ottoman trade. My case
study illustrates that the main businessmen of the Venetian community did not routinely
register their commercial business contracts and dealings with their consular chancellery.
On the contrary, as we will see in the next chapter, and as it is demonstrated by
sequestration mandates, courts injunctions, and notarized business documents, they used
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this institution primarily as a forum of commercial arbitration. Unfortunately, lacking
other quantitative studies of European chancelleries in the Ottoman Empire, we cannot
know if my results reflect a wider trend towards avoiding public certification of business
dealings by long-distance merchants in the early modern Mediterranean. In contrast to
Venetian merchants, the notarial services of the Venetian chancellery were mostly sought
by Ottoman merchants and Venetians of a lower social status. In other words, it was
those individuals with a weaker relationship, in term of religion affiliation, political
identity, and social status, with the Venetian community and its commercial elite who
mostly sought the public certification of business dealings.
Lastly, my research also illustrates the limited circulation of notarial documents
produced in the Venetian chancellery across the seventeenth-century Mediterranean. The
Venetian secretary drafted numerous economic and legal documents for a cosmopolitan
clientele of individuals. However, these documents circulated mostly in Venetian
territories. Only in minority of cases did individuals seek documents, such as grants of
power of attorney or receipts of debt payment, to use in non-Venetian territories. This
phenomenon casts doubt on the existence of a shared notarial culture in the
Mediterranean developed out of Italian commercial expansion in the late medieval
period. As shown by the few cases of documents circulating across different states, it did
exist a degree of commensurability among southern European notarial cultures in the
early modern Mediterranean thanks to the common legal background (the ius commune).
However, the few examples of such circulation suggests that European mercantile
communities in the Ottoman Empire privileged their own notarial systems which should
be studied in their own terms.
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Chapter 5: A Court for Merchants
1—Introduction
On February 19, 1619, Antonio Allegretti, a ship master (patrono) from the
Ottoman tributary city-state of Dubrovnik (Ragusa), and Rabi David Abudente, a Jewish
merchant in Istanbul, appeared before the bailo Almorò Nani. Antonio demanded that
David load on his ship, called the Santa Maria, the full amount of leather and other goods
set by a charter contract (noleggiato) they had signed because David had failed to do so.
David responded that he would load the goods only after Antonio produced surety
(piezaria) that, “being himself a subject of Dubrovnik,” 1 he would go with his ship to
Venice and not to Naples. The capital of a Spanish viceroyalty, Naples in the 1610s and
1620s maintained strained relations with Venice while it conducted regular diplomacy
with Dubrovnik. 2 The bailo ruled that Antonio should provide such surety. After their
court session the two parties did not find an agreement and the voyage to Venice was
called off. Eventually, on May 16, they turned again to the bailo’s chancellery to register
a declaration (quietanza) according to which they renounced to any claims against one
other over the above-mentioned charter contract. 3
This dispute raises several questions about the administration of justice in early
modern Istanbul. Neither of the two litigants was a Venetian subject. However, they
voluntarily submitted their controversy over a shipping contract to the bailo’s judgment.

1

“…che essendo raguseo.”

2 Zlatar, Zdenko. Between the Double Eagle and the Crescent: The Republic of Dubrovnik and the Origins
of the Eastern Question (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 101.
3 BAC 279, reg. 403, fol. 280v (19 February 1619); and 280, reg. 402, fol. 156r (16 May 1619).
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The only element of this case linking the two sides to Venice was the destination of the
goods. What did they expect to obtain from the bailo? How could the bailo enforce his
rulings in Ottoman Istanbul?
This chapter examines the reasons why individuals chose the Venetian
chancellery to settle their disagreements and the function of this court in the commercial
life of seventeenth-century Istanbul. I put forth two main arguments. First, regardless of
religious and political affiliation, individuals appeared before the bailo’s consular court to
solve disputes pertaining to trade with Venice because of the court’s specialization and its
summary/commercial procedure. Characterized by fast proceedings, individual
responsibility, a focus on the “facts” rather than on the legal status of litigants, the court’s
summary procedure allowed individuals of different social status and religion to quickly
solve their controversies and repair their business relations. Such procedure was not
peculiar to the Venetian consular court but was characteristic of merchant courts in
medieval and early modern Europe. However, in the Venetian consular court in Istanbul
it presented some unique characteristics. Secondly, the political economy of Venice
played a central role in both the procedure followed by the court in both solving dispute
and the court’s access to different individuals. The protection of Ottoman-Venetian trade
and Venice’s preoccupation with keeping peaceful relations with the Ottomans
influenced both the international clientele of the court and the solutions chosen by the
bailo to settle controversies. This concern is especially clear in disputes involving
preeminent businessmen that were connected to Ottoman officials.
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2—Defining a “Lawsuit”
Between 1609 and 1620, the baili Simone Contarini, Cristoforo Valier, and
Almorò Nani heard 434 lawsuits in the consular court. Before we begin our analysis, we
should clarify what constituted a lawsuit in the bailo’s consular court. Among 2,136 legal
and economic deeds for the years 1612-1620, it is complicated to neatly distinguish
between lawsuits and notarial acts. This institution could handle a commercial dispute
and notarize agency or business contracts in the same day. The bailo (the judge), the
secretary (the notary), and the bailiff worked together in court when solving disputes. As
we have seen in previous chapters, the secretary did not distinguish between lawsuits and
notarial deeds in the indexes (rubrica) of all the acts taking place in the Venetian
chancellery.
This lack of a neat distinction between notarial transactions and lawsuits was a
normal feature of pre-modern courts of justice in Europe and the Muslim world. Like in
the tribunals of early modern Europe and the Ottoman Empire, a key function of the
Venetian chancellery as a court of justice was to certify business agreements that had
been conducted orally out of court without turning to a public notary. 4 Adjudication of a
legal suit and certification of rights were interchangeable, and they cannot be separated
from one another. As we saw in the previous chapter, creditors did not always start court

4 On the tribunals’ function of certifying rights in early modern Europe see Ago, Renata. Economia
barocca: mercato e istituzioni nella Roma del Seicento (Roma: Donzelli, 1998), 131-166; Cerutti, Simona.
Giustizia sommaria: pratiche e ideali di giustizia in una società di ancien régime: Torino 18. secolo
(Milano: Feltrinelli, 2003), 14, 73; Shaw, James. The Justice of Venice: Authorities and Liberties in the
Urban Economy, 1550-1700 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 178-206, 212. As we will see in
Chapters 6 and 7, also creditors turning to Ottoman courts mostly sought the certification of property rights.
For instance, see Ghazzal, Zouhair. The Grammars of Adjudication: The Economics of Judicial Decision
Making in fin de-siècle Ottoman Beirut and Damascus (Beirut: IFPO, 2007), 16, 277-313.
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proceedings against a debtor—for instance by seeking a summon, an injunction, or a
confiscation of the debtor’s assets— exclusively to pursue a sentence against the latter.
Rather, their goal might have been to have a previous agreement with their debtors
certified by the court and to then retrieve their credit through an out-of-court settlement.
In other words, applying to the court to collect a debt did not always amount to a social
conflict. Certification of rights was all the more important because in Istanbul and the
other commercial centers of early modern Europe and the Middle East business
agreements, especially those involving small sums, were not usually registered in notarial
offices due to the costs of this operation or the personal nature of many transactions. 5
As a consequence of the blurred separation between legal suites and notarial
actions, it is highly complicated to identify each court’s entries, such as an injunction of
payment or a goods delivery, a protested bill of exchange or a business agreement, as
either part of a “dispute” or as a “notarial transaction” aimed to certify property rights.
The same applies to the registration of private documents, such as letters of credit or
commercial correspondence: often we do not know whether individuals had them
notarized during a lawsuit at the chancellery or as a precautionary measure in case of
possible future dispute.
For the sake of my analysis, I list 434 lawsuits among 3,231 court documents. I
call them “disputes” because they either resulted in a final sentence (sententia or
terminatione) of the bailo, or they contained information that allow us to understand that
5 For Europe, see Kessler, Amalia K. A Revolution in Commerce: The Parisian Merchant Court and the
Rise of Commercial Society in Eighteenth-century France, New Haven, 2007), 61/62; Ago, Economia
Barocca, 131-133; for the Ottoman Empire, see Masters, Bruce. The origins of western economic
dominance in the Middle East: mercantilism and the Islamic economy in Aleppo, 1600-1750 (New York:
New York University Press, 1988), 60-68.
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a litigation process took place, such as a specific reference to a “lawsuit” (causa,
differentia, contradditorio), the presence of different phases of the resolution of a dispute,
such as a summon, a deposition, a confiscation of a debtor’ estates, and judicial orders of
payment or goods delivery. I include in my analysis neither single court injunctions nor
single protests of bills of exchange or business agreements because, as I showed in the
previous chapter, they were not followed by other legal actions in the court, and they
might to have constituted the certification of a debt/obligation and not an actual suit. The
same applies for single judicial mandaments (59 cases) and acts of confiscation (278),
since we know nothing about the contest in which the court issued them, and, therefore,
we cannot know whether they resulted in a legal suit. Finally, I do not include here those
disputes that were settled through an out-of-court arbitration, which the parties later
notarized in the court. Instead, I study only those cases in which the bailo himself chose
arbitration as a course of action to settle them.
We encounter a similar difficulty in classifying the different types of disputes.
The officials of the Venetian chancellery did not make formal distinction between
different types of disputes, rather they lumped together any legal actions conducted
before the bailo. This was the case with other courts in medieval and early modern
Europe and the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, with a very few exceptions, most
plaintiffs or their legal representatives never justified their suit through reference to a
particular law or statute. 6 The same applies to the rulings of the bailo. Consequently, any

6 About the difficulty of classifying civil lawsuits in medieval and early modern European courts of law,
see Smail, Daniel L. The consumption of justice: emotions, publicity, and legal culture in Marseille, 12641423 (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 2003), 38/39; Shaw, The Justice of Venice, 147-158.
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attempt to categorize the different suits heard by the bailo is a complex and necessarily
arbitrary undertaking. I provide here my own categorization of 434 disputes.
Table 5.1: Types of Disputes handled by the Venetian Chancellery (1609-1620)
Type of Dispute

Number of Cases

Percentage

Debt

300

70%

Delivery of Goods

81

18%

Spoilt Goods

15

3.5%

Unclear 7

36

8.5%

TOTAL

434

100%

As shown in Table 5.1, at least in their external form, most disputes appear as
instances of debt litigation (300 cases, thus 70%). In many legal suits, the records contain
too little information for us to understand the context of these controversies. Among these
cases, we can discern cases concerning unpaid bills of exchanges, cases about broken
commercial agreements, inheritance-related controversies, and few instances of disputes
over the payment of the wages of sailors (3 cases). 8 No cases concerning contracts of
either agency or maritime insurances appear in the years under study. Another major
source of litigation was disagreements over the delivery of goods (81cases) between
business associates, that is, about the timing of the delivery and the quantity of the goods
delivered. These two categories of disputes point to disagreements in the terms of credit
and commercial contracts.

These are those legal suits about which we possess no clear information about actual reason of the
dispute.

7

8

For an instance of this last type of dispute, see BAC 276, reg. 394, fols. 122r/123r (17 August 1609).
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Furthermore, in the years understudy no criminal lawsuit appear in the record of
the Venetian chancellery, even though criminal sentences do appear in the index of all the
legal services provided by this institution. It is possible that the Venetian secretary kept
separate registers for criminal disputes. If this is the case, to my knowledge they have not
been preserved in the archives of the Venetian ambassadorships in Ottoman Istanbul.
3—The Religion, Political Affiliation, and Social status of the litigants
Lacking the political status for most of the individuals appealing to the court, we
focus here on different religious communities and how their members engaged in
lawsuits. Religion indicates the subjecthood with a degree of certainty only for Muslims
and for most of Jews as well. 9
Table 5.2: Religion of the Litigants in the Venetian Chancellery (1609-1620)
Plaintiff

Defendant

Number of Lawsuits Percentage

Christian

Christian

278

64%

Christian

Jew

74

17%

Jew

Christian

59

14%

Jew

Jew

13

3%

Muslim

Christian

10

2%

434

100%

TOTAL

As Table 5.2 shows, most of the disputes took place between Christian individuals
(64%), while those including at least a Christian as either a litigant or a defendant
amounted to 88% of the lawsuits. High-ranking individuals, like nobles, are extremely

As we have seen in Chapters 1 and 2, only the legal and political status of Jews from Venetian Crete was
extraordinarily complex.

9
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rare (only two persons). 10 The individuals identified as “Venetian merchants” in the
records of the chancellery appeared in 286 out of 434 lawsuits (about 66% of all cases).
As described in Chapter 1, this small number of merchants, whose number amounted to
65 individuals (out of 1,777 using the Venetian chancellery), constituted the most active
group of individuals engaged in trade between Venice and Istanbul and took part in the
Council of the Twelve, the government body of the Venetian community. If we sum up
all the lawsuits involving merchants, ship masters and scribes that also took part in the
Council of the Twelve, we notice that they constitute 78% of all the lawsuits heard by the
bailo. This shows the dominance of merchants and economic operators engaged in
shipping—the core of the Venetian mercantile community—in the disputes solved by the
Venetian consular court.
Most of the Christian litigants belonged to Istanbul’s Venetian community. Again,
the lack of political affiliation does not allow us to clearly distinguish the numerous
“Venetians” and “non-Venetians” from within the group of Christians. We must rely on
other information to ascertain their blurred political status, such as their presence within
the Venetian community in the Ottoman census of 1616 of all Europeans, their places of
origins, and their business connections with Venetians. The non-Venetian Christians
whom I have been able to identify with a degree of clarity appeared in a small number of
disputes: 28 cases involving Galata’s Catholics (the so-called “Franks of Galata,” or
“Perots”), 9 disputes with subjects of Dubrovnik (Ragusa), and 5 separate cases involving

The only three lawsuits started by high-ranking individuals include two cases with a noble from Venice
and Dubrovnik, respectively, and one by the Catholic bishop of the Venetian island of Tinos. BAC 276,
reg. 394, fol. 95v (17 July 1609); BAC 317, reg. 3, fols. 9r (21 August 1614), BAC 276, reg. 394, fol.
97r/98v (27 July 1609).
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French, English, and Florentine individuals engaged in trade between Istanbul and
Venetian territories. Considering all these factors, the total number of mixed cases with
Ottoman subjects amounted to at least 198 individuals, that is, the 45% of all legal suites
handled by the Venetian baili in the period understudy.
The 5 cases involving French, English, and Florentine merchants are notable as
they are examples of disputes among members of different European communities. For
instance, in 1612, the French merchant Pietro Gervasio sued the Venetian merchant
Andrea Orlandi over a load of wool, whose quality, according to Pietro, had not been
correctly appraised by Venetian officials specialized in such an operation (cernidori
ordinari) before Andrea sold it to him. Andrea complained about the alleged low quality
of the wool, and he demanded that Andrea compensate him. After the latter rejected the
claim and brought a witness to testify to the appraisal of the wool, the bailo Cristoforo
Valier ruled that experts (periti) should evaluate the quality of that wool. 11 We do not
know how this case ended, as the court registers do not contain further records of activity
pertaining to it, but this may suggest an out-of-court settlement.
The Capitulations of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries do not contain
instructions about the resolution of disputes among members of different European
communities. According to the customary practices used by European merchants in the
Levant, the principle of actor sequitur forum rei, which derived from Roman law,
mandated that the ambassador or the consul of the defendant had to hear the case and

11 BAC 277, reg. 397, 119r (22 November 1612). We do not know how this dispute ended eventually. For
another lawsuit involving a Frenchman, see BAC 276, reg. 394, fols. 277v/278r (29 July 1610), for one
with an English merchant Artor Gania, see BAC 279, reg. 402, fols. 57v/58r (17 May 1617); and for a case
with a Florentine noble see BAC, 280, reg. 403, fol. 116r (10 February 1620).
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pass judgment. 12 In the 5 instances of these types of mixed cases included in our study,
French, British, and Florentine litigants were always the plaintiffs. In these cases, the
bailo applied the same procedure he followed in intra-Venetian or Venetian-Ottoman
controversies.
The only non-Christian group that litigated a lawsuit in the court in high numbers
were Ottoman Jews (34% of all the lawsuits). They sued and were sued by Christians
almost in the same number of disputes (75 and 59 respectively), and they even took their
own coreligionists to court in a few cases (13, 2%). Jews won 25% of all their lawsuits
against Christians (60 cases) which ended with a final sentence.
The 72 cases in which Jews appear as plaintiffs suggest a degree of knowledge of
the Venetian chancellery and confidence in its judicial procedure. Jews in Istanbul had a
variety of legal institutions to use to solve civil and criminal disputes. First, Jews had the
right to adjudicate intra-communal civil cases, including trade-related controversies, in
their congregations’ own courts (beit din), which operated under the judicial authority of
rabbis and applied Jewish law (halakha). Secondly, as Ottoman subjects, they had to turn
Ottoman courts, both kadı courts and the Imperial Council, if they wanted to sue Muslim
and Christian individuals for civil and criminal matters. Furthermore, despite admonitions
by rabbis against such practice, individual Jews also brought business- and family-related

12 The French Capitulations of 1740 were the first treaty containing a specific ruling about the forum rei
procedure. Van den Boogert, The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System: Qadis, Consuls and
Beratlıs in the 18th Century (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 36, 41, 187. On the forum rei principle, which derived
from Roman law, see also Calafat, Guillaume. “Jurisdictional Pluralism in a Litigious Sea (1590–1630):
Hard Cases, Multi-Sited Trials and Legal Enforcement between North Africa and Italy,” Past and Present
242/14 (2019), 142-178, 161; and Apellániz, Francisco. Breaching the Bronze Wall: Franks at Mamluk and
Ottoman Courts and Markets (Leiden: Brill, 2020), 168-170.
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lawsuits against coreligionists before the kadı. Research shows the spread use of Muslim
courts by Jews and Christians in seventeenth-century Istanbul. 13
The Venetian consular court constituted another forum of justice where they
could file complaints against both non-Jews and their own coreligionists. In theory, apart
from Jewish law and rabbis’ injunctions, nothing prevented Istanbul’s Jews from suing a
Venetian subject in a Muslim court. As a matter of fact, the Capitulations stipulated that
kadı courts were the forum for mixed Venetian-Ottoman controversies regardless of the
religious affiliation of the Ottoman subjects. Furthermore, the Venetian consular court
had limited enforcement power in Ottoman Istanbul vis-à-vis Ottoman courts.
Nonetheless Ottoman Jews applied to the Venetian chancellery to benefit from some of
the procedural features, such as summary procedure and the role of the bailo as an arbiter
in commercial disputes.
In contrast to the Jews, Muslims appeared in only 10 cases but always as plaintiffs
and they won the only three cases ending with a final sentence. 14 We have no instance of
Muslims and Jews prosecuting one another in the court, or of Christians suing Muslims
there. Despite their limited number, the presence of Muslims among the litigants is
13 On the legal and economic affairs of Istanbul’s Jews in Ottoman courts during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries see Shmuelevitz, Arieh. The Jews of the Ottoman Empire in the late Fifteenth and the
Sixteenth Centuries: Administrative, Economic, Legal and Social Relations as Reflected in the Responsa
(Leiden: Brill, 1984), 41-73; Wittmann, Richard. Before Qadi and Grand Vizier: Intra-Communal Dispute
Resolution among Christians and Jews in the Plural Society of 17th-Century Istanbul (PhD dissertation,
Harvard University, 2008). For Jews applying to state courts in Mediterranean Christian states, see
Trivellato, Francesca. “Sephardic Merchants between State and Rabbinic Courts: Malfeasance, Property
Rights, and Religious Authority in the Eighteenth-Century Mediterranean,” in Diogo Ramada Curto, Eric R
Dursteler, Julius Kirshner, and Francesca Trivellato (eds), From Florence to the Mediterranean and
Beyond: Essays in Honor of Anthony Molho (2 Volumes, Florence: Leo Olschki, 2009), Vol. 2, 625-648;
and Lauer, Rena. “Jewish Law and Litigation in the Secular Courts of the Late Medieval Mediterranean,”
Critical Analysis of Law 3 (2016), 114–32.
14 For these three disputes, see BAC 276, reg. 394, fol. 40v/r (28 March 1609), BAC 317, reg. 3, fol. 11v
(27 August 1614), and BAC 279, reg.403, fol. 64r (23 May 1617).
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particularly important for the study of Mediterranean trade and the history of Muslim
economies. According to established wisdom, in the pre-modern period Muslims were
barred from European legal institutions on religious and legal grounds. According to
some economic historians, such prohibition prevented Muslim merchants from
conducting business under the allegedly more efficient legal systems of Western
European states which was based on impersonal adjudication and the use of written legal
evidence. 15
This alleged prohibition has never been empirically proven. To my knowledge,
research on fetva (fatwa) collections (legal opinions of Muslim jurists, müfti) from the
early modern period has, so far, not produced any examples of specific rulings against
Muslims’ use of Christian and Jewish legal institutions. 16 Studies of consular justice
focus on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a period characterized by an overall
decline of Muslim commercial activities with western Europe. Furthermore, they deal
with states such as the Dutch Republic, France, and England with which Muslim
merchants either conducted limited trade or were outright barred from trading. In
contrast, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Venice constituted the most
important place of Muslim commercial deployment in Western Europe.

15 Kuran, Timur. The Long Divergence: How Islamic Law Held Back the Middle East (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2010), 198; Artunç, Cihan. “The Price of Legal Institutions: The Beratlı
Merchants in the Eighteenth-Century Ottoman Empire,” The Journal of Economic History 75/3 (2015),
720-749, 724.
16 For instance, see the Pehlül Düzenli-edited collection of fatwas concerning non-Muslims (including
their affairs in Muslim courts) issued by the chief muftis of the Ottoman Empire (şeyhülislam) between the
sixteenth and the end of the late eighteenth centuries. Gayrimüslimlere Dair Fetvalar (İstanbul: Kolektif,
2015).
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The records of Venetian chancellery show a few cases of disputes involving
Muslim merchants engaged in trade with Venice and there exist also other historical
contexts, such as early modern Aleppo and Tunis, and nineteenth-century Morocco,
which illustrate the practice of Muslims using non-Muslim legal institutions in Muslim
lands. 17 I am not suggesting the Muslim merchants routinely applied to the legal services
of European consulates/embassies like Ottoman Jews and Christians did: the few
recorded instances of such practice undoubtably prove the opposite. However, these cases
demonstrate that no religious or legal prohibition prevented Muslim entrepreneurs from
applying to European courts when such course of action was best suited to their business
interests.
Overall, this use of the Venetian consular court as a civil tribunal by Ottoman
subjects calls into question the established belief that, in order to gain access to European
consular jurisdiction, Ottoman subjects had to first obtain a berat (a deed of appointment)
issued by Ottoman officials. Its holders (called beratlı), usually the dragomans attached
to European embassies and their descendants (Jews included), acquired fiscal and legal
privileges akin to those enjoyed by the subjects of a European state which benefited from
the Capitulations and they became “protegees” of an European states. 18 This system

17 For instance, see Steensgaard, Niels “Consuls and nations in the Levant from 1570 to 1650.”
Scandinavian Economic History Review 15/1–2 (1967), 13–55, 23; Marcus, Abraham. The Middle East on
the eve of modernity: Aleppo in the eighteenth century (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 109;
Marglin, Jessica M. Across legal lines: Jews and Muslims in modern Morocco (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2016), 77-102. Kaiser, Wolfgang and Guillaume Calafat. “The Economy of Ransoming
in the Early Modern Mediterranean: A Form of Cross-Cultural Trade between Southern Europe and the
Maghreb (Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries),” in Francesca Trivellato, Leor Halevi, and Cátia Antunes
(eds), Religion and Trade: Cross-Cultural Exchanges in World History, 1000–1900 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2014), 108–130, 123.
18 On the berat system, see mostly Masters, The Origins, 189-208; Van den Boogert, The Capitulations,
63-116, Kuran, The Long Divergence, 189-208; Artunç, “The Price of Legal Institutions.”
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developed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a period marked by growing
European commercial activities in the Ottoman Empire and by a steady weakening of the
latter’s military and diplomatic standing in Mediterranean and European politics.
In the period under study, the seventeenth century, such a system did not exist yet.
As Chapter 1 illustrates, the status of the Venetian dragomans as “naturalized” Venetian
subjects was a matter of contention between Venetian and Ottoman authorities.
Furthermore, no distinctive group of berat-holders who engaged in long-distance trade
operated in Istanbul in this period. The Ottoman practice of granting berats to dragomans
and other individuals close to European embassies and consulates had not developed yet.
Despite the lack of berat, our records show numerous Ottoman Jews, Christians, and a
few Muslims too, turned to bailo’s consular court to litigate a lawsuit and this practice
did not arouse the complaints of Ottoman authorities in the period 1600-1620.
Finally, in the year understudy, there is single noteworthy example of a woman
who turned to the bailo’s chancellery court to bring her complaints against indebted
merchants. Named Elena, she hailed from Heraklion (Candia in Crete) and lived in
Beyoğlu, outside the walls of Galata. Both her individual title of respect “Chira” (from
the Greek Kira, “lady”) and her appellative “sultana” suggests a high-social standing in
the Christian community of Galata. Between 1612 and 1620, she engaged in commercial
exchanges between Crete and Istanbul and credit operations with different Venetian
merchants and ship masters. 19 She appeared personally without a legal tutor in court in 20
different occasions to sue debtors and to register credits and contracts of power of
19 We know little about her private life apart the fact that, in 1614, she was divorced from an individual
called Magna who lived in Heraklion (Candia), Crete, her place of origin. BAC 317, reg. 3, fol. 29r (20
October 1614).
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attorney. In each of the five civil disputes she was always the plaintiff, and she employed
legal representatives on only one occasion. For instance, in October 1615, she brought to
court the Venetian merchant Francesco Spiera over a credit agreement and, after a few
rounds of litigations together with her legal representative (avvocato) Zuanne Zecheni,
she managed to have Francesco sentenced to pay her 270 sequins. 20 The procedure
applied to her legal suits did not differ from those implemented in all-male cases.
4—Court Procedure
Court Procedure played a central role in the choice of the Venetian consular court
by Venetian and Ottoman subjects. In the Chapter 3 we discussed that merchant courts in
medieval and early modern Europe applied summary or “merchant-style” procedure. It
entailed speedy trials, individual legal responsibility, a limited role played by witnesses,
the absence of law professionals such as lawyers and jurists, and a general disregard of
the formalities of positive law. Judges passed judgment according to the “nature of
things” and the “truth of the facts,” and not according to laws, customs, and previous
cases. As a legal proof, they generally accepted written evidence (including private
documents) and probative oaths performed by the litigants. In this way, this procedure
eliminated the privileges, such as the ability to produce local witnesses, enjoyed by those
individuals who resided in a locality and possessed strong local connections.
Did the Venetian consular court apply the same procedure? As we have seen, we
do not possess documents attesting to a normative framework about the procedure
applied in this court and the latter’s records very rarely refer to specific legal norms and

20

For this dispute, see BAC 278, reg. 400, fols. 110v (19 October 1615) and 114v/115v (29 October 1615).

232

customs and they never mention summary justice and its principles such as the “nature of
the things” or “equity.” Therefore, we must reconstruct the procedure starting from the
legal documents produced by the court.
Quick Court Proceedings
The Venetian consular court shows several elements of summary justice. Firstly,
the court procedure was usually quick. A plaintiff appealed the court either by submitting
a document (called memoriale) about his claims or presenting them orally. The bailo then
issued a subpoena (citatione) for the defendant: the court’s bailiff notified the latter at his
residence or publicly (per stridor) in both the commercial district of Lonca and the
nearby Church of San Francesco in intra-muros Galata. If the defendant did not appear at
court, the bailo’s would issue two other subpoenas. After three unanswered subpoenas,
the bailo would pass judgment in absence (sententia in absentia) sentencing him to fully
comply with plaintiff’s demand. 21
We do not know how much time passed between the three different subpoenas but
given the nature of trading, we can hypnotize that the court issued them within a few
days. The public nature of the subpoena, which took place in the commercial district of
Gala and in its surroundings, made answering to them more urgent to protect one’s
business reputation. A rare case illustrates the short length of the process of subpoenaing
a debtor. On January 18, 1616, on request of the Venetian merchant Iseppo Vidali di

21 In merchant courts in Europe, in case of a sentence in absence, a plaintiff had to take an oath since his
opponents did not show up in court. Our records do not show such procedure. Malynes, Gerard.
Consuetudo, vel, Lex Mercatoria (London, 1622), 425; Cerutti, Giustizia sommaria, 64. For the procedures
of summon and trial in absentia in Venice, see Ferro, Dizionario, Vol. 1, 152-158 and 385-392,
respectively.
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Stefano, the bailiff publicly subpoenaed Rabi David Campo in the district of Lonca but
the latter did not come to court. After twelve days from the first summon, on January 30,
the bailo sentenced against David over a load of uncollected Venetian textiles. 22
Another procedure was for a creditor to first register a credit or an unfulfilled
commercial agreement and then have the bailo issue an injunction (intimatione). If the
defendants did not comply with the injunction a legal suit would follow. For instance, on
June 7, 1615, Zeno Papadopulo, a ship master from Crete, registered in the chancellery a
bill of lading (polizza di cargo) and obtained a court injunction for another Cretan, Zorzi
Mathoneo, to collect several barrels of lemon juice from his ship by the following day.
The same day, Zorzi appeared in court to reject such request on the grounds that his
business partners in Chania, Crete, had not instructed him to receive those goods and that
they were also spoilt. On June 16th, the bailo ruled against Zeno’s claims but compelled
Zorzi to formally renounce any claims over the contested barrels. 23
Another proof of the generally fast procedure of the Venetian consular court is
provided by those lawsuits that were resolved over different court sessions. Out of 434
disputes, 184 cases entailed different phases of a litigation process, such as the issuance
of court injunction, the appointment of a legal representative, the bailo’s request to
produce evidence, the final sentence, and the enforcement of latter, etc. Each of these
phases took place on different days. The average number of phases for the 184 disputes is
about 3 each.

22 BAC 279, reg. 400, fol. 151r (30 January 1616).
23 BAC 279, reg. 400, fols. 76r (14 July 1615) and 80r (16 July 1615).
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Table 5.3: Duration of the Lawsuits handled by the Venetian Chancellery (1609-1620)
Duration Time

Number of Disputes

Percentage

1 day

250

57%

2-18 days

126

30%

More than 20 days

58

13%

TOTAL

434

By examining the duration of the lawsuits, we notice that the bailo resolved more
than half of them in a single day and court section (57%). 24 In another substantial number
of cases (126, the 30%) the resolution of a lawsuit lasted between 2 and 18 days. I set 18
as limit of days of “quickly” resolved disputes because this number appear, on average,
as the highest number of the days of litigation. Only in 58 cases did litigation drag on
more than a month. Twenty of these cases are examples of disputes that bailo ruled on
but the convicted individual failed to comply with and, on the request of the winner, the
bailo issued a court injunction, an order of confiscation of assets, or a legal mandament
demanding compliance. 25
Among other long-lasting disputes, 38 cases are exceptionally complex lawsuits
that involved multiple actors, claims and counterclaims, the presentation of different
types evidence, and different modalities of resolution, such as arbitration panels ordered
by the bailo and the intervention of courts of appeal in Venice. Their low number (13%
of all the lawsuit) proves that their occurrence was negligible in the years under study
24
There exists the possibility that the chancellery’s secretary might have not recorded in his registers all the
different phases of the litigation process of all the disputes handled by the bailo. He might have lumped
together different moments of a lawsuit into a single court entry. However, if this were true, we are left
wondering why he registered the different episodes of dispute resolution only for selected legal suits.
25

For instance, see BAC 276, reg. 394, fols. 40r (28 March 1609) and 80r (15 June 1609).
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while most of the disputes handled by bailo were usually resolved within a short time.
Lengthy litigation in a court of law was potentially detrimental to the business activities
of long-distance merchants since it could interrupt commercial transactions, damage
business relations, engender the secrecy of commercial dealings, and cast shadow over
one’s reputation in the commercial community of seventeenth-century Galata. 26
Furthermore, a long resolution process in the Venetian consular court was also costly
since each different phase of litigation, from the notarization of evidence in court, the
testimony of witnesses, court orders, and the final sentences, had a different price which
was not negligible in seventeenth-century Istanbul. Litigation costs might explain why all
the 38 long disputes involved Venetian merchants, the most economically preeminent
members of the Venetian community.
Limited Use of Proxies
In small a percentage of cases (67 out of 322 disputes, that is, about 20%),
litigants employed legal representatives to act on their behalf during litigation processes.
Court records refer to them as “avvocato,” “commesso,” “interviente”, or “procuratore,”
without a clear distinction of duties between these terms and often interchangeably for
the same person. In 54 cases, individuals registered their legal agent in court (scritto in
corte) at the beginning of the litigation. An analysis of the religious status of these
proxies shows that litigants mostly chose to be represented by individuals belonging to

For merchants opposing formal legal proceedings, see Gelderblom, Oscar. “The Governance of Early
Modern Trade: The Case of Hans Thijs, 1556–1611,” Enterprise and Society 4/4 (2003), 606–39, 634.
26

236

the same religious group (62 out 67 disputes). 27 Furthermore, in 16 cases, Venetian
merchants employed other fellow merchants as representatives.
Among the legal representatives, those called “avvocato” are noteworthy since
they often appear together with their principal in court. This suggests that, alongside
providing representation, they may have operated as legal consultant in court. A few
individuals appear in court only as “avvocato” showing a specialization in legal services
for the users of the Venetian consular court. For instance, in 1615/1616 a man named
Zuanne Cecheni from Chania (Crete) operated on behalf of 12 different individuals,
including Venetian merchants and Ottoman subjects. 28

The five cases in which the litigants and his/her proxy belonged to different religious communities
include three cases of Jews representing Venetian Christians, one case of a Christian representing a Jew, a
case of Muslim representing a Christian, and a case with a Jew representing a Muslim. For an example of a
Jew representing a Christian, see BAC 277, reg. 397, fol. 31v (15 May 1612); for a case of a Jew acting on
behalf of a Muslim merchant, see BAC 280, reg. 403, fol. 189v (08 August1618).
27

28 For instance, see BAC 270, reg. 400, fol. 138r (13 January 1616) and fol. 55v (30 May 1615).
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Legal Proofs
Table 5.4: Proofs in the Lawsuits heard in the Venetian Chancellery (1609-1620)
Proof

Number of Cases

Percentage

Documents

234

64%

Eyewitnesses

21

6%

Oath

19

5%

Expert Witnesses

13

3%

Oral Deposition

38

10%

No Proof Mentioned 29

46

12%

TOTAL NUMBER OF
DISPUTES ENDING
WITH A SENTENCE

171

100%

As in European merchant courts, the Venetian chancellery employed written
evidence as the most important type of proof during lawsuits. As illustrated by Table 5.4,
among the disputes ending with a bailo’s ruling—371 out of 434 cases—documents
appear in 63 % of the legal suits.
Litigants produced different varieties of documents during lawsuits. Out of 183
cases with written evidence, only 14 cases included sealed documents produced by
Venetian tribunals and notaries. 30 No documents issued by non-Venetian courts, either
European or Ottoman, were used during disputes in the years under study, even though,
as we saw in the previous chapter, individuals did at times notarize these types of

With the label “No proof” I refer to those cases legal suits for which our records do not show with a
degree of clarity the basis of a ruling by the bailo. They are generally cases ending with a sentence in
absence or when the bailo ruled that the plaintiff produce evidence on his behalf.
29

30 For instance, see BAC 279, reg. 403, fol. 38v (4 March 1617).
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documents to certify loans or identify themselves. Most documents brought to court
during legal suits were private writings such as letters of debts, bills of exchange,
business agreements, accounting books, bills of lading, and commercial
correspondence. 31
In 98 disputes, documents are simply called “writing” (scrittura), and, given the
few details on them, we cannot ascertain the nature of such documents. For example, on
April 6th, 1617, the bailo ruled in a debt-related dispute between the brothers Matteo and
Stefano Pironi, two natives of Galata (Perots), and the Venetian merchants Francesco
Girardi and Giulian Boneri. The Pironi brothers demanded that the latter pay the
remainder of two “writings” (scritti) dated, respectively, 1612 and 1613. The bailo
sentenced the Venetian merchant to such payment “after hearing and carefully
considering the opponents’ depositions and also after reading the documents.” 32
This dispute also illustrates that documents did not necessarily play a more
important role than oral utterances role in court procedures. Despite the submission of
documents in most of court cases, in each lawsuit the bailo considered both them and the
depositions of litigants before passing judgment. Oral utterances and written evidence
reinforced each other as legal proof and court records do not show a clear ascendancy of
documents over orality in the decisions taken by the bailo.

31 For an overview of these types of private documents see Lopez, Robert S. and Irving W. Raymond.
Medieval Trade in the Mediterranean World: Illustrative Documents Translated with Introductions and
Notes (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), 229-235. For their use in commercial disputes in
early modern Europe, see Lattes, Alessandro. Il diritto commerciale nella legislazione statutaria delle città
(Milan: Hoepli, 1884), 281-286; Cerutti, Giustizia Sommaria, 58-61; Trivellato, “Sephardic Merchants,”
634/635.
32 “…il tutto udito e maturamente considerateo et veduti parimenti et letti i medesimi scritti..” and BAC
279, reg. 402, fol. 86r (06 April 1618). For a similar ruling, Chapter 3, 122.
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Conversely to written evidence, the testimony of witnesses played a limited role
in the resolution of the commercial controversies brought before the bailo (in 21 cases,
6%). This is another hallmark of summary procedure. In both European and Ottoman
ordinary courts of justice, both eyewitnesses and reputation witnesses played a central
role in adjudication processes during the early modern period. 33 The ability of producing
witnesses to testify on one’s behalf was a legal privilege enjoyed by the long-term
residents of a town. Witnesses could testify on a merchant’s professional reputation, and,
therefore, could considerably affect the resolution of a commercial controversy. Foreign
merchants in transit, given their mobility and the resulting lack of a web of strong social
connections in a locality, enjoyed little public reputation and therefore suffered major
disadvantage in court. Summary procedure, by attributing validity to documents and
focusing on the “truth of things” rather on individual reputation within a resident
population, allowed them to offset such disability. 34
Unfortunately, court officials do not usually register the name of the witnesses
and therefore we cannot know their social and religious status. In a rare example from
1616, the Venetian merchant Simon Tosi sued the Jewish brothers Rabi Iuda and Saltiel
Coen over a commercial agreement (bazaro) involving an exchange of a variety of
fabrics from Venice and other European cities for an amount of raw leather and camlets
from Anatolia. The two parties disagreed over the terms of the delivery of the goods, and

33 On the slow shift towards written evidence in civil procedure in early modern Europe, with a focus on
France, see Garnot, Benoît (ed.), Les témoins devant la justice: une histoire des statuts et des
comportements (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2003). For the relationship between the legal
process and the locality in the Ottoman Empire, see Canbakal, Hülya. Society and Politics in an Ottoman
Town: ‘Ayntab in the 17th Century (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 123-149.
34 Cerutti, Giustizia Sommaria, 58-63.
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they produced different (unspecified) documents on their behalf. The Jewish brothers also
brought to court two commercial brokers (sensali), Cacam Iosef Abencabib and Rabi Saul
Mevorac, who were questioned by the court’s bailiff (esame di testimoni) over the
contested clauses (capitoli) of the written agreement between the two parties. They had
been previously employed to enable the business transaction between the two parties and,
therefore, they had direct knowledge of the facts in contention. After their testimony, a
third individual, Cacam Iosef Abeneraf, had the two witnesses swear on the Ten
Commandments of the Hebrew Bible 35 about the truthfulness of their testimonies. After
their oath, the bailo passed sentence against Simon requiring him to comply with the
original agreement. 36
Apart from illustrating the whole process of testimony in the bailo’s court, this
dispute is noteworthy as it shows the operational logic of the bailo’s court. According to
Roman and Canon laws, Jews could not act as witnesses in a lawsuit involving a
Christian but only in intra-Jewish controversies. Ordinary courts in medieval and early
European upheld such principle. 37 Prioritizing the assessment of the facts under dispute
(in this case a commercial transaction) rather than the application of fixed and generally
applicable rules, the court procedure allowed non-Christians to testify in mixed cases. 38

35 “..dieci commadamenti del testamento vecchio in lingua ebraica..”
36 For the sentence, see BAC 278, reg. 400, fol. 211r (9 June 1616), for the notarized commercial
agreement, see Ibid, fols. 196v/197v (5 May 1616). For another rare instance of a lawsuits in which the
names of the witnesses are recorded, see BAC 276, reg. 394, fols. 56v-58r (5 May 1609).
37 For instance, see Smail, The Consumption of Justice, 53.
38 I did not encounter cases of Muslim witnesses in the chancellery. However, Muslims too could produce
witnesses (Christian) to testify on their behalf. For instance, in the years before our study, see Hacı Davut
from Aleppo, BAC 324 I (15 October 1607) (unnumbered page and document).
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The other type of oral testimony was provided by the expert witnesses (periti, 13
cases, 3%). Either the bailo or the litigants summoned them to court in case of
controversies about the quality, the value of goods, or services in navigation or
commercial undertakings. They were either merchants or individuals with an expertise in
dealing with particular goods, such as wool appraisers (cernidori). After offering their
expert opinions, the bailo would rule over the contested goods and the services and the
parties would accept the opinion without the continuation of formal legal proceedings. 39
For instance, on February 4, 1614, Michele Cavaco from Chios brought Marco di
Mutio, the scribe of a Venetian ship named nave paradisa, to court. Michele demanded
that that latter compensate him for the damages suffered by two bales of paper that had
just arrived to Istanbul on that ship. Marco rejected Michele’s claims and the bailo ruled
that the litigants should choose two experts each among the Venetian merchants
(mercanti della nazione) to examine the paper. In the chancellery, the two parties
appointed Giacomo Brachi and Zuanne Battista Orlandi as the two experts. After
analyzing the two bales of paper, which had been spoilt by seawater entering into the
ship, they declared on paper that Marco should pay 51 ducats. On May 21, Michele
registered their declaration (dichiaratione) in court. The case did not produce further
documents, suggesting that Marco had likely accepted the outcome of the examination of
the paper. 40

39 On expert testimony in European merchant courts see Calafat, Guillaume. “Expertises et tribunaux de
commerce: Procédures et réputation à Livourne au XVIIe siècle,” Hypothèses 14/1 (2010), 141-54.
40 BAC 277, r. 397, 245r/v (2 April 1614) and 251v (14-05-1614). For a case in which the opinion of
experts constituted the basis for the sentence of the bailo see BAC 279, r. 402, 154v (02/19/1618).
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Apart from written evidence and testimony, another proof in commercial disputes
was the decisive oath of the defendant. In merchant courts in early modern Europe, the
oath of a litigant, constituted full proof and it was often used in combination with oral
agreements. 41 In the years under study, 19 (5%) cases ended after the administration of a
decisive oath. The defendant could swear that he or she rejected the claims of the plaintiff
on the request of the latter, or the bailo could instruct him/her to do so in order to
promptly resolve the case. The administration of an oath remitted the decision over a
controversy to the conscience of the oath-giver. Litigants swore over religious texts, the
four Gospels in the case of Christians, the Hebrew Bible for Jews. We do not have any
evidence of Muslims giving oath in the chancellery.
For instance, on January 26, 1606, Mustafa Ağa from Athens brought to court
Andrea Benitio, the scribe of a galleon called Tapino, over an unfulfilled commercial
agreement. Mustafa claimed that, near Athens, Andrea had loaded on the galleon with
3,000 cantari of valonia oaks instead of the 5,000 that they had agreed upon, and he
demanded that Andrea compensate him for the missing 1,500 cantari. The latter rejected
Mustafa’s pretentions on the grounds that the ship was overloaded and that those missing
oaks were rotten. He also added that in Venice he had compensated Mustafa’s business
partners as proven by a letter signed by Andrea’s principals. Mustafa then demanded that

41 Lattes, Il diritto commerciale, 285; Ferro, Dizionario, Vol. 2, 13-17; Cerutti, Giustizia Sommaria, 6568; Kessler, A Revolution in Commerce, 86-91.
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Andrea swear that he had not broken their agreement. The bailo ruled that, after Andrea
take the oath on the four gospels, he should be liberated from Mustafa’s charges. 42
In cases involving Christian witnesses, confessional identity could affect the
religious object over which witnesses took their oath. In court in March 1618, Antonio
Marcillo from Venice demanded that his business partner Zorzi Masacopo from Crete
deliver him a load of silk just arrived from Heraklion (Crete) claiming that these goods
belong to him in according to their partnership (compagnia). Zorzi replied that he had
brought that amount of silk in his name. As Antonio did not show any written evidence of
their commercial agreement, the bailo sentenced Zorzi to swear on who he had bought
the silk from and its quantity. Since probably Zorzi was an Orthodox Christian, he swore
over an image of the Virgin Mary (likely an icon) instead of the four Gospels. Under oath
he declared that had purchased the silk from his daughter-in-law in Heraklion and he
specified the quantity. 43
Legal Responsibility
The procedure of subpoenaing and the prevalence of writing in court procedures indicates
a conception of justice based on individual legal responsibility. The rulings of the bailo
were based mostly on business agreements and the actions of individuals (the nature of
the things), instead of the public reputation of the litigants (the quality of the persons).

42 Despite taking place a few years before our period of study, I describe this case to demonstrate that the
court applied the same procedure in legal suits involving Muslim litigants. BAC 275, reg. 393, fols. 64r/65v
(26 January 1606).
43 BAC 279, reg. 402, fol. 162r/v (20 March 1618).
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Individual responsibility in court procedure was defined in a precise temporal and spatial
contest: the time and the location where a commercial transaction took place. 44
However, court cases contain mixed evidence about the application of individual
responsibility, which for some economic historians is a hallmark of European “efficient”
legal systems. 45 On the one hand, the bailo usually passed sentence based on oral or
written commercial contracts stipulating the relations among different business partners.
On the other hand, the practice of confiscation against business partners of a
debtor/convicted illustrate that elements of communal responsibility too existed in court
procedure. Unfortunately, the almost absence of both partnership contracts in court
records and of specific reference to them in litigation processes hinders our understanding
of the nature of all the contractual associations among different individuals. However,
records show two kind of business partnerships: joint ventures among non-kin individuals
and family partnerships. 46
An example of liability-related controversy is the dispute between the Venetian
merchant Zuanne Bernardis and four Jews—Mose Sami, Mose Abravanel, Salomon
Abravanel, Iosua Verioti —in 1609 over a business dealing (mercato). This group of
Jews had jointly (in solidum) purchased 12 Venetian silk cloths from Zuanne, but, among
them, Salomon had not paid the latter for the cloth he had received. Zuanne brought

44 Cerutti, Giustizia Sommaria, 63-68.
45
For instance, see Greif, Avner. Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval
Trade (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2006), 309-349.

46 For Venetian commercial partnerships, see Lane, Frederic C. “Family Partnerships and Joint Ventures”
in ibid, Venice and History. The Collected Papers of Frederic C. Lane (Baltimore: John Hopkins
University Press, 1966), 36-55.

245

Mose Sami and Mose Abravanel to court and demanded his credit from them. The
defendants rejected his demand on the grounds that Salomon was not their partner
(compagno). However, the bailo sentenced them to make payment because the four Jews
had taken part to the commercial dealing in solidum. 47 This case shows how, sometimes,
the liability extended only to the business associates involved in the commercial
transaction at issue.
In another dispute, in December 1615, a Galata’s native Zuanne Turiglia, sued the
Venetian Iseppo Vidali over a credit of 26,855 aspers. which he owed towards his late
brother Ludovico. According to Zuanne, Iseppo, being brother and heir of his creditor,
was responsible for the latter’s debt. Iseppo’s legal representative (avvocato), Andrea
Timon, submitted to the court a document of power of attorney (procura) drawn by a
public notary in Venice in which Iseppo’s father, Stefano Vidali, appointed him, as his
representative to collect Ludovico’s estates in Istanbul. Since the document specified
Stefano as the only heir of Ludovico and not Iseppo, the bailo ruled against Zuanne, but
invited him to recover his credit from Ludovico. Again, the bailo’s ruled following a
contract stipulating the agency relations of everyone engaged in a business transaction. 48
However, the mandates of confiscation show an important element of communal
responsibility in the procedures of the Venetian consular court. In 436 cases, upon the
request of a creditor, the bailo ordered the seizure of the goods and credit of a debtor

47 BAC 276, reg. 395, fols. 123v/124v (19 August 1609).
48

BAC 278, reg. 400, fols. 128v/ 129r (9 December 1615).
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from the hands of a third individual which possessed them at that moment. 49 This
practice affected a third party who was not responsible for the controversy between the
two parties. This third party could complain against such confiscation since it might
disrupt his commercial activities and he could start a lawsuit against the creditor/plaintiff
over the removal of the confiscation.
An instance of this practice is the dispute of the Venetian merchants Nicolo
Soruro and Zuanne Maria Parente against the French merchant Cristoforo Daschiere over
the ownership of a jeweled box in 1610. The two Venetians had received this box from
the heirs of the late Venetian merchant Ieronimo Pianella for a debt owed to them by
latter. In January 1610, Cristoforo had the bailo sequestrate the jeweled box since he
owed a credit of 60,000 aspers towards Ieronimo, claiming that the latter had delivered
the box to him in the previous year. In July, Nicolo and Zuanne appeared in court with
Cristoforo to remove the confiscation mandate. The bailo, after examining the will of
Ieronimo, ruled in favor of the two Venetians, and he invited Cristoforo to retrieve his
credit from Ieronimo’s heirs. 50
An analysis of the names of the third parties who were victims of seizure orders
shows that they were mostly (368 of 436 individuals, 84%) Venetian and Ottoman longdistance merchants, ship masters, and scribes, and other individuals providing services to
them, such as wool-appraisers, commercial brokers, and sailors. In other words, such
mandates for the seizure of goods and money took place mostly within the professional

Among 436 orders of confiscation, 158 (36%) were issued during the litigation of a lawsuit. The rest of
these orders, 278 (64%), are single entries in the court registers. I analyzed them in the previous chapter.t
49

50

BAC 276, reg. 394, fols. 277r/278v (29 July 1610).
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community engaged in long-distance trade between Venetian and Ottoman lands. 51 As
our records indicate, communal responsibility for debts and other commercial issues
generally did not extend to individuals who were not engaged in commerce and shipping.
This notwithstanding, sequestration mandates represent a clear example of how features
of communal responsibility persisted in the administration of justice in European
merchant courts. In court procedures, they served the goal of accelerating the recovery of
credits, the fulfillment of business contracts, and the resolution of lawsuits by
endangering the commercial activities and the business reputation of the debtor in the
mercantile community of Galata. 52
The bailo as a commercial arbiter
A final key feature of the procedure was the role of the bailo as an arbiter.
Venetian and Ottoman merchants voluntarily applied to him to arbitrate their
controversies according to widely known court procedures in commercial matters. As an
arbiter, a third-party neutral actor, the bailo mediated a solution to a dispute in order to
satisfy both parties. 53 His foremost concern was to promote the smooth conduct of trade
and his rulings aimed to repair business relations rather than terminate them.
Accordingly, he sought to find a quick solution which was acceptable to both parties
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I have been unable to identify the social and economic connections of the rest of the individuals (68).

Cerutti, Giustizia Sommaria, 404. In studies of merchant courts, I have been unable to find reference to a
similar procedure of seizing the monetary assets or goods of a debtor possessed by a third party.
52

53 On the role of the judges of merchant courts and European consuls as arbiters see Cerutti, Giustizia
Sommaria, 36; Calafat, Guillaume. “La jurisdiction des consuls français en Mediterranée” in Bartolomei,
Arnaud, Guillaume Calafat, Mathieu Grenet, and Jörg Ulbert (eds), De l'utilité commerciale des consuls:
l'institution consulaire et les marchands dans le monde méditerranéen (XVIIe-XXe siècle) (Rome; Madrid:
École française de Rome, Casa de Velázquez, 2018), 155-172, 157; Kessler, A Revolution in Trade, 101104.
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according to shared notions of equity in commercial practice without referring to any
state’s law, customs, or precedents. 54 This settlement was not meant to penalize one side,
rather, it allowed the two litigants to continue their commercial dealings. Such an arbitral
role implied less-formalistic procedure on the bailo’s part, which aligned with the needs
of long-distance merchants: quick proceedings and equity-based rulings.
The role of the bailo as commercial arbiter is evident in his judicial decisions.
They are divided into two categories: sentences (sententia) and what I call “bailo’s
rulings.” (terminatione). 55 They differed from one another, first, in their costs: the rulings
had a fixed price (18 aspers) while the costs of sentences changed according to the
amount of the claims in dispute. Second, the rulings mostly instructed the litigants to
follow a specific course of actions in order settle the controversy—by ordering them to
produce proof, make an oath, produce surety—while sentences obligated an individual to
fulfill a business obligation after it had been proven in court. Both types of rulings show
the bailo’s goals to promote a speedy resolution of a controversy. Numerically, court
rulings appear more numerous than sentences: 216 cases against 155 (out of 371 disputes
ending with a final ruling/sentence by the bailo).
All the disputes described so far point to this outcome-oriented (quick settlement,
continuation of business relations) approach of the bailo. Another telling examples is the
following case. On August 7, 1614, Rabi Salomon Abeatar demanded that Pietro Miani

54
For the notion of equity in medieval and early modern merchant groups, see Donahue, Charles Jr.
“Equity in the Courts of Merchants,” Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis [The Legal History Review] 72
(2004), 1-35.

In the indexes of all the services of the Venetian chancellery, these two types of legal acts belonging to
the same category of acts (sentenze et terminiationi). BAC, 274, reg. 391, fols. 9v-13v (1604-1608, no
days).
55
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and Giacomo Rossi, the commercial agents (commessi) of the Venetian merchant Stefano
Manzoni, pay him 83,000 aspers for two bills of exchange drawn in Venice by the
merchant Pietro Siro to be paid by Stefano in Istanbul. Stefano did not pay Salomon, so
he, first, protested the two bills in court, and, secondly, summoned Stefano there. Pietro
and Giacomo responded that they could pay the bills in one of three ways: they could pay
them after selling a load of leather in the port city of Izmir; by borrowing money from
Salomon and committing the goods to the repayment; or by sending the goods to Venice
in Salomon’s name at the latter’s risk since they did not want to pay to insure the goods.
Salomon replied that he preferred to advance credit to Pietro and Giacomo and that he
decided that this credit should be transferred to another Jew, Isaac Romano. The bailo
ruled that the two Venetians should pay their credit to Romano in one of those three
manners. 56
Arbitration
In the medieval and early modern Mediterranean arbitration was a preferred means to
solve commercial conflicts. In arbitration, a third party out-of-court mediated between
two parties following a flexible and less rule-bound procedure that aimed to reach a
solution considered equitable by both sides. This procedure allowed a speedy resolution
of a controversy, preserved the confidentiality of commercial transactions, and offered
the possibility of healing rifts without irreparably damaging business relations and

56 BAC 317, reg. 3, fol. 3v (7 August 1614).
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reputation. 57 Merchant manuals and preserved contracts of partnership instructed
merchants to choose arbitration rather than court litigation to settle their controversies. 58
In the European legal tradition, there existed two forms of arbitration according to
their protagonists, the arbiter and the arbitrator. The arbiter (arbiter ex compromisso) was
a legal expert who ruled according to the prevailing law of a location. The arbitrator was
the amicable restorer (amicabilis compositor) charged with reconciling the parties by
proposing a compromise that they voluntarily chose to embrace. He ruled independently
from local laws based on a vague but flexible principle of equity. The powers of both
arbiters and arbitrators were voluntary: they were chosen by the parties who placed
themselves under their determination at the time of election in an agreement contract
called “compromise” (compromissum). This contract clarified the competencies and the
procedures the arbiter/arbitrators would follow, stipulated the time they had to issue a
decision, the determination of a penalty in case a litigant did not obey to the sentence.
Their sentence (called laudum) was theoretically unappealable and it constituted a
contract which state courts recognized and enforced. 59

57 On arbitration in late medieval and early modern Europe, see Kuehn, Thomas. “Law and Arbitration in
Renaissance Florence,” in Thomas Kuehn, Law, family & women: toward a legal anthropology of
Renaissance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 19-74; Marrella, Fabrizio and Andrea Mozzato.
All’Origine dell’Arbitrato Commercial Internazionale: L’Arbitrato a Venezia tra Medio Evo e Età
Moderna (Padova: CEDAM, 2001); Gelderblom, Oscar. Cities of commerce: the institutional foundations
of international trade in the Low Countries, 1250-1650 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 105110, and “The Governance of Early Modern Trade,” 634; Calafat, “La jurisdiction des consuls français,”
150-160; Kessler, A Revolution in Commerce, 68-90.
58 For example, see Cotrugli, Benedetto. Il libro dell'arte di mercatura (edited by Ugo Tucci, Venezia:
Arsenale, 1990), 219; Savary, Jacques. Le parfait négociant: ou Instruction générale pour ce qui regarde le
commerce des marchandises de France, & des pays étrangers (Paris: Jean Guignard, 1675), 363. For an
example of a contract of commercial partnership (compagnia) between Venetian merchants that stipulated
arbitration as the means to solve any conflict between the business partners (compagni), see BAC 277, reg.
396, fols. 76r-79v (2 September 1611).
59 Venetian legislation stipulated the irrevocability of the arbiters’ rulings. Nani, Filippo. Prattica civile
delle corti del palazzo veneto (Venice, 1694), 252/253; Marrella/Mozzato. All’Origine dell’Arbitrato, 77.
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In the records of the bailo’s consular court, all the individuals charged to arbitrate
a controversy are called “arbiter” (giudici arbitri) and their decision as “arbitration
sentence” (sententia arbitraria). Henceforth, I will refer to them as “arbiters”. In the
years 1609-1620, the records of the Venetian chancellery include 51 instances of
arbitration. In 23 cases, the bailo ruled that a lawsuit should be solved through arbitration
and he either urged each side to elect an arbiter or he himself chose arbiters among
Venetian merchants. 60 In 28 instances, individuals brought to court an arbitration
sentence for registration. Before doing this, they also notarized the contract of arbitration
agreement (compromesso). The number of arbiters was usually two, but arbitration
contracts contained a clause that, in case of disagreements between them, the two arbiters
could elect a third arbiter. They were all preeminent members of the mercantile
community trading between Istanbul and Venice including mostly Venetian merchants
and dragomans and Jewish merchants.
Table 5.5: The Religious of the Litigants in Disputes Decided by Arbiters (1609-1620)
Religion of the Litigants

Number of Disputes

Percentage

All Christian Litigants

36

70%

Mixed Christian/Jewish Litigants

12

23%

All Jewish Litigants

3

7%

Total Number of Cases

51

100%

There was disagreement among medieval European jurists over the unappealable nature of the rulings
produced by arbiters/arbitrators. See Kuehn, “Law and Arbitration,” 25/26. This notwithstanding, evidence
from commercial litigation in medieval European trading cities shows that appeals to arbitration sentences
took place. Soldani, Maria E. “Arbitrati e Processi Consolari Fra Barcellona e L’Oltramare nel tardo
Medievo” in Elena Maccioni and Sergio Tognetti (eds), Tribunali di mercanti e giustizia mercantile nel
tardo Medioevo (Biblioteca storica toscana, serie I, 2016). 83-105, 87/88.
60 For this form of top-down arbitration in European merchant courts, see Kessler, A Revolution in
Commerce, 70, 167; Soldani, “Arbitrati e Processi,” 88.
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Arbitration took place among Venetian and Ottoman subjects for trade-related
commercial matters. 61 In 38 cases there was at least one Venetian merchants as a litigant,
10 of these cases involved disputes between them. In 12 cases, there was arbitration in
disputes between Jews and Christians, while in other 3 cases it took place in an intraJewish conflict. No Muslims were involved in arbitration procedures. Arbitrations
between Christians and Jews include 5 cases in which Jews chose Christian arbiters.
However, in two disputes Jewish individuals operated as arbiters for Christians as well. 62
The submission of Jews to the judgment of Christian arbiters and their role as arbiters in
cases involving Christian litigants are a noticeable phenomenon since, according to
Venetian legislation, Jews were excluded from processes of arbitration in Venetian
courts. 63 As it was the case with the testimony of Jews against Christian merchants, the
role played by Ottoman Jews in commercial arbitration demonstrates the arbitral nature
of the bailo’s judicial administration, which focused on the mediation of commercial
conflicts rather than on the strict observance of legal norms.
An example of top-down arbitration is found in case from June 23, 1615, which
involved the Venetian merchants Iseppo Giustiniani, Agustin Pina, and Nicolo Soruro.
Before the bailo, Iseppo demanded that Agustin pay him 12,420 aspers to payout a credit
of 42,360 aspers borrowed by Agustin in the name of the late Zuanne Maria Parente.

In the years under study, the only non-commercial dispute settled with an arbitration was an inheritancerelated dispute between two brother Venetian dragomans. BAC 277, reg. 397, fols. 294r-296r (16 June
1614).

61

62
For an instance of a Jewish merchant appointing a Christian arbiter and for one of a Christian merchant
appointing a Jewish arbiter, see BAC 277, reg. 397, fols. 146 (26 March 1613) and 145v (12 March 1613).

Marrella, Mozzato. All’Origine dell’Arbitrato, 71. For other instances of mixed Venetian/Jewish
arbitrations in the early modern Mediterranean, see Arbel, Benjamin. Trading nations: Jews and Venetians
in the early-modern eastern Mediterranean (Leiden; New York: Brill, 1995), 135-144.
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Until his death, Zuanne Maria had been the commercial partner (compagno) of Nicolo,
while Agustin was a helper (giovine di casa) of the two merchants charged with keeping
records of their business transactions. Agustin rejected Iseppo’s demand, claiming that
records of the alleged credit did not exist, and he asked him to show confirmatory
documents. Nicolo suggested that Agustin bring to court accounting books (libri di
compagnia) of the partnership between Nicolo and Zuanne Maria. The bailo ruled that
each party should appoint a Venetian merchant to analyze the books and other records to
resolve the controversy. He added that, if the arbiters disagreed over the resolution, they
should appoint a third arbitrator. On July 15, the two arbiters, the Venetian merchants
Zuanne Paolo Zois and Zuanne Battista Orlandi, issued an arbitral ruling out of court in
Galata. According to it, Nicolo was expected to compensate Iseppo for latter’s credit
towards the late Zuanne Maria. The arbiters encouraged Nicolo to settle the credit issue
with Agustin. Several months later, on January 13, 1616, Agustin registered the arbitral
decision in the chancellery. 64
The bailo also appointed arbiters in dispute involving Jews. In 1615, Rabi
Salomon Nassi sued the ship captain (capitano) Michielin Poliducati from Chania
(Canea, in Crete), asking him to pay 47,040 aspers for a commercial agreement between
himself and the late brother of Michielin, Manoli Poliducati. According to this
agreement, notarized in the Venetian chancellery in 1606, Manoli had bought from
Salomon an amount of leather valued 56,000 aspers and had committed himself to repay
the latter 40,000 aspers in one year and 16,000 aspers sixteenth months later. After going
to Chania, Manoli did not honor his commitment. Three years later, Manoli’s brother

64 BAC 278, reg. 400, fols. 65r (23 June 1615) and 138v (13 January 1615).
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Nicolo Poliducati came to Istanbul and Salomon brought him to court. They reached an
out-of-court agreement that stipulated that Nicolo pay 9,000 aspers immediately to
Salomon and promise to pay 6,000 aspers yearly to extinguish Manoli’s debt. Three Jews
witnessed this agreement. Later, Nicolo died, and Salomon demanded the payment from
Michielin as the heir and partner of the late Nicolo. On August 26, the bailo delegated
the dispute to the Venetian merchants Zorzi Giana and to the Venetian dragoman
Tommaso Navone. They analyzed the public instrument of the original commercial
transaction and heard the three Jewish witnesses while Michielin presented a power of
attorney issued in Crete, which registered that he was the commissioner of the late
Nicolo. The two arbitrators ruled that Michielin should pay Salomon 12,000 aspers. They
also recommended that Salomon take the heirs of the late Manoli Puliducati tou court—
wherever they are to be found— to retrieve the goods and the credits owed to him. 65
Most of the arbitrations (28 cases) took place without the intervention of the bailo
and the litigants used its chancellery only to register the arbitration sentence. These out of
court arbitrations often took place among business partners (compagni). For instance, on
July 10, 1613, the long-time partners Stefano Manzoni and Gabriele Siro registered an
arbitration agreement over a controversy in the clearance of the accounts of their
partnership (compagnia). They appointed two Venetian merchants, Iseppo Bozza and
Giulio Antonio Alberti, as arbiters to analyze the accounting books of their partnership
(libri di compagnia) and determine the credits for each of them and the division of the
profits arising from different commercial transactions. On December 12, the arbiters

65 BAC 278, reg. 400, fols. 89v (13 August 1615), 92r (26 August 1615), and 92r-94v (28 August 1615).
In 3 cases the bailo also appointed a Jewish arbiter in intra-Jewish dispute. For instance, see BAC 278, reg.
400, fols 22r (8 April 1618) and 47r/48v (20 May 1615).
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turned to the chancellery and verbally stated their decision. They ruled that Gabriele
remained the debtor of 66,924 aspers towards Stefano for the transaction of a load of
camlets sent to their agent there, Rocco Benedetti, in Venice, and that they equally divide
the profits from the sale of a small ship (saettia) jointly owned by them as well as the
credits owed to their partnership by third parties. 66
As mentioned above, individuals could appeal the decisions issued by arbiters.
This happened in two instances when new proof became available. For instance, on
January 15, 1613, the Venetian merchants and brothers Pietro and Lorenzo Arrigoni and
Rabi Leon Bianchi elected two Venetian merchants, Zuanne Paulo Zois and Francesco
Pencini, to solve their dispute over the price of a load of wool and some spoilt silk
Venetian textiles, which were the objects of a commercial agreement between the two
parties. After hearing Jewish witnesses (the brokers of the transaction) and reading
(unspecified) documents produced by both sides, the arbiters decided that Leon had to
pay 260 aspers for pick (pico) for a number of Venetian fabrics, but that he remained
exempted from the payment of two dyed silk cloths (archimia) because the Arrigoni
brothers had failed to produce evidence that those goods were part of their original
agreement.
On March 25, Pietro turned to the chancellery asking the arbiters to hear the case
again since he had two new witnesses and new proofs on his behalf. Leon rejected the
request on the grounds that the arbiters’ sentence was unappealable according to their
arbitration agreement. However, the bailo ruled that Pietro should swear an oath that

66 BAC 277, reg. 397, fols 222r/223v (12 December 1613).
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previously he had not known about the new witnesses and the proofs that he wanted to
produce, and that, after the oath, the arbiters should rehear the case and pass judgment
within three days. On March 29, the arbiters Francesco and Zuanne Paulo registered the
new arbitration sentence in court. According to it, after hearing two new witnesses, the
Venetian merchant Ludovico Vidali and the wool appraiser (cernidore) Ippolito Perla, the
arbiters confirmed their previous decision. 67
Overall, arbitration, either chosen by the bailo or by the litigants themselves outof-court, took place in fewer instances than formal litigation in the Venetian chancellery:
51 disputes in 11 years—5 disputes every year—while the 23 cases of top-down
arbitration constitute only 5% of all the lawsuits litigated in the Venetian chancellery. 68
The limited use of arbitration contrasts with the popularity of arbitration in merchant
manuals and the related emphasis by scholars that it was a preferred way to solve traderelated controversies. 69 As far the top-down arbitrations are concerned, one of the reasons
of their scarce occurrence vis-à-vis litigation in court might have been the length of the
procedure itself. 15 of the 23 disputes that the bailo decided to be solved through
arbitration entailed more than 3 different phases, such as the appointment of arbiters, the

67 BAC 277, reg. 397, fols. 146v-149r (26 March 1613), 151r/152v (20 March 1613), and 155v (30 March
1613). The long arbitration sentence included ten matters (capo) of dispute over which the arbiters issued a
decision. For another instance of appeal to the decision of arbiters see BAC 278, reg. 400, fol. 151r (30
January 1616).
It is also plausible that businessmen did not register many out-of-court arbitrations due to avoid the costs
of notarization. However, unregistered arbitration decisions could not constitute legal evidence in court.
68

69

For instance, see Gelderblom, Cities of Commerce, 108.
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litigants’ submission of evidence to them, and the sentence and its enforcement after the
bailo issued a warrant (intimatione) for it. 70
Appeals to Venice
Another type of procedure in the bailo’s chancellery was appealing to Venetian
magistracies in the metropole. In Venetian territories in Italy and the Levant, the
possibility of appealing sentences imposed by local judicial officials was a nodal point in
Venice’s governing policy. Any Venetian subject, irrespective of social status and
religious affiliation (for instance, the Jews of Crete), could appeal to Venice. In the
seventeenth century, the two principal courts in Venice that heard appeals from Venetian
territories were the Auditori Nuovi alle sentenze (for civil disputes) and the Avogaria di
Comun (for criminal cases). The appellate system allowed Venetian magistracies a degree
control over the administration of justice in the subject territories limiting the judicial
power of Venetian officials and it constituted a unifying element throughout the
administratively and jurisdictionally heterogenous Venetian domains. 71
Venetian and Ottoman subjects in Istanbul too enjoyed the right to appeal the
bailo’s verdicts to Venetian magistracies. Between 1612 and 1620, such procedure took
place in 27 cases. In 11 instances, Ottoman Jews appealed to the sentence of the bailo

For an instance of a lengthy arbitration process, see BAC 276, reg. 394, fols. 75v/76v (1 June 1609); 105r
(3 August 1609), 126v (1 September 1609), 171r (6 December 1609), 173r (15 December 1609).
70

71 On the Venetian appellate system, see Cozzi, Gaetano. “La politica del diritto nella Repubblica di
Venezia,” in Gaetano Cozzi (ed.), Stato, società e giustizia nella Repubblica Veneta (sec. XV–XVIII)
(Rome, Jouvence, 1980), 15-145, 69/70 and 114-121; O’Connell, Monique. Men of Empire: Power and
Negotiation in Venice's Maritime State (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009), 84-95; Lauer,
Rena N. Colonial Justice and the Jews of Venetian Crete (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
2019), 90/91; Setti, Cristina. “L’Avogaria di Comun come magistratura media d’appello.” Il diritto della
regione. Il nuovo cittadino. Rivista bimestrale 1 (2009), 143-171; Ferro, Dizionario, Vol. 1, 117-123; Nani,
Prattica civile, 166-205.
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while no Muslims ever used this procedure. Most of the appeals (23) were addressed to
the Auditori Nuovi while the rest (4 cases) went to the Venetian Board of Trade (Cinque
Savi alla Mercanzia). This latter magistracy had jurisdiction over lawsuits involving
Ottoman Muslims and Jews residing in Venice. Despite this regulation, in 7 cases, Jews
appealed to the Auditori instead. In the seventeenth century, this latter institution heard
appeals only in disputes with claims smaller than 100 ducats (120,000 aspers in 1615).
For larger claims, they transferred cases to the Quarantia Civil Nova. 72
An instance of appeal to the Auditori is the dispute, started in April 1620, between
two Venetian merchants, Ieronimo Grattaruolo and Teodoro Lusi over the sale of a
necklace made up of forty pearls (146 carat each). On April 28, Ieronimo demanded that
Lusi pay for pearls since, according to a commercial agreement, the former’s principals
in Venice, Zuanne Vendramin and Taddeo Stella, had instructed him to do. Lusi replied
that he had sold the necklace, he had sent a bill of exchange to Venice valued 608
Hungarian florins (ungari), and that he had instructed his son Francesco to settle the
transaction with the principals. The bailo sentenced Teodoro to deposit in the chancellery
the monetary value of the pearls while awaiting news from Venice about the settlement of
the transaction. On May 2, Teodoro appealed the bailo’s ruling to the court of the
Auditori. As it was the norm in instances of appeals to Venetian courts, the bailo wrote a

72 Caro Lopez, Ceferino. “Gli auditori nuovi e il dominio di Terraferma,” in Gaetano Cozzi (ed.), Stato,
società e giustizia nella Repubblica Veneta (XV–XVIII sec.) (Rome: Jouvence, 1980), 259–316, 274/275.
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letter to the Auditori to accompany a copy of his sentence and the appeal demand written
by Teodoro. Unfortunately, we do not know how the case eventually ended in Venice. 73
All four appeal disputes heard at the Board of Trade stemmed from the same
episode of shipwreck. On May 17, 1617, a group of 8 Jewish businessmen brought to
court Dimitri Toderini, a shipmaster from Trikala (in Thessaly), who was engaged in
shipping between Istanbul and Venice in the 1610s and 1620s. Divided in pairs of
business partners (compagni), the plaintiffs filed four separate lawsuits against Dimitri
over the payment of four bills of exchanges (valued at 871, 420, 400, and 435 sequins,
respectively) drawn by him in June 1614. Dimitri had committed himself to pay back the
bills to the Jewish lenders with the condition (obbligo) that, while sailing back from
Venice to Istanbul, he would carry on his ship (called nave naranzera) a load of Venetian
fabrics belonging to the lenders. While returning to Istanbul, the ship had sunk near the
Aegean island of Bozcaada (Tenedos), and the Jews in court demanded the Dimitri repay
their credit. He rejected the request on the grounds that the “the obliged fabrics in the
agreement took a risk” (correvano il risio) during the navigation. The bailo ruled in favor
of Dimitri but his Jewish creditors appealed to the Venetian Board of Trade. 74 After
several months, on December 2, this court reviewed the evidence and passed sentence
reconfirming the bailo’s sentence. 75

73 BAC 280, reg. 403, fols. 138r (28 April 1620) and 143 (2 May 1620). During a preliminary research of
the extensive archives of the Auditori Nuovi I was unable to find documents about the bailo’s sentences
appealed in this institution. So far, I checked the 5 registers for the years 1612-1617. ANS 217-221.
74 BAC 279, reg. 403, fols. 55v-59 r (17 May 1617).
75 CSM, Prima Serie, busta 30, fol. 257r (1 December 1617). Unfortunately, the records of this institution
contain no information about the procedure of legal review, and they tell us only the court’s final decision.
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Appealing sentences of the bailo to Venetian tribunals was a rare practice in the years
under study: it took place in only 27 of all 434 lawsuits (that is, 6%) handled by the
Venetian consular court. The costs of this procedure, which entailed fees for the use of
the Venetian chancellery and the appellate courts in Venice, the costs of employing legal
agents in the latter to conduct the appeal trial, and the overall length of the whole
procedure, which lasted several months, must have been substantial. Given these two
factors, an appeal procedure must have interrupted business transactions between litigants
and harmed business relations. It is also likely that it constituted an escalation of a
conflict, and it could have aimed at either delaying possible sanctions or promoting outof-court settlements to avoid damaging business relations. 76
5—Enforcement and the Limits of the Court Jurisdiction
How could the bailo enforce his sentences? According to international treaties, he
possessed judicial authority only over disputes between Venetian subjects. However, as
this chapter has amply demonstrated, he ruled over many disputes involving Ottoman
subjects belonging to different religious communities. In theory, nothing could have
stopped an Ottoman subject from refusing to appear in the Venetian consular court when
subpoenaed or, if he had been convicted by the bailo, from disregarding the sentence.
What were the actual limits of his jurisdiction? How could he get non-Venetians to
comply with his decisions?

Working on the judicial systems of the late medieval and early modern Low Countries, Oscar
Gelderblom maintains that the length of the appeal procedure was responsible for the little number of
appeals to higher courts by local and foreign merchants. Cities of Commerce, 126-133.
76
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Court records contains only two instances of individuals rejecting the jurisdiction
of the bailo or declining to conform to his judgment. For instance, on October 30, 1623,
the Venetian merchant Francesco Lioni sued two Muslims, Piyale Beşe and Ahmet Beşe,
who accompanied the merchant caravans travelling between Istanbul and the Adriatic
port of Split (Spalato) in Venetian-held Dalmatia. In the chancellery, Francesco
demanded that Piyale and Ahmet pay him 200 ducats for some goods which, he claimed,
they had not delivered to Split. Ahmet and Piyale rejected the charge on the grounds that
they did not recognize the judicial authority of the bailo but only that of the kadı. 77
Such instances of outright rejection of the bailo’s jurisdiction are exceptional.
There existed two formal ways to require a litigant to conform to the bailo’s judgment.
First, at the beginning of a lawsuit, a litigant (or the bailo through a judicial order) asked
the other to produce surety (piezaria) that he would abide by the bailo’s sentence. For
instance, in October 1616, Rabi Iacob Camiz and Rabi Isaac Aluf were in dispute with
the shipmaster Dimitri Toderini over an unpaid bill of exchange (871 sequins). Another
Jew, Rabi Isaac Castiel in court agreed to serve as surety that the two Jewish plaintiffs
would comply with the sentence of the bailo and would not go to the Ottoman courts with
the condition that, within three days, Dimitri had to produce a guarantor. 78
Second, one litigant or the parties could agree to register in court that they
promised to submit themselves to the bailo’s judicial authority. The registered

77 “riconosciamo solo la giustitia del Cadi.” BAC 346 (unnumbered document). Despite taking place
outside the years of this study, I show this rare case as it shows the rationale for not accepting the
jurisdiction of the bailo by Muslim defendants. The other case involves a French ship captain, BAC 279,
reg. 402, fol.133r (14 October 1617).
78 “…che staranno al giuditio del bailo e non andranno alla giustitia turchesca.” BAC 278, reg. 400, fol.
294v (26 October 1616).
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commitment was called constituto or obbligatione. 79 For instance, in 1616, the brothers
Rabi Isaac Navon and Rabi Iacob Navon brought to court the Venetian merchant Simon
Tosi to demand him the fulfillment of a business agreement. Before the bailo, they
voluntarily declared that they recognized the bailo’s jurisdiction, and, subsequently, they
asked that the bailo’s sentence be unappealable. The parties notarized the agreement in
the chancellery. 80
However, these two procedures took place only in 16 disputes and involved only
Jewish and Muslim individuals. In the rest of religiously mixed cases (133 cases),
litigants did not formally pledge to accept the judgment of the bailo. This suggests that,
rather than constituting a usual practice, registering a contract of surety or a commitment
might have constituted only an additional guarantee that the adversary would comply
with the final sentence. The few instances of formal commitment shows how matters of
reputation within the mercantile community of Ottoman Galata influenced judicial
practices. The Venetian consular court was an old and well-known institution of
commercial arbitration in Ottoman Istanbul, which was employed by long-distance
merchants engaged in the Ottoman/Venetian trade. Failing to abide by his rulings must
have had entailed serious reputational costs for the businessmen and it might have
endangered future commercial operations. Such costs might have been provided litigants
with strong incentives for self-enforcement. 81

79 Ferro, Dizionario, Vol. 1, 522-523.
80 BAC 278, reg. 400, fol. 140r (13 January 1616).
81 Amanda Kessler too stresses the reputational costs of refusing to follow the judicial decisions of the
commercial court of eighteenth-century Paris. A Revolution in Commerce, 66/67.
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If the convicted party did not comply with the bailo’s sentence, the latter could
order his arrest and imprisonment at the hands of the Janissaries at the service of the
embassy. There was a prison on the premises of the Venetian embassy for Venetian
subjects convicted by the bailo or by Venetian officials in the metropole or the Levant. 82
While the court’s marshal had the authority of communicating the sentence to convicted
individuals, only the embassy’s Janissaries were responsible for arresting convicted
individuals. The role of the Janissaries, who were members of an elite military corps of
the Ottoman Empire, shows the involvement of Ottoman officials in the operations of the
Venetian consular court. Unfortunately, we do not know whether, in such capacity, the
embassy’s Janissaries operated in consultation with or without the knowledge of other
Ottoman authorities, like the kadı or the executive officials of Galata (ehl-i örf).
In the years under study, we find only three cases of imprisonment of individuals:
they were all low-status Christian individuals who could not pay their debts and went
bankrupt. The amount of such debts was not higher than 60 sequins (7,200 aspers). No
Venetian merchant was imprisoned for bankruptcy. An arrest was highly detrimental to
one’s business reputation of a businessman because it entailed public shaming with the
physical arrest and the sequestration of the defaulter’ assets. Furthermore, the arrest of a
debtor could endanger future business operations with him. 83
For instance, on January 12, 1616, Grigor, an Armenian from Ankara, applied to
the chancellery to retrieve a credit and he obtained from Alessandro de Luca the

82 Dursteler, Eric. Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern
Mediterranean (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 39.
83 On Venetian law and bankruptcy, see Cassandro, Giovanni. Le rappresaglie e il fallimento a Venezia nei
secoli XIII-XVI (Turin: S. Lattes, 1938), 89-136.
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confiscation of several wine barrels that belonged to Rabi Salomon Masariti, a Jew living
in Chania (Crete). Alessandro was the agent of Salomon in Istanbul. Salomon was
indebted to Grigor for an unspecified previous business exchange. The following day, the
two parties appeared in court and the bailo sentenced Alessandro to pay Grigor 60 ducats
for a bill of exchange drawn by Salomon in 1613 and to pay custom duties for the wine
barrels. Alessandro was then unable to pay that sum, and he was imprisoned in the
bailo’s embassy. Two weeks later, an agent (intraviente) of Alessandro paid the sum to
Grigor, and, on January 26, the bailo released the former from prison. 84
Apart from imprisonment, another way for the bailo to enforce his judicial
decisions was, at least theoretically, pronouncing a boycott (batellazione) against a
convicted individual. According to this order, no member of the Venetian community
could have business dealings with the boycotted individual, otherwise they would be
fined to pay a substantial monetary fine. Like the arrest, a boycott entailed substantial
reputational and economic damages for the victim. In the years under study, we do not
find instances of this practice for individuals who failed to obey the sentence of the bailo.
The only instances of boycotts (5 cases) were made upon the request of Venetian
merchants against Ottoman subjects, both Jews and Muslims, who were indebted towards
the former and had refused to pay their debts, or when Ottoman subjects failed to pay
consular duties (cottimo) to the bailo. 85

84 BAC 278, reg. 400, fols. 138v (12 January 1616) and (13 January 1619), and 147r (26 January 1619).
85 For instance, see a boycott against the Muslim tanner (“tabaco,” tabak) Hoca Bekir from Üsküdar who
was indebted to two Venetian merchants. BAC 280, reg. 403, fol. 236v (14 December 1620) and that
against a group Jewish merchants who had failed to pay the cottimo duties to the bailo, BAC 276, reg. 394,
fols. 238r/239r (2 July 1610). On the practice of boycotts in Venetian communities in the Levant during the
late medieval period, see Ashtor, Eliahu. The Levant Trade in the Later Middle Ages (Princeton: Princeton
University Press 1983), 400; and Tucci, Ugo. “Mercanti veneziani e usi di piazza ad Alessandria alla fine
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Finally, apart from enforcement restrictions, another limit of the bailo’s jurisdiction was
the actual type of dispute he could deal with. As noted above, the bailo exclusively
adjudicated disputes concerning Ottoman/Venetian trade and arising from trade- and
shipping-related controversies. Could he hear cases unrelated to commerce? The
following dispute provides clues on this question that can help to answer this question.
On September 3, 1610, Madonna Caterina Pirone, the wife of Benetto Salvago (a
Venetian dragoman), her mother Madonna Teodora Pirone, her brother Stefano Pironi,
and Gianesino Salvago, another Venetian dragoman, and his brothers appeared before the
bailo. The Pirone and Salvago families were two prominent Catholic families of Galata,
whose members engaged in Venetian-Ottoman trade and served as dragomans for the
Venetian embassy. Stefano Pironi demanded that Gianesino and his brothers pay the
dowry of his sister Caterina. Gianesino rejected such demand on the grounds that
Caterina and her husband Benetto were “Ottoman subjects” (sudditi turcheschi) and that
they had received her dowry according to “local customs” (l’uso del paese). He added
that Caterina and Benetto should go to the Ottoman tribunals (foro turchesco) to purse
their claims against him and his brothers. Caterina then intervened, stating that, despite
the fact that she, her husband, and her brother were Ottoman subjects, she wanted to
produce surety that she and her husband would comply with the bailo’s sentence in that
dispute. After hearing the two sides, the bailo ruled that, with Caterina and her husband

del Quattrocento,” in Simonetta Cavaciocchi (ed.), Relazioni economiche tra Europa e mondo islamico,
secc. XIII–XVIII (2 Volumes, Grassina: Le Monnier, 2007), Vol. 1, 365-373, 366.
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being Ottoman subjects, the Ottoman courts and not a bailo should hear her demands. He
then gave permission to the dragoman Gianesino to apply to these courts. 86
This dispute shows both the limits of the bailo’s jurisdiction and his politics of
justice. The defendants rejected the bailo’s jurisdiction over the case by claiming that
plaintiffs were Ottoman subjects and Ottoman tribunals should handle the case. This last
argument reflects the article of the Capitulations that stipulated that Ottoman legal
institutions had jurisdiction over mixed Ottoman-Venetian cases. 87 This case is one of the
very few occasions in court records when litigants in the courts strategically used
political affiliation as an argument in their defense. Both Benetto Salvago and Gianesino
Salvago were Venetian dragomans. As we have seen, in Chapter 1, the baili in the
seventeenth century strove to have their membership in the Venetian community
recognized by Ottoman authorities. The same individuals appear in other lawsuits without
claiming their Ottoman subjecthood. 88
The bailo rejected to hear this case since the plaintiffs were “Ottoman subjects.”
This is the only instance I have encountered in which the bailo refused to deal with a
lawsuit using such an explanation. Furthermore, he allowed his dragomans to appeal to
Ottoman courts—another rare procedure. As we have seen throughout this chapter, the
bailo passed judgment in many legal suits involving Ottoman subjects, especially
Ottoman Jews. Rather than the political affiliation of the litigants, the refusal to deal with
this case likely stems from the nature of the lawsuit itself, a dowry-related controversy.
86

BAC 276, reg. 394, fols. 237v/238v (3 July 1610).

87 See Chapters 3 and 6 on the Capitulations’ rulings on mixed Ottoman-Venetian disputes.
88 For instance, see BAC 277, reg. 396, fol. 39r (13 May 1611).
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The bailo as a Venetian consul operated as arbiter in disputes concerning OttomanVenetian trade following merchant customs and Venetian legislation. Dealing with a
contested dowry required him to engage with the family’s customary norms of Galata’s
Catholic community, which lay outside his customary and officially recognized
jurisdiction. In other words, it was the nature of the case rather than the group
membership of the litigants that determined the actual jurisdiction over this dowry-related
dispute.
6—The Baili and their Politics of Justice
The equity-based procedure of the Venetian consular court allowed long-distance
merchants to solve their controversies under the same legal procedure irrespective of
religious, social, and political status. However, the court operated within the wider
political and economic context of the seventeenth-century Mediterranean. Venetian
efforts to maintain peaceful relations with the Ottomans and to promote Venetian and
Ottoman trade in a period of growing commercial competition by European competitors
unavoidably affected the administration of justice in the Venetian chancellery. While in
the previous two chapters we discussed the openness of this court to non-Venetian
merchants, here I provide evidence of the interrelations between political/economic
concerns and the procedure chosen by the bailo to settle disputes.
On May 23, 1617, Şeyh Hacı Ali, a merchant from Aleppo, brought to court two
Venetian merchants, Ieronimo Agosti and Iacomo Lioni over a surety contract. Three
years before, in June 1614, Zorzi di Lazzaro and Marco Mutio, respectively the
shipmaster and the scribe of a Venetian ship (Nave Paradisa), had borrowed 3,500 ducats
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from Ali and four other individuals (three Muslims and a Jew) for the expedition of the
said ship from Istanbul to Venice. They had drawn up five bills of exchange and
promised to pay that sum, once in Venice, to the brothers Alessandro and Niccolò
Nobiloni, the commercial representative (commesso) of Ali. Furthermore, they committed
the ship with its setup (arredi) to that payment. However, in Venice, Zorzi and Marco
remained debtor of 435 ducats towards the Nobiloni brothers. Consequently, in March
1615 in Istanbul, Ali, who represented himself and the other creditors (the Jewish one
included), complained with the bailo about his credit, and, in the chancellery, he
registered a legal representative (procuratore) to recover his credit in Venice from the
Nobiloni brothers.
The bailo informed the Venetian government and the Board of Trade about this
case, urging it to expedite the resolution of the controversy—especially since Ali had
threatened to conduct “acts of retaliation” (rapresaglia) against Venetian merchants. We
do not know what these threats consisted of, but we can hypothesize that they might refer
to Ali’s appeal to Ottoman courts and authorities. The Board of Trade investigated the
case, and, seemingly in a way to appease the creditors, in November 1615 it ruled that
two Venetian merchants had to stand surety for Ali’s credit as long as the shipmaster and
scribe did not fully pay the Nobiloni brothers. Following this ruling, in June 1616, in the
bailo’s court the merchants Gironimo Agosti and Giacomo Lioni agreed to stand surety
for the credit of the Muslim businessmen. Eleven months later Hacı Ali had not retrieved
his credit yet and he brought to court the two Venetian merchants. After evaluating all
existing evidence, which included the private correspondence between Hacı Ali and the
Nobiloni brothers and a public instrument of a Venetian notary over the credit, at the end
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of May 1617 the bailo sentenced Gironimo and Giacomo to pay Hacı Ali for their surety
contract. 89
The procedure followed by the bailo to settle this controversy involved, on his
request, the intervention of the Venetian government and a special Venetian magistracy,
namely the Board of Trade. This procedure place exclusively in important cases in the
years under study. Such rare instances (only 3 cases) involved affluent Muslim
businessmen in Galata who threatened the Venetian mercantile community by appealing
to Ottoman authorities, or who had business connections with Ottoman grandees like
royal merchants. 90 Given the potential risks for Venetian-Ottoman trade from such
disputes, the bailo strove to involve other Venetian officials to settle them as quickly as
possible without the intervention of Ottoman legal and administrative authorities.
Venetian and Ottoman records from the second half of the sixteenth century onwards, are
replete of examples of important trade-related controversies involving well-to-do
Ottoman Christian, Jews, and Muslims, that led to diplomatic crises between Venice and
the Ottoman Empire and threats to interrupt trade. 91

89 This dispute produced several entries in the archives of the bailo’s chancellery and of other Venetian
institutions. For the notarization of the four bills of exchange, see BAC 277, reg. 397, fols 296r/297v (17
June 1614); for Ali’s power of attorney, see BAC 279, r. 401, fol. 74 (26 October 1616); for the surety
contract, see BAC 278, r. 400, fol. 219 (27 June 1616); for the bailo’s sentence, BAC 279, r 402, folio 64
(23 May 1617); and, for the ruling of the Venetian Board of Trade, see CSM, Prima Serie, busta 144, fols
61r/62v (26 November 1615). For the letter of bailo to the Venetian government over the controversy and
Ali’s threats against Venetian merchants, see SDC, filza 80, No 8 (3 October 1615).
For instance, see the lawsuit of Resul Ağa ibn Abdülgani, a merchant with connections to the şeyhüislam
Esad Efendi. BAC 280, reg. 403, fol. 220v (21 November 1620), and LST, Filza IV, No 608 (25 September
1618). For the third case, which involved the royal merchant Mehmed Ağa, see Chapter 8.
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For other important trade-related disputes, see Arbel, Trading Nations, 95-144, and “Maritime Trade and
International Relations in the Sixteenth-Century Mediterranean: The Case of the Ship Ghirarda (15751581)”, in Vera Costantini and Marcus Koller (eds), Living in the Ottoman Ecumenical Community. Essays
in Honour of Suraiya Faroqhi (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 391-408; Stefini, Tommaso. “Ottoman Merchants in
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6—Conclusion
In seventeenth-century Galata, regardless of religious and political affiliation,
social status, merchants, shipmasters and scribes, and other individuals who were
engaged in trade and shipping activities between Istanbul and Venetian territories shared
a common need: how to quickly solve disputes arising from the every-day conduct of
long-distance trade and navigation, and to repair business ties in order to continue
commercial and shipping activities. The Venetian consular court addressed this specific
need by offering its clientele a fast and equity-based procedure that allowed individuals
belonging to different religious and political communities to solve their trade-related
disagreements without the procedural burdens of positive law. Despite the limited
enforcement power of this court in Istanbul, individuals filed a lawsuit there and they
usually respected its sentences since this institution constituted an old-established forum
of commercial arbitration in the Ottoman capital which served a professional community
of merchants, shipmasters, scribes, and other individuals involved in long-distance trade
and shipping between Istanbul and Venetian territories.
The fact that individuals belonging to different religious and political
communities chose to litigate a dispute in the Venetian chancellery does not point to the
existence of an international law merchant in the seventeenth-century Mediterranean. All
lawsuits stemmed from commercial undertakings between Venetian and Ottoman
territories. The lack of disputes unrelated to Ottoman/Venetian trade demonstrates that
this court was not a Mediterranean-wide and open-access institution of commercial

Dispute with the Republic of Venice at the End of the 16th Century: Some Glances on the Contested
Regime of the Capitulations,” Turcica 46 (2015), 153-176.
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arbitration despite its fast, equitable, and document-based legal proceedings. Rather than
referring to an international law merchant, we should talk about a set of well-known
procedures of dispute resolution that had been applied in the Venetian trading system in
Istanbul and in the eastern Mediterranean since the medieval period. Within such system,
any individual regardless of religious affiliation, membership in a specific political
community, and even gender, was subject to the same rules in litigating lawsuits arising
from long-distance trade and navigation.
However, the justice administered by the Venetian consular court had its own
limitations which contradicted its principles of equity. First, the numerous instances of
confiscation mandates against individuals who possessed the goods and credits of
businessmen in dispute with other individuals indificate an important element of
communal responsibility in the working of this institution. The victims of such practice
had their goods and credits confiscated through no fault of their own and they suffered
from business damage. Second, as the disputes involving affluent Ottoman Muslim
businessmen show, the diplomatic and commercial setting of seventeenth-century eastern
Mediterranean could affect the procedure of dispute resolution in the Venetian consular
court. In order to safeguard Ottoman-Venetian trade and peaceful relations with Ottoman
officials, in such cases the bailo endeavored to quickly solve complex commercial
controversies by applying special procedures favoring one litigant which contradicted the
equity-based summary procedure of his consular court.
Lastly, most of the individuals who initiated a legal suit in the Venetian consular
court were preeminent members of the cosmopolitan professional community who traded
between Istanbul and Venetian territories. They were Venetian merchants, shipmasters,
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scribes—that is, the core of the Venetian mercantile community—as well well-to-do
Jewish and Muslim merchants holding prestigious honorific and professional titles. We
can explain the presence of such individuals as litigants, among other factors, by referring
to the costs of court services in the Venetian chancellery. As we have seen in Chapter 3,
court fees were substantial for many sectors of Istanbul’s population in the seventeenth
century and might have limited the use of the Venetian chancellery for both low status
Venetian and Ottoman subjects. The high price of court services is another element
contradicting the principles of summary/mercantile procedure.
Overall, these limitations complicate our common description of European
consular courts as the embodiment of impersonal judicial practices and points to the
importance of local circumstances and judicial practices as well as international political
and commercial contexts in the daily administration of justice for merchants.
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Chapter 6: Venetians in Istanbul’s Kadı Courts (1604-1625)
1—Introduction
On January 5, 1605, two Venetian merchants and business associates (şerȋk),
Nikola veled-i Soruri and Cama Mara veled-i Paranda (Nicolò Soruro and Zuanne Maria
Parente), and an Ottoman Christian (zimmi) named Simun veled-i Marku appeared in the
kadı court of Galata (mahkeme-i şer'). The Venetians sued Simun over an unpaid load of
broadcloth (çuka) worth 275 sultani and 60 aspers, which the latter and his partner
Kostantin (another Ottoman Christian) had jointly (ber vech-i iştirak) bought from them
in September 1604 but had yet pay for. The two Venetians submitted to the court a legal
certificate (hüccet) issued by a deputy kadı (naib) named Hüsam Efendi bin Mehmed,
which certified their credit toward Simun. However, the latter rejected the validity of the
hüccet and demanded evidence (beyyine) for his debt. Therefore, Nikola and Cama Mara
brought to court two Muslim eyewitnesses from intra-muros Istanbul, Abdülkadir Hoca
bin Hacı and Piri bin Nebi, who testified that they were present when Hüsam Efendi drew
the document. Upon hearing their testimony, the kadı ruled in favor of the two Venetian
merchants. 1
This brief episode from the extensive archives of the court of Galata shows an
instance of commercial lawsuit started by Venetian subjects in an Ottoman Muslim court.
Despite the fact that the Venetian community enjoyed considerable administrative, fiscal,
and legal autonomy, it did not benefit from privileges of extraterritoriality. According to
the Capitulations, Ottoman judicial officials had full jurisdiction over controversies

1

İSAM, GŞS 25, 143/B (14 Şaban 1013/5 January 1605).
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between Venetian and Ottoman subjects. However, as we have seen in the previous two
chapters, the bailo ruled over trade-related cases involving Ottoman subjects. Why then
did Nikola and Cama Mara sue Ottoman Christians in a Muslim tribunal instead of the
bailo’s consular court? What bodies of norms regulated the standing of Venetian subjects
in Ottoman courts? Did Venetians, as subjects of a Christian foreign power, enjoy
specific legal immunities and procedural privileges? What specific legal and economic
services did they seek there?
This chapter addresses these questions by analyzing the use of kadı courts made
by Venetian subjects in Istanbul in the first three decades of the seventeenth century. It
focuses on the procedures followed by Ottoman courts during lawsuits—the methods of
dispute resolution, the admitted proofs, and the role of out-of -court actors in judicial
processes—and on the specific legal and economic deeds performed by Venetian subjects
there. In this way, it illustrates how factors such as religion, membership in a foreign
political community, and the political economy of Venice, might have affected the
standing of Venetian subjects in kadı courts and the reasons why they appealed to either
these or other forums of justice/notarial offices in early seventeenth-century Istanbul.
I put forth three main arguments. Firstly, despite the fact that the Capitulations
introduced some important procedural privileges that improved the legal standing of
Venetians in Ottoman courts, in the period under study Istanbul’s kadıs still applied
standard Hanafi procedure in dealing with the lawsuits of Venetian merchants. This
shows a marked degree of assimilation of Venetian subjects into the status of Ottoman
non-Muslims (zimmi), at least as far as their interactions with Ottoman legal institutions
are concerned. At the same time, the application of standard Hanafi legal procedure
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constituted one of the main reasons why Venetian subjects overall made little use of kadı
courts. Secondly, I demonstrate that, as it was the case with the Venetian chancellery,
Venetian merchants principally sought notarial deeds in Ottoman courts rather than the
adjudication of lawsuits. Thirdly, these courts did not operate independently from the
political and socioeconomic context of early-seventeenth century Istanbul and OttomanVenetian relations. As shown by the intervention of Venetian baili in the resolution of
civil and criminal disputes of Venetian subjects in kadı courts, major political and
commercial concerns such as the smooth conduction of long-distance of trade could
affect judicial processes in these tribunals.
By studying the legal and economic deeds of Venetian subjects in Ottoman kadı
courts, this chapter contributes to current debates within the historiography of the early
modern Ottoman Empire and the Mediterranean on the Ottoman legal system, the
interaction between non-Muslims (in our case, Europeans) and Islamic institutions, and,
more generally, on the interrelationship between long-distance trade and state institutions.
First, it engages with current research on the relationship between the two main branches
of Ottoman law—Hanafi Islamic law (Sharia) and sultanic legislation (kanun, which
included the Capitulations)—in the administration of justice in kadı courts. 2 By
examining the legal and economic affairs the Venetian subjects in kadı courts, this

A few examples of contributions to this debate are Jennings, Ronald, “Limitations of the Judicial Powers
of the Kadi in 17th C. Ottoman Kayseri,” Studia Islamica 50 (1979), 151-184; Gerber, Haim. State, Society,
and Law in Islam: Ottoman Law in Comparative Perspective (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994), Peirce, Leslie,
Morality Tales: Law and Gender in the Ottoman Court of Aintab (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2003); Hallaq, Wael. Sharīʿa: Theory, Practice, Transformations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2009), Metin Coşgel and Boğaç Ergene. The Economics of Ottoman Justice: Settlement and Trial in the
Sharia Courts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), Baldwin, James. Islamic Law and Empire
in Ottoman Cairo (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017); Tuğ, Başak. Politics of Honor in
Ottoman Anatolia: Sexual Violence and Socio-Legal Surveillance in the Eighteenth century (Leiden;
Boston: Brill, 2017).
2
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chapter provides new evidence on how Hanafi Islamic law and kanun shaped legal
practices in these Muslim tribunals.
Second, the chapter expands the still-limited literature on commercial and
maritime litigation in early modern Ottoman Empire courts by showing how kadı courts
dealt with legal controversies between Western Europeans and Ottoman subjects. Third,
it illustrates the little-known role of Ottoman courts as notarial offices for international
merchants. While there is a significant body of scholarship on the interactions between
foreign merchants and state institutions regulating their activities for western Europe, we
still have few studies for the Ottoman Empire, despite the fact that the latter was the
destination or the origin of much European shipping in the Mediterranean. 3
Lastly, this chapter contributes to these debates and venues of research through its
quantitative approach: instead of focusing on a few significant case-studies of disputes or
commercial transactions, it offers a study of all the legal and economic affairs of
Venetian subjects in kadı courts of Istanbul over an uninterrupted series of years, 16041625. By these means, I uncover previously unnoticed patterns in the use of the kadı
courts by European merchants, such as the prevalence of notarial transactions and the
overall little use of this institution by them which contrasts with the much more prevalent
us of this institution by Ottoman non-Muslims.

For a few studies on the Ottoman Empire, see Van den Boogert, Maurits, The Capitulations and the
Ottoman Legal System: Qadis, Consuls and Beratlıs in the 18th Century (Leiden: Brill, 2005), Stefini,
Tommaso. “Ottoman Merchants in Dispute with the Republic of Venice at the End of the 16th Century:
Some Glances on the Contested Regime of the Capitulations,” Turcica 46 (2015), 153-76; White, Joshua.
“Litigating Disputes over Ships and Cargo in Early Modern Ottoman Courts,” Quaderni Storici 51/3
(2016), 701-725.
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2—Hanafi Islamic law and the Capitulations
In early modern Istanbul, Ottoman Muslim courts headed by kadıs and the
Imperial Council (divan-ı hümayun), a legislative and executive court under the authority
of the Grand Vizier (the sultan’s deputy), handled civil and criminal disputes involving
Venetian and Ottoman subjects. In addition to this adjudicative function kadı courts also
operated as notarial offices. Contrary to some contemporary European trade centers, such
as Venice or Amsterdam, in Istanbul and other Ottoman commercial hubs the Ottomans
did not create specialized courts, like boards of trade and admiralty courts, that dealt with
commercial and maritime controversies and applied legal procedures distinct from those
employed in ordinary state courts. 4 Rather, the aforementioned two types of legal forums
dealt with all types of controversy among Ottoman subjects as well as between Venetians
and Ottomans alike, and applied the same bodies of law to all. The legal standing of
Venetians in Ottoman courts was determined by the norms of the Hanafi Islamic law
concerning non-Muslims and by rulings of the Capitulations on Ottoman justice, which
belonged to the sphere of dynastic law (kanun), the second domain of Ottoman law. 5

The Ottoman approach to the legal affairs of European merchants differed from that employed by the
Mamluk rulers in medieval Egypt and Syria. The latter created special courts (siyasa) manned by state
officials to deal with disputes of Europeans with less formalistic legal procedures that those applied by
kadıs. See Apellàniz, Francisco. “Judging the Franks: Proof, Justice, and Diversity in Late Medieval
Alexandria and Damascus.” Comparative Studies in Society and History 58/2 (2016), 350-378.
4

Throughout this chapter, I define as “Ottoman law” the combination of the particular branch Hanafi law
adopted by the Ottomans, dynastic legislation, and local customs (örf). See Gerber, Haim. “Sharia, Kanun,
and Custom in the Ottoman Law: The Court Records of 17th Century Bursa.” International Journal of
Turkish Studies 2/1 (1981), 131–47.
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Hanafi Islamic Law
According to Hanafi Islamic law, 6 the official legal school of the Ottoman
Empire, the beneficiaries of the Capitulations (called müstemin or “protected foreigners”)
enjoyed a legal status akin to that of Ottoman non-Muslims (zimmi) in Ottoman courts in
matters of “civil law” with a few different rulings regarding testimony and inheritance. In
matters of “criminal law,” the Hanafi doctrine hesitated, and jurists held different
opinions on the prosecution of specific offenses. 7
Like Ottoman Jews and Christians, Venetians and other protected foreigners
suffered from the same key disability in Muslim courts, namely, the notorious ban on
their testimony on the behalf of Muslims. Jews and Christians could testify only on nonMuslims. This disability was of utmost importance since, according to Hanafi
jurisprudence, oral testimony (şehâdet) played a central in judicial procedures in Ottoman
courts. The testimony of at least two adult male Muslim eyewitnesses (udȗl-i müslimȋn)

Hanafi law was codified only in the nineteenth century while in the early modern period it consisted of
different regional scholarly traditions with conflicting interpretative positions among jurists over specific
issues. Furthermore, local customs played an important role in the application of legal norms in different
Ottoman towns. Tamdoğan, Isık. “Sulh and the 18th-Century Ottoman Courts of Üsküdar and Adana,”
Islamic Law and Society 15 (2008), 55–83; Meshal, Reem. “Antagonistic Sharī‘as and the Construction of
Orthodoxy in Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Cairo.” Journal of Islamic Studies 2/1 (2010), 183–212; Burak,
Guy. “Evidentiary Truth Claims, Imperial registers, and the Ottoman Archive: contending legal views
of archival and record-keeping practices in Ottoman Greater Syria (seventeenth-nineteenth centuries).”
Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 79/2 (2016), 233–254.

6

Schacht, Joseph. “Amān,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition; Heyd, Uriel, Studies in the Old
Ottoman Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1972), 288. European concepts of civil, criminal,
or penal law did not exist in medieval and early modern Hanafi law. Hallaq, Sharīʿa, 308-311. There is a
growing historiography on use of kadı courts by non-Muslims. For instance, see Jennings, Ronald C.
“Zimmis (Non-Muslims) in Early 17th Century Ottoman Judicial Records: The Sharia Court of Anatolian
Kayseri,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 21/3 (1978), 225–93; Gradeva,
Rossitsa. “Orthodox Christians in the Kadı Courts: The Practice of Sofia Sheriat Court, Seventeenth
Century,” Islamic Law and Society 4/1 (1997), 37–69; al-Qattan, Najwa. “Dhimmis in the Muslim Court:
Legal Autonomy and Religious Discrimination,” The International Journal of Middle East Studies 31/3
(1999), 429-444; Wittman, Richard, Before Qadi and Grand Vizier: Intra-Communal Dispute Resolution
and Legal Transactions among Christians and Jews in the Plural Society of Seventeenth-Century Istanbul,
(PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 2008).
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constituted evidence par excellence in civil and criminal lawsuits, and it also enabled the
authentication of private documents in courts. Documents such as legal and business
contracts and property titles alone did not amount to legal proof. Rather, they were
instruments of litigation that needed to be corroborated by witnesses before a kadı in
order to constitute legal evidence in adjudication processes. 8
The testimony of Muslim men was also necessary to certify the identity of the
individuals appearing in the court (ta‘rîf procedure) and to assess the honesty and social
reputation of ocular witnesses (tezkiye-i şuhȗd procedure). Lastly, Muslim procedural
witnesses (şuhȗdülhâl) had to be present during any court session in order for the court
hearing itself to be legally valid. 9 Being unable to act as witnesses, non-Muslims were
excluded from all these important court procedures, and they had to hire Muslim
witnesses to bring them to court to both support their stance during a lawsuit and to
register legal and business contracts for the use in potential future disputes. 10

The four legal schools of Sunni Islam had different opinions regarding the admissibility of uncorroborated
documents. Marglin, Jessica. “Written and Oral in Islamic Law: Documentary Evidence and Non-Muslims
in Moroccan Shari‘a Courts,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 59/4 (2017), 884-911. On the
relations between orality and writing in Islamic courts, see Ergene, Boğaç. “Document Use in Ottoman
Courts of Law: Observations from the Sicils of Çankırı and Kastamonu,” Turcica 37 (2005), 83–111;
Lydon, Ghislaine. “A paper economy of faith without faith in paper: A reflection on Islamic institutional
history,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 71 (2009), 647–659; Aykan, Yavuz. Rendre la
justice à Amid Procédures, acteurs et doctrines dans le contexte ottoman du XVIIIème siècle (Leiden: Brill,
2016), 87-114.
8

On the different roles of witnesses in Islamic courts see Bayındır, Abdülaziz. Islam Muhakeme Hukuku:
Osmanlı Devri Uygulaması (Istanbul: İslami İlimler Araştırma Vakfı, 1986), 141-204; Johansen, Baber.
“Le jugement comme preuve. Preuve juridique et vérité religieuse dans le droit islamique hanéfite,” Studia
Islamica 72 (1990), 5-17; Hallaq, Sharīʿa, 348-352; Erünsal, İsmail. “Osmanlı Mahkemelerinde Şâhitler:
Şuhûdü’l-‘udûlden Şuhûdü’l-hâle Geçiş,” Osmanlı Arıştırmaları 53/1 (2019), 1-50.
9

Kuran, Timur and Scott Lustig. “Judicial Biases in Ottoman Istanbul: Islamic Justice and Its
Compatibility with Modern Economic Life.” Journal of Law and Economics 55/3 (2012), 631–66, 645.
10
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In the case of protected foreigners, their inability to testify against Muslims was coupled
with a ban on their testimony against Ottoman Jews and Christians. According to the
Mülteka’l-ebhur penned by the jurist Ibrahim Halebi (d. 1549), one of the most important
legal manuals for Ottoman kadıs, a zimmi could testify in favor or against a protected
foreigner, while the reverse was prohibited. However, two protected foreigners could
testify against one another as long as they hailed from the same country. 11 The same rules
can be found in many fetvas issued by şeyhülislams in response to queries of individual
litigants during the entire early modern period. 12
The explanation of such prohibition lies in Hanafi law’s rules over the admissible
witnesses in court procedures. According to Hanafi jurists, the legitimate witness, even if
he was non-Muslim, had to possess a series of moral attributes (above all trustworthiness
and personal rectitude, adl) and performed religious and social duties that were officially
recognized by judicial authorities and the members of the community in which he
resided. At court kadıs inquired into the witnesses’ moral character before admitting their
testimony by summoning members of the community to testify on their character. 13
Protected foreigners lacked a locally established social and business reputation since, at
least in the theoretical situations hypothesized by the Hanafi jurists, they resided in

Ibrahim Halebi, İzahlı Mülteka el-ebhur tercümesi (translated by Mustafa Uysal) (3 Volumes, İstanbul:
Elif Ofset Tesisleri, 1975), Vol. 3, 235.
11

12
For instance, see SK, Zekeriyyazade Yahya Efendi (office 1622–1623, 1625–1632, 1634–1644) SK,
Fetava-yı Yahya Efendi Amcazade Hüseyin 254, p. 104. Düzenli, Pehlül (ed.), Gayrimüslimlere Dair
Fetvalar (İstanbul: Kolektif, 2015), 364, No 1911.

Bayındır, Islam Muhakeme Hukuku, 145-162; Peirce, Morality Tales, 179-182; Canbakal, Hülya. Society
and Politics in an Ottoman Town: ‘Ayntab in the 17th Century (Leiden: Brill 2007), 123-148.
13
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Muslim lands only temporarily without establishing lasting social networks within their
host society.
The territoriality of Islamic law also restricted the appeal to Muslim courts for
disputes over business transactions that had taken place outside Muslim lands. The
Mülteka states that if an Ottoman merchant (either Muslim or not) moves to the Abode of
War (dârü’l-harb) to conduct business and becomes embroiled in a dispute with the
subject of a non-Muslim ruler over a debt or an unlawful appropriation of one’s goods or
capital (gasb), and they later both move to the Abode of Islam, Muslim courts cannot
hear their case. The same ruling applies to commercial disputes between two protected
foreigners over business exchanges that had taken place in their native lands. 14 According
to Hanafi jurists, since the contested legal or economic transaction had occurred in nonMuslim lands, it had not been conducted according to Islamic legal norms. Therefore, the
jurists-conceived divide between the Abode of Islam and Abode of War played a central
role in attributing the jurisdiction of Muslim courts over the legal disputes of protected
foreigners and Ottoman subjects alike trading abroad: kadıs and jurists considered as
legally valid only those legal or business transactions conducted within the borders of
Muslim polities, regardless of the religious and political affiliation of the litigants, and
they heard lawsuits originating from them alone. 15

Halebi, Mülteka, 597/598. Fetva collections contain numerous queries over disputes originating from
legal and economic transactions occurred in non-Muslim lands. For instances, see Yahya Efendi, Fetava,
100-114, and Düzenli, Gayrimüslimlere Dair Fetvalar, 353 No 1850, 355 No 1861, 357 No 1874.
14

15
The divide between Abode of Islam and Abode of War also played a crucial role in disputes over
ownership of ships captured by pirates/privateers. White, Joshua. Piracy and Law, 183-264. On this
territorial conception of Islamic law see Johansen, Baber. “Entre révélation et tyrannie: le droit des nonmusulmans d'apres les jurists musulmans,” in Baber Johansen, Contingency in a Sacred Law: Legal and
Ethical Norms in the Muslim Fiqh (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 218-237; Mushtaq Ahmad, Muhammad. “The
Notions of Dār al-Ḥarb and Dār al-Islām in Islamic Jurisprudence with Special Reference to the Ḥanafī
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The Capitulations
The Capitulations provided more specific rulings than legal manuals and fetva
collections over the standing of Venetian subjects and other protected foreigners in
Ottoman courts of justice. These diplomatic and commercial agreements fell within the
sphere of dynastic law (kanun), the second main source of Ottoman law, which was
tightly related to or directly derived from the third one, local customs (örf). 16 They were
the product of the political, administrative, and judicial authority of the sultan (siyaset-i
şeriyye, Ar. siyasa shariyya) and they represented continuation of pre-Ottoman
customary practices employed by Muslim rulers in the eastern Mediterranean to deal with
Western European communities. 17
The articles of the Capitulations concerning the administration of justice
established the competencies of different Ottoman tribunals and the procedures to be
followed there during lawsuits between Ottoman and Venetian subjects. Specific imperial
orders and general decrees issued at the request of the baili during major commercial and
criminal controversies added new norms in specific matters of legal procedures which
were not covered by the texts of the Capitulations that also became part of the

School,” Islamic Studies 47/1 (Spring 2008), 5-37; Ayoub, Sami. “Territorial Jurisprudence, Ikhtilaf alDarayn: Political Boundaries & Legal Jurisdiction,” Contemporary Islamic Studies 2 (2012), 1-14.
The complex relationship between Hanafi Islamic law and kanun constitutes a long-time debate within
the historiography of the Ottoman Empire. For a critical summary of this debate, see Ergene, Boğaç.
“Qanun and Sharia,” in Rudolph Peters and Peri Bearman (eds) The Ashgate Research Companion to
Islamic Law (Burlington: Ashgate, 2014), 109-120.
16

17
On the Capitulations in the Ottoman legal system, see De Groot, Alexander “The Historical Development
of the Capitulatory Regime in the Ottoman Middle East from the Fifteenth to the Nineteenth Centuries,” in
Kate Fleet and Maurits van den Boogert (eds), The Ottoman Capitulations, Text and Context (Rome:
Istituto per l’Oriente C.A. Nallino 2003), 1-46, 1/2; Panaite, Viorel. The Ottoman law of war and peace:
the Ottoman Empire and tribute payers (Boulder: East European Monographs, 2000).
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capitulatory system thereafter. Overall, the rulings concerning court procedures for
Venetians, constituted an example of the intervention of a ruler and his representatives in
the administration of justice at the local level—an intervention that Ottoman judicial
authorities at times opposed. 18
Concerning the jurisdiction of Ottoman courts over Venetian subjects, the
Capitulations stipulated that kadı courts had jurisdiction over any dispute between
Ottoman and Venetian subjects. A Venetian dragoman had to be present during court
proceedings otherwise a kadı could not hear the legal suit. 19 In the event of a lawsuit
brought against the Venetian bailo and Venetian consuls, the kadı could not hear trials
that fell under the competence of the Imperial Council. The same rule applied for
controversies involving the heads of non-Muslim Ottoman communities and high-ranking
state officials. 20 The Imperial Council also had jurisdiction over private disputes with
claims larger than 5,000 aspers. 21 Lastly, these two courts could not prosecute either a
Venetian subject or the bailo for the debt of another Venetian. The prohibition of

18
In the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, the interventions of the Ottoman central government into
the administration of justice in provincial towns aroused the opposition of local jurists. See Meshal,
“Antagonistic Sharī‘as;” Burak, Guy. The Second Formation of Islamic Law: The Ḥanafī School in the
Early Modern Ottoman Empire (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Baldwin, Islamic Law and
Empire, 72-98.

See the Capitulations of 1606, lines 39/40. Theunissen, Hans. “Ottoman-Venetian Diplomatics: The Ahdnames. The Historical Background and the Development of a Category of Political-Commercial
Instruments Together with an Annotated Edition of a Corpus of Relevant Documents,” Electronic Journal
of Oriental Studies 1/2 (1998), 1–698, 586/587.
19

The same rule applied for controversies involving the heads of non-Muslim Ottoman communities and
high-ranking state officials. Wittman, Before the Qadi and the Grand Vizier, 183.

20

The English Capitulations of 1601 firstly introduced this rule for claims larger than 4,000 aspers. Van
den Boogert, The Capitulations, 48/49.
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collective reprisals was of utmost importance for the smooth conduction of Venetian
trade, and it was included in the Venetian capitulations since the fifteenth century. 22
As far as court procedures are concerned, the Capitulations improved the weak
standing of Venetian subjects in Ottoman courts in matters of legally admissible
evidence. Firstly, they introduced the important ruling that testimony of Venetian
subjects against Ottoman Christians was permissible. The Capitulations of 1604 states:
“Some Venetians are in dispute with non-Muslim Ottomans (harâçgüzar) and
have Venetian witnesses residing in locus (ikâmet idüp) but, at court, the Ottoman
subjects maintain that only the testimony of local non-Muslims can be accepted
and that of those Venetian Christians is invalid. Since all Christians belong to a
single religious community (nasârâ millet-i vâhide), in a lawsuit the Venetian
party can bring to court any resident Christian and their testimony is valid
according to the Sharia.” 23
This ruling is striking since it overrules the Hanafi law’s prohibition against the
testimony of protected foreigners on non-Muslim Ottoman Christians. By declaring any
Christian group—regardless of denomination— as member of a universal Christian
community (millet), the Capitulations allowed Venetian subjects to bring to court any
Christian witness, included a Venetian, as long as he “resided” in the town where the
dispute arose. 24
Other articles of the Capitulations deal with the admissibility of written evidence
in Ottoman courts. Despite the legal ascendancy of oral testimony over documents

See for instance, see the Capitulations of 1482, lines 30/31. Theunissen, Ottoman-Venetian Diplomatics,
374.

22
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Theunissen, Ottoman-Venetian Diplomatics, 587, line 43/44.

In the early modern Ottoman Empire, Ottoman jurists never validated this ruling. According to the
şeyhüislam Ebussuud Efendi (office 1545-1574), such article of the Capitulations was the product of
“uninformed scribes” (cehele-i küttȃb). Düzenli, Gayrimüslimlere Dair Fetvalar, 364, No 1911.
24
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according to Hanafi law, the Capitulations introduced two important rules in favor of the
use of written records in trade-related lawsuits involving Venetian subjects. First, they
recommended that Venetians use kadı court to register their legal and business
transactions with Ottoman subjects. Second, they stipulated that in case of a dispute over
commercial exchanges (beyʿ ü şirȃ), a surety contract (kefȃlet), or any other legal and
economic transactions falling under the purview of Hanafi Islamic law (umȗr-ı şerʿiyye),
an Ottoman subject could not sue a Venetian without evidence certifying that such
transaction took place.
Contrarily to the contemporary Capitulations granted to other Western European
powers, the texts of the Venetian Capitulations of the sixteenth and first half of the
seventeenth centuries do not contain such rules, which were introduced by sultanic
rescripts issued to kadıs in Istanbul and in the provinces. For instance, an imperial order
sent to the governor (beylerbeyi), treasurer (defterdâr), and chief kadı of Cyprus in 1588
states:
“A Venetian merchant who engages with someone in my Well-Protected Domains
in matters of selling, buying, guarantees, and other issues administrated by Sharia
should go to the kadı, have him register such transaction in his safe-guarded book
(sicil), and obtain a certificate (hüccet) according to the established customs (âdet
ve kanun üzre). If a dispute takes place over such matters, the kadı should act
according to the aforementioned documents and if the Ottoman plaintiffs do not
possess written evidence and produce false witnesses (şâhid-i zur) residing in the
same locality they cannot demand anything from the Venetian merchants.” 25

25
ASV, DT, busta 8, No 976 (evâsıt-ı Muharram 997/ 11 November-9 December 1588) This is the earliest
reference to such ruling on the behalf of Venetian merchants I have been able to find. The French and
English Capitulations of the second half of the sixteenth century introduced this ruling which is absent in
the contemporary Venetian ones. Van den Boogert, The Capitulations, 44, note 49. For similar rulings see
for Istanbul and Aleppo see: BOA, ED 13.1, 10/31 (15 Ramazan 1013/ 2 February 2 1605) and MD 17901,
9/4 (evȃıl-ı Rebî‘ülevvel 1028/ 16-25 February 1619).
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These rulings about written evidence introduced two important procedural privileges for
Venetian subjects. Contrarily to established judicial procedure in kadı courts, oral
testimony alone was not sufficient to prosecute a Venetian subject, at least for
commercial cases, and registration of legal and economic deeds became mandatory. To
my knowledge, apart from protected foreigners, no other non-Muslim communities in the
Ottoman Empire enjoyed such procedural privileges in Ottoman courts. These rules were
the outcome of diplomatic efforts of European ambassadors vis-à-vis Ottoman
authorities, and they aimed to solve one of the main reasons of complaints against the
Ottoman legal system, namely, the use of (presumably) false witnesses in court
procedures against Europeans. 26 However, they did not remove the need for Venetian or
Ottoman plaintiffs to produce witnesses at court to authenticate documents previously
obtained by kadıs.
Overall, the articles of the Capitulations concerning Ottoman justice introduced
important procedural privileges aiming to improve the standing of Venetian subjects visà-vis Ottoman ones during lawsuits. They forbade collective reprisals, prescribed the
presence of Venetian dragomans during court hearings, enabled Venetian subjects to
testify on Ottoman non-Muslims, and required Ottoman subjects to produce
documentation issued by kadı courts to sue a Venetian for civil disputes. These last two
rulings aimed to help the Venetians to overcome a key advantage of Ottoman subjects,
both Muslim and non-Muslim, vis-à-vis them and other protected foreigners in Istanbul
and elsewhere in the empire: the wealth of social relations (relational resource) that
enabled an Ottoman litigant to deploy witnesses from local communities against a

26

On false and liar witnesses and their punishment see Bayındır. İslam muhakeme hukuku, 192-197.
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Venetian subject or to serve themselves as such given their established public reputation
in the locality. In the next paragraph we will see how far Istanbul’s kadı courts upheld the
rulings in the early seventeenth century.
3—The courts of the kadı of Galata and of the kazasker of Rumeli
The courts
In early modern Istanbul, as in any Ottoman city, no formal division of
jurisdiction existed among different kadı courts and the city’s inhabitants as well as
foreigners could turn to the courts located in any district. My research for the period
1604-1625 focuses on the kadı of Galata and that of the kazasker of Rumeli.
The kadı of Galata had jurisdiction over a vast area (Galata kazalığı) including
the walled town of Galata, where most Venetians and other Western Europeans resided
and conducted business, Beyoğlu (the seat of the Venetian embassy), Kasım Paşa (the
location of the Ottoman arsenal), the whole European shores of the Bosporus, and also
some islands and settlements along the Marmara Sea. Together with Üsküdar, Eyüp, and
intra-muros Istanbul, it was of one of was one of the four judicial districts of the Ottoman
capital. 27
The kadı of Galata conducted his legal, notarial, and administrative duties in the
premises of his house located within the town walls near the district main mosque, the

The judgeship of Galata was one of the most prestigious judicial position of the Ottoman Empire holding
the title of mevleviyet, the jurisdiction of high-ranking kadıs. Uzuncarşılı, İsmail H. “İstanbul ve Bilād-i
Selase denilen Eyüp, Galata ve Üsküdar Kadılıkları,” İstanbul Enstitüsü Dergisi 3 (1957), 25-32; Bulunur,
Kerim İ. Osmanlı Galatası, (1453–1600) (Istanbul: Bilge, Kültür, Sanat, 2014), 192-200.
27
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Arab Camii. 28 His office usually lasted between two and twelve months after which he
was rotated to another judgeship. As civil and criminal judge, he dispensed justice to any
individual regardless of religion, sex, and political status. The kadı conducted the trials
and passed judgment while executive officers (ehl-i örf), like police chiefs (subaşı),
enforced his sentences. 29
Kadı courts did not formally specialize in specific types of cases and all kadıs
treated various kinds of civil and criminal disputes. However, research shows that the
court of Galata had reputation for expertise in maritime affairs. Contrarily to the kadı, the
staff of the court did not rotate as frequently as the kadı, and they had a knowledge of
maritime customary norms. Furthermore, the court could summon to court local experts
(ehl-i vukȗf) of shipping and maritime customs, such as ship captains and sailors, to
provide their expertise or act as mediators or arbitrators when dispute arose over cargos
and ships. 30 As we have seen in Chapter 4, this procedure took also place in the Venetian
consular court.
Apart from his judicial authorities, a kadı was also a public notary and a state
administrator. At his court, individuals registered all types of legal and economic
contracts, and he was responsible for keeping an archive (divân) of private and state

Zarinebaf, Fariba. Mediterranean Encounters: Trade and Pluralism in Early Modern Galata (Oakland,
California: University of California Press, 2017), 37.
28

Other important executive officers with authority over the district of Galata were the Head of Palace
Guards (bostancibaşı), the Chief of the Janissary Corps (yeniçeri ağası), and the Admiral of the Ottoman
Navy (kapudan paşa), stationed in the imperial arsenal (tersane). Bulunur, Osmanlı Galatası, 222-232.
29

30
Vatin, Nicolas. “Ces messieurs de Galata. Note sur deux rapports d’expertise en droit maritime redigés
en Août 1640 à Galata au profit d’un capitaine patmiote,” Journal of the Economic and Social History of
the Orient 49 (2006), 48-67. White, “Litigating Disputes,” 704. On expert witnessing in Islamic law, see
Shaham, Ron. The Expert Witness in Islamic Courts: Medicine and Crafts in the Service of Law (Chicago,
Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2010), 27-100.
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documents. 31As state administrator, the kadı represented the authority of the sultan by
transmitting and executing the orders conveyed by the Imperial Council, maintaining
peace and order in his district, controlling market prices, regulating the quality of
products, etc. 32
At court, the kadı was surrounded by assistants/deputies (nâib), scribes (kâtib),
procedural witnesses, and other court officials, who too played an important role in the
judicial processes. Naibs helped the kadı in the functioning of the court and represent him
either in his absence or when it was necessary for judicial authorities to travel both inside
or outside the walled town of Galata to conduct investigations and hear and decide cases.
The scribes recorded court operations, kept the court’s ledgers (defter), and prepared
legal and economic documents (hüccet) for the private use of court clients. Contrarily to
the kadı, the court employees were all members of the local community, and they
possessed knowledge of local customs and expertise of specific types of controversies,
like maritime affairs. 33
In seventeenth-century Istanbul, the court of Galata was subordinate to that of
intra-muros Istanbul (Istanbul mahkemesi), the tribunal of the kazasker of Rumeli
(Rumeli Sedâret mahkemesi), and the Imperial Council headed by the Grand Vizier. My

The divan contained different types of documents, included the sicil, the documents used in this study.
Hallaq, Wael. “The Qadi’s Diwan (Sijill) before the Ottomans,” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and
African Studies 61/3 (1998), 415–36.
31

Jennings, Ronald C. “Kadı, Court, and Legal Procedure in 17th C. Ottoman Kayseri,” Studia Islamica 48
(1978), 133–172. A kadı also supervised the administration of religious endowments (vakıf).
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Other court functionaries included the usher (muhzir) who acted as court police summoning people to
court, the bailiff (mübaşir), and procedural witnesses (şuhȗdühâl). On court officials and their importance
in judicial processes, see İnalcık, Halil, “Maḥkama / Ottoman Empire / Early Centuries,” Encyclopaedia of
Islam, Second Edition; Ergene and Coşgel. The Economics of Ottoman Justice, 65-102.
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research shows that, in years under study no Venetian, appeared in the court of Istanbul,
which had jurisdiction over the whole of intra-muros Istanbul which included the city’s
largest marketplace, the famed Grand Bazar. The Imperial Council, as we will see in the
next chapter, operated mostly as a guarantor of the correctness of the legal procedures
followed by kadı courts and dealt mostly lawsuits originating from the provinces. 34
The kazasker (military judge) of Rumeli was the highest-ranking judicial figure of
the Ottoman Empire. Appointed by the şeyhülislam, he selected the kadıs and oversaw
the judgeships in the European provinces (Rumeli), including Galata. He sat in the
Imperial Council and the Friday Council (cuma divanı), where he assisted the Grand
Vizier by handling legal suits under the purview of Islamic law. Furthermore, he held a
court in his mansion in Istanbul where, according to our current knowledge, he heard
important civil and criminal cases, and as well as those involving members of the ruling
group of the Ottoman empire (askeri). This court is the least known Ottoman legal
institution.35
Despite this judicial hierarchy, no formal division of jurisdiction existed among
the aforementioned courts. They applied the same bodies of laws, and, apart cases
involving high-ranking Ottomans and foreign ambassadors, Ottoman subjects and

Evidence for other European communities for the same years and, especially, for the second half of the
seventeenth century shows that Europeans used also the kadı court of Istanbul. For instance, see İŞS 3, 150
(25 Rebî‘ülevvel 1027/March 22, 1618), and Kuran, Timur (ed.), Mahkeme Kayıtları Işığında 17. Yüzyıl
İstanbul'unda Sosyo-Ekonomik Yaşam (Social and Economic life in Seventeenth Century Istanbul:
Glimpses from court records) (Istanbul: Turkiye Bankası, 2010), V. 1, 777-920. On the kadı of Istanbul,
see Uzunçarşılı, İsmail H. Osmanlı Devletinin İlmiye Teşkilâtı (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1965), 133143.
34

In particular, we do not know the relation between this court and the lawsuits delegated to the kazasker of
Rumeli by the Imperial Council. On this institution see Uzunçarşılı, Ilmiye Teşkilatı, 144-160; Şentop,
Mustafa. Osmanlı yargı sistemi ve Kazaskerlik (İstanbul: Klasik, 2005), 135-147; White, Piracy and Law,
225.
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Venetians were able to take their legal suits to the local court of Galata, the court of the
kazaskers, or the Grand Vizier’s Imperial Council. The only difference consisted in the
different capabilities of enforcement of these institutions, with the Grand Vizier’s
Council enjoying the strongest executive authority. 36
The cost of the court
Ottoman kadı courts were financially independent from the imperial treasury.
Even though kadıs received a fixed salary from the government commensurate to the
importance of their judgeships, the bulk of their incomes derived from the fees (harc)
charged from court users. The central government set the rates of these fees for different
varieties of court services in law codes (kanuname) and a kadı divided the collected
amount between himself, his deputies, court scribes, ushers, and other court officials.

36

Baldwin, Law and Empire, 12/13
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Table 6.1: The Official fees of Kadı Courts (in aspers) in the Seventeenth Century 37
Types of Court Services

Kanunname of

Telhîsü’l-

Abdurrahman Paşa

Ahmed I 38

beyân 39

kanunnamesi 40

(1604-1617)

(1675/1676)

(1676)

Notary Service (hüccet)

32

32

25

Registration Fee (sicil)

11

12

8

Witness’ registration (şehâdet)

25

20

Letter to authorities (mürâsele)

11

6

Signature (imzâ)
Slave manumission (iʿtâk)

12
Either 50 or 40

12
60

depending on the
owner’s wealth
Inheritance (mirâs)

20 for every
1,000 aspers of
estate value

As shown in Table 6.1, three law compilations of the seventeenth century set officially
sanctioned court fees for different legal and economic services. Apart from the price of
the final document (hüccet) on the outcome of either a dispute or a notarial transaction,
they do not show if or how charges for adjudication might have changed according to the
nature of the dispute and to the amount of the claims. Furthermore, they and other

I exclude from this table the prices for marriage registration (nikâh) because such issue does not concern
business transactions.
37

Akgündüz, Ahmet (ed.) Osmanlı kanunnâmeleri ve hukukı̂ tahlilleri (İstanbul: Osmanlı Araştırmaları
Vakfı, 2006-), V. 9, 518/519.

38

Hezarfen Hüseyin Efendi, Telhîsü’l-beyan fî Kavanin-i Âli Osman (edited by Sevim İlgürel, Ankara:
Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1988), 264.
39

Abdurrahman Abdi, Abdurrahman Abdi Paşa Kanunnamesi (edited by H. Ahmet Aslantürk, İstanbul,
Okur Kitaplığı, 2012), 63.
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compilations issued between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries, show little
changes in the amount of court fees between the sixteenth and eighteenth century, raising
doubts about their reliability as a source of the daily operations in court. 41 Unfortunately,
apart from these law codes, we know very little about the amount of fees actually charged
by the court because, with a very few exceptions, records produced by the court do not
show the prices of each transactions in actuality. 42
If the officially prices reflect the historical reality, the fees for kadı appear
expensive in early seventeenth-century Istanbul. According to narh registers of Istanbul,
the administratively-determined price of goods sold in the city’s marketplaces, in the first
three decades of the seventeenth century 1 okka (=1,28 kilograms) of flour costed
between 4 and 6 aspers, 1 okka of rice 7 aspers, 1 okka of bread between 1,3 and 4
aspers, and one egg 0,3/0,4 aspers. In 1610s a skilled worker earned around 23 aspers per
day while an unskilled one earned 14 aspers, and a Janissary (yeniçeri), a member of an
elite military corps, took home15 aspers. 43 Given these prices and stipends, court services
might have constituted a considerable investment for large sectors of Istanbul’s
population.

For the official court fees between 1500-1800, see Coşgel and Ergene, The Economics of Ottoman
Justice, 80.

41

For instance, Ergene illustrates how estate inventories (tereke) show the actual fees charged by the kadı
in overseeing the division of an estate. Ergene, Boğaç. Local Court, Provincial Society and Justice in the
Ottoman Empire: Legal Practice and Dispute Resolution in Çankırı and Kastamonu (1652-1744) (Leiden:
Brill, 2003), 84-89.
42

43
Pamuk, Şevket (ed.), İstanbul ve diğer kentlerde 500 yıllık fiyatlar ve ücretler 1469-1998 (500 years of
Prices and Wages in Istanbul and other Cities) (Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 2010), 106-115, and
Ibidwith Süleyman Özmücür, “Real wages and standards of living in the Ottoman Empire, 1489-1914,
”Journal of Economic History 62 (2002), 292-321, 301; Uzunçarşılı, İsmail H. Osmanli devleti
teşkilâtindan: Kapukulu Ocaklari (2 Volumes, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1984), Vol. 1, 412/413.
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However, according to these official prices, kadı courts were generally less costly
than the Venetian chancellery, for both legal and notarial services. The minimum price
for a sentence in the latter, which changed with the amount in dispute, was 60 aspers
while the kadı charged 32 aspers for any document (hüccet), regardless of the monetary
value of the lawsuit or of the notarial transaction. The same applies for any
credit/commercial agreement drawn by the Venetian secretary, which costed, at least, 120
aspers. If we are to trust the officially recorded fees, we can exclude court costs from the
possible reasons why merchants chose the Venetian consular court over Istanbul’s kadı
courts.
Generally, scholars agree that the actual fees were considerably higher, especially
given the high inflation of Ottoman silver currency during the seventeenth century.
According to Timur Kuran and Scott Lustig, in that century, the kadı of Istanbul and
Galata could collect about 2% from the amount at stake in commercial disputes while
Abraham Marcus claims that in eighteenth-century Aleppo a kadı charged 10% of all
sums contested in legal suits. 44 European observers reported that kadı charged
conspicuous sums which, coupled with bribes and gifts offered to them by litigants to
favor their stance, raised the overall costs of turning to the court. For instance, in 1612
the bailo Simone Contarini reported that, since the fees charged by the kadı were
substantial, numerous Ottoman Jews and Muslims trading with Venice turned to his
consular court instead. 45

Kuran and Lustig, Judicial Biases, 635, Marcus, Abraham. The Middle East on the eve of modernity:
Aleppo in the eighteenth century (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 106.
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“Relazione di Simone Contarini,” in Barozzi and Berchet, Relazioni, 1, 236. Ergene, Local Court, 99124. French consuls in seventeenth-century Tunis too reported about the high costs of the tribunals of the
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4—Venetian Subjects in Kadı Courts
Between 1604 and 1625, the court records (sicil) of Galata contain a total of
13,353 documents of lawsuits, notarial transactions, and imperial commandments. 46
These records include documents issued by the kadıs and copies of imperial orders on
administrative, fiscal, and security matters. Since in the early modern Ottoman judicial
system no specialized courts dealing with particular matters existed, kadı courts dealt
with any kind of civil and criminal dispute and registered a vast variety of legal and
economic deeds, from business contracts to probate inventories (tereke) and documents
about inheritance, divorce, suretyship (kefȃlet), and guardianship (vasiyet). 47 In contrast
to the court of Galata, the records of the court of the kazasker of Rumeli contains 5,223
on civil and criminal cases, mostly inheritance-related disputes and involving numerous
high-ranking Ottoman officials, and no notarial documents. 48
Venetians and other protected foreigners 49 appear in 195 court entries of Galata,
about 1,5% of the 13,353 documents, and only in 8 of 5,223 documents from the

kadıs to explain the recourse to their consular court by Ottoman subjects, Muslims included. Kaiser,
Wolfgang, and Guillaume Calafat. “The Economy of Ransoming in the Early Modern Mediterranean: A
Form of Cross-Cultural Trade between Southern Europe and the Maghreb (Sixteenth to Eighteenth
Centuries),” in Francesca Trivellato, Lior Halevi, and Cátia Antunes (eds), Religion and Trade: CrossCultural Exchanges in World History, 1000–1900 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 108–130, 123.
I analyzed 27 registers of the kadı of Galata: GŞS 25-27, 30, 34, 36, 38, 40, 41, 42, 45, 49, 50, 51, 53The
records did not exist for three years: 1609-1611. Two other court documents, belonging respectively to the
assistant of the kadı of Galata and the kazasker of Rumeli, are recorded in the registers of the Venetian
chancellery. See BAC 277, reg. 397, fols. 306r/307v (19 July 1614); and 278, reg. 400, fols. 113v-114r (29
October 1615).
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Some registers of the kadı of Galata for the years under study contain only probate inventories and
related disputes over inheritance. See GŞS 24, 26, 28/29, 31-33, 35, 39, 44, 46-48, 52.
47
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I studied 19 registers of the kazasker of Rumeli, RSM 25, 27-43.

I include here in my definition of “protected foreigners” both the merchants of the city-state of
Dubrovnik (Ragusa) which was a tributary state of the Ottoman Empire, and the members of Galata’s
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kazasker of Rumeli. These numbers unmistakably demonstrate a limited use of these two
courts by Western European communities in the first three decades of the seventeenth
century. In Galata, the Venetians constituted the largest European community, and they
used the local kadı court more frequently than any other group of protected foreigners, 86
out 195. They appeared in 4 of the 8 lawsuits heard by the kazasker of Rumeli. 50 The rest
of the protected foreigners (109) turning to the court of Galata are local Catholics,
French, English, Dutch, and Dubrovnik merchants. This little number of Europeans in the
court of Galata also contrasts with the total number of lawsuits and notarial transactions
that involved at least one Ottoman Christian or Jew: 5.075 records (about 38% of
13.353). 51 This shows that the Ottoman non-Muslim population of Galata made
substantial use the of kadı court of their district in the years under study.
Table 6.2: The Legal and Economic Affairs of Venetians in the Court of Galata (16041625)
Types of Court deeds

Number of Cases

Percentage

Lawsuits

22

25%

Notarial Transactions

57

66%

Imperial Orders

7

8%

TOTAL

86

100%

Catholic community (the “Franks” of Galata) because both groups enjoyed several legal and economic
privileges according to the Capitulations granted to their community. However, as shown Chapter 1, such
privileges differed from those of Western European merchants.
The actual number of Venetian subjects may be higher because, as we have seen in the Chapter 1,
Ottoman court officials often conflated Venetians with members of Galata’s Catholic community (the
Perots), called “Franks” in Ottoman administrative and legal documents. The actual number of Galata’s
“Franks” is also likely to be higher given the blurred nature of their relation to the Ottoman non-Muslim
population. It is possible that Ottoman court officials registered many of them as Ottoman non-Muslims
(zimmi).
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Here I counted only those court entries where both or one of two parties in dispute are/is non-Muslim or
where a Jew or Christian accomplished a notarial deed.
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The 86 documents of the court of Galata which involved Venetian subjects
included lawsuits (22 cases), notarial transactions (57) and imperial orders (hüküm, 7
cases) issued by Imperial Council on general matters concerning Venetian trade, such as
the rate of customs duties and forbidden goods. Henceforth, I focus my analysis only on
lawsuits and notarial acts handled in the court of Galata and on the four disputes with
Venetian subjects handled by the kazaskers of Rumeli. Together the documents of these
deeds amount to 90.
Lawsuits: adjudication and amicable settlements
Legal suits constitute about a third of all the legal and economic transactions (26
out of 90 cases, the 29%) carried by Venetian subjects in both the kadı court of Galata
(22) and that of the kazasker of Rumeli (4 cases) between 1604 and 1625.
Among lawsuits, I also include four amicable settlements (sulh), which took place
with the mediation of either the kadı himself or members of the local community. Most
legal historians of the Ottoman Empire focus on the kadı’s adjudication which they
consider latter’s exclusive role in litigation processes while they dismiss amicable
settlements as an extra-judicial and informal means of dispute resolution which members
of the community arranged outside the court according to local customs and brought to
court only for notarial purposes. Recent studies of Aida Othman, Işık Tamdoğan, and
Boğaç Ergene cast doubt on this view arguing that the kadı’s himself might have played a
role as a mediator between the parties and that at court he might have promoted a
compromised settlement to end the controversy, especially in communal-sensitive issues
such as intra-family controversies. They also illustrate that Hanafi jurists considered
mediation as one of the kadı’s chief duties together with adjudication (kaza) and they
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valued amicable settlement as a legitimate way to settle a conflict. 52 Unfortunately, court
records do not show the participation of the kadı and other court officials to any amicable
settlement.
Furthermore, we cannot rule out that the cases of mediation might have been
instances of arbitration (tahkim), which, as we have seen in the previous chapters, was an
important means of solving commercial disputes among merchants engaged in OttomanVenetian trade. Despite being sanctioned by Hanafi jurists, research on Ottoman kadı
courts all over the Ottoman Empire so far has not produced instances of this practice,
despite it was spread in the mercantile community of Galata. It is possible that court
scribes recorded arbitration sentences brought to court for registration as cases of
mediation because what mattered to them was the final settlement of the dispute and not
the specific role played by third parties in reaching that outcome. 53
All the 26 lawsuits took place exclusively between Venetian and Ottoman
subjects. In the period under analysis, we find no instance of intra-Venetian disputes as
well as cases between members of different European communities litigated before a
kadı. As we have seen in the two previous chapters, rules of the Venetian community
forbade the use of Ottoman courts by Venetian subjects against coreligionists without the
authorization of the baili or of Venetian consuls. In case of legal suits among European

Mutaf, Abdülmecid. “Amicable Settlement in Ottoman Law: Sulh System,” Turcica 36 (2004), 125-40;
Othman, Aida. “‘And Amicable Settlement is Best:’ Sulh and Dispute Resolution in Islamic Law,” Arab
Law Quarterly 21/1 (2007), 64–90; Tamdoğan, “Sulh and the 18th-Century Ottoman Courts,” Ergene.
“Why Did Ümmü Gülsüm Go to Court? Ottoman Legal Practice between History and Anthropology,”
Islamic Law and Society 17/2 (2010), 215–44; Ergene and Coşgel, The Economics of Ottoman Justice, 127164.
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Coşgel and Ergene. The Economics of Ottoman Justice, 135, note 8.
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subjects of different polities, the ambassador or the consul of the defendant heard the case
and passed judgement following the principle of the actor sequitur forum rei. 54
The 26 lawsuits dealt by the kadı of Galata and the kazasker of Rumeli included
Venetian subjects pitted them against members of the three major religious communities
of early modern Istanbul: Muslims, Christians, and Jews without major differences in the
number of disputes with each of these communities. An analysis of the social status of
these individuals based on their titles of prestige and occupation shows that they all
belonged to the tax-paying group (reaya) of the Ottoman society. 55 It is likely that
disputes between Venetian subjects and high-ranking Ottomans were settled by
diplomatic means or through appealing to the Imperial Council. 56
Civil cases 57
The 18 civil lawsuits arose from mostly unfulfilled credit agreements, such as
unpaid loans (karz) and goods, guarantee contracts (kefâlet), debts of deceased partners,
and one single notable case concerning the contested estates of a deceased Venetian
merchant. All these matters belong to the section of Hanafi jurisprudence called fıkhu’lmu‘âmelât (“transactions”), which included norms regulating daily social and economic
interactions, from business exchanges to family relations. The kadı had full jurisdiction
over these issues and could imprison defaulters. In matters of business contracts, sales
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See Chapter 5, 226/227.

The same is true for the lawsuits involving other Europeans in second half of the century. Kuran, Social
and Economic Life, Vol. 1, 830-920.
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See Chapters 7 and 8 on lawsuits involving prominent Ottoman subjects.

Despite Hanafi law did not distinguish between civil and criminal matters like modern legal systems, I
employ this distinction for the sake of facilitating my analysis.
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and purchases, the same norms of Hanafi law applied to Muslims and non-Muslims.58 As
was the case with disputes litigated in the Venetian chancellery, court cases contain few
details about the commercial undertakings of litigants apart from essential information
about the reason of dispute. None of the disputes involved different forms of Islamic
commercial partnerships. Equally absent from our records are disputes involving
Venetian merchants on shipwrecks, jettison, and freight charges, which the court of
Galata was used to handling Ottoman subjects. 59 Since the Capitulations include several
rulings about shipwrecks, it is likely that disputes over such issues were handled through
diplomatic negotiations.
Before analyzing the disputes, it is important to note that not all the 26 legal cases
may have been “actual” lawsuits. As in the case of European tribunals, an important
function of a kadı court was to certify property rights in order to avoid future
controversies. Individuals could achieve this either with the testimony at court of
witnesses over a verbal or written agreement or by creating a fictitious process. 60 By this
means, two parties pursued litigation in order to have pre-arranged agreements validated
by a kadı and notarized in the court registers as a verdict. Given that, according to Hanafi
law—unless proven deficient due to a legal error— a kadı’s sentence cannot be
overturned, individuals sought a fictitious litigation to achieve a more secure certification

An exception was the mufâvaza (Arabic, mufawada), the partnership of equal partners with unlimited
liability. Udovitch, Abraham L. Partnership and Profit in Medieval Islam (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1970), 46/47; Johansen, Baber. “Secular and Religious Elements in Hanafite Law:
Functions and Limits of the Absolute Character of Government Authority,” in Johanse, Contingency in a
Sacred Law, 189-218, 202/203. For the Ottoman period, see Gedikli, Fethi. Osmanlı şirket kültürü: XVI.XVII. yüzyıllarda mudârebe uygulaması (Sultanahmet, İstanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1998), 140-149.
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White, “Litigating disputes.”
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Ghazzal, The Grammars of Adjudication, 137-141; and Aykan, Rendre la justice à Amid, 121-129.
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of their property rights. Unfortunately, from our records we cannot distinguish with a
degree of certainty between “fictitious” and “authentic” litigations.
In 14 out of 18 civil lawsuits the plaintiffs were Venetian subjects who voluntarily
turned to a kadı court to litigate a dispute. They never employed a legal representative
(vekȋl). We know the result of the litigation process in 11 cases that ended with a verdict
(hüküm, 8 cases), with the defendant’s admission (ikrâr) of his adversary’s claims (2
cases), or with amicable settlement (1 case). In the rest of the disputes (7) the court
registered only a phase of the process of litigation such as the appointment of a guarantor
or the request to submit further proof. 61 The latter disputes were likely resolved outside
the court through extra-judicial means. In the cases of adjudication, the kadı of Galata
and the kazasker ruled in favor of the Venetian side in 5 out of 8 cases. This rate of
victory as well as the higher number of Venetian plaintiffs in civil lawsuits demonstrate a
degree of confidence by the latter in their claims when they applied to this Ottoman
institution.
The legal procedure followed by the two courts in solving the commercial
disputes of Venetian subjects shows standard Hanafi procedures employed by Ottoman
courts to deal with the civil disputes of Ottoman subjects of different religious affiliation,
especially concerning the rules of evidence and the means of settlements. The testimony
of eyewitnesses or expert witnesses, the acknowledgment of the defendant, and mutual
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For instance, see BAC, 278, r. 400, 113v-114r.
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settlement were the key factors in deciding the outcome of a lawsuit (8 out of 11 cases). 62
Despite the admissibility of Venetian witnesses according to the Capitulations, Venetian
plaintiffs always produced Muslim ones, even in controversies against Christians and
Jews. Furthermore, in the years under study, kadı courts did not apply the ruling of the
Capitulations that stipulated the jurisdiction of the Imperial Council over disputes with
claims larger than 5,000 aspers: both the kadı of Galata and the kazasker of Rumeli
handled commercial disputes with sums ranging from 2,500 to 146,000 aspers. 63
Among the 5 disputes settled through oral testimony, in one case the plaintiff
brought expert witnesses to court. In October 1614, the Ottoman Christian (zimmi) and
commercial broker (dellâl) Franceşko veled-i Kosta sued the Venetian merchant Pandeli
over an unpaid brokerage fee (dellâliye). According to Franceşko, Pandeli had bought an
amount of unspecified goods valued 30,000 aspers but he had not yet paid the customary
(mu‘tâd-ı kadîm) brokerage fee of 2% of the value of the commercial transaction. Pandeli
rejected the set price amount of fees and demanded proof of this custom. Then, Franceşko
called to court four Muslim expert witnesses (ehl-i vukūf) who testified that brokers,
according to “old usage” (kānûn-ı kadîm), were used to charging the amount of fees and
then the kadı sentenced Pandeli to the payment. This case shows the importance of local
commercial customs in the adjudication of lawsuits. 64

The two cases of acknowledgment are GŞS 51, 61/A (28 Rebi‘ulâhir 1031, March 12, 1622) and 53 89/A
(25 Zilhicce 1033, October 8, 1624). Another legal proof admitted by Hanafi law, the oath of the parties
(yemîn), is absent in our civil lawsuits but, as we see below, it appeared in criminal cases.
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GŞS, 51, 61/A and 36, 104/B (evâil-i Cemâziyelevvel 1023/ 9-19 June 1614).
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GŞS, 38, 3B (evâil-i Ramazan 1023/5-10 October 1614).
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Concerning the role played by documents in adjudicative processes, they
appeared in only three out of 18 civil disputes. 65 In a notable case, a document
uncorroborated by witnesses, a fetva, proved decisive in the adjudication of a lawsuit. In
June 1624, Petru (Pietro), son of the late Venetian merchant Nikola veled-i Soruri
(Nicolò Soruro), appeared in the court of Galata against the Mustafa Ağa and the
Ottoman Christian Atenaş veled-i Yorgi. Mustafa was the legal representative of
Françeşku, a son whom Nikola had had by an Ottoman Christian woman (zimmiye)
named Angelina, while Atenaş was Franceşku’s legal guardian (vasȋ). Petru demanded
his shares of his father’s inheritance but Mustafa and Atenaş denied his request on the
grounds that he had left the Ottoman Empire to settle permanently in non-Muslim lands
(in Venetian-held Crete), and, as a result, he relinquished his inheritance rights. Petru
submitted to court a fetva of the şeyhülislâm Hocazade Esʿad Efendi that stated that, in a
similar hypothetical situation, if the heir living in non-Muslim territories moves back to
Muslim lands with the “intention to reside there permanently” (tavattun itmek kasdı ile)
he can inherit his father’s estates. 66 Consequently, the kadı ruled that Nikola’s estates
should be divided according to Islamic inheritance rules.
According to Hanafi jurisprudence, a fetva was not a binding legal ruling in a
court case but constituted only the opinion of a jurisconsult on a general controversy.
However, in the Ottoman Empire a consensus among high-ranking ulema developed that
stipulated that kadıs had to comply with the fetva issued by the şeyhülislâm, the most

65
GŞS 25, 143/B (14 Şaban 1013) and 143/C (18 Şaban 1013/ January 9, 1605). Both cases appear in
Kuran (ed.), Social and Economic Life, Vol. 1, 785-788.

GŞS 53, 69/A (12 Şevval 1033/ July 29, 1624). Later, Petru also appealed to the kazasker of Rumeli to
receive the entire inheritance of his father, but he lost the case. RSM 39, 54/B (evȃsıt-ı zilkaʿde
1033/August 24 -September 3, 1624).
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prestigious office in the Ottoman legal hierarchy. Such practice represented an
intromission of a member of the Ottoman central government in the court processes of
kadı courts throughout the empire. 67 The aforementioned case is the only instance of the
use of a fetva by a Venetian subject in a lawsuit in the years under study, even though
evidence from Venetian archives show that Venetian merchants and the baili sought this
legal instrument in the course of commercial and diplomatic controversies. 68
Apart from acknowledgment and adjudication, another way to settle a traderelated dispute was amicable settlement (only 1 case). In early March 1621, the Jewish
siblings Elyaz, Kalita, and Garaca (a brother and two sisters) along with Petru veled-i
Rigun (Pietro Arrigoni), a Venetian merchant, appeared in the court of Galata. Elyaz
stated that his late father Elya veled-i Bali had had a credit of 40,000 aspers towards
Petru for a commercial dealing involving a load of fleece wool (yapağı), which he had
acquired after suing the latter before his death. At a certain time during the litigation,
unspecified mediators (muslihȗn) intervened into the dispute and helped the two parties
to reach an agreement according to which Petru would pay 6,000 aspers to Elyaz and his

Wittman, Before the Qadi, 218-220; Baldwin, Islamic Law and Empire, 73/74. On in the institution of
the fetva (Ar. fatwa) in general see Masud, Muhammad Khalid, Brinkley Messick, and David Powers.
“Muftis, Fatwas, and Islamic Legal Interpretation.” Muhammad Khalid Masud, Brinkley Messick, and
David Powers (eds), Islamic Legal Interpretation. Muftis and Their Fatwas (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1996), 3–32.
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BAC 342 and 345 I contain numerous fetvas issued to the Venetian baili and merchants. On the use of
fetvas in international politics see White, Joshua. “Fetva Diplomacy: The Ottoman Şeyhülislam as TransImperial Intermediary.” Journal of Early Modern History 19/2–3 (2015), 199–221. Court records for the
second half of the seventeenth century too show instances when the submission of a fetva of the
şeyhülislam proved decisive in the outcome of a legal suits involving Western Europeans in Istanbul. For
instance, see Kuran (ed.), Social and Economic Life, Vol. 1, 830-920, 830-832 and 901-904.
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two sisters, a sum much lower than the original claim. In court, the latter declared that he
had received the payment from Petru and that he freed the latter from any further claim. 69
Contrarily to adjudication, the precepts of Hanafi law were not the only norms
regulating amicable settlement, but local customary practices too may have influenced its
achievement. Furthermore, an amicable settlement was not constrained by Hanafi Islamic
evidentiary rules and offered more equitable outcomes than the formal law just much like
arbitration procedures. Taken together, these two factors may have played a role in
choosing this avenue of dispute resolution over adjudication in this and other
controversies. Unfortunately, we do not know the identity of the individuals who helped
Petru and the Jewish sibling to reach a settlement, but we can speculate that they were
members of the international business community of early-seventeenth century Galata.
As all these examples of dispute demonstrate, orality prevailed in the processes of
litigation and resolution of commercial disputes between Venetian and Ottoman subjects
in Istanbul in the first three decades of the seventeenth century. The courts of Galata and
of the kazasker of Rumeli does not seem to have enforced the Capitulations’ ruling that
made mandatory the possession of documents issued by a kadı to sue a Venetian. The
lack of documents did not stop Ottoman subjects from suing Venetian merchants over
business transactions and in 4 out of 8 cases of adjudication the testimony of Muslim
witnesses alone secured the outcome of the legal suit for either the Venetians or their
Ottoman opponents.
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“zimmetini ibrâ ve ıskât eyledim.” GŞS 50, 21/A (evâsıt-ı Rebi‘ulâhir1030/ 4-10 March 1621).
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However, there is a single case that shows how a lack of documentation could at
times become a matter of contention and ended a process of adjudication. In 1616,
several individuals, whose religious identity is not unknown, brought the merchant
Edvardu (Edoardo di Gagliano) before the kadı of Galata. They had suffered economic
losses as a ship carrying their goods had been captured by Christian pirates. At court,
they claimed that Edvardu had stood surety for the any losses suffered by Ottoman
merchants at the hands of Christian pirates during that voyage. Through the help of the
bailo Almorò Nani, Edvuardu managed to obtain a sultanic rescript from the Imperial
Council stating that without existing documents certified by a kadı about the alleged
surety contract (kefȃlet) his opponents could not pursue their claims, even if they brought
local witnesses to court. 70 Apart from this case, evidence from the second half of the
seventeenth century shows little use of documents in the litigation of commercial disputes
of Western Europeans in the kadı court of Galata. 71
Criminal disputes
The other groups of disputes (8 cases) of Venetian subjects dealt with the kadı of
Galata involved criminal offences. These include cases of bodily harm (2), theft (4), and
piracy (2). In Hanafi law, offenses classified by modern secular codes as criminal acts
belonged to different categories. 72 Bodily harms, such as homicide and wounding, were
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GŞS 40, 72/A (evâsıt-i Sefer 1025/ January 29-February 8, 1616)
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See also the 20 legal disputes of European merchants litigated in the courts of Galata and Istanbul in
1660s, 1680s, and 1690s in Kuran (ed.) Social and Economic Life, V.1, 831-92. In three disputes, again
over alleged surety contracts, the lack of documents ended the disputes only after the intervention of
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Hallaq, Sharīʿa 308-311. Sultanic law codes of fifteenth and sixteenth centuries proscribed lesser fines
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“private wrongs” (hakk adamȋ, the “claims of men) and had to be judged along civil cases
like business and family matters. Their prosecution was a private undertaking initiated by
the victim or his/her relatives. By contrast, theft and piracy constituted hudud offenses
which belonged to “claims of God” (hakk Allah): they represented crimes against religion
and a violation of the interest of the whole Muslim community (maslahat-ı âmme). State
authorities had the duty to bring to court and punish the culprits of such offenses by
imposing fixed penalties on them (hadd). 73
In any category of criminal offenses, the kadı only had only authority over the
investigation and trial of the offender while executive officials were to carry out the
sentence. 74 Furthermore, contrary to commercial disputes, according to Hanafi law in all
criminal cases the “local community” (the family of the culprit, the neighborhood, a tribe,
etc.) played an important role since it was charged with bringing the offender to court and
testifying on his/her character. Such testimony proved vital in the type of punishment
assigned to the offender. 75 Failing to bring the culprit to court entailed measures of
collective punishment against the entire community. Given the importance of collective

Evidentiary rules were more stringent for this category of offenses. Johansen, “Secular and Religious
Elements,” 210-218; Hallaq, Sharīʿa, 311-320.
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responsibility in criminal cases, this kind of dispute constituted a sensitive matter for the
whole Venetian community.
We know the outcome of 6 out of 8 criminals cases involving Venetians: two
amicable settlements, one adjudication (in favor of a Venetian merchant), and three cases
that ended, due to lack of evidence, with an oath of innocence (yemîn) from the
defendants. The Venetians figure equally as both plaintiffs and defendants in these penal
lawsuits and were victorious in the only adjudication case. Four of the cases involved the
same episode of theft against the warehouses of several Venetian merchants in Galata in
1605. In three instances, the merchant Marku veled-i Kalifnari (Marco Califonari)
accused several Ottoman Christians and Muslims of stealing some goods (mostly iron
wires, tin canisters, and a quantity of rice) from his warehouse in Galata. Three separate
court entries contain his legal suits against each of the defendants. In one instance, he
accused a group of 13 Ottoman Christians for the theft. In this case some mediators
intervened in the controversy, helping the two sides to reach an amicable settlement
according to which the group of Christians jointly paid 150 sultani to Marco. However, in
two other lawsuits, he charged two Muslim individuals for the same episode, but he failed
to produce evidence to back his claims. In these cases, the kadı asked the defendants to
swear on their innocence (tahlȋf) which ended the lawsuits. 76
In a case of bodily harm, in 1614, Rüstem bin Veli, brother and legal
representative of a boatman (pramacı) named Şah Veli bin Veli, appeared in the court of
Galata with a Venetian captain Pavlo veled-i Françeşku (Paulo di Francesco). Rüstem

GŞS 25, 61/A (22 Cemâziyelevvel 1013, 16 October 1604), 153/B (22 Şaban 1013/ 13 January 1605),
155/B (22 Şaban 1013/ 14 January 1605).
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claimed that, during some night celebrations (şenlik) on Pavlo’s ship, someone fired a
cannonball that crushed Şah Veli’s boat, damaging it and injuring his eyes. Rüstem sued
Pavlo for his brother’s injuries and demanded blood compensation (diyet). Pavlo denied
that such accident had taken place. After the mediation of some individuals, the two
parties reached an amicable agreement: Pavlo would pay 2,000 aspers to Şah Veli to
settle the dispute. 77
As shown in two piracy-related controversies, Istanbul’s courts also heard
criminal lawsuits originating from outside of Istanbul. For instance, in 1617, the ship
captain Manulaki veled-i Antun, an Ottoman Christian from Yeniköy (a village on the
European shores of the Bosphorus) and Antun veled-i Aspatulo, a Venetian subject from
Crete, appeared before the kazasker of Rumeli. Manulaki claimed that about fifteen years
before (hijri year 1010) Antun had attacked his ship (korsanlık idüp) in a port in the
Aegean island of Syros and had stolen a load of wheat (50,280 bushels/kil). Questioned
by the kazasker, Antun denied that he had not committed such an attack and claimed that
he had instead purchased a load of wheat for 180,000 aspers from Manulaki. The latter
failed to produce witnesses to support his claims and the kazasker, after demanding that
Antun take an oath over the Gospels and Jesus, acquitted him. 78
Overall, these criminal offenses involving Venetians show the difficulty of
applying Hanafi law’s evidentiary rules in matters of criminal law. The requirement to
produce at least two eyewitnesses to single episodes of crime made litigation in kadı
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court a complex undertaking. This is particularly true when a crime occurred in a place
far away from the locality where the court hearing took place and when a period of time
has passed from the episode, as the above case episode of piracy shows. The evidentiary
hurdles in criminal litigation may have encouraged litigants to find an amicable
settlement instead. It is likely that pushing the opponent to settle a criminal case may
have been one of the main reasons why individuals started a litigation in a kadı court. 79
Notarial transactions
Notarial services were the main reasons (59 out of 86, or 71%) why Venetian
subjects turned to kadı courts in the early seventeenth century. The kadı court of Galata
was the most important notarial office in that district, the only one whose records, if
corroborated, were recognized by other kadı and Ottoman administrative officials. 80 As
we have seen, the Capitulations prescribed that Venetians and other Europeans register
their business transactions with Ottoman subjects there so that, in case of dispute, the
kadı could find information about them in the court archives.
The first observation concerns the overall number of the notarial deeds of
Venetian subjects: 57 transactions out of all 13,353 court records for Galata for the period
1604-1625. Considering that at least 65 individuals were actively trading between Venice
and Istanbul in the first two decades of the seventeenth century, such a small number of
notarized transactions undeniably demonstrates that Venetian merchants did not follow
the Capitulations’ prescription about the requirement to register business transactions in
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kadı courts. This small figure is even more striking when we compare it with the much
more numerous notarial deeds conducted by Venetian merchants and their Ottoman
associates in the Venetian chancellery: 1,702 documents between 1609 and 1620.
Nevertheless, the relatively few notarial documents pertaining to Venetian subjects drawn
in the court of Galata are important because they indicate the reasons why these
individuals chose this Ottoman institution instead of the Venetian chancellery to certify
their property rights.
The notarial deeds of Venetian subjects at the court of Galata involved the
registration of debt payments, sales of goods, credit agreements, guarantors, slave
manumission, sale, rent contracts, power of attorney, etc. Apart from 4 cases, all notarial
documents (53) concerned business exchanges between Venetian and Ottoman subjects
that took place within the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire. They involved mostly
Ottoman Muslims (27 cases), followed by Ottoman Christians and Jews (31 together).
Contrarily to commercial lawsuits, notarial deeds illustrate trade exchanges between
Venetian merchants and members of both the tax-paying class (reaya) and the ruling
class (askeri) of the Ottoman Empire (6 cases). The latter included members of military
and palace corps such as Janissaries, bostancı, müteferrika, and sipahi. Therefore, as it
was the case with the Venetian chancellery, prominent individuals turned to kadı courts
only for notarial transactions while refrained from bringing legal cases against Venetian
subjects to these tribunals. As shown in Chapter 8, in many cases international diplomacy
played a central role in the resolution of their legal suits with Venetian subjects.
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Table 6.3: Types of Notarial Deeds conducted by Venetians in the Kadı Court of Galata
(1604-1625)
Types of Notarial Deeds

Number of Documents

Percentage

Quittances

36

63%

Credit Agreements

9

16%

Slave manumission

5

8%

Sale

3

5%

Other issues 81

4

7%

TOTAL

57

100%

The largest number of commercial transactions involve the notarization of a
payment (36 court records). These documents are important for the study of long-distance
trade because they contain valuable information about merchants’ debts, their varieties of
goods, and their prices. These records include the debt quittances, credits agreements, the
manumission of a slave (i‘tâk), and the sale of merchandise—mostly raw wool and
Ottoman fabrics, but also wine, jewels, and other goods. Unfortunately, as in the
Venetian chancellery, the records of the court of Galata contain little information about
the actual context in which such payments took place. For example, we do not know if
the payment of a debt was part of a business partnership or a credit agreement. The
monetary value of each single transaction ranged between 14,000 to 210,000 aspers, a
lower value than the of costlier notarial deeds performed in the Venetian chancellery. 82
After debt quittances, the registration of business agreements (9) constitutes the
second most numerous notarial deeds sought by Venetian merchants in the court of
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Galata. While trading in Istanbul and the rest of the Ottoman Empire, Venetian
businessmen and their Ottoman partners could employ different forms of Islamic
commercial partnerships and credit agreements, some of them strongly comparable to
European ones. For instance, Ottoman merchants employed the mudârabe in which one
party provided funds while the other party contributed his skills and then the profits were
divided, or the inân contract in which both parties contributed capital. 83 We do not have
instances of Venetian merchants and Ottoman merchants registering these types of
commercial contracts despite the fact that the records of Istanbul’s courts contain
numerous instances of the notarization and litigation of such contracts by Ottoman
subjects. 84 The business agreements existing in our records do not fit specific types of
Islamic partnerships. In their external form they are credit agreements for expeditions to
redeem Muslim slaves in European territories and for trade operations in the Black Sea.
Expeditions to liberate Muslim slaves (4 cases) involved an agreement between a
relative of the slave and a Venetian merchant. The latter received a sum of money in
advance for the expedition and appointed a surety for the former. These agreements are
the only instances of notarized business contracts between Ottoman and Venetian
subjects for commercial ventures taking place between the Ottoman Empire and Western
Europe. Our records show that between 1604 and 1625 a small group of Venetian and
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other European merchants specialized in this branch of trade. 85 Despite their small
number, these agreements for the liberation of Muslim slaves are important because,
contrary to the ransoming of Christian slaves from Muslim lands, we still know little
about the activities of Ottoman Muslims in redeeming coreligionists detained in
European cities and the Islamic legal and economic institutions facilitating these
ventures. 86
An example is an agreement, made in 1617, between the Venetian merchant Pavlo
veled-i Antun (Paulo Bon di Antonio) and Fatma Hatun ibnet Mehmed, a Muslim woman
from Istanbul, to rescue her son Mahmud bin Mehmed who was detained in Messina, in
Spanish-held Sicily. Fatma committed herself to pay in advance 24,000 aspers to Pavlo
and to pay him a further 19,200 aspers after he managed to save her son. Two
individuals, the Muslim Iskender Ağa bin Bathiyar from Istanbul and the Christian
Françeşku Sokitir (?) veled-i Cani from Chios, where Pavlo also resided, stood surety that
they would repay Fatma Hatun in the event that Pavlo failed to rescue her son. The
mission failed and, in September 1619, Pavlo and Fatma appeared in the court of Galata
to register the return of the money to the latter. 87
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The other types of business agreements (5 cases) concern commercial ventures
between Istanbul and the Black Sea port city of Kiliya (today in Ukraine) located at the
mouth of the Danube, a major transit port connecting Mediterranean and Polish markets.
Despite the fact that the Ottomans, since the fifteenth century, had closed the Black Sea
to foreign shipping, they allowed Venetian subjects, mostly individuals from Crete to
trade in the ports of Kiliya, Akkerman (today Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi), Kefe (Caffa, today
Feodosia) where they brought Cretan wine and other agricultural products and they
purchased local goods such as caviar, codfish, and hides. They usually conducted such
trade by chartering Ottoman ships and hiring Ottoman ship captains (reis) to ship and
trade their goods in Ottoman ports but there are also a few instances of Venetian subjects
themselves venturing into the Black Sea. 88 Such contracts are absent in the Venetian
chancellery. The reasons Venetians registered such agreements in the court of Galata
likely stems from the fact that all the ports on the Black Sea were under Ottoman
sovereignty and the baili had little influence over the trade routes there. Consequently,
Venetian merchants had to rely on Ottoman legal institutions to monitor the activities of
their Ottoman business partners.
For instance, in August 1619, the Venetian merchant Canbatişta veled-i Covan
(Zuanne Battista Cigala di Zuanne) and the Muslim ship captain Mehmed bin Fatih from
Sinop registered a credit agreement, noted in the document simply as kavl—an Arabic
term referring to any form of social, political, and economic agreement. According to it,

On Kiliya and the Black Sea trade in Ottoman period see İnalcık, Halil “The Ottoman State: Economy
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Mehmed would go Kiliya with his ship to purchase an unspecified quantity of codfish
(morina balığı) for 33 aspers of kantar and bring it to Galata, and Canbatişta would pay
him 130 florins (fılori) for the whole expedition. In case Mehmed returned to Galata 15
days later than the stipulated return date, he would need to present a certificate issued by
the kadı of Kiliya explaining the reason for his delay. 89 This agreement resembles the
Islamic hire contract (icâret) which combines both the rent of an object (a ship) and the
hire of human labor. In such a contract an individual performs a specific service in
compensation for a stipulated fee (ecr-i misli) and within a specified duration (müddet) of
time. 90
In another instance of credit agreement, in 1614 the Cretan merchant Kostantin
veled-i Batişta (Costantino Veveli di Battista) and Kostantin veled-i Yorgi, also from
Crete, notarized an agreement about wine trade with Kiliya. Kostantin appointed
Kostantin veled-i Yorgi as the captain of his own ship (mülk) and paid him in advance
125,000 aspers in advance to go Kiliya to conduct trade “as he pleased” (keyfe ma-yaşa)
without specifying the goods to be traded. After his return, he would pay his share of the
whole transaction to his principal. Hıristodul veled-i Kiriyakuz, an Ottoman ship captain,
stood surety for Kostantin veled-i Yorgi. 91 This last instance is remarkable since it is the
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only case of commercial agreement between two Venetian subjects (both from Crete)
which was notarized in the court of Galata in the years under study.
Lastly, a single document concerns the sale of real estate. As we have seen in
Chapter 1, the ownership of real estate by Venetian subjects in the early modern Ottoman
Empire was a matter of contention between Ottoman and Venetian authorities. With the
“Carazo affair,” the Ottomans forbade Western Europeans from owning real estate— if
they did, they would be regarded as Ottoman subjects. The only case of real estate
transaction involved a member of the Venetian community, the dragoman Tomazaki
veled-i Paska (Tommaso Navon di Pasquale). In 1616 he purchased a house valued
120,000 aspers in the district of Bereketzâde in the center of intra-muros Galata from
local Christians. 92 Conversely to long-distance merchants, in the first decades of the
seventeenth century dragomans still enjoyed a blurred status as de facto Venetian
subjects, with tax exemptions and inheritance privileges, but they also benefitted from
social and economic rights usually allocated to Ottoman subjects, such as the right to own
immobile assets. In this court record, Tomazaki is registered as an Ottoman subject.
5—The Baili and the Kadıs
Kadı courts allowed Venetian subjects to solve business and criminal disputes
with Ottoman subjects and register their legal deeds and economic transactions
individually and without mediation or the direct intervention of the Venetian baili. As a
matter of fact, apart from the cases of peaceful settlement, court records do not show
intervention by any non-court officials in judicial processes. However, the baili became
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involved in lawsuits involving Venetian subjects in cases of violations of court
procedures and when they threatened to jeopardize Venetian trade. In order to understand
such intervention, we have to consider the attitudes of the Venetian baili towards the
Ottoman legal system.
The baili’s views of kadı courts
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the baili had an utterly negative view of
the kadı courts, and Ottoman legal system more generally, as did European ambassadors
and consuls, merchants, and travelers to the Ottoman Empire. Such accounts served as
the basis for Max Weber’s famous conceptualization of Kadijustiz in the nineteenth
century as an arbitrary and unpredictable system of law administration resulting from the
unlimited discretion at the disposal of the kadı. 93
According to the baili, the distinguishing features of the kadı justice were the
brevity of the court processes, unappealable sentences, the non-importance of documents
in court procedures, the determinant role of witnesses in civil and criminal lawsuits, and
the exclusive application of Islamic law. 94 The kadı passed sentences quickly—right after
listening to the witnesses, whose testimony was the only acceptable proof at court—but
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they did not admit documents, depositions of lawyers, postponements of judgment, or
appeals. After a testimony against defendants, the latter could defend themselves and the
kadı punished them exclusively according to his discernment—his sentence could not be
overturned. 95 Finally, according to the baili, kadıs exclusively applied Islamic law, which
they deemed notoriously biased against Christians, and they disregarded other bodies of
Ottoman law, such the kanun. 96
The central role of the eyewitnesses in the adjudication process and the absence of
judicial review are, for the baili, the most dangerous features of kadı’s justice, which they
defined as a system of “appalling injustice” (grandissima ingiustitia). 97 In their view,
they entire judicial system depended on witnesses who received monetary compensation
for their testimony by the litigants. The wealthier a litigant was, the more likely he/she
could secure witnesses testifying on his/her behalf and win a legal suit. According to the
baili, such a “market” of witnesses was responsible for numerous avania, a term widely
employed in European ambassadorial accounts to refer to instances of arbitrariness and
“injustice” (at least as Europeans perceived it) committed by Ottoman administrative and
legal officials against the subjects of European powers. 98 The frequent use of false
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witnesses, coupled with the speediness of adjudication procedures, promoted verdicts
highly detrimental to Venetian subjects. The fact that once a kadı issued a verdict it was
unappealable, and the losing party had no choice but to abide by it, made the situation
even worse.
Apart from fast and unjust sentences by kadıs, the other major preoccupation for
the baili were collective reprisals. Despite the fact that Capitulations forbade collective
punishment against the whole Venetian community for the debts of individual Venetians,
the history of Ottoman-Venetian relations shows some episodes of this practice during
major commercial controversies, especially those involving high-ranking Ottoman
officials. 99 Fearing that such episodes would threaten the well-being of the Venetian
community and the smooth flow of trade between the two states, they struggled to avoid,
by the means of diplomacy, the involvement of the kadı’s court in major commercial
controversies since they feared that their quick, biased, and unappealable verdicts would
lead to reprisals against the whole Venetian community.
In criminal matters, the situation was even more complex. The Capitulations do
not contain rulings exempting Venetian subjects from collective punishment for crimes
committed by an individual Venetian, but only general bilateral articles on the
punishment of pirates and bandits. Venetian records show that the baili were much
anxious about criminal deeds of Venetians subjects in Istanbul and that they intervened to
prevent the intervention of Ottoman judicial officials fearing reprisals against the whole
Venetian community. Such concern might not have been wholly unjustified since, as we
For instance, see Arbel, Benjamin. Trading Nations: Jews and Venetians in the Early Modern Eastern
Mediterranean (Brill’s series in Jewish studies, 14, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), 95-168; Stefini, “Ottoman
Merchants.”
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have seen, Hanafi law contemplated measures of collective punishment against the family
of the convicted criminal or the “community” in which he lived (for instance, the
neighborhoods, the tribe, and, in our case, a community of subjects of a foreign ruler).
As an example of crime-related controversy dates from June 1617, when three
young Venetians killed a cavalryman (sipahi) in Galata and fled the city. The latter’s
widow wanted blood money as compensation. She appealed to the kadı of Galata who
had an innocent Venetian subject arrested instead of the three felons and allowed his
release only after a Venetian merchant stood surety for the payment of 400 sequins.
Furthermore, the widow appealed to the Imperial Council headed by the deputy Grand
Vizier (kaymakam), Ahmed Pasha. Fearing further episodes of collective punishment
against Venetian subjects in case the Pasha ruled against the Venetian side, the bailo
strove to settle the case outside Ottoman courts, and achieved this by offering a
compensation (unspecified in our sources) to the widow of the victim. 100
Discouragement of Appeal and Selective intervention
As a general practice, the baili discouraged Venetian subjects from appealing to
the kadı. General regulations of the Venetian communities in the Ottoman Empire
contains instructions (capitoli) commanding Venetian subjects to turn to kadı court
against Venetians and other individuals exclusively with orders of the baili and Venetian
consuls. 101 We do not know if Venetian subjects truly respected this rule, but we can
assume that such rule applied more to lawsuits than to notarial transactions.
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In 1611, we gain glimpse of bailo’s attitude towards to kadı courts from Venetian
records. In March, the bailo sentenced two Jewish merchants, Rabbi Isaac Navon and
Rabbi Simon Acris, to pay 11,745 aspers to the Venetian merchant Zuanne Bernardis
over an unpaid load of leather. Another Venetian merchant, Andrea Orlandi, stood surety
for the payment. Three months later Zuanne had not yet been paid, and, on June 4, he
brought Andrea to court demanding he pay for his surety contract with Isaac and Simon.
Andrea proposed that Zuanne went to the kadı of Galata to force the two Jews to pay
their debt. The bailo ruled that Zuanne should appeal to the kadı with the help of a
dragoman, but, in case he failed there to retrieve his credit, Andrea should pay him. 102As
this case shows, the bailo could authorize a Venetian merchant to appeal to kadı courts
under specific circumstances. However, we do not know if the bailo explicitly authorized
all the 18 lawsuits that the Venetian merchants started in the kadi of Galata in the period
under study.
As a norm, the baili did not become involved in the affairs of kadı courts on the
behalf of Venetian subjects. For the baili lawsuits heard by the kadıs were “private
matters” and became “public affairs” only when the Imperial Council handled them. 103 In
the instructions they received from the Venetian government at the beginning of their
ambassadorship, the latter warned them against intervening in “private matters” (such as
commercial disputes) of members of the Venetian community, fearing that they would be
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held accountable for the debts or the wrongdoings of individual Venetian subjects. 104
Such intervention would have transformed the dispute from a “private” matter into a
“public” controversy between the Ottoman and the Venetian authorities which could have
potentially endangered inter-state relations and the smooth conduct of trade.
Despite these instructions, the baili did intervene in the legal processes of kadı
courts for specific issues such as the nonobservance by the kadı of court procedures
prescribed in the Capitulations, when a lawsuit involved high-ranking Ottoman officials,
or, more generally when it was potentially disruptive for Venetian trade as a whole. Such
involvement entailed the baili’s diplomatic efforts with high-ranking Ottomans, usually
the Grand Vizier, to settle the case outside kadı courts, for instance through diplomacy or
by bringing it to the Imperial Council instead (which was headed by Grand Vizier), to
obtain imperial orders in favor of the Venetian side. The records of kadı courts do not
contain evidence of the role of the baili and Ottoman authorities in court processes and
we should turn to either Venetian sources or imperial orders issued by Imperial Council
to discern their involvement.
The non-observance of court procedures enshrined in the Capitulations amounted
for the baili to a violation of these inter-state agreements. In 1616, Galata’s Christian
Covan veled-i Turigla (Zuanne Turiglia) brought the Venetian Ijepu (Iseppo Vidali) to
the court of the kadı of Istanbul over a debt-related dispute. There, a deputy kadı heard
the lawsuit between them in the presence of a Jewish dragoman instead of a Venetian
one, as the Capitulations prescribed. The kadı passed sentence against Ijepu who was
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later imprisoned. By petitioning the Imperial Council, the bailo managed to free Ijepu
from prison on the grounds that the procedure followed by the kadı had violated the
Capitulations, and he obtained a new hearing of the lawsuit in the Imperial Council
itself. 105 In another instance, which we have seen on page 310, several Ottoman subjects
charged the merchant Edvardu at Galata’s kadı court over a surety contract for damages
suffered during a sea voyage at the hands of Christian pirates. In this case, by referring to
the clause of Capitulations that the possession of documents on legal and business
agreements was mandatory in order to sue a Venetian subject over a commercial matter
(with a claim larger than 5,000 aspers), the bailo managed to have the legal suit against
him dropped.
The bailo also could intervene when the outcome of a single lawsuit could
potentially jeopardize the investments of several Venetian merchants and their partners in
Venice. For instance, in 1614 in the court of Galata Ali bin Yusuf from Jerba sued the
Venetian captain (reis) Nikoluz (Nicolò di Luca) over an act of piracy that had taken
place eight years before near the port of Volos in Thessaly. In this attack, Ali’s son
Süleyman was killed and the goods in the ship seized by Nikuluz and his crew. At court
Ali demanded blood compensation but Nikuluz denied that he had been involved in such
an attack. Ali brought to court a survivor from the attack, a Muslim named Mehmed bin
Abdüsselam, to testify against Nikuluz but he could not produce another witness and,
therefore, the kadı granted him extra-time to bring further witnesses. 106 From Venetian
sources, we learn that in the meantime the Grand Vizier Öküz Kara Mehmed Paşa (office
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1614-1616), also petitioned by Ali, had ordered the confiscation Nikoluz’s ship (Nave
Tobia), which was bound for Venice loaded with the goods of numerous Venetian
merchants.
Being a piracy matter, this dispute was potentially detrimental for OttomanVenetian relations, in the event the kadı issued a verdict against the Venetian Nikoluz.
Pirate attacks by Venetian subjects against Ottoman ships and towns constituted a major
breach of the Capitulations and often led to diplomatic crises. 107 Fearing for Nicolo’s life
and for the potential loss of the ship and its cargo, had the kadı passed sentence against
him, the bailo Almoro Nani intervened into the lawsuit. He summoned the Council of
Twelve to raise money to cover the expenses for solving the case, which he regarded as
an avania, and he entered negotiations with Ottoman administrative and legal officials,
included the kazasker of Rumeli to whom the Grand Vizier had delegated the affair. After
an inconclusive hearing of the case in the Imperial Council the bailo managed to settle
the dispute outside Ottoman courts with the mediation of the kazasker. 108
5—Conclusion
Kadı courts were the principal Ottoman legal and notarial institutions available to
Venetian subjects in early modern Istanbul. Their standing in these courts was dependent
on norms of Hanafi Islamic law concerning non-Muslims in Muslim courts and on
interstate agreements, namely the Capitulations, which belonged to the sphere of sultanic
legislation. The Capitulations stipulated the jurisdiction of these courts over cases
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involving both Venetian and Ottoman subjects, prescribed Venetian subjects to register
business transactions there, and introduced procedural privileges—especially in matters
of testimony and the admissibility of documentary evidence—that aimed to improve their
overall standing vis-à-vis Ottoman subjects.
In spite of the availability of kadı courts to Venetian individuals, as both forums
of justice and notarial offices, and the prescriptions of the Capitulations on their behalf,
evidence from the first three decades of the seventeenth century illustrates that these
institutions played only a little role in regulating Ottoman-Venetian trade. Venetian and
Ottoman merchants turned to these courts in a small number of cases for legal and
notarial services in comparison with the workload of the Venetian chancellery. The
reasons for this modest use of kadı courts was the employment of standard Hanafi
procedures for dealing with the legal suits of the non-Muslims and the little application of
the norms of the Capitulations on behalf of Venetian litigants. The testimony of Muslim
men prevailed in processes of adjudication and both Venetian and Ottoman litigants made
little use of written documents in lawsuits, although the Capitulations made their
possession necessary in matters, like trade-related disputes, which fell within the purview
of Hanafi Islamic law.
However, court procedure alone fails to explain the minor role played by kadı
courts in the Ottoman/Venetian trade: we should also refer to judicial and notarial
alternatives. The presence of the Venetian chancellery—an old-established institution of
commercial arbitration and a notarial office which offered summary/mercantile procedure
and produced documents circulating within Venetian territories and the Venetian trading
system at large—is likely the main explanation why Venetian and Ottoman merchants
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trading with Venice only seldom used kadı courts. As shown by the preeminence of oral
testimony in legal proceedings, in contrast to the Venetian chancellery, kadı courts
represented an institution at the service of Istanbul’s urban population—Muslims,
Christians, Jews—and local social and economic networks.
Despite the limited use of Istanbul’s kadı courts by Venetian merchants, these
institutions provided them with specific legal and notarial services that were unavailable
in the Venetian chancellery. First, they operated as criminal tribunals dealing with
episodes of thefts and physical assaults against Venetian subjects and vice versa. Thanks
to their greater enforcement capabilities, they allowed Venetian individuals to sue felons
and obtain monetary compensations from them or their kin. Second, in kadı courts
Venetian subjects registered commercial agreements with Ottoman subjects for trade
ventures within the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire (like in the Black Sea region) and
with foreign countries, like Malta and Sicily, for rescuing Muslim slaves. Such
documents of commercial agreements are absent in the records of Venetian chancellery,
where Venetian merchants abstained from registering their business contracts altogether.
It appears that Venetian merchants and their Ottoman partners used the notarial services
of the court of Galata only for a few specific services, such as the registration of business
contracts for trade ventures in specific areas of the Ottoman Empire and with nonVenetian territories elsewhere. However, the limited number of both criminal lawsuits
and notarized business transactions shows that such occurrences constituted an exception
in the total workload of kadı courts in Istanbul.
Lastly, this chapter has shown that, apart from the normative framework, political
and commercial issues could also influence the workings of Istanbul’s kadı courts. The
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political, social, and economic context of Ottoman Istanbul and the eastern
Mediterranean affected the workload and operations of these institutions. 109 The Venetian
baili intervened in some lawsuits involving Venetian subjects by appealing to Ottoman
authorities to either interrupt or influence adjudicative processes in favor of Venetian
subjects. Such intervention took place when judicial procedures violated specific rulings
of the Capitulations or when the outcome of a legal suit could potentially jeopardize
Venetian trade in the Ottoman capital. Apart for harming individual Venetian subjects,
the non-application of procedures enshrined in the Capitulations amounted to a violation
of interstate agreements. The role of diplomacy in the resolution of disputes handled by
kadı courts illustrates how much the administration of justice, commercial interests, and
inter-state diplomatic relations were intertwined in early modern Istanbul. The next
chapter extends this examination of the interrelations between political economy and
justice administration by focusing on the Imperial Council.
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109

329

Chapter 7: Claims of Venetian Subjects heard in the Imperial Council
1—Introduction
In 1612, a Venetian merchant named Nikola veled-i Corcu ventured from Izmir
(Smyrna) into the hinterland of western Anatolia to purchase cotton from local producers.
In a locality called Nif, near the city of Manisa, he purchased sixteen sacks of cotton, which
he entrusted to a local Muslim named Hacı Arslan to deliver it to his Venetian partners in
Izmir, Izepu Bergama and Batişta. However, Hacı Arslan did not deliver the cotton. Unable
to retrieve the goods through the local justice, Nikola and his partners appealed to the bailo
in Istanbul for help. The latter filed a complaint within the Imperial Council (divan-ı
hümayun), the “council of state” of the Ottoman Empire and a court of justice headed by
the Grand Vizier. The Imperial Council ruled in favor of the Venetian party and,
subsequently, it issued an imperial order (hüküm) instructing the kadı of Manisa and the
regional governor (Saruhan sancakbeyi) to bring Hacı Arslan and Nikola to court to stand
trial together with Nikola for the undelivered cotton. If Hacı Arslan was to be found guilty,
the order continues, he should immediately deliver the goods to Nikola. If he refused to
comply with the court’s sentence, the order instructed the Ottoman officials to bring Hacı
Arslan, Nikola, and his two partners from Izmir to Istanbul where the Imperial Council
would hear the case and pass judgment according to Islamic law (şerʿle görile). 1
As this case shows, kadı courts were not the only forum of justice in the Ottoman
Empire. Like the inhabitants of medieval and early modern European polities, the subjects
of the Ottoman sultans enjoyed the right to directly petition the sovereign to forward their
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grievances against state officials and coreligionists and to seek new economic rights and
offices in the state administration. In the Ottoman Empire, the central institution dealing
with the petitions of Ottoman subjects from any corner of the empire was the Imperial
Council. It embodied the sultans’ responsibility to maintain order and dispense justice
(adâlet) to all individuals residing in their dominions regardless of religion, sex, and socioeconomic background. 2 Furthermore, the case above demonstrates, the Imperial Council
also dealt with controversies between Venetian and Ottoman subjects arising from daily
business transactions and criminal offenses.
This chapter analyzes the role of the Imperial Council in the legal and economic
affairs of the Venetian community in Istanbul and in the rest of the empire during the first
three decades of the seventeenth century. After presenting the entire range of activities
carried out by this institution regarding Venetian affairs, this chapter focuses on how it
handled civil and criminal disputes between Venetian and Ottoman subjects. I show that,
while this institution rarely adjudicated private disputes involving Venetian subjects, it
intervened in the judicial processes of kadı courts, both in Istanbul and in the provinces, by
instructing kadıs to arrange trials, to follow specific procedures, and to consider types of
evidence. I therefore argue that, in case of the lawsuits of Venetians, the Imperial Council
operated as first and foremost as an overseer of the judicial processes performed in kadı
courts.
What is more, this chapter shows that that the operations of this institution
embodied the political economy of the Ottoman Empire and Venice in the early

Hagen, Gottfried. “Legitimacy and World Order,” in Maurus Reinkowski and Hakan Karateke (eds),
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seventeenth century. The Imperial Council, as both an assembly of Ottoman officials and
a court of justice, supported Venetian merchants residing in the Ottoman Empire by
punishing Ottoman officials responsible of misconduct alongside corsairs, and bandits, by
regulating customs duties, issuing new regulations on trade, and by intervening in local
judicial processes in favor of the Venetian litigants. Therefore, the workings of this
institution illustrate the Ottoman authorities’ desire to encourage Venetian trade and
maintain peaceful relations with Venice in the period under consideration. These Ottoman
efforts are evident in the rulings of the Imperial Council, which prioritized the upholding
of international treaties (the Capitulations), which belonged to the sphere of sultanic
legislation (kanun), over the strict application of Hanafi Islamic norms in matters of legal
evidence, jurisdiction of kadı courts, and procedures of dispute settlement.
At the same time, Venetian diplomacy played a key role in the resolution of legal
controversies involving Venetian subjects that were dealt with by the Imperial Council.
The baili dominated the process of appealing to this institution on behalf of Venetian
subjects and negotiated with Ottoman officials for favorable outcomes for the latter. Such
interventions demonstrate the political nature of appealing to this institution in the early
modern Ottoman Empire for the subjects of Western European powers. Interstate
diplomatic relations and commercial interests jointly affected the administration of justice
in the Imperial Council. In another words, when a legal dispute involving Venetian subjects
was brought to the Imperial Council, it ceased to be a legal case and it became a political
matter settled through diplomatic means.
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2—The Imperial Council in the Ottoman Legal System and the Capitulations
A multi-purpose institution
The Imperial Council served different purposes in the administration of the
Ottoman Empire and its relations with foreign powers. It was both a “council of state”
dealing with major political, military, and economic issues, and as legislative and executive
court which administered public order through law books (kanuname) and ad hoc decrees
(nişan and hüküm) when the need arose. Until the reign of sultan Mehmet II (1451-1480),
the sultans themselves presided over the Imperial Council. After 1480, they endowed their
executive authority to their deputies, the Grand Viziers (sadrazam), with executive
authority. Other permanent members of the Council were the two highest-ranking kadıs of
the Ottoman Empire (kazasker) of Rumeli and Anatolia, the governors-general of these
two administrative divisions (beylerbeyi), the chief of the financial administration (baş
defterdâr), and the chief chancellor (nişancı). 3
The overall authority of the Imperial Council, the frequency of its meetings, and
their location changed throughout the early modern period because of shifting power
configurations in the Ottoman politics. 4 In the first, half of the seventeenth century, it
convened in the Council Chamber (divan odası) of the royal palace (Topkapı Palace) four
days a week (Saturday, Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday). The Grand Vizier also held
councils in his mansion after the regular meetings (ikindi divanı, “the Afternoon Council”)
of the Imperial Council and on every Wednesday (çarşamba divanı) when he met with the
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four chief kadı of Istanbul (intra-muros Istanbul, Galata, Üsküdar, and Eyüp) and
distributed between them judicial cases. 5 When on military campaigns, the Grand Vizier
convened a council in his tent, and in Istanbul he placed, his deputy (kaymakam), to preside
over the Imperial Council’s regular sessions. In regional capitals, provincial governors held
councils that were modelled after the Imperial Council in Istanbul. 6
Any subjects of the sultan—reaya (tax-paying subjects) or askeri (the military and
administrative ruling elite), men, women, Muslims, and non-Muslims—as well as
protected foreigners, could bring their grievances to the Imperial Council. This was a key
component of the legitimacy of the sultans and the embodiment of the Near Eastern idea
of the “circle of justice.” 7 However, the actual process of petitioning the Imperial Council
could be a complex and expensive undertaking. Plaintiffs had to produce a petition
(arzuhȃl), which was often written by a professional petition writer (arzuhȃlcı) or by a kadı
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for a fee, and which had to follow standardized legal formulae. 8 In order to strengthen their
case, plaintiffs could also obtain a legal certificate (hüccet) issued by a kadı court
concerning their claims or a fetva penned by either provincial muftis or, even better, by the
şeyhülislam in Istanbul. The importance of producing written records to submit and support
one’s grievances and to support the case illustrates a key difference between the Imperial
Council and kadı courts, wherein plaintiffs did not need any document to sue an individual.
After producing a petition, an individual had to submit it to the Imperial Council.
In the case that they lived outside Istanbul, they had to travel there or sending the case
through an intermediary. In Istanbul, the plaintiff or their agent could deliver it during the
regular sessions of the Imperial Council or activate networks of acquaintance or patronage
to send the petition to high-ranking Ottoman officials. Another method of delivery was to
approach the sultan during his public appearances, such as the Friday prayer in the mosque
of Aya Sofya, and hope that his attendants would collect the petition and forward it to the
Imperial Council. 9 Those appealing to the Imperial Council in person presented their case
orally before Ottoman officials, while for those sending a petition from provincial cities a
hearing did not take place and the Imperial Council ruled on the basis of the petition, the
submitted documents, and available evidence in Ottoman archives. By the second half the
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seventeenth century, the whole process of petitioning had become a bureaucratized one
with standardized procedures for handling petitions and registering the responses to them.10
The process of petitioning, which entailed paying for the production of written
documents, travelling to Istanbul, and conveying the petition, could incur substantial
expenses. The court also charged a fee for issuing the imperial order sought. According to
the 1613 account book of Kağıd Emini Mustafa Çavuş, a bookkeeper (kâtib) of the Imperial
Council under Sultan Ahmed I (1604-1617), the hüküm issued in response to an
individual’s petition costed 24 Ottoman aspers. 11 According to Richard Wittman, the
Imperial Council’s moderate fees reflected the commitment of the sultans to provide justice
to all subjects. 12 However, given the aforementioned considerable expenses of petitioning
and the likely additional expenses for expediting procedures and, in case of favorable
decision by this court, for having the imperial order enforced in locus, appealing to the
Imperial Council must have been a considerable investment for most of the inhabitants of
the Ottoman Empire. A way of limiting the costs were collective petitions by groups of
individuals. Apart from such occurrence, it is likely that it was mostly preeminent
individuals with substantial financial means turned to this institution.
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As far as the function of the Imperial Council as a court of justice is concerned,
there is disagreement among legal historians of the Ottoman Empire. The Islamic law’s
principle of siyâset-i şerʿiyye (Arabic siyasa sharia), that is, the exercise of political and
administrative power in accordance with Sharia, provided the Muslim ruler with the
authority to maintain public order and to intervene in the judicial administration. 13 Sultanic
legislation (kanun) was the result of this authority. According to scholars like Ronald
Jennings, Haim Gerber, and Wael Hallaq, in the Ottoman Empire such authority was
limited to tax collection, public order, public morality, and criminal law for specific issues
(such the hudud crimes mentioned in the previous chapter), while the kadı enjoyed a
monopoly on the administration of justice. Consequently, these scholars maintain that the
foremost duty of the Imperial Council was to address matters of public order, in particular
grievances against state officials, while it did not play any role in private disputes. 14
Recent studies on seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Istanbul and Cairo, such as
those of Wittmann and James Baldwin, and on eighteenth-century Anatolia, like that by
Başak Tuğ, cast doubts on this view. These scholars show that individuals brought all types
of disputes to the Imperial Council all types of dispute, both private or public, civil, and
criminal. They also argue that individuals sued one another in the Imperial Council without
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turning first to kadı courts, and they provide evidence that this court actually passed
sentences in private disputes thereby not always delegating adjudication to kadıs. Lastly,
these scholars show that lack of formal jurisdictional boundaries between the Imperial
Council and kadı courts existed, apart from cases involving high-ranking Ottoman officials
and the heads of non-Muslim communities.15
As a court of law, the Imperial Council applied the three sources of Ottoman law,
namely, Hanafi Islamic law, kanun, and örf. The Grand Vizier either took decisions after
hearing a petition or delegated different matters to other members of the Council according
to the nature of the dispute and the workload of the court. In matters related to Hanafi law
(umȗr-ı şerʿȋ), such as commercial, family, and property-related disputes, the Grand Vizier
transferred the adjudication to the kazasker of Rumeli, the highest-ranking judicial official
of the Ottoman Empire. In such cases, Hanafi law provided the procedural and doctrinal
framework like it did in kadı courts. 16
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After the submission of a petition, the Imperial Council evaluated the claims of
petitioners based on the evidence available. The inhabitants of Istanbul could take part in
the court hearing and bring witnesses on their behalf. In the case of petitions sent from the
provinces, usually no hearing between the parts took place and the Imperial Council could
assess the claim of an individual only on the basis of the documentation kept in its own
archives. For instance, it could establish a petitioner’s claim resting on a title to property
or to an office that had been granted by a previous rescript registered in its archives. Based
on the information it possessed, the Imperial Council either ruled directly over a petition
or, especially in cases originating in the provinces, delegated the adjudication of the
controversy to a local kadı. 17
A controversial function of the Imperial Council is legal review. In the past twenty
years, scholars of Islamic law and the Ottoman judicial system have challenged the
conventional view that a kadı’s decision was final according to Hanafi Islamic law.
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the one hand, studies on legal doctrine by Baber Johansen and David Powers show that,
during the period of formation of Islamic law (eight/ninth centuries), Hanafi jurists had
already developed procedures to review a kadı’s verdict according to specific jurisdictional
principles and Ottoman jurists developed new arguments in order to accomplish it. Such
reasons include mistakes in court procedures and the legal incompetency of the kadı. 19 On
the other hand, historians working on legal practice, such as Michael Ursinus, Rossitsa
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Gradeva, Fariba Zarinebaf, Richard Wittmann, Eyal Ginio, and Başak Tuğ argue that the
Ottomans created an appellate judicial hierarchy, both in collective empire under the
Imperial Council and in each province under the governor’s Council, in which legal review
could take place. They also provide evidence, admittedly quite limited, of appeals to the
Imperial Council to review a previously-issued court verdict. 20
However, other scholars working on different localities disagree over this function
of the Imperial Council. Focusing on Cairo, Baldwin does not find any instances of an
appellate hierarchy and argues that when plaintiffs brought cases to either the Imperial
Council or the governor’s Council as a second instance, they aimed not have a previous
sentence by a kadı overturned but to have the latter enforced on side. 21 Working on the
administration of justice in the eastern Anatolia town of Diyarbakir during the eighteenth
century, Yavuz Aykan shows that plaintiffs that turned to the governors’ Council sought
either the enforcement power of this institution or the punishment of abusive state officials.
Regardless of their view on the appellate function of the Imperial Council, scholars agree
that enforcement of a kadı’s decision was the main reasons why individuals appealed to
the Imperial Council or the Governors’ Councils in second instance.
Lastly, while the appellate function of the Imperial Council remains controversial,
there is a general consensus that this institution did not have the legal authority to grant
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acts of mercy or grace. In numerous medieval and early modern European polities
individuals could appeal to high magistracies or princely courts, such as the Supplication
Committee of the Holy Roman Empire, the Serenissima Signoria in Venice, and the
Magistrato Supremo in Florence, to ask for the lowering of a fine, the reduction of a
punishment, or even for the cancellation of a sentence altogether. 22 However, Hanafi
Islamic law did not contemplate such practices. According to Wittmann, the Imperial
Council responded only to petitions addressing violations of the law while it could not
grant grace or alms. 23
The Capitulations
The Imperial Council also played an important role in the social and economic life
of the Venetians as well as other Western Europeans residing in Ottoman towns. It issued
new regulations concerning the legal and economic status of the Venetian subjects and the
conduct of long-distance trade within the empire’s boundaries. For instance, it introduced
rules on the rate of custom duties, exemption from newly introduced taxes, new court
procedures, and prohibited goods. 24 These newly introduced rulings thereafter became part
of the regime of the Capitulations, and, consequently, of Ottoman law. As a court, the
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Imperial Council dealt with the baili’s grievances about any types of controversy
jeopardizing the peaceful residence and business activities of Venetian subjects in the
empire, from mistreatments at the hands of Ottoman officials, banditry, and piracy, to
commercial disputes.
As far as the judicial function of this institution is concerned, the Capitulations
stipulated that any lawsuits brought against the bailo should be brought to the Imperial
Council alone. 25 This mirrors the aforementioned Ottoman practice of granting the
Imperial Council the exclusive jurisdiction over disputes involving the heads of nonMuslim communities and high-ranking state officials. In the case of lawsuits involving
Venetian consuls and individual Venetians the situation was less clear. The texts of the
Venetian Capitulations of the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth century did not
specify if consuls and individual merchants could turn to this forum and, if they could,
what kind of disputes they could bring here. The English Capitulations of 1601 introduced
the clause that lawsuits involving claims larger than 4,000 aspers should be heard only in
the Imperial Council. 26 Despite the absence of such articles in contemporary Venetian
Capitulations, several imperial edicts established a similar practice for Venetian merchants
and consuls. For instance, in 1616, an order instructing the kadı of the Aegean Island of
Naxos about consular authority and protection of Venetian consuls and merchants states
the following:
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“According to the Capitulations, [in Naxos] if someone sues the above-mentioned
[Venetian] consul or any other Venetian for a sum of money larger than 5,000
aspers, and if he does not have a court certificate (hüccet) or a title-deed
(temessük) written by himself proving his claim, or in case that a court record
(sicil) about such claim has not been registered in the kadı’s safeguarded records,
the latter should not hear the case or listen to witnesses. The case should be heard
at the Imperial Council.” 27
Given the significant devaluation of the aspers from the late sixteenth century onwards,
such ruling must have been inapplicable to every case brought to the Imperial Council
involving an equal amount of capital, especially if the cases originated in the provinces. 28
This imperial order also illustrates the importance of producing written records in order to
be able to sue Venetians in both kadı courts and in the Imperial Council.
3—The Records and the Types of Legal Acts
Our sources consist of orders (hüküm) issued by the Imperial Council in response
to petitions of the bailo. They are preserved in the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives in the
series Düvel-i Ecnebiye Defterleri (Registers of Matters Related to Foreign States). 29 These
registers cover the years 1604-1628. From the early seventeenth century onward, Ottoman
officials began to keep separate registers of documents concerning the diplomatic, legal,

MMD 6004, s. 2, No 6 (evâsıt-ı Receb 1025/ 24 July-3 August 1616). Köse, Metin Z.. 1600-1630
Osmanlı Devleti ve Venedik Akdeniz’de rekabet ve ticaret (İstanbul: Giza Yayınları, 2010), 171.
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In 1600-1620 5.000 aspers corresponded to about 41,6 Venetian ducats. Pamuk, A Monetary History,
144, table 8,3.
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Adriatic” in Suraiya Faroqhi Another mirror for princes: the public image of the Ottoman sultans and its
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and economic issues of foreign states. 30 The registers under study contain hundreds of
documents concerning Ottoman-Venetian affairs and, as they reflected the daily
application of the Capitulations, constitute an extremely important source for studying
diplomatic and commercial relations between the two powers. 31
The three registers contain 765 imperial orders concerning military, security, legal
and economic matters of Venetian subjects in Istanbul and the Ottoman provinces. 32 They
are short and formulaic documents illustrating how the Imperial Council responded to the
baili’s petitions, yet they tell us very little about the procedures of petitioning, the litigation
of a lawsuit (if it actually took place), or the possible negotiations between Venetian and
Ottoman authorities that led to the issuance of the imperial order. In the case of private
disputes, an absence of Venetian sources on the same episodes means that we know little
about the initiatives of the litigant parties and the role of Venetian consuls in the provinces.

Hitherto, documents concerning Venetian-Ottoman affairs were kept in the archival series Mühimme
Defterleri (Registers of Important Matters).30 I conducted a survey of two registers archival series of the
MD 81, 82 and I found very few cases involving Venetians that were copies of documents kept in the
Registers of Foreign Affairs. See, for instance, MD 82, 282/83. On the different varieties of documents
produced by the Imperial Council and the development of record-keeping practices of the Imperial Council
from the sixteenth century onwards see Emecen, Feridun. “Osmanlı Divanının Ana Defter Serileri: Ahkâmı Mîrî, Ahkâm-ı Kuyûd-ı Mühimme ve Ahkâm-ı Şikâyet.” Türkiye Araştırmaları Literatür Dergisi 3/5
(2005), 107-139.
30

On the importance of these records for studies of European communities and the regime of the
Capitulations see, Goffman, Daniel. Izmir and the Levantine World, 1550-1650 (Seattle: University of
Washington Press, 1990), 147-154; Faroqhi, “The Venetian Presence,” 352-354.
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Furthermore, we do not possess information about the ways in which Ottoman officials
enforced the decisions of the Imperial Council locally. 33
Table 7.1: Types of “Venetian affairs” dealt by the Imperial Council (1604-1628)
Types of Matters

Number of Cases

Percentage

Mistreatment by State Officials

275

36%

General Instructions

143

19%

Travel Documents

94

12%

Private Disputes

76

10%

Piracy

70

9%

Border Issues

57

7.5%

Protection of Catholics

50

6.5%

TOTAL

765

100%

The variety of issues dealt with by the Imperial Council is considerable
demonstrating its nature as a multi-purpose institution. I divide the issues into 7 (etic)
categories. As Table 7.1 shows, the largest group of orders (36%, 275 cases) addressed
episodes, from a Venetian perspective, of mistreatment of Venetian subjects at the hands
of Ottoman officials throughout the empire. Unsurprisingly, the main source of abuse was
the collection of excessive custom duties (32% of 275, 79 cases), followed by the

33
For studies of commercial and maritime litigation combining Ottoman and European sources see van den
Boogert, The Ottoman Capitulations, and “Redress for Ottoman Victims of European Privateering: A Case
against the Dutch in the Divan-ı Humayun (1708–1715).” Turcica 33 (2001), 91–118; and Stefini,
Tommaso. “Ottoman Merchants in Dispute with the Republic of Venice at the End of the 16th Century:
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imposition of illegal taxes (17%), such as the Islamic poll-tax on Ottoman non-Muslims
(harac) and the new extraordinary state taxes (such as the avârız-ı divâniye). Both issues
were sources of repeated controversy and negotiation between Venetian and Ottoman
authorities. 34 The rest of the cases involved arbitrary detention of Venetians, enslavement,
confiscation of their ships, etc. The Imperial Council’s primary role in dealing with the
misdeeds of state officials against Venetian subjects reflects one of the chief duties of this
institution, namely the scrutiny of administrative and military officials.
The second group of matters (19%, 143 documents) concern general instructions to
Istanbul’s and provincial authorities over a variety of issues, from the rate of custom duties,
exemption from newly-introduced state taxes, market regulations, prohibited goods,
consular authority, and court procedures in disputes involving Venetian merchants, etc. In
these cases, the Imperial Council either introduced new rules or, by repeating previous
orders or Capitulations’ articles, instructed local authorities on how to deal with specific
matters. Here, this institution acted as a legislative body by issuing new rulings which
thereafter became part of the system of the Capitulations. 35
Other matters handled by the Imperial Council were the issuance of travel
documents, piracy, private disputes (the focus of this study), borders issues, and
ecclesiastical affairs. In 94 cases (12%), the bailo appealed to this institution to receive a
travel document for himself, other Venetian officials, and merchants travelling in specific
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For instance, see the Venetian merchant’s exemption (not included in the texts of the Capitulations) from
the administratively-fixed prices (narh) for woolen and silk cloths they imported to Aleppo. MMD 17901,
7/2 (evâsıt-ı Rebi‘ülevvel 1028/25 February- 7 March 1618).
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areas of the Ottoman Empire, especially in the Balkans. In Ottoman bureaucratic
terminology, these documents are called yol hükmü or yol emri (literally “commandment
of the road”) and played different roles in the empire’s military and fiscal administration.36
In the Venetian case, they were not safe-conducts since, according to the Capitulations,
Venetian subjects could travel safely through the Ottoman Empire. Rather, these
documents functioned as an identification paper for the bearer and thus as extra-protection
while passing through specific areas of the empire.
Border issues and piracy constituted together 16.5% of all the imperial orders. The
former (57 orders) included irregular warfare and controversies on the jurisdiction of areas
along the Ottoman/Venetian frontier zones in Dalmatia and Albania. Pirate attacks (70
cases) by Ottoman subjects against Venetian shipping, especially in the Ionian and Aegean
Seas and around Cyprus, constituted one of the most dangerous threats to Venetian trade
and a source of numerous complaints to Ottoman authorities by the baili. 37 Despite mutual
clauses against piracy by Venetian and Ottoman subjects, pirate attacks, mostly by
Ottoman subjects, witnessed a sharp rise in the first three decades of the seventeenth
century.
Lastly, I classified ecclesiastical affairs (6.5%, 50 orders) separately due to the
beneficiaries of these imperial orders, namely Catholic priests, and friars. As part of their
duties as ambassadors of a Catholic power, the baili sought imperial orders in defense of
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Catholic Churches and clergymen in Jerusalem and throughout the Ottoman Empire
regardless of the latter’s geographical provenience and political affiliation. From the late
sixteenth-century onwards, protection over Catholic priests and laymen, all called “Franks”
(frenk) in documents of the Imperial Council, became a source of competition between
Venice and France. 38
Regarding locations where disputes arose, the Imperial Council dealt with
Venetian-related controversies originating mostly from the provinces (94%) while only 46
cases took place in the Ottoman capital (6%). Among the latter, 9 cases were private
disputes (7 civil and 2 criminal cases), while the rest of the orders concern episodes of
excessive customs duties and other forms of illegal taxation, instructions on court
procedures, shops, and taxation. Outside Istanbul, the trade hubs of İzmir and Aleppo
figured prominently in the imperial documents, with about 30% together.
We can explain the limited use of the Imperial Council by Venetian officials and
subjects in the Ottoman capital by referring to the presence of the Venetian embassy, an
old-established diplomatic mission. The baili’s constant diplomacy with Ottoman officials
on behalf of Venetian subjects in major legal and commercial affairs might have prevented
many disputes from making their way to the Imperial Council. Contrarily, in provincial
commercial centers, Venetian consuls and subjects suffered from a weaker standing in the
social, political, and economic life of the host society, resulting in numerous petitions
forwarded to the baili in Istanbul.
4—The Petitioning Process
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There is a crucial difference in procedures applied Venetians in the Imperial
Council and in kadı courts. Venetian subjects did not appeal individually to the former but
the baili submitted petitions on their behalf and negotiated a resolution of their case with
Ottoman officials. This contrasts with the use of this institution by Ottoman subjects who,
at least those residing in Istanbul, appealed individually to the Imperial Council regardless
of social status, sex, and religious affiliation. 39 Upon receiving grievances from Venetian
subjects and consuls in Istanbul, or from any corner of the Ottoman empire, the baili
submitted a petition to the Imperial Council by sending his dragomans to the sessions of
the court or forwarded the petition to high-ranking Ottoman officials, sometimes even to
the sultan himself. 40 After reviewing the petition and ruling over the matter, the Imperial
Council issued an order to the either kadı, the governors of the city, or the administrative
region where the controversy had arisen commanding the enforcement of its ruling. This
procedure occurred ubiquitously regardless of the nature of the dispute and applied to all
Western Europeans. 41
The central role of the baili in appealing to the Imperial Council on the behalf of
Venetian subjects shows that this institution dealt with cases involving the subjects of a
foreign state as communal matters and it handled the grievances of Venetians exclusively
through mediation with the representative of their community. Even in the rare cases when
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a hearing took place in the court, the Venetian litigants acted under the supervision of the
baili. 42 In this communal bias, the Imperial Council differed from kadı courts where
Venetians usually appealed individually and without the interference and mediation of
ambassadors and consuls. In the years under study, I did not find a single instance of
Venetian merchants individually forwarding a complaint to the Imperial Council and
defending their case before it.
Most studies of the Imperial Council present the petitioning process as a one-sided
undertaking in which this institution decided over a dispute in a bureaucratic fashion
relying only on a single petition sent by one party. 43 This view derives from an exclusive
reliance on the records of this institution, which only show how the Imperial Council
responded to single petitions. From these records alone we cannot know if, before ruling
over a controversy, the Imperial Council considered the petition of only one party without
considering complaints forwarded by the opposing party as well. Venetian records
illustrate that, at times, that Imperial Council resolved a dispute after evaluating petitions
by both sides as well as after negotiations between the parties and Ottoman officials.
For instance, between 1606 and 1608, the bailo Ottaviano Bon (office 1605-1608)
and the Venetian consul in Egypt became embroiled in a bankruptcy affair involving a
Venetian merchant, Niccolò Algarotti, and his numerous Jewish and Muslim creditors in
Cairo. According to both Venetian and Ottoman sources, Niccolò was the exclusive
responsible for his bankruptcy as he wasted the capital of his business partners in gambling

Apellàniz, Francisco. ““You cannot produce a Muslim witness”: Early Ottoman attitudes towards proof
and religious difference,” Quaderni Storici 51/3 (2015), 633-648, 642/643. For a case involving Dutch
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and non-trade related activities. In 1606 he tried to pay his creditors by selling goods that
he had just received from his principal partners in Venice: Venetian fabrics, paper, glass,
and refined corals valued at 30,000 sequins. The Venetian consul in Cairo endeavored to
avoid such occurrence and had those goods put in a sealed storehouse in the port of
Alessandria (İskenderiye), but Niccolò’s creditors turned to local kadı courts and the
Council of the governor-general (beylerbeyi) of Egypt to collect them.
Over the course of the next two years, urged by the Venetian government and the
principal merchants in Venice, the bailo in Istanbul sent numerous petitions to the Imperial
Council and obtained 7 rescripts ordering the safe delivery of the goods to the consul. The
enforcement of these orders proved difficult since Niccolò’s creditors too petitioned the
Imperial Council via agents sent to Istanbul in 1607 and 1608. The bailo resolved the affair
through negotiations with both the representatives of the creditors in Istanbul and with the
Grand Vizier Kuyucu Murad Pasha (office 1606-1611), who, on the bailo’s request,
prevented the issuance of an imperial order in favor of the creditors. This example shows
that petitioning the Imperial Council could be a two-sided undertaking, involving
negotiations between the litigants and Ottoman judicial and administrative officials. 44
5—Civil Disputes
Between 1604 and 1628 the Imperial Council handled 55 civil cases between
Ottoman and Venetian subjects. Almost all of them, 53 cases, are commercial disputes
taking places in the main trade centers of the Ottoman Empire, such as in Izmir (18 cases),

On the bailo’s diplomatic activities in Istanbul see ASV, SDC, busta 65, No 10, 97r-106r (11/09/1607)
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Istanbul (7), Chios (7) and Aleppo (6). They arose from unpaid debts, undelivered goods,
and debts of deceased businessmen. The two non-commercial disputes involve contested
private ownership of houses and estates. We know the monetary value of the civil disputes
in only 31 out of 55 disputes. As noted above, the Capitulations stipulated that the Imperial
Council hear only cases with claims larger than 5,000 aspers. All the disputes with a
monetary value show claim larger than this sum and ranging between 12,975 to 270,000
aspers. 45
Table 7.2: Religion of the Opponents of the Venetians in the Imperial Council (1604-28)
Religion of the Opponents

Number of Cases

Percentage

Christians

30

54%

Jews

10

18%

Muslims

15

28%

TOTAL

55

100%

Table 7.3: Types of Dispute Resolutions in the Imperial Council (1604-1628)
Types of Resolution

Number of Cases

Percentage

Delegation to Kadıs

25

45%

Specific Order

16

30%

Summon to Court

4

7%

Instructions on Procedures

10

18%

TOTAL

55

100%

45
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is shown by our disputes, foreign currencies also circulated in the Empire such as the Spanish eight-real
piece (riyâl guruş) and the Dutch thaler or lion dollar (esedi guruş).
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As shown in Table 7.2, the 55 civil lawsuits pitted Venetians against Ottoman
subjects (53) belonging to different religious communities, mostly Christians, and, in three
notable cases, even against fellow Venetians. Furthermore, in 7 cases the Ottoman litigants
were state officials—customs officials, Janissaries, and cavalrymen (sipahi)—the latter
two groups belonging to the askeri group. Lastly, in only one case the plaintiff was an
Ottoman subject. 46 As far as court procedures are concerned, Table 7.3 shows that the
Imperial Council applied four varieties of ruling when handling these cases: delegation of
adjudication to a kadı court, specific order, summons to the Imperial Council, and
instructions on court procedures. Below, we will analyze here each type of resolution.
Delegation to a kadı
If the Imperial Council received a petition from the baili but did not have enough
evidence to assess a claim in locus, it could instruct the local kadı to hear the case and pass
a sentence. This delegation of adjudication took place in more than half (38 out of 55) of
all civil cases. According to recent studies this was the usual practice of the Imperial
Council in dealing with petitions of Ottoman subjects from both the provinces and
Istanbul. 47
In 1615, in the Aegean island of Chios (Sakız), the Venetian merchant Gutardu
veled-i Biresu (?) was creditor towards a local Christian individual, Sevastan veled-i
Muratu, of 12,795 aspers for an unspecified business transaction. The latter died and his
heirs divided his belongings. Gutardu possessed a document sealed by a kadı (mühürlü
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“Petitioning the Sultan,” 511-513.
47

353

tezkere) testifying his credit. For reasons we cannot know from our sources, he did not
manage to retrieve his credit from Sevastan’s heirs in Chios through the local justice.
Therefore, he appealed to the bailo in Istanbul. After being petitioned, likely through the
mediation of the Venetian consul in Chios, the bailo obtained an imperial order
commanding the kadı of Chios to summon the heirs of Sevastan to court and to conduct on
investigation (teftȋş) based on the aforementioned document. If the Venetian merchant
manages to prove his claim (hak), the order continues, the heirs of Sevastan should pay
him without any delay. 48
This record shows two important features of the resolution of private disputes by
the Imperial Council. First, documents played an important role in the rulings of this
institutions: in 32 of 55 civil disputes, the Venetian plaintiffs possessed documents to back
their claims, either legal certificates (hüccet) issued by kadı courts or private documents
(temessük or tezkere) produced outside of courts. In the case above, the Imperial Council
instructed the kadı of Chios to investigate the claims of Gutardu based on a legal deed.
Secondly, rather than simply delegating adjudication to a kadı, in the case above the
Imperial Council instructed the latter on how to conduct a trial by showing him the proof
to be examined at court. This illustrates the intervention of the Imperial Council in the
administration of justice in a provincial court. Such interference favored the Venetian
litigants since it made the admission in court of a specific document proving his claims
mandatory. However, it is important to remark that, according to Hanafi evidentiary rules,
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Gutardu would still have needed to produce two witnesses testifying on the document in
order to be able to use it as legal evidence in support of his claims.
Another instance of the delegation of adjudication and interference of the Imperial
Council in the provincial administration of justice took place in 1605 and it involved
Marku, an Ottoman Christian from Ioannina (Yanya) in Epirus, who traded in Venice. He
purchased a quantity of goods from two Venetian two merchants (Covan veled-i Tedarilu
and an unclear one) but he remained indebted of 528 guruş towards the two merchants and
fled Venice without honoring his debt. His creditors held private documents (temessükȃt)
on their credits. They appointed an agent (vekȋl), named Koluna (?), to go to Ioannina and
demand the payment from Marku and, after appealing to the bailo, they obtained an
imperial rescript to help the agent accomplish his task. According to the rescript, the kadı
of Ioannina should investigate the claims of the two Venetian merchants according to
Sharia (hak üzerine şerʿ ile teftȋş eyleyüp). If the claim is proven, Covan should pay Koluna
the sum shown in the aforementioned documents. Between 1605 and 1608 the Imperial
Council issued three imperial orders, with the same instructions, in this case showing the
difficulty of enforcing its ruling in the locality. 49
Apart from its resolution, this case is also noteworthy because it arose from a
business dispute originating outside the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire. As we have
seen in the previous chapter, according to manuals of Hanafi jurisprudence (fıkıh) and fetva
collections of the Ottoman period, kadıs could not hear lawsuits over legal and economic
transactions carried out outside of Muslim lands (darülislam) even if they involved Muslim
DED 13/1, 18/53 (25 Zilhicce 1013/14 May 1605); 38/151 (11 Receb 1015/12 November 1606); 54/235
(14 Safer 1017/30 May 1608).
49
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individuals. In this case, the Imperial Council instructed a kadı to adjudicate exactly this
type of dispute based on the documentation produced by non-Muslims outside the
empire. 50 This case is another example of the intervention of the central government in the
administration of law in a provincial town by setting the procedure to be followed in a kadı
court for a specific case— even if such procedure diverged from the norms of Hanafi
Islamic law. Furthermore, it shows the strong connections between politics of justice and
interstate relations in the operations of the Imperial Council. As a political body, it upheld
international agreements: according to the Capitulations, Ottoman authorities had the duty
to prosecute Ottoman subjects who went to Venetian territories to conduct business and
fled without honoring their business obligations towards local entrepreneurs. The same
responsibility applied to Venetian authorities. 51 In prosecuting Marku, the Imperial
Council was enforcing an obligation enshrined in international agreements, and, therefore,
in the kanun.
In a last example of delegation of adjudicative authority, again in 1605, the
Venetian noble (beyzade) Alvize Kontarin (Alvise Contarini) was creditor towards another
Venetian, Antun, for 2,826 “Venetian silver coins” (Venedik Guruş). 52 He held a private
document (temessük) written by Antun himself concerning his debt. In the meantime, the
latter had become tax-farmer of a saltpan (tuz emini) in the town of Makarska along the
Dalmatia coast, within the borders of Ottoman Bosnia. In order to recover his credit, Alvize

As for documents produced by the Venetian creditors, the agent of the latter required two witnesses in
court to turn these documents into a legally admissible document (hüccet).
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appointed an agent to go to Bosnia. He also petitioned the bailo to obtain an imperial order
to facilitate the mission. The Imperial Council issued a rescript addressed to both the
governor-general and the chief kadı of Bosnia. According to this order, the two authorities
had to bring Antun to court (likely in the provincial capital of Banja Luka) where the kadı
had to investigate the dispute in the presence of Alvize’s agent and pass judgment.
This rare intra-Venetian controversy (there are only 3 examples of such cases)
shows an Ottoman institution handling a commercial controversy between two Venetian
subjects. Despite enjoying judicial authority over Venetian subjects, the baili in Istanbul
and the Venetian consuls could struggle to prosecute Venetian suspects of civil or penal
offenses since, being foreign ambassadors in Ottoman territories, they lacked enforcement
power. In order to enforce their rulings against Venetian subects, they needed to apply to
Ottoman authorities through the Imperial Council. In facilitating the resolution of an intraVenetian dispute within the empire’s boundaries, Ottoman officials were, again, upholding
the bilateral articles of the Capitulations about prosecuting those subjects of one state who
did not pay debts or committed crimes in their home country and resided in the other state. 53
Specific orders
In 16 of 55 civil disputes, the Imperial Council instructed the local kadıs to reach a
particular judgment in a lawsuit. Scholars disagree over the nature of such rulings.
According to Wittman, these orders constituted an actual sentence passed by this court. In
these cases, this institution passed a legal decision that regulated every aspect of a legal
suit with a specific order to implement it. However, according to Baldwin, the Imperial
53
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Council issued these specific orders only when the petitioners possessed title deeds or court
records about a property or a credit. In this case, he notes, the Imperial Council did not
actually adjudicate. Rather, it enforced an already-certified right. Our records confirm
Baldwin’s understanding about the enforcement function of some specific orders. 54
In 1625, the chief kadı of Izmir heard a complex dispute between the Venetian
merchant Vinçu veled-i Domeniko (Vicenzo di Domenico) and an Ottoman Christian,
Dimitri veled-i Mihail, from the Aegean Island of Lesbos (Midilli), over cotton and broad
cloth (çuka). In 1621, Vençu had agreed to send Dimitri broadcloth, valued at 248,000
aspers, in exchange for a quantity of cotton to be given to him 4 months later. Dimitri
delivered 260 kantar of cotton worth 1,000 aspers for kantar, but still owed Vinçu 26.5
kantar of cotton. Three years later, in 1624, Dimitri had still not honored his debt. He
turned to a kadı court and “deceitfully” (hile ile) claimed that, at that time, a kantar of
cotton was valued 4,000 aspers instead of 1,000 as it had been three years before. To
accommodate the new exchange rate, he demanded that Vinçu pay for the 260 kantar of
cotton that he had delivered to him three years before. Otherwise, he threatened to take the
cotton back. After the intervention of (unknown) mediators (muslihȗn), in 1625 the two
sides reached an amicable settlement (sulh). It was agreed that Dimitri would pay 500 riyâli
guruş to Vinçu. The court registered the settlement. In order to forestall any future claims
by Dimitri, Vinçu, or the Venetian consul on his behalf, appealed to the bailo in Istanbul
for an imperial order. The following rescript prohibited Dimitri from suing Vinçu for the
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same dispute since the case had already been decided according to Islamic law, as it is
proven by a hüccet, and consequently the kadı could hear the lawsuit again. 55
In 1609 in Galata, Davud, the trustee (mütevelli) of the Muslim charitable
foundation (vakıf) of Hoca Yunus in intra-muros Istanbul, brought to court Marku Antun
(Marco Antonio Borissi), the chief dragoman of the Venetian embassy in the 1600s and
1610s, over a house (menzil) in Galata that was privately-owned (mülk) by latter’s late
wife, an Ottoman Christian (zimmiye) called Aleksandriye (Alessandra Pironi). According
to Davud, the house, which had been used (tasarruf) by Aleksandriye’s family for one
hundred years, actually belonged to the aforementioned foundation and therefore the
dragoman could not inherit it. After an investigation by a court official (mübâşir), the kadı
Abdurrahman Efendi ruled in favor of the dragoman and issued a title deed (hüccet). Davud
did not stop arguing a claim over the house. The dragoman thus sought an imperial order
to confirm the kadı’s sentence. The Imperial Council issued an imperial rescript addressed
to the kadı of Galata that confirmed the dragoman’s ownership of the house according to
title deed and thereby it prohibited Davud from claiming it further in kadı courts. 56
In the above two cases, a commercial dispute and a real-estate related controversy,
the rulings of Imperial Council constituted certifications of claims already established by
a kadı court trials. The chief kadı of Izmir and that of Galata heard the legal suits and passed
sentences, and the Venetian litigants possessed legal certificates issued from these courts
on their behalf. Furthermore, in the second case, the Imperial Council could also verify the

DED “bir defʻa şerʻle görilüp fasl olunan husûsu bir dahi istimâʻ itmeyüp hâli üzre ibkâ eylemeyesin.”
MM 6004, 26/3, 54/2, 117/3. Daniel Goffman mentions this case in Izmir and the Levantine World, 109.
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Two orders over this case survive. DED 13/1 28 and 34. I did not find documents on this legal suit in
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ownership of the contested house by the dragoman’s wife by relying on imperial archives.
The reason why the Venetian litigants likely sought a sultanic rescript in these cases was
the certification of their rights in the Imperial Council and the enforcement of a kadı’s
sentence.
In another case, there is not mention of a previous lawsuit in kadı court. For
instance, in an intra-Venetian case, in 1612, a Venetian residing in Chios, Covan Andriya
veled-i Kavak, owed 196 guruş to a Venetian merchant, Nikola, who lived in the Venetianheld island of Zakynthos. To recover his credit, Nikola appointed a zimmi living in Chios,
named Françeşku, as his agent (vekil). A letter with Nikola’s own seal and a document of
power of attorney (vekâletnâme) written by Venetian authorities in Zakynthos proved the
delegation of legal authority and Nikola’s credit. In order to expedite the collection of his
credit, Nikola sought the help of the bailo, who petitioned the Imperial Council asking for
an imperial order to force Covan, in accordance with the two aforementioned documents,
to pay his debt to Nikola’s agent and, in case he refused, to deliver him to the Venetian
consul in Chios as he was a Venetian subject. 57 In the following order, the Imperial Council
instructed the governor (bey) and the kadı of Chios to summon Covan and Françeşku to
court and to sentence Covan to pay the latter. If he refused, he was to deliver him to the
Venetian consul as requested by the bailo. 58
A verbatim reading of the records of this dispute would suggest that a specific
rescript from the Imperial Council directed the kadı of Chios to sentence a Venetian subject
“ol temessükât muktezâsınca tâcir mezbûrun [Nikola] hakkı mezkûrun vekîline alıvirilüp eğer hakkın
virmekde teʻalüll ü ınâd iderse medyûn-ı mezbûr [Covan Andrya] Venediklü olmağla Sakız’da olan
konsolosa teslîm olunup ol dahı Âsitâne-i Sa‘âdetüm'e göndermek bâbında emr-i şerîfim taleb itmeğin.”
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using documents produced by Venetian subjects and institutions outside of the boundaries
of the Ottoman Empire. Given that, according to scholarly consensus, Ottoman courts did
not accept documents produced by non-Muslim tribunals, notaries, or by individuals as
evidence in adjudicative processes, it seems unlikely that the aforementioned Venetian
documents constituted the basis of a legal ruling issued by the Imperial Council. Rather, it
is more plausible that, before assenting to the payment, the kadı of Chios verified in his
court the claims of each party or acted as a mediator between the plaintiff’s agent and the
culprit, in the presence of the Venetian consul and with the employment of the
aforementioned paperwork. Otherwise, the kadıs might have delivered Covan to the consul
to stand trial in the latter’s consular court. In other words, the role of the local kadı as either
a judge or a mediator might have been important in assessing the claims of all parties even
though the imperial rescript ordered him to oversee the payment of Covan’s debt without
mentioning any investigation.
Summons to the Divan
A third way to deal with civil disputes of Venetian subjects the Divan was to
directly summon the litigants to the Imperial Council where the kazasker of Rumeli would
assess the claims of the plaintiffs and pass sentence. Such procedure took place in two
different ways. First, in 4 cases, imperial restricts instructed judicial and executive
authorities to arrest the culprits and send them to the Imperial Council to stand trial without
a previous investigation and adjudication by a local kadı. Second, as a preventive measure
in case a convict did not abide by a kadı’s sentence or a commandment of the Imperial
Council itself, the latter could include in his rulings, after the instructions on the solution
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of the controversy, the clause to bring to the case to Istanbul for adjudication as a last resort.
This procedure took place in almost half of all the civil disputes (25 cases out of 55).
All of the 4 cases with direct orders to bring to the Imperial Council originated in Galata
and involved Jewish and Christian debtors of Venetian merchants who fled the Ottoman
capital in order to avoid the payment. For instance, in Galata in 1605, the Ottoman Jews
Musa veled-i Habes and Levi veled-i (?) collectively purchased a load of broad cloth from
five Venetian merchants -Nicolò Soruro, Benetto Bozza, Ludovico Vidali, Ieronimo Paese
and Zorzi Colonna- but remained debtors of 2,056 sultani towards the latter. The Venetians
possessed a legal certificate issued by a kadı court (probably that of Galata) attesting their
credit. In order to not pay their debt, the two Jews left Istanbul and moved to Cairo. One
of them, Musa was later spotted in Gelibolu, a town on the Dardanelles. Under request of
the latter’s Venetian creditors, the bailo petitioned the Imperial Council to arrest him and
make him pay his debt. After responding favorably to the bailo’s petition, this institution
issued an imperial order commanding the kadı of Gallipoli to arrest of Musa and to send
him to Istanbul to stand trial in Imperial Council according to Islamic law. 59
We do not find information in either Ottoman and Venetian sources if such trial in
the Imperial Council actually took place, but it is possible the litigants resolved the affair
in Istanbul among themselves outside this court or that baili intervened in the dispute on
the behalf of the Venetian merchants. The Venetian creditors might have used such order,
which entailed a trial before the Grand Vizier and the kazasker of Rumeli, to put pressure
on their Jewish debtor to pay them or to accept an amicable settlement. The Imperial
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Council issued such direct summons only in four cases all originating in the Ottoman
capital in which the addressee of the orders was always the kadı of Gelibolu, the location
where the debtors of Venetian merchants were spotted. The fact that the disputes had
originated in Galata, where the Venetian plaintiffs resided, may explain why the Imperial
Council, rather than ordering a court hearing in Gelibolu, opted for transferring the case to
the Ottoman Capital so that a trial with all the litigants could take place.
As for the second type of summons, the Imperial Council issued them after either a
specific order or a delegation of adjudication to local kadıs. For instance, in 1606 in Aleppo,
Seyyid Lütfi brought a Venetian merchant named Andul (?) before a kadı claiming that his
later brother, Seyyid Hasan, had a credit towards the latter. After a trial, the kadı ruled
against Lütfi and issued a hüccet to Andul on his victory. As it seems, Lütfi did not stop
demanding his alleged credit from Andul (in other kadı courts?) and the latter managed to
receive an imperial order from the bailo. According to the latter, the chief kadı of Aleppo
cannot hear the case again as a previous sentence existed and, if Lütfi do not stop his
pretensions against Andulu, the kadı and the governor-general of Aleppo’s province
(beylerbeyi) should arrest him and send to Istanbul where he would stand trial in the
Imperial Council together with Andulu. 60
In another example, in 1620 in Istanbul, Radul (Radu Mihnea), the previous ruler
(voyvoda) of the Ottoman vassal Principality of Moldova, was creditor of 300 altun (or
sultani, the Ottoman golden currency) towards Kostantin (Costantino Veveli), a Venetian
merchant sojourning then in Edirne. Radul held a document sealed by a kadı (mühürlü
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tezkere) testifying his credit. He petitioned the Imperial Council to retrieve his credit. The
ensuing imperial order commanded the chief kadı of Edirne to summon Kostantin to court
to ascertain Radul’s credit. In case Kostantin refuses to pay, the order continues, the kadı
should detain and send him to Istanbul to stand trial in the Imperial Council. 61 This is the
only case in our records in which an Ottoman subject filed a complaint against a Venetian
in the Imperial Council and he obtained a rescript on his behalf. Unfortunately, we do not
know if and how Ottoman officials enforced it and the attitude of the Venetian bailo over
this case. 62
Overall, while it seems that a summons to the Imperial Council to stand trial was
an exceptional procedure, it was more common for this institution to opt for this possibility
exclusively as a last resort in case the culprit did not comply with a previous imperial order.
Instructions in court procedures
Finally, the Imperial Council could intervene in civil disputes between Ottoman
and Venetian subjects by instructing the kadı on procedures against them (10 cases). These
instructions addressed important procedural matters such as the type of legal evidence,
which was required in commercial lawsuits involving Venetian subjects, the jurisdiction of
different Ottoman courts over them, the immunity of Venetian consuls from the jurisdiction
of kadı courts, testimony of Venetian subjects, etc. As we have seen, the texts of the
Capitulations include some of these issues while in other instances, such rules on
admissible proof, it was the Imperial Council that introduced them through general rulings,
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and it reiterated them when addressing individual controversies. Such intervention
constituted another instance of interference of the Ottoman center in the administration of
justice throughout the empire.
For example, in early 1613, in Izmir a Venetian merchant named Alvize (Alvise)
was creditor towards some local Christians of an unspecified sum of money. He appeared
with his debtor before a local a kadı and brought some fellow Venetian merchants to testify
on his behalf. However, his debtors denied their debts and they opposed the testimony of
Venetian witnesses on the grounds that the only admissible testimony was that of resident
Ottoman non-Muslims (zimmi). As we have seen in the previous chapter, this was the
position on the matter of most medieval and early modern Hanafi jurists. It seems that the
kadı upheld this legal position and he refused to admit Venetian witnesses. Unable to
retrieve his credit through the local justice, Alvize appealed to the Imperial Council through
the bailo in Istanbul. The ensuing imperial order followed the rulings of the Capitulations
instructing local kadı to admit the testimony of Venetian subjects as long as they “resided”
in the place where the dispute had begun and to rule over the dispute. Again, the Imperial
Council prioritized the rulings of the Capitulations over Islamic law’s rules on testimony.63
Another instance of intervention in court procedures is the lawsuit between Covani Turigla (Zuanne Turiglia), an Ottoman Christian living in Galata, and the Venetian
merchant Ijepu (Iseppo Vidali). In early 1616, Covan brought Ijepu before a deputy kadı

“Mezbȗr [Alvize] dahi Venediklülerden şehȃdetler ikâmet eyledüğünde vech-i meşrȗʿ üzere ahidnâme-i
hümâyȗn muktesâzınca şehȃdetlerin istimȃʿ eyledikten sonra şerʿle sâbit olan hakkın bi-kusȗr aliverup,”
DED 13/1, 103/503 (20 Muharrem 1022/March 14, 1613).
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(naib) in Istanbul over a debt related dispute. 64 A Jew translated the court proceedings to
Ijepu contrarily to the article of the Capitulations that prescribed that the presence at court
of a Venetian dragoman were mandatory otherwise the kadı could not hear the case. The
deputy kadı ruled against Ijepu and sent him to jail for his debt. Complaining about the
illegality of the procedures employed in this trial, the bailo obtained an imperial order
which commanded the kadı of Istanbul to send Ijepu to the Imperial Council together with
a Venetian dragoman to have the case heard again by this institution.
This last case is also noteworthy since the Imperial Council overruled a verdict of
a kadı on the grounds that it violated an article of the Capitulations. This is the only instance
in the years under study in which the Imperial Council annulled a sentence in lawsuit
involving a Venetian subject and ordered a retrial in another forum of justice. As we have
seen above, legal review by the Imperial Council is a topic of debate among scholars of
Islamic law and the Ottoman legal system. This is case is also striking because the legal
basis for the annulment of kadı’s verdict was not the violation of Hanafi legal procedure,
but of an article of the Capitulations, which belonged to the legal sphere of Ottoman
dynastic legislation. 65
6—Criminal Cases
A last group of disputes between Venetian and Ottoman subjects dealt by the
Imperial Council concerned criminal matters. Hanafi law did not conceive criminal
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offenses as belonging to a single unifying category as it happens in many modern secular
legal systems but it divided crimes into two main categories. Homicide and bodily harm
fell within the group of “claims of men,” like commercial and property-related
controversies and they constituted a private wrong. The kadıs prosecuted such them only
upon demand of the victim or his/her relatives. Another groups of offenses, hadd crimes,
belonged to the category of “claims of God” and include theft, adultery, false accusation
of adultery, drinking alcohol, and highway robbery, which included piracy. They
represented “offenses against God” and fixed fines regulated their persecution. Apart from
theft and false accusation of adultery, it was the duty of executive officials (ehl-i örf) and
of the members of a community to bring such crimes to court. Furthermore, contrarily to
civil cases, Ottoman dynastic law (kanun) stipulated the kind of punishment for different
kinds of criminal offenses and the Capitulations too contain articles on these matters,
especially in piracy-related issues. 66
In the period 1604-1628, the Imperial Council dealt with 21 criminal disputes
between Venetian and Ottoman subjects. They included cases of thefts (sirkat, 8 cases),
banditry (6), homicide (4 cases) and 3 instances bodily harms. Apart from one case from
Istanbul, they all took place in Ottoman provinces. The Ottoman culprits were 10
Christians,10 Muslims, including two members of the askeri class (two soldiers), while no
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Jew appeared in criminal cases. Furthermore, in two instances, the baili appealed to the
Imperial Council to arrest and punish Venetian subjects.
As for the procedures followed by this institution in criminal matters, the Imperial
Council applied the same type of procedures in civil and disputes: delegation of
adjudication authority to a local kadı (15 cases), specific orders (5) cases, and summons to
the court (2 cases). However, there is an important difference in the treatment of civil and
criminal cases. Contrarily to commercial and civil disputes, documents played a little role
as evidence in the resolution of criminal matters by the Imperial Council. While in most of
the civil disputes, the Imperial Council instructed kadıs to establish claims of Venetian
subjects based on specific documents, in case of criminal lawsuits it instructed kadıs to
arrange a lawsuit without any particular proof of show. Finally, regardless the nature of the
procedures followed by this institution in criminal disputes, we do not know the actual
punishment afflicted against convicts since our records contain the generic expression “I
order to punish him” (haklarında gelinmek mukarrerdir), its variants.
An example of delegation of adjudication is a case of banditry against a Venetian
merchant and jeweler (koyumcu) Yakumu Silvestri (Giacomo Silvestri) which took place
in 1607 in Tuzla, a locality in Asia Minor close to Istanbul. While sailing to Istanbul from
the Aegean island of Lesbos, he disembarked in Tuzla, but he was there attacked and
robbed by two bandits (şakȋ) who took from him 200 florins (filuri), a diamond valued 140
altun, and a golden ring. Informed on the event, the bailo obtained an imperial order
commanding the kadı of Tuzla to arrest the two culprits and take them to trial. The kadı
sentenced the two bandits to return the stolen goods to Yakumu and issued an hüccet over
the sentence. However, a few months later, the two convicts had yet to return 150 altun to
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Yakumu. Petitioned a second time by the bailo, the Imperial Council ordered the kadı to
bring the convicts to court to return the remaining sum to an agent appointed by the bailo.
In case they avoid the payment, the order instructed the kadı to oversee their punishment.67
An instance of specific order involves a homicide of a Venetian merchant. In 1607,
two merchants, the business partners Yakumu Breşani (Giacomo Bressani) and Antun,
ventured into Ottoman Bosnia to trade. While sojourning in Banja Luka, at that time the
capital of the province (eyâlet) of Bosnia, a cavalryman (sipahi) named Ali broke into their
residence during night, seized some of their goods, and murdered Yakumu while Antun
survived and fled to Istanbul. Following this tragic event, the kadı of that town and the
head of the financial administration of Ottoman Bosnia (defterdâr) visited the crime scene
and, after registering the merchandise left by the two merchants, mostly Venetian fabrics,
sums of money, and private documents (temessük) on their credits towards local
businessmen, they confiscated all of them. Afterwards, they sold all goods at half of their
real price and collected the credits of the merchants. Such actions contradicted the clause
of the Capitulations that Ottoman authorities should not seize the goods of deceased
Venetians but, rather, should deliver them to Venetian officials.
Informed by Antun about the murder of his partner and sale of their goods, the
bailo petitioned the Imperial Council. After negotiations with Ottoman authorities, he
arranged a mission to Bosnia to recover the goods with Antun, the Venetian dragoman
Gianesino Salvago, and an Ottoman official, the kapıcı Ibrahim Ağa. To facilitate the
mission, he obtained a specific commandment addressed to the governor-general of

DED 13/1, 67/315 (20 Cemâziyelâhir1018/9 September 1609) and 72/342 (9 Muharrem 1019/3April 3
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Bosnia and the chief financial official of Bosnia instructing them to punish the murderer
according to Islamic law and to allow the Antun to recover all the goods and credits
belonging to the murdered merchant and himself. 68
A last example of criminal case involved a Venetian bandit. In 1610, Covan, a
Venetian subject from Crete, committed some unspecified “crimes” (bazı fesâdı) in the
Aegean island of Naxos but he managed to flee local justice by going to the island of Tinos
(İstendil), which was then under Venetian sovereignty. Afterwards, probably persecuted
by the Venetian justice as well in Tinos, returned to Naxos. In order to arrest and prosecute
him, the bailo petitioned the Imperial Council asking to arrest and deliver him to some
Venetian envoy he had he sent to Naxos and obtained an imperial order to this end. 69 Also
in this case, the Imperial Council was acting in accordance with the Capitulations by
facilitating the capture of a Venetian criminal in Ottoman territories and his prosecution by
Venetian officials, a bilateral obligation for latter and Ottoman officials as well.
7—Conclusion
In the early modern period, the Imperial Council played many important roles in the legal
and economic life of Venetian subjects residing in Ottoman territories and in the diplomatic
relations between Venice and the Ottoman Empire alike. As a “cabinet of state” it dealt
with major political and military issues between the Venetian and the Ottoman government.
In his capacity as an administrative and legislative body, it oversaw the conduct of trade
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and peaceful relations between Venetian and the Ottoman subjects in Ottoman cities by
introducing norms regulating the marketplaces, legal procedures in Ottoman court of
justice in mixed cases, customs duties, etc. Finally, as a court of justice, it heard the
grievances of Venetian subjects against state officials and Ottoman subjects as well. The
punishment of wrongdoings of Ottoman officials constituted the principal reasons why the
Venetian baili applied to this Ottoman institution on behalf of Venetian subjects.
Private civil and criminal disputes between Venetian and Ottoman subjects
represented a minority of the myriad of issues concerning Ottoman/Venetian relations
handled by the Imperial Council. Despite possessing judicial authority, the Imperial
Council did not adjudicate these disputes, but, rather, it left this task to the kadıs of the
locality where they had taken place. Kadı courts were the main Ottoman tribunals hearing
the legal suits of Venetian subjects and passing judgment over them. However, the Imperial
Council intervened in the resolution of civil and criminal disputes including Venetian
subjects in these courts in two main ways. First, in most of the disputes it instructed the
local kadı to conduct a trail with all litigants, stipulating which procedures he should follow
and, at times, even directing him to consider specific evidence, such as legal deeds
previously issued by other kadıs and private documents. Second, the Imperial Council
commanded local kadıs and executive officials to enforce a legal sentence previously
emitted by a kadı which, for reasons we cannot know, could not be applied in locus. A
ruling of this institution amounted to a further public certification of one’s economic right.
In both cases, the intervention of the Imperial Council in the workings of kadı courts
favored the Venetian side.
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Such intervention in local judicial processes, together with all the different
operations in favor of the Venetian merchants undertaken by the Imperial Council, were
the outcome of both Ottoman and Venetian efforts to protect trade and to maintain peaceful
relations between these two efforts. These political and commercial concerns are all evident
in the Imperial Council’s priority to uphold international treaties in the resolution of
commercial and criminal lawsuits between Venetian and Ottoman subjects. As we have
seen in matters of the type of evidence accepted to courts, the testimony of Venetian
subjects there, and the jurisdiction of kadı courts, this institution prioritized the
enforcement of the clauses of the Capitulations, which belonged to the sphere of dynastic
legislation, over the strict applications of Hanafi law’s legal procedures. The same
emphasis on enforcing international treaties is evident in solving intra-Venetian cases,
which fell outside the purview of Hanafi law.
Overall, the operations of the Imperial Council in legal and commercial affairs of
Venetian subjects in the Ottoman Empire, illustrates the close connection between political
economy of empire and the administration of justice. This institution’s modalities of
resolution of the commercial disputes of Venetian merchants were part of the seventeenthcentury Ottoman policy of encouraging foreign international trade. By upholding the
rulings of the Capitulations, and therefore Ottoman sultanic legislation, Ottoman
authorities became involved in local judicial processes promoting the commercial activities
of foreign merchants. Given the close correlation between international politics,
commercial interests, and politics of justice in the workings of the Imperial Council, the
study of European affairs handled by this institution offers an excellent context to study
the multifaceted and everchanging relations between Hanafi Islamic law and kanun. This
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chapter has demonstrated that, as a normative framework, sultanic legislation played an
important role in the administration of justice, at least for protected foreigners from
Western Europe, in the seventeenth-century Ottoman Empire. This finding contradicts
long-time assumptions that kadı courts dominated the administration of law in the Ottoman
Empire and that Ottoman courts in general were unfriendly to foreign merchants.
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Chapter 8: A Constrained Forum-Shopping
1—Introduction
In the previous chapters, I analyzed the three main legal institutions that played an
important role in regulating trade between Istanbul and Venetian territories. I primarily
examined their clientele, their practices of classifying individuals, and the manifold
judicial and notarial services that they provided to long-distance merchants. As my
results indicate, despite differences in religious affiliation, membership in a political
community, and social status, Venetian and Ottoman merchants used both Venetian and
Ottoman institutions. However, they clearly preferred the Venetian chancellery and
turning to Ottoman courts only when summoned there or for specific legal actions and
notarial deeds. Relying on the findings of the previous chapters and new historical
evidence, this last chapter provides a comprehensive analysis of forum-shopping—the
practice of choosing the forum which offers the best solution to one’s claims or the best
notarial services 1—between Venetian and Ottoman courts in seventeenth-century
Istanbul.
As both a historical practice and an analytical and heuristic tool, forum-shopping
plays an important role in studies of pluralistic legal regimes in empires of the past and in
modern-day nation states. Its existence or absence is taken as a marker of either strong or
weak legal pluralism, of the actual agency of non-state actors, such as foreign merchants
or colonial subjects, and of imperial politics of toleration of ethnic and religious

In this chapter, I focus exclusively on the practice of choosing among different tribunals and notarial
offices in Istanbul. I do not consider here appeals to courts in Venice, Christian and Jewish communal
courts, and out-of-court settlement procedures, such as arbitration panels.
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minorities. According to Ido Shahar, in colonial and postcolonial societies, when an
individual could appeal to more than one tribunal of law in a specific situation and for a
specific service there existed a “strong legal pluralism.” 2 Lauren Benton categorizes
forum-shopping among the different the legal strategies used by colonial subjects to
advance their legal and economic standing in colonial empires. Karen Barkey argues that
the possibility of forum-shopping in the Ottoman Empire was the outcome of strategies
of Ottoman authorities traying to incorporate different religious and ethnic communities
into the imperial system of governance, there by enabling the existence of their own
forums of adjudication next to state courts. 3
The problem with the current scholarly conception of forum-shopping is that it
assumes that court users, as “consumers” of legal services, knew the doctrinal and
procedural differences between the various forums well, and that their aim was only to
secure the best outcome in a specific dispute. Recently, scholars working on pre-modern
and modern European and Middle Eastern states have demonstrated that court users did
not intend exclusively to win a controversy when they “shopped” among different legal
institutions and that financial gains alone cannot account for all the reasons why
individuals chose a particular forum of justice. Religious and legal norms, communal
solidarity, commercial customs, and state regulations affected the use of specific

Shahar, Ido. “Legal Pluralism and the Study of Sharia Courts,” Islamic Law and Society 15 (2008), 112–
141.
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Benton, Lauren. Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400–1900 (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2002), Barkey, Karen. “Aspects of Legal Pluralism in the Ottoman Empire,”
in Richard J. Ross and Lauren Benton (eds), Legal Pluralism and Empires, 1500-1850 (New York: New
York University Press, 2013), 83-107.
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institutions by different religious and political communities. 4 Furthermore, scholars
engaging with the concept of forum-shopping deal exclusively with the resolution of
lawsuits. However, as I demonstrated in the previous chapters, merchants also shopped
between different notarial institutions. The public certification of property rights was
actually the most important reason why they applied to legal institutions in the first place.
How spread was the practice of forum-shopping for Venetian and Ottoman
merchants in seventeenth-century Istanbul? How much leeway did they actually have in
choosing among different courts? What benefits and costs (monetary, reputational, etc.)
factored into selecting either Venetian or Ottoman legal institutions? I answer these
questions by connecting the findings of the previous chapters, by analyzing three disputes
that were brought to both Venetian and Ottoman courts, and by providing examples of
notarial transactions accomplished in both of these institutions. This last group of legal
suits and notarial deeds is the only one in the years under study in which we encounter
cases of businessmen applying to both Venetian and Ottoman courts to win their lawsuit
or to notarize specific legal and economic acts. Therefore, these case studies are
important because they offer insights on the reasons why merchants turned to Ottoman
and Venetian courts and on the social and economic context of such practice.

Smail, Daniel L. The consumption of justice: emotions, publicity, and legal culture in Marseille, 12641423 (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 2003), 29-132; Trivellato, Francesca. The Familiarity of
Strangers: The Sephardic Diaspora, Livorno, and Cross-Cultural Trade in the Early Modern Period (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 153-176, 251-270; Goldberg, Jessica. Trade and Institutions in the
Medieval Mediterranean: the Geniza Merchants and their Business World (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2012), 120-179; Marglin, Jessica M. Across legal lines: Jews and Muslims in modern
Morocco (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016), 12/13, 77-102; Baldwin, James. Islamic Law and
Empire in Ottoman Cairo (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017), 72-98, 117-135; Lauer, Rena N.
Colonial Justice and the Jews of Venetian Crete (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019),
76-101; Apellániz, Francisco J. Breaching the Bronze Wall: Franks at Mamluk and Ottoman Courts and
Markets (Leiden: Brill, 2020), 143-205.
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I argue that the occurrence of forum-shopping —both for the adjudication of disputes and
for the registration of business deeds and legal acts— for Ottoman and Venetian
merchants was limited primarily by communal regulations, legal norms, reputational and
monetary concerns, and, above all, by the by the specialization of different institutions in
distinct legal and notarial services. Such specialization, in turn, stemmed from long-term
commercial exchanges and practices of dispute resolution and the certification of
property rights between Venetian and Ottoman merchants in Istanbul.
2—Shopping among Courts of Justice
A Dubrovnik nobleman against a Venetian merchant (1612-1616)
The first case, dating 1612-1616, pitted Luca Menza, a nobleman (nobilouomo)
from the Ottoman-tributary Republic of Dubrovnik, against the Venetian merchant
Giacomo Brachi and his partner Zorzi Sumachi, a Venetian subject from the island of
Zakynthos.
In February 1612 in the city of Lamia (Ott. Ezdin) in central Greece, Giacomo
and Zorzi, and Luca concluded a credit and registered agreement in a private document
(scrittura), according to which the Venetians declared themselves debtors solidum of
1,500 Dutch lion thalers (esedi guruş) towards Luca for a load of Venetian fabrics that
they promised to unload on Luca’s ship. However, for unknown reasons, they remained
debtors of 1,125 thalers, and, more than two years later, in August 1614 Luca appeared
before the bailo in Istanbul to sue Giacomo. On August 27, Luca pledged to respect the
bailo’s sentence in that dispute with the condition that he could appeal such sentence in
ordinary tribunals in Venice. As we saw in Chapter 4, this procedure was used at times by
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non-Venetians litigating a lawsuit in the Venetian consular court on request of their
Venetian opponents. Giacomo asked the bailo to allow him to send to send an envoy
(messo) to Lamia to collect written evidence (scritture) on his behalf. Two months later,
Luca appeared again before the bailo to request a time limit for Giacomo to produce
proofs on his behalf. The bailo granted 72 days to Giacomo. However, one year later, in
November 1615, the dispute had not yet been solved since Luca presented new evidence
on his behalf and complied with the decision (terminatione) of the bailo to produce a
guarantor to testify that he would respect the bailo’s sentence.
Litigation in the Venetian consular court did not take place. Unable to recover his
credit, sometimes in 1616 Luca brought Giacomo before the kazasker of Rumeli, the
chief judicial authority of the European provinces of the Ottoman Empire. This official
had the strongest enforcement power in Istanbul, and this might explain why Luca turned
to his court instead of that of Galata. Furthermore, as shown in Chapter 6, this court
usually handled lawsuits involving high-ranking individuals, like Ottoman administrators
and Luca himself, who was a nobleman. Instead of adjudicating the dispute, the kazasker
ruled that the two litigants should appoint arbiters to verify Luca’s claims. Such a
decision is noteworthy since it shows the kazasker’s role as a mediator rather than as a
judge in the resolution of a lawsuit, a still little known and debated function of Ottoman
kadıs. 5 The two litigants chose two Jews, Rabbi Matatia Ben Castiel and Rabbi Lazaro di
Iseppo. The former was a businessman hailing from Dubrovnik while the latter was a

5
Tamdoğan, Işık. “Sulh and the 18th-Century Ottoman Courts of Üsküdar and Adana,” Islamic Law and
Society 15 (2008), 55–83, 76-80; Coşgel, Metin and Boğaç Ergene. The Economics of Ottoman Justice:
Settlement and Trial in the Sharia Courts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 134-143. I did
not find records of this dispute in the records of the tribunal of the kazasker of Rumeli. The likely
explanation for such absence is that fact that the kazasker did not adjudicate the dispute but opted for an
out-of-court arbitration.
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commercial broker (sensale) for European merchants in Galata. Both engaged in
Venetian-Ottoman trade in the 1610s and 1620s. 6 We cannot know the reasons why they
chose two Jews as arbiters, but we can assume that likely preferred their distance from
the litigants, since they were members of a different religious community as well as their
expertise in trade matters and their business reputation in the Ottoman capital. However,
the two arbiters did not agree over the sentence and appointed a third arbiter, the English
Ambassador Paul Pindar (office 1611-1620). Therefore, the dispute also assumed an
international dimension with the intervention of a high-ranking arbiter.
The three arbiters reached a decision on December 3, 1616, sentencing Giacomo
and his partner Zorzi to pay his debt of 1,125 thalers towards Luca. However, Giacomo
refused the arbitration order with the “excuse” (inventione), according to Luca, that his
partner, and not himself, was the real debtor and he threatened to bring the case to the
kadı court of Galata. Possibly in order to avoid such occurrence and to quickly settle the
controversy, Luca decided to reach a compromise with his debtor. On December 15, he
turned to the Venetian chancellery to register a written declaration (quietanza) in which
he stated his willingness to halve his claim against Giacomo down to 562,5 thalers and to
end any legal action against him. However, he also added that he would pursue his claim
against Giacomo’s partner for the other half of his credit from the 1612’s transaction. 7
We do not know how this second dispute concluded.

Matatia Ben Castiel appeared as an arbiter also in an intra-Venetian dispute in 1616. BAC 278, b. 400,
fol. 251v (11 August 1616).

6

BAC 317, reg. 3, fols. 9r (21 August 1614), 11r/12r (27 August 1614), 59r/60v (9 December 1614), BAC
278, reg. 400, 117v (12 November 1615), 119r, (16 November 1615); BAC 279, reg. 402, fols 11r-13v (15
December1616). The final document of settlement (quietanza) contains most of the information about Luca
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A Venetian merchant against a “Frank” of Galata (1614-1616)
In October 1613, the Venetian merchant Ludovico Vidali died in Galata. In the
following months, his numerous Venetian and Ottoman creditors appealed to the
Venetian consular court to obtain the confiscation of his monetary assets and
merchandise from his legal and business representative (commesso) and commissioner
(commissario), Nadalino Sanguinazzo, an Ottoman Christian in Galata. Among the
creditors there was another Ottoman Christian from Galata, Zuanne Turiglia. 8 In the fall
1614, Ludovico’s brother Iseppo Vidali came to Istanbul, commissioned by his father
Stefano, to recover the estates of Ludovico and the credits he owned towards other
merchants. 9
Failing to recover his credit through a confiscation mandate, on February 8, 1615,
Zuanne Turiglia brought Iseppo to court demanding that, as the heir of his brother
Ludovico, he pay him 26,855 aspers for a credit towards the latter. Iseppo rejected
Zuanne’s claims on the grounds that the late Ludovico was the actual creditor towards
Zuanne, and he asked to be granted two months to prove the claim. The bailo Cristoforo
Valier granted Zuanne 8 days to prove his claim. 10 However, two months later, on April

Menzi’s actions against Iacomo at the kazasker of Rumeli, the following arbitration, and the settlement of
the case.
BAC 317, reg. 3, fol. 52v (16 November 1614). Zuanne Turiglia and Nadalin Sanguinazzo were members
of Galata’s Catholic community of Genoese descent (the Perots, the “Franks of Galata”). In Ottoman
sources, they appear as Ottoman subjects (zimmi). See Note 14 below.
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The commission (procura) had been registered in a Venetian notarial office.
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BAC 317, reg. 3, fol. 74r (14 February 1615).
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9, after failing to produce any proof of his claim, Iseppo was sentenced to pay Zuanne for
his brother’s debt. 11
In the meantime, numerous other creditors of Ludovico sued Iseppo to collect
their credits and goods from Ludovico’s estates, which were kept in the Venetian
chancellery, while both Iseppo and Nadalin strove to collect credits owned by Ludovico.
They managed to retrieve 13,128 aspers from Ludovico’s debtors that became the focus
of a dispute among seven different creditors of the latter, both Venetian and Ottoman
subjects, including Zuanne. Each of them obtained a confiscation order for that sum of
money. Because of the many conflicting claims over Ludovico’s estates, the dispute
between Zuanne and Iseppo dragged on for several months. 12
On December 13, Zuanne and Antonio Timon from Chios, the legal
representative of Iseppo (avvocato), appeared before the new bailo Almoro Nani. Zuanne
asked for receiving the 13,128 aspers that had been deposited in the chancellery since he
possessed two sentences issued by the previous bailo against Iseppo. Antonio rebutted
Zuanne’s claims on the grounds that, according to a document of power of attorney
(commissione) drafted in a notarial office in Venice by Iseppo’s father Stefano, Iseppo
was the exclusive legal representative (commesso) of Stefano who was the only heir of
his son Ludovico. Therefore, he maintained that the sentences of the previous bailo did
not apply to the sum of money deposited in the chancellery. The bailo supported Iseppo’s

BAC 378, reg. 400, fols. 23s-27v (9 April 1615). On the same day, Nadalin made an inventory of all the
goods and credits/debts of the late Ludovico.

11

For all these developments, see BAC 279, reg. 400, fols. 69v (25 June 1615), 73v/74v (4 July 1615), 98v
(25 September 1615), 99v/100r (28 September 1615), 109v/110v (19 October 1615), 116r (3 November
1615), 117v/118v (12 November 1615).
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stance and ruled against Zuanne inviting him to pursue his claims against Stefano Vidali
in Venice. 13 Zuanne rejected the sentence, and, on the same day, he and Ludovico’s other
creditors obtained a confiscation mandate over the sum of money kept in the
chancellery. 14
Being unable to retrieve his credit using the Venetian consular court, in January
1616 Zuanne appealed to Ottoman tribunals. He took Iseppo before a deputy kadı (nâib)
in intra-muros Istanbul, which was outside of the jurisdiction of the kadı of Galata. After
a trial in the presence of a Jewish dragoman, the judge ruled in favor of Zuanne and
imprisoned Iseppo for bankruptcy. Iseppo chose this deputy kadı outside Galata because
he likely considered the latter as less knowledgeable with legal procedures in lawsuits
involving Western Europeans than the kadı of Galata and, therefore, more likely to rule in
his favor. On January 31, fearing for the economic losses of all Iseppo’s creditors arising
from the sentence of the kadı, the bailo collected 1,000 aspers to obtain his release. He
also petitioned the Imperial Council to ask for the release of Iseppo since he had stood
trial in an Ottoman court without a Venetian dragoman, whose presence at court was
mandatory according to the Capitulations. In his petition, the bailo asked that, once freed
from prison, the dispute between Iseppo and Zuanne should be heard again in the
Imperial Council in the presence of a Venetian dragoman. Such a request shows the
bailo’s willingness to transfer the case to the Imperial Council, which, being both a
political and judicial institution, meant that inter-state diplomacy played an important role

BAC 278, reg. 400, fols. 128r/ 129r (9 December 1615). In November 1614, Iseppo had registered the
document of power of attorney drawn in notarial office in Venice BAC 317, Vol. 3, fols, 48/49 (1
November 1614).
13
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BAC 278, reg. 400, fols. 129v (9 December 1615) and 41r (14 January 1616).
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in the resolution of private disputes. The Imperial Council ruled in favor of freeing
Iseppo. 15
However, this Ottoman court did not hear the dispute which ended in the Venetian
consular court. On March 3, the bailo issued a new sentence in favor of Zuanne, allowing
him to recover the 26,855 aspers that he had awarded by the first sentence in his favor in
February 1615. It is possible that this outcome was the product of an out-of-court
agreements between all parties and the sentence was only a certification of their
agreement through a fictitious trial. According to the text of the final sentence, in the
months after the first verdict new information had emerged that Iseppo was not the heir
of his brother Ludovico but only the legal representative (commesso) of their father
Stefano. This notwithstanding, the text continues, it was “unreasonable” (non
ragionevole) that Zuanne suffered a loss due with “these pretests of inheritance and
commissionership” (sotto pretesto di heredità et commissaria). Therefore, the bailo
confirmed his predecessor’s sentence and ruled that Zuanne should be paid with money
recovered from the sale of Ludovico’s goods kept in the chancellery. 16
A Venetian against a royal merchant (1613-1616)
This last dispute was a debt-related lawsuit (1613-1616) between a Venetian
merchant, Simon Tosi di Faustino, and a royal merchant, Mehmed Ağa bin
Abdülmennan. Mehmed traded goods with Venice in the name of the sultan himself and
different high-ranking Ottoman officials and he held different honorific titles in the royal

15

GŞS 40, sayfa 72/A (evâsıt-ı Muharrem 1025/29 January-8 February 1616).

16

BAC 278, reg. 400, fol. 169r (3 March 1616).

383

palace. He was therefore a member of the Ottoman ruling group (askeri). 17 Given the
social and economic preeminence of this individual, the case involved different Ottoman
and Venetians courts and the intervention of the baili and officials and magistracies in
Venice. It is an important case since it shows the legal ways pursued by a Venetian
subject against a member of the Ottoman elite and the attitude of both Venetian and
Ottoman authorities towards such controversy.
The dispute originated from a commercial dealing in June 1610 in which Simon
sold an amount of silk textiles to two Jewish businessmen, Isaac Riglialogo e Iosef
Pancieri, who held the office of tax farmers (emin) of customs duties in Galata, for the
price of 180,185 aspers. According to the document of the transaction written in Ottoman
Turkish (a tezkere), the Jews committed to pay the goods by 30 December of the same
year. Mehmed Ağa, who was then the overseer (nazîr) of commerce in Galata under the
authority of the chief financial official of the Ottoman Empire (başdefterdâr)
Ekmekçizâde Ahmed Pasha (office 1606-1613), stood surety of the payment of those
goods. 18 The two Jews failed to honor their debt, and, on December 29, they drafted
another agreement with Simon in which they committed themselves to pay 150,000
aspers by exempting him from customs duties for the goods he received from Venice by
the land caravans for the next four months. In case the exception did not produce that
sum, they agreed to pay the entire sum by 4 months. 19

17

We briefly discussed this individual in Chapter 2, 108.

A receipt (tezkere) of delivery recorded the transaction. Its translation into vernacular Italian is in SDelC,
busta 12 (unnumbered record dated 23 December 1613).
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However, in the following months, Ahmed Pasha removed the two tax farmers
from their office, making it impossible for them to honor their debt. Simon then sued
Mehmet Ağa for the payment of his credit in Ottoman courts. He appealed to the Imperial
Council, which was then headed by a deputy Grand Vizier (kaymakam), instead of kadı
courts. This choice was likely motivated by the stronger enforcement powers of the
Imperial Council and by the role played by inter-state diplomacy in solving the
controversies of Venetian subjects there. This court issued an order (buyrultu) compelling
Mehmed to pay that sum of money to Simon. 20 However, Mehmed refused the payment
on the grounds that the two Jews had been removed from office and he appealed to
Ahmed Pasha. The bailo Simone Contarini then intervened in the dispute negotiating a
settlement between, on the one hand, Mehmed and Ahmed Pasha, and, on the other hand,
Simon. The litigants agreed to a compromise: Ahmed Pasha would pay for Mehmed’s
100,000 aspers to Simon instead of 180,185 of the original agreement with the Jews. In
March 1611, the Pasha paid 50,000 aspers to Nicolò Soruro, Simon’s representative, and,
through a written agreement (tezkere), he promised to pay the rest later without setting a
date. The agreement did not mention the Pasha as the debtor of Simon but only Mehmed.
Further imperial commandments instructed Mehmed to pay the debt of 50,000 aspers. 21
However, two years later, in 1613, the Pasha had not paid yet the rest of
Mehmed’s debt. In that year, the sultan Ahmed I (r. 1604-1617) removed him from the

It is likely that the bailo himself petitioned the Imperial Council on Simon’s behalf. As we saw in
Chapter 7, this was the standard procedure in case of the disputes of Venetian subjects brought to the
Imperial Council. However, our records do not show the bailo’s role in appealing to this institution in the
dispute between Mehmed and Simon even though a copy of the imperial order was sent to the bailo. Both
the original Ottoman document of the commandment and its translation into vernacular Italian are in kept
in BAC 345 I (unnumbered and undated record).
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office of chief financial administrator and sent him to Damascus. Simon was then in
Venice. In order to put pressure on Mehmed to honor his debt, he applied to Venetian
courts to order the confiscation of Mehmed’s merchandises and capital from Rabbi Mose
Mazoad, Mehmed’s commercial agent in Venice. In November of that year, Mehmed,
then holding the tile of kapıcıbaşı of the Grand Vizier Nasuh Pasha (office 1611-1614),
complained to the bailo Cristoforo Valier over the confiscation claiming that Ahmed
Pasha, and not himself, was the debtor of Simon. The bailo took the matter very seriously
since he feared that Mehmed, being “closely associate” (intimo) to the Grand Vizier,
could seize the goods of Venetian merchants in Galata as a reprisal against his
confiscated goods in Venice. 22
The Venetian government ordered an inquiry over the affair. The Venetian Board
of Trade (Cinque Savi alla Mercanzia) summoned Simon who reported on the dispute
and presented the available documentation over his credit. This magistracy ruled in favor
of his claims against Mehmed and confirmed the confiscation of the latter’s goods. 23 In
Istanbul, Simon’s legal representative, the Venetian merchant Nicolò Soruro, appeared in
the Venetian chancellery on October 1613 to notarize the 1611 declaration (tezkere) of
Ahmed Pasha to prove Simon’s credit. 24 The following year, August 1614, Mehmed
agreed to pay his debt and he sent a representative, Rabi Abraam Abeniacar, to deliver
the 50,000 aspers in the Venetian chancellery. 25
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The payment did not end the dispute. In 1615 Simon returned to Istanbul and
appealed to Venetian and Ottoman institutions to claim the original credit towards
Mehmed, 180,185 aspers, of which he had only recovered 100,000 after the agreement
with Ahmed Pasha. In late September, he appeared before the kazasker of Rumeli, who
had been commissioned by a deputy Grand Vizier to deal with the dispute, together with
Mehmed to obtain the remaining 80,165 aspers. 26 He brought to court a Muslim witness,
Müeyyid ül-din bin Ali, who confirmed the 1610’s business transaction of silk textiles
but he mentioned Mehmed and not the Jewish tax farmers as the actual purchasers of
those goods from Simon. However, Simon failed to produce a second witness, as was
required by Hanafi Islamic law, and so the kazasker granted him extra time to produce
one. 27
Failing to present another witness, Simon joined the other Venetian creditors of
Mehmed, the Venetian merchants Nicolò Soruro and Zuanne Battista Orlandi, to whom
Mehmed owed 65,000 and 56,000 aspers, respectively. Through their commercial agents
in Venice, they obtained the confiscation of goods Mehmed in Venice valued 2,500
sequins (about 300,000 aspers in 1616). In early July 1616, Mehmed allowed the bailo to
arbitrate the dispute. He came to the Venetian chancellery to appoint Rabbi David
Abudente, a prominent Jewish merchant in Galata, as both his representative (scritto in
corte) in the dispute and as his guarantor (piezzo) that he would comply with the sentence

26
It is possible that the Grand Vizier had transferred the controversy to kazasker after hearing the case in in
the Imperial Council. Unfortunately, our sources do not provide any information on the process of
appealing to this authority.

BAC 278, reg. 400, fols. 113r/114r (29 October 1615). The hüccet (translated into vernacular Italian) was
dated 3 Ramazan 1024/ 25 September 1615.
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of the bailo over the controversy. 28 Upon the registration of this guarantee, the three
Venetian creditors agreed to remove the sequestration mandate against Mehmed’s goods
in Venice. All the three Venetian creditors were finally compensated by David in October
1616 without litigating the controversy in the Venetian consular court. 29 This suggests
that an out-of-court agreement between the parties might have taken place.
The limits, the historical occurrence, and the costs of forum-shopping for adjudication
These three cases illustrate important features of the practice of forum-shopping
for merchants engaged in Venetian-Ottoman trade. First, statistically, appealing to
different Ottoman and Venetian courts to win the same lawsuit was an exceptional
practice within the mercantile community trading between Istanbul and Venice in the
seventeenth century. Second, these legal suits lasted a long time—even years in all the
three cases described above. Third, they involved important disputes with large claims,
well-to-do litigants, and the intervention of high-ranking authorities, such as the Venetian
ambassadors and different Ottoman judicial and administrative officials, in the process of
resolution.
We can explain the few recourses to multiple forums of adjudication by
considering monetary and business-wise factors. Such practice was costly: it entailed the
payment of court fees in different tribunals, expenses to produce specific evidence, such
as notarized documents or the testimony of eyewitnesses, and to hire/consult with legal
experts, and likely other costs to have the final verdict implemented. Furthermore,
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turning to different courts required lengthy procedures of resolution since the litigants
had to produce specific evidence in different courts, take part in multiple court sections
and out-of-court negotiations, and, likely, also appeal to non-judicial authorities, like
ambassadors, to influence the settlement on one’s behalf.
More generally, a long and costly litigation process in public courts also harmed
long-term commercial relations between two businessmen and damaged their reputation
in the mercantile community trading between Istanbul and Venetian territories. It entailed
the disclosure of business dealings, the interruption of business transactions, publiclyannounced subpoenas, and legal actions like sequestration mandates that damaged
commercial operations of the litigants and their partners as well. 30 It is not a coincidence
that the protagonists of the three disputes above were not long-term business partners.
Our sources do not show other instances of commercial transactions between the
litigants, both before the disputes and after their resolution. It is likely that the recourse of
the litigants to both Ottoman and Venetian courts might have constituted an escalation
that ended business relations, which both parties did not foresee to continue.
Scholars working on legal pluralism and on trade and institutions in pre-modern
societies usually focus on the different enforcement powers of legal institutions to explain
the choice of specific forums of adjudication by historical actors. 31 Let us consider the
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recourse to Ottoman forums of justice by Venetian and Ottoman merchants in the three
disputes above. It is tempting to consider such practice as motivated by the strongest
enforcement powers of these institutions and by the failure of a previous arbitration in
either the Venetian consular court or out-of-court among businessmen. In the first two
instances, Ottoman plaintiffs brought Venetians to kadı courts after failing to obtain
justice in the Venetian consular court. In the third case, the Venetian plaintiff sued his
Ottoman opponent in the Imperial Council before filing a complaint against him in the
Venetian chancellery. Collectively, the cases ow that enforcement of a business
obligation was definitely a component of the reasons for choosing Ottoman state courts in
addition to or instead of using the Venetian consular court.
However, in those disputes where individuals appealed exclusively to either
Venetian or Ottoman courts, we find that enforcement was not always a central concern
in choosing a specific tribunal. I am referring here to those legal suits in which Venetians
appealed to Ottoman courts alone, and those cases in which Ottoman subjects only turned
to the Venetian chancellery in lieu of Ottoman courts against either Venetians or other
Ottoman subjects. In other words, in these cases merchants chose to bring their lawsuits
exclusively to a single forum of justice outside of their political and religious community,
and they were not summoned there by other individuals. This was the most common form
of forum-shopping among merchants who were active in Venetian/Ottoman trade in

Litigious Sea (1590–1630): Hard Cases, Multi-Sited Trials and Legal Enforcement between North Africa
and Italy,” Past and Present 242 (2019), 142-178, 156-163.
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seventeenth-century Istanbul. As a practice, it differed among religious and political
groups and between Venetian and Ottoman courts. 32
Table 8.1: Venetian Subjects choosing Ottoman Courts in Istanbul (1604-1628)
Type of Ottoman Court

Venetian Plaintiff

Total Number of Disputes
with Venetians

Kadı courts

14

26

Imperial Council

4

9

TOTAL

18

44

In the year under study the use of Ottoman courts by merchants engaged in
Venetian-Ottoman trade was limited. As we saw in Chapters 6 and 7, between 1604 and
1625, the kadı court of Galata and that of the kazasker of Rumeli heard only 26 lawsuits
between Venetian and Ottoman subjects while the Imperial Council handled private
disputes of Venetian subjects in Istanbul only in 9 cases during the same period. 33
Among these cases (35 in total), we find 10 criminal disputes, which, given the types of
cases, were automatically transferred to Ottoman courts without the possibility of
choosing the Venetian consular court. Therefore, we are left with 25 trade-related
lawsuits, which Venetian and Ottoman merchants in Istanbul chose to solve in Ottoman
Muslim courts in the twenty years under study. In 18 cases, the Venetians brought
Ottoman subjects to these courts while in only 4 cases it was the other way around.
It also possible that Ottoman Jews and Christian shopped between their own communal courts and
Ottoman Muslim tribunals or the Venetian chancellery. However, due to the lack of systematic studies of
Jewish and Christian communal courts in early modern Istanbul, we cannot ascertain the existence and
frequency of this practice. See Kermeli, Eugenia. “The Right to Choice: Ottoman, Ecclesiastical and
Communal Justice in Ottoman Greece,” in Christine Woodhead (ed.), The Ottoman World (Abingdon:
Routledge, 2012), 347–361.
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Among the defendants, Ottoman Muslims and non-Muslims appeared in about the same
numbers (8 and 10, respectively) signaling that Venetian plaintiffs sued Ottoman subjects
in Muslim courts without any regard for religious identity.
Table 8.2: Ottoman Subjects choosing the Venetian Chancellery (1600-1620)
Plaintiffs and Defendants

Number of Disputes

Ottoman plaintiff/ Venetian defendant

88

Ottoman plaintiff/Ottoman defendant

20

TOTAL

108

The small number of legal suits handled by Ottoman tribunals contrasts with the
198 disputes (out of 434 legal suits) between Venetian merchants and Ottoman subjects
heard by the Venetian baili between 1609 and 1620. In 108 (54%) of these mixed cases
(198), it was Ottoman subjects who brought a Venetian individual to the Venetian
consular court in the first instance. 34 They included 20 cases in which Ottoman subjects
sued one another in this tribunal. Furthermore, 72 of these disputes involved Ottoman
Jews who, statistically, represented the religious and ethnic group that mostly shopped
among Venetian, Ottoman, and their own communal courts in commercial disputes. The
overall higher number of lawsuits started by Ottoman subjects in the Venetian consular
court rather than in Ottoman courts is significant given that the Venetian chancellery was
less capable of enforcing its rulings in Istanbul, especially in disputes including Ottoman

As shown in Chapters 2 and 3, given the unclear political status of many Christian users of the Venetian
consular court, the actual number of Ottoman subjects suing Venetians in that institution could be higher.
On the religious affiliation of Ottoman litigants in the Venetian chancellery see Chapter 5, 224.
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subjects. Nevertheless, instances of individuals refusing its sentence are very few: 29
cases out of 434 lawsuits adjudicated there. 35
The limited use of Ottoman courts by Venetian and Ottoman merchants illustrates
that, in our historical context, providing the strongest enforcement power was not the
main reason why merchants chose either Venetian or Ottoman courts. Similarly, court
prices do not seem to have played a role in this choice either. As we saw in Chapters 3,6,
and 7, according to official price lists of court services, the Venetian consular court was
more expensive than kadı courts in Istanbul and the Imperial Council in matters of
litigation costs. This explains, in part, why it was largely prominent Venetian and
Ottoman subjects that used this institution to solve a commercial dispute. As shown in
Chapter 5, Venetian merchants, ship masters, and well-do-to Ottoman Jews dominated
the legal suits handled by this institution.
Communal rules, legal norms, and international treaties played a more important
role than enforcement and court prices in regulating access to forums of adjudication for
Venetian and Ottoman subjects. In the Venetian case, the baili forbade Venetian subjects
to use Ottoman courts in disputes with other Venetians, and, as we saw in Chapters 6 and
7, they discouraged them from turning to these courts even when dealing with Ottoman
subjects and they oversaw their appeals to Ottoman courts. Furthermore, according to
Ottoman law, Muslim courts had jurisdiction over criminal suits between Venetian and
Ottoman subjects. These two norms were applied during the period under study since we

27 of them were instances of legal appeals in courts in Venice while the other 2 cases are the first and the
second dispute described in this chapter. See Chapter 5 on legal appeals in Venice.
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did not encounter any intra-Venetian dispute heard in Ottoman tribunals while the
chancellery did not handle criminal suits.
However, as the use of the Venetian consular court by Ottoman subjects shows,
state regulations on jurisdictional boundaries were not always upheld. According to the
Capitulations, any dispute between Venetian and Ottoman subjects fell under the
jurisdiction of Ottoman courts. This notwithstanding, we have plenty of instances of
Ottoman subjects turning to the Venetian chancellery to litigate a commercial dispute
against both Venetian subjects as well as coreligionists. As a matter of fact, Ottoman
businessmen in dispute with Venetian merchants, mostly Ottoman Jews, applied more to
the Venetian chancellery than to Ottoman courts. This demonstrates that the Ottoman
authorities allowed a degree of liberty to Ottoman subjects, at least to non-Muslim ones,
to turn to foreign legal institutions in commercial matters. They also recognized the
validity of the law administered in the Venetian chancellery, which they considered as
“customs” of a community of merchants.
Together with communal rules and legal norms, we should refer to court services
to explain why Venetian and Ottoman merchants mostly chose the Venetian consular
court to settle their trade-related disputes. This court specialized in commercial
arbitration: the bailo’s goal as a commercial arbiter was to quickly solve controversies
and repair business relations. In order to achieve this, he applied summary procedure
which entailed a less formalist approach to legal evidence and, more importantly, a focus
on the “facts” under dispute (business contracts and the actions of individuals), rather
than on the social status and the religious affiliation of the litigants. This allowed nonVenetians to be treated in this court on par with Venetian subjects. Furthermore, thanks to
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his regular correspondence with Venetian authorities, the bailo could mobilize Venetian
magistracies in Venice and elsewhere on the behalf of individual merchants. By all these
means, the court provided confidence and stability in commercial transactions between
Istanbul and Venice. Its operations reflected the bailo’s consular duty to promote
Ottoman/Venetian trade in a period of increasing commercial competition in the eastern
Mediterranean by European and Ottoman merchants. Taken together, summary procedure
and the baili’s policy to promote Venetian/Ottoman trade were the key factors in the
choice of the Venetian chancellery as a forum of commercial arbitration.
The “justice of the bailo” belonged to the legal culture of a mercantile community
trading between the Levant and Western Europe since the Middle Ages. Evidence shows
that summary justice was applied in commercial disputes in Galata since, at least, the
fourteenth century. 36 It was a justice exclusively for merchants and other economic
operators who engaged in shipping activities, like shipmasters, scribes, and seamen. The
baili did not deal with family law-related controversies or disputes resulting from the
contested ownership of real estate or the personal status of individuals. Rather, he
exclusively handled controversies arising from commercial undertakings and navigation.
Furthermore, the justice administered by him does not point to a universal lex mercatoria
in the eastern Mediterranean, since, as we have seen, the baili only handled controversies
among businessmen engaged in Ottoman/Venetian trade. Rather, it was the justice of a
professional community trading between Ottoman and Venetian territories.

Promis, Vincenzo. “Statuti della colonia genovese di Pera,” Miscellanea di storia italiana edita per cura
delle Regia Deputazione di Storia Patria 11 (1870), 513-780, 732/733.
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From the sixteenth century onwards, this professional community also included
several Ottoman subjects, above all Istanbul’s Jewish merchants. In the Ottoman capital,
this group of businessmen constituted a social order, or a “norms-generating
community,” 37 with its own normative structure that transcended political and
confessional lines. All merchants regardless of religious and political affiliation had to
pay consular duties (cottimo) to the baili to be able to trade with Venice and they had to
follow their rulings concerning navigation and traded goods. They also recognized the
baili as the arbiters for controversies related to trade and shipping activities. The few
instances of merchants rejecting their sentences demonstrates that their judicial authority
in commercial matters was generally respected despite their little enforcement power in
Istanbul. Noncompliance likely harmed the reputation of businessmen within this group,
and it might have compromised future commercial undertakings. 38 In matters of
administrative and judicial authority within a professional group, the standing of the baili
resembled that of heads of Jewish and Christian communities and of artisan groups in
Istanbul’s marketplaces that arbitrated intra-group controversies according to their
“customs” but lacked enforcement powers. 39

Berman, Paul. Global Legal Pluralism: A Jurisprudence of Law beyond Borders (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2012), 13.
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Court and the Rise of Commercial Society in Eighteenth-century France, New Haven, 2007), 66/67. On
business reputation and the use of public tribunals, see also Fontaine, Laurence. Moral economy: poverty,
credit, and trust in early modern Europe (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 268-296.
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This trans-imperial and cross-religious professional community did not formally
exist. Rather it was the creation of trade developments started in the sixteenth century,
with the expansion of the individuals who could engaged in Venetian-Ottoman trade, like
non-citizen Venetian subjects, Ottoman Jews, Christians, and Muslims.40 The members
of this group only shared a common business pursuit: trade and shipping operations
between Venetian and Ottoman territories.
Furthermore, not everybody was integrated in the same way within this
professional group. The members of the Venetian community had to follow strict rules in
matters of commercial activities and judicial appeals, as they could not use Ottoman
courts in disputes with other Venetians and the baili oversaw their legal disputes with
Ottoman subjects. In contrast, our records show that Ottoman subjects, mostly Ottoman
Jews and Christians, were less susceptible to the admonitions of religious and communal
authorities when choosing a forum of justice to solve their commercial disputes. They
first and foremost preferred the Venetian consular court to solve disputes during
commercial ventures between Istanbul and Venetian territories. As shown in Chapter 2,
these two religious and ethnic groups were also more integrated in the Venetian
commercial system and business practice, and they relied on far-flung trade networks
between the Levant, Venice, and the rest of Western Europe. In the case of Muslim
merchants, their little use of the bailo’s court for solving disputes points to their limited

For an overview of these developments, see Arbel, Benjamin. Trading Nations: Jews and Venetians in
the Early Modern Eastern Mediterranean (Leiden, Brill, 1995), Fusaro, Maria. Political Economies of
Empire in the Early Modern Mediterranean: The Decline of Venice and the Rise of England, 1450-1700
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
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integration within the legal culture of the Venetian consular court and within commercial
networks operating between Istanbul and Venice.
3—Shopping among Notarial Offices
Apart from shopping across judicial forums, we should also consider the practice
of choosing between different notarial institutions in Istanbul. Both the Venetian
chancellery and the kadı courts of Galata operated as notarial offices and registrars for
both Venetian and Ottoman subjects. Actually, it was the need to certify business
dealings and legal acts that motivated Venetian and Ottoman merchants to apply to these
institutions in the first place. In contrast to judicial matters, in notarial practice no formal
prohibition existed, neither in Venice nor in the Ottoman Empire, against Ottoman and
Venetian merchants turning to Muslim, Christian, and Jewish scribal institutions. 41
Table 8.3: Venetians and Ottomans Shopping for notarial services
Individuals and Notarial Offices

Number of Deeds

Venetians in kadı Courts

57

Ottoman subjects in the Venetian chancellery

582

We should first consider the practice of registering the same business agreement
or legal document in both Ottoman and Venetian courts. In the year understudy instances
of such practice are exceedingly rare: two grants of power of attorney and three
documents of debt cognizance registered by Muslim merchants. It is possible that these

For different contexts, see Burns, Robert I, Jews in the notarial culture: Latinate wills in Mediterranean
Spain, 1250– 1350 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 32– 5; Marglin, Across Legal Lines,
83-94; Apellániz, Breaching the Bronze Wall, 100-125.
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merchants chose to record these acts in both Venetian and Ottoman courts to be able to
produce written documentation in courts in both Istanbul and in Venice in case a dispute
arose. The fact that only Muslim merchants opted for this double certification of legal
acts and economic deeds might point to lack of familiarity with the Venetian legal system
and business practice, and to their need to possess more documentation in this unfamiliar
system. Double certification might have offered a stronger guarantee for the court users
in case of controversy.
For instance, in December 1613 the merchant from Aleppo el-Hac Hasan ibn
Abdülkadir and Sena bint Abdüllah, the widow and heiress of the late merchant Cebeci
Behram bin Abdüllah, appeared in the court of Galata to record the granting of a power
of attorney (vekâlet). Behram had died the previous month near the Adriatic port of Split
(Spalato) when he was going to Venice with a load of camlets (sof) belonging to Hasan.
The latter and Sena appointed Derviş Ali bin Mehmed, another merchant from Aleppo
who was then in Venice, and Andrea Fontana, a commercial broker for Muslim
merchants (sensale dei turchi) in the city, to recover the estates of the late Behram. 42 Two
months later, in February 1614, Hasan and Sena registered the same document of power
of attorney (procura) in the Venetian chancellery. 43
The other three instances of notarial documents drawn by both Venetian and
Ottoman courts are instances of debt acknowledgment. For example, in July 1607, the
merchant Hoca Mesud ibn Ramazan from Tosya appeared in the tribunal of the district of
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Mahmud Pasha, in intra-muros Istanbul, to register a declaration before a deputy kadı.
According to it, Mesud had given to Mahmud bin Keyvan 1,580 sequins to go to Venice
and deliver them to Mesud’s legal agent in that city, Cesare Nicsia, another broker for
Muslim merchants. Mesud asked Mahmud to swear that he had received the sum of
money and had forwarded it to Cesare. Mahmud complied. In August 1609, two years
later, Mesud appeared in the Venetian chancellery to notarize the court document
(hüccet) suggesting that some controversy over the delivery of that sum of money might
have arisen between the two business partners. 44
These instances of the double-registration of legal acts and commercial deeds are
exceptional in the years under study. In most notarial transactions, Venetian and Ottoman
merchants chose different notarial offices for recording specific acts and business
transactions. In the case of the kadı of Galata, Venetians executed 57 notarial deeds
between 1604 and 1625. They included the registration of commercial transactions, credit
agreements, documents of power of attorney and surety, and debt quittances. They almost
exclusively regarded business transactions taken place within the boundaries of the
Ottoman Empire. As we saw in Chapter 6, among them the instances of credit agreements
drawn in the court are significant because Venetian and Ottoman merchants only
exceptionally registered such agreements in the Venetian chancellery. The reason of the
choice of kadı courts for registering these contracts was likely because of the stronger
enforcement power of this institution when disputes over contracts took place in Ottoman

We have only the translated notarized document drawn by the court of Mahmud Pasha. BAC 276, reg.
394, fol. 109r (4 August 1609).
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cities. The Capitulations also urged the Venetians and other European to register such
agreements in Ottoman courts.
In the case of Muslim merchants alone, kadı courts from Istanbul or elsewhere
also produced documents to be used for identifying legal representatives in the Venetian
chancellery. In the years understudy, these documents (5 cases) are mentioned—but not
notarized in the protocols—in grants of power of attorney registered by Muslim
merchants who applied to the court on behalf of other individuals. For instance, in
December 1612, Mahmud bin Elias from Beypazarı in Anatolia, the brother of the late
Hacı Üveys, appointed the merchant Francesco Barbieri, in Venice, to recover the profits
of a load of camlet that his brother had sent him. Mahmud presented a legal certificate
(hüccet) issued by the kazasker of Rumeli to demonstrate that he was the only heir of his
late brother. This legal certificate is only mentioned in the document of the power of
attorney. 45
However, apart from the small group of business dealings and agreements
recorded in the kadı court of Galata and the identification papers produced by other kadıs,
merchants who were active in Venetian/Ottoman trade turned mostly to the Venetian
chancellery for notarial services. There, they registered a variety of documents, mostly
grants of power of attorney, debt cognizance and quittances, and notarized complaints
against both debtors, such as with protests of bills of exchange, and commercial partners
who had not fulfilled clauses of agreements. The chancellery’s secretary drafted

BAC 277, reg. 398, 27v (19 December 1612). I did not find the documents mentioned in this document
of power of attorney in the archives of the kazasker of Rumeli. BAC 347 contains an entire folder (called
scritture dei turchi) full of notarized Ottoman court documents from Anatolian kadı courts which were used
to identify heirs or legal representatives of Muslim individuals for the years 1627-1629.
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commercial papers to be employed for commercial ventures and legal actions in Venice
and legal and economic documents to be used as legal evidence to begin processes of
debt recovery and contract enforcement in the Venetian chancellery. This practice shows
how much the adjudicative and notarial functions of this institution were intertwined.
Venetian and Ottoman merchants sought the notarial services of the Venetian
chancellery even though, like in the case of lawsuits, they were generally costlier than
those offered by Ottoman courts and the fact that the documents produced by this
institution were not accepted in Ottoman courts. In the records of the period under study,
there is no instance of Venetian subjects bringing these documents to kadı courts or to the
Imperial Council during a lawsuit against Ottoman subjects. In Chapter 7, we saw that the
Imperial Council instructed local kadıs in Istanbul and in other Ottoman cities to consider
documents produced by other kadıs (hüccet) or uncertified private documents (temessük)
of Venetian and Ottoman merchants in order to assess private claims. However, there is
no evidence that such private documents came from the Venetian chancellery. According
to established consensus among scholars of Islamic legal systems, documents produced
by non-Muslim courts were not accepted by Muslim legal institutions during procedures
of litigation since they did not constitute admissible legal evidence. 46
In spite of the costs, their uselessness in Ottoman tribunals, and the fact that the
Capitulations urged Venetians to register their business dealings with Ottoman subjects
(and vice versa) in kadı courts, Venetian and Ottoman merchants and other subjects chose
to register legal acts and business transactions first and foremost in the Venetian

For instance, see Maurits Van den Boogert. The Capitulations and the Ottoman Legal System: Qadis,
Consuls and Beratlıs in the 18th Century (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 45.
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chancellery: 1,702 notarial deeds, of which 582 were implemented by Ottoman subjects.
They did so because they could employ the notarial documents of this institution during
commercial undertakings with Venetian territories or as legal evidence in Venetian courts
in Istanbul, Venice, and elsewhere. The vast majority of these notarial deeds regarded
commercial transactions taking place between Istanbul and Venetian territories, mostly
with the city of Venice and, secondly, with Venetian Crete. Only in Venetian legal
institutions are we certain that they constituted legal evidence. As we saw in Chapter 4,
Venetian and Ottoman merchants obtained documents, such as notarized grants of power
of attorney, to use them in Venetian courts to recover debts or to appeal sentences issued
by the baili. Again, as it was the case with legal suits, Ottoman Jews constituted the
Ottoman religious and ethnic group who most employed the notarial services of the
Venetian chancellery: they appeared in 341 out of 582 notarial deeds performed by
Ottoman subjects.
The Venetian chancellery operated as the main institution for certifying property
rights within the professional community trading between Venetian and Ottoman
territories. Venetian public notaries had been operating in Istanbul since the Byzantine
period (from the twelfth century onwards) while in the early modern period the
secretaries of the Venetian embassies took over their function. Therefore, Venetian
secretaries represented an old-established Venetian notarial culture in the Ottoman
capital. While until the sixteenth century mostly Venetian merchants benefitted from the
services of the notary of their community, in the period under study numerous nonVenetians, mostly Ottoman Jews and Muslims but also several Western Europeans,
employed these services. The Venetian chancellery provided its users with a set of
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practices that belonged to a shared notarial culture in the centuries-long Venetian
commercial system and in Venetian territories from the Levant to the city of Venice.
Despite a degree of commensurability between the Venetian notarial system and the legal
cultures of Mediterranean European countries, my research shows that the documents
produced by the Venetian chancellery in Istanbul circulated only minimally in nonVenetian territories.
4—Conclusion
The pluralist legal regime of early modern Istanbul offered to merchants trading
between Istanbul and Venetian territories a multitude of public institutions for solving
commercial disputes and registering business dealings. Their choice among these
institutions was contingent on number of factors, such as communal rules, customary
practices, costs of appeals, enforcement powers, and the legal and economic services
provided by each of them. Furthermore, the freedom of choice changed among different
religious and political communities, at least in judicial matters. The regulations of the
Venetian community in Istanbul permitted Venetian subjects to use Ottoman courts
exclusively in case of dispute with Ottoman subjects. In the Ottoman case, religious and
communal norms prevented Jews, Orthodox Greeks, and Muslims to appeal to legal
institution outside their communal ones, at least for intra-group controversies. However,
as the evidence presented in this and in the previous chapters demonstrates, Ottoman
merchants, mostly Ottoman Jews and Christians, made substantial use of the Venetian
chancellery to solve commercial controversies and register business dealings: 108 (25%)
out of 434 disputes, and 582 (35%) out of 1,702 notarial deeds. The use of the Venetian
chancellery by Ottoman subjects, mostly non-Muslims, was the most common practice of
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forum-shopping in the professional community trading between Istanbul and Venice in
the seventeenth century.
As I argued in this chapter, even though forum-shopping between Ottoman and
Venetian courts took place without arousing protests from Ottoman legal officials, it was
constrained by legal norms, communal rules, and, more important, by the specialization
of each court in distinct legal and economic services. Venetian and Ottoman subjects
appealed in first instance to specific forums and for distinct services and only
exceptionally turned to both Ottoman and Venetian institutions to solve the same
controversy or to register the same commercial deed. In judicial matters, these distinct
services included the commercial arbitration offered by the Venetian consular court, the
resolution criminal cases, the enforcement of business contracts and of norms of
international agreement in case of Ottoman courts (above all the Imperial Council). In
notarial practices, we saw that the Venetian chancellery was the principal institution for
registering business dealings and legal acts concerning trade undertakings between
Ottoman-Venetian territories, while Ottoman kadı courts only registered the business
transactions of Ottoman and Venetian merchants for trade ventures unrelated to this flow
of trade. Overall, the choice of Ottoman and Venetian merchants for specific legal and
notarial institutions arose from the long-time practices in the administration of justice and
in the certification of property within the mercantile community trading between the
Levant and Venice. Such choice of forums thus followed long-time commercial and legal
customs that had developed following the development of European trade with the
eastern Mediterranean in the late medieval period.
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Conclusions
The Venetians in early modern Istanbul were both insiders and outsiders in the
socioeconomic life of the Ottoman capital. On the one hand, they interacted daily with
Ottoman subjects belonging to different religious groups in the marketplaces and in other
social contexts, such as dwelling and worship spaces in Galata— this was the case, at
least, for Catholic individuals. On the other hand, they remained largely separated from
most of the population in terms of the normative systems regulating their communal
affairs, membership in a political community, religion affiliation, and because of
linguistic barriers. Venetians and Ottoman Jews, Christians, and Muslims engaged in
commercial undertakings in a corporatist society of unequal and separate groups, and
they perceived themselves as distinct communities, an historical experience that
Francesca Trivellato terms “communitarian cosmopolitanism.” 1
The administration of justice and the public certification of property rights for
Venetian subjects capture this separation/inclusion that characterized the experience of
foreign merchant communities in the early modern Mediterranean. The intensity of
commercial exchanges and diplomatic encounters in the eastern Mediterranean since the
late medieval period had enhanced mutual knowledge of different commercial practices
and legal norms but it had not created a common legal framework for long-distance
merchants. Similarly, an informal or hybrid “middle ground” 2 that would offer the
possibility to act outside formal regulations did not exist. To the contrary, the Venetian

The Familiarity of Strangers: The Sephardic Diaspora, Livorno, and Cross-Cultural Trade in the Early
Modern Period (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 18.
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and Ottoman normative systems remained distinct in matters of court procedures, legal
evidence, and norms concerning trade and navigation, even though there existed some
analogous commercial and legal customs among them. 3 Consequently, merchants in
Istanbul who engaged in Venetian/Ottoman trade had to navigate a multitude of
legislations, courts, and notarial offices.
Even though it did not create a common legal framework, the intensity of
commercial and diplomatic contacts generated routines in the use of legal institutions by
long-distance merchants. Such routines were dependent on communal rules, legal norms,
reputational and monetary concerns, different legal and notarial services that were unique
to each institution, and on the commercial and political contexts of seventeenth-century
Istanbul. For merchants trading between Istanbul and Venetian territories, these routines
included appeals to the Venetian embassy for commercial arbitration and notarial
services, as well as to Ottoman courts for a few specific types of notarial deeds, criminal
matters, the enforcement of business contracts, and the regulation of trade affairs as a
whole. These routines relied on a widespread knowledge of local and foreign legal rules
and institutions among merchants trading between Ottoman and Venetian territories.
Such knowledge, as well as customary commercial practices, allowed Venetian and
Ottoman merchants to turn to different legal institutions for specific reasons. Overall,
Venetian and Ottoman courts jointly supported an interimperial framework of norms and
practices that allowed Venetian and Ottoman merchants to cooperate in business

For instance, as we saw in Chapters 3, Ottoman and Venetian legislations on shipwrecks and jettison
include similar legal principles, such as the general average, while, as shown in Chapter 8, the Venetian
chancellery accepted Ottoman court records as means to verify agency relations among Muslim merchants.

3

407

undertakings and to solve disputes as a matter of routine, despite the absence of a system
of international law in the early modern Mediterranean.
I have uncovered routines in the use of courts thanks to both a legal pluralist
perspective of the study of Venetian and Ottoman legal institutions and a combination of
quantitative and qualitative analyses of court records. Such an approach has enabled me
to uncover hitherto unknown patterns in the use of courts by businessmen belonging to
different religious and political communities, and the overall contribution of each court to
trade regulation. One of the most important findings of my research is that Venetian and
Ottoman merchants sought mainly notarial services in both Venetian and Ottoman courts.
They appealed to these institutions primarily to publicly register business dealings,
contracts, and legal acts, in order to preserve the memory of past transactions or to use
them in case a controversy might arise. Even when they began procedures of debt
recovering or contract enforcement, Venetian and Ottoman merchants often aimed to
publicly certify property rights rather than obtain a sentence against other businessmen.
This finding contrasts with the traditional emphasis of scholars on adjudication and
contract enforcement as the main contribution of legal institutions to the regulation and
promotion of international trade in Western Europe and the Islamic world before the
nineteenth century.
My study also challenges essentialist accounts of Ottoman and European courts as
“traditional” and “unsympathetic” to long-distance trade and “modern” and
“economically efficient,” respectively. Rather than focusing exclusively on Islamic legal
norms and judicial procedures, I have illustrated the entire array of legal and economic
services provided by Ottoman Muslim courts to long-distance merchants. Despite their
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overall minor role in regulating Ottoman/Venetian trade, Ottoman kadı were the main
forum for the resolution of criminal affairs involving Venetian subjects and the only
notarial office for the registration of commercial contracts between Ottoman and
Venetian merchants for trade ventures taking place either within the Ottoman Empire or
with non-Venetian territories. In contrast to kadı courts, the Imperial Council played a
central role in regulating and protecting Venetian/Ottoman trade by punishing rapacious
Ottoman officials, bandits, and pirates, by introducing new trade-related regulations, by
enforcing business contracts, and by intervening in the resolution of private disputes
between Ottoman and Venetian subjects in favor of Venetian side. The important
contribution of this institution to the promotion of international trade is little considered
in studies of trade and institutions in the Ottoman Empire, which deal exclusively with
kadı courts and Hanafi legal norms on commerce and dispute resolution. As I have
shown, the emphasis on upholding international treaties, which belonged to sultanic
legislation (kanun), and the resulting political nature of the resolution of commercial
conflicts in this institution explain the greater role of the Imperial Council in Venetian
affairs in the Ottoman Empire.
This reassessment of the role of Ottoman Islamic courts in regulating international
trade notwithstanding, my research clearly shows that the Venetian chancellery was the
most important institution used by Venetian and Ottoman merchants trading between
Istanbul and Venetian territories. Despite its little enforcement powers in Istanbul, many
Venetian and Ottoman merchants, including a large number of Jews and also a few
Muslims, appealed to this court to solve commercial lawsuits because of its fast and
equity-based procedure which aimed foremost to repair business ties among litigants.
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Such a procedure—titled either “summary” or “mercantile”—had been applied in
merchant courts in Western Europe and in the consular courts of Venetian and other
Italian mercantile communities in Istanbul since the late medieval period. At the same
time, the Venetian chancellery operated as the main notarial office for merchants engaged
in Venetian/Ottoman trade by certifying numerous types of legal acts and commercial
deeds, which were accepted as legal evidence in Venetian courts in the metropole and
elsewhere.
Nevertheless, the Venetian chancellery was not an “open-access” institution
providing legal and notarial services to any individual, irrespective of geographical
provenance, social status, profession, and religious affiliation. The lawsuits handled by
this court were exclusively commercial affairs arising from trade ventures between
Venetian and Ottoman territories while the documents its issued circulated mostly within
Venetian territories and the Venetian commercial system as a whole. Furthermore, its
substantial fees, its elements of collective justice (such as orders of sequestration against
third parties), and the special procedure it offered to high-ranking Ottoman individuals
demonstrate that this institution was not the embodiment of modern impersonal justice
which many economic historians see in the European chancelleries in the Ottoman
Empire. On the contrary, my study demonstrates the importance of analyzing, all
together, local commercial and legal norms and customs, the economic context, and
interstate relations, in which these consular chancelleries operated.
The importance of the local context brings us to the political economy of empires,
another central theme of this dissertation. Like today, in the early modern period justice
for merchants was nowhere independent from local configurations of power, regional or
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global commercial developments, and political relations among empires and other
polities. The political economy of the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Venice
affected the workings of courts in matters of the jurisdiction of specific courts,
procedures of dispute settlement, and access to specific tribunals and notarial offices for
merchants belonging to different political and religious communities. In the Venetian
case, the Republic’s efforts to preserve its ascendancy in trade between the Levant and
Western Europe and to maintain peaceful relations with the Ottoman Empire explains
why the Venetian chancellery offered its legal and notarial services to large numbers of
Ottoman subjects who were competitors of Venetian subjects. Furthermore, these
political and commercial issues played a role in the specific legal procedures chosen by
the baili to settle disputes involving preeminent Ottoman merchants, and in their
intervention in the workings of Ottoman courts in cases of disputes that were potentially
detrimental to Venetian trade as a whole. On the Ottoman side, the willingness of
Ottoman officials to encourage foreign trade within the sultan’s realm and to preserve
peace with Venice in the early seventeenth century accounts for the Imperial Council’s
rulings in favor of Venetian commercial interests in matters of protection of merchants.
Such policy is particularly telling in the case of trade-related private disputes between
Venetian and Ottoman merchants in which Ottoman officials privileged the upholding of
international agreements over the strict application of Hanafi Islamic norms concerning
legal procedures in Ottoman courts.
Overall, by focusing on legal pluralism, institutional analysis, and political
economy of empires, this dissertation has offered a different account of the practice of
dispute settlement and the certification of property rights in a major commercial hub in
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the early modern Mediterranean. It has revealed the close interrelations between different
legal cultures, the socioeconomic contexts, and the use of legal institutions by
businessmen belonging to different religious and political communities. More
importantly, it has demonstrated that, rather than being incompatible institutions,
Venetian and Ottoman courts and notarial offices jointly regulated and promoted trade
development in the early modern eastern Mediterranean. What is more, it has shown their
common practices that Venetian and Ottoman merchants to collaborate in business
undertaking and solve controversies on a day-to-day basis.
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Appendix I
My quantitative analysis of court records relies on a relational database based on a
Structured Query Language (SQL). I built this database with the help of Yale Digital
Humanities Lab. 1The database organizes the social and economic information contained
in my primary sources into a relational model of data that shows the multiplex
relationships among courts users and between, on the one hand, religious and political
affiliation and, on the other hand, the types of legal acts and notarial transactions
performed in courts. I built this database relying on the records of the Venetian
chancellery, the kadı courts of Galata, the court of the kazasker of Rumeli, and those of
the Imperial Council concerning the Venetian community in Istanbul.
I organized the database into four tables. In the first table, named “disputes,” I
have inserted all the legal suits and notarial transactions litigated or carried out in the
Venetian and Ottoman courts in the period of my study. 2 Each entry in the table has its
own number of identifications. In listing the disputes, I have chosen a name for each of
them (etic classification) that corresponds to the actual matter of contention. For example,
“spoilt merchandise” refers to those cases involving individuals litigating over an
allegedly damaged merchandise. Furthermore, for each lawsuit, I have shown the name
1
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Trip Kirkpatrick from the Yale Library for all the time he
spent with me in building this database and in helping me to understand the great potential of relational
databases for organizing and analyzing historical sources.

I excluded from my database those court documents that, as described in Chapter 3, I define as “public
acts.” They refer to those actions carried out by the bailo as the representative of the Venetian government.
Some examples are the appointment of a public dragoman for the Venetian embassy and the issuance of a
safe-conduct to allow individuals to go to Venetian or non-Venetian territories. I apply this analytical
category also to those documents issued by the Imperial Council about general instructions on Venetian
trade, such as in matters of taxation and court procedures. They are not related to private disputes and,
therefore, I did not insert them into my database either.
2

413

of the winner and the loser. In the case of notarial transactions and publics acts, I have
written only the nature of the transaction. In the second table, called “names,” I have
listed all the individuals recorded in my documents (both those personally appearing at
court and those mentioned in the legal acts) and the key elements of their identity.
Among the latter, I showed their personal titles, their names as they appear in the
document’s script, their religious affiliations in both the etic and emic categories, their
place of origin and residence, occupation, and gender. I excluded political identity in the
case of the documents of the Venetian chancellery since it appears in only 4 cases out of
1,777 courts users. Every individual has his/her own number of identification.
In the third table, named “subdisputes,” I inserted all the phases of the lawsuits
litigated in the Venetian chancellery. For Ottoman courts there is a single record for each
lawsuit, so I inserted a single entry for each of these cases. In the Venetian chancellery,
different entries in my records show a particular phase in the litigation process of a single
lawsuit, such as the submission of a grievance, the testimony of witnesses or the
presentation of written proofs, the appointment of a guarantor, the bailo’s final sentence,
and the possible following appeal to the latter. These different phases provide us with a
quite detailed and lively picture of the entire process of litigation and the legal procedure
followed by the court. However, in some instances, court officials recorded only a
particular phase of a legal case, or the final sentence is missing. Therefore, it is not
possible to follow the unfolding of a lawsuit in its entirety. I listed all the different phases
of a single dispute including the date, and the emic and etic classification of the legal acts
carried out in them, and linked them to the corresponding dispute in the “disputes” table.
Each entry in “subdisputes” has its own number of identification.
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Lastly, in the fourth table, called “subdisputes-names,” I connected all the
information contained in the previous three tables and showed the specific roles played
by each individual in all phases of a dispute and in notarial transactions. The same
individual could have played similar or different roles in several lawsuits or notarial
transactions. For instance, an individual could have been the plaintiff in a trade-related
dispute, stood surety or acted as proxy for someone else in another, and, in a notarial act,
he or she could have notarized a business agreement. This fourth table illustrates those
individuals who were most required by others as business partners, witnesses, proxies
and/or were most active themselves. Furthermore, it shows the manifold types as well as
the frequency of the social relations that bound together all the members of the
community of merchants trading between Istanbul and Venetian territories. Examples of
social relations can be traced from powers of attorney, commission contracts, and surety.
However, we should keep in mind that the legal and economic transactions carried out in
the bailo’s court, and the social and business relations that they show, constitute only one
site of interaction within the large Ottoman and Venetian mercantile community in
Istanbul. Court officials registered only those legal and economic transactions that they,
or the individuals who turned to the court, deemed imported to be recorded.
Consequently, we cannot have a complete picture of the intense social and economic
relations among the individuals in these trade networks. For instance, family ties or
acquaintances made in the marketplace, which may have played an important role in
trade ventures, escape our knowledge as well as some legal and economic transactions.
Furthermore, some disputes might have been settled outside the court between the
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interested parties, and some business agreements, such as commercial partnerships, might
have not been notarized.
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